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Climate change has become a critical 21st global problem, and with it, more threats to planetary 
existence are increasing. Notwithstanding the seriousness of the climate problem, politicians and 
policymakers in South Africa and globally have identified climate change as a problem but 
prescribe solutions that extend either the interests of the fossil fuel industry under the guise of 
technological development (clean coal and carbon sequestration) or Promethean neoliberal 
solutions benchmarked on renewable energy and carbon trading. Both solutions prioritise 
neoliberal interests and fall short of averting a more severe biospheric and planetary catastrophe. 
The news media, generally long thought of as the societal ‘watchdog,’ have also acceded to the 
injunctions of profit and accumulation, and construct climate change and solutions to it within 
paradigms that promote capitalist self-mutation. Through theoretical sampling, this discourse 
analysis study selected four weekly newspapers from South Africa, namely, the Mail & Guardian, 
the Sunday Independent, the Sunday Times, and the City Press, and examined how they represented 
climate change discourses. The media selected for this study were instrumental and had sheer 
capacity to define and determine the frames and representations within which climate change is 
articulated and understood in South Africa and outside. At a grand theoretical level, the thesis 
incorporated the metabolic rift/ecological rift theories (Clark and York, 2005; Foster et al., 2010) 
as grand paradigms for theorising climate change. Articulation (Laclau, 1977; Hall et al., 1978, 
1980, 1985; Grossberg, 1992, 1996; Slack, 1996, 2008, 2016) and discourse analysis (Fowler et 
al., 1978, Hall et al., 1978, Hall, 1985, 1986, Hall and O’Shea, 2013, Fairclough, 1989, 1992, 
1995; van Dijk, 1983, 1985, 1988, 2008; Foucault, 1971) were used at both theoretical and 
methodological levels and were useful in deconstructing ideologies in the news, the role of 
language, the sponsors of such discourses and the power they hold in society. The thesis, through 
discourse analysis, together with articulation, the metabolic rift theories, and ecological rift 
theories, examined 290 stories selected from the four newspapers for emergent themes that came 
from the chosen news stories. The key themes related to a) news media constructions of climate 
change impacts, b) news media representations of climate change politics, internationalisation and 
multilateral processes, c) news media representations of South African energy futures, d) news 
media representations of South African responses, especially carbon tax policies, e) news media 
reproduction of the green economy Promethean discourse and f) news media representations of 




policy and discourse arenas as they played out in the news media. Firstly, climate change 
discourses in South Africa were intimately linked to energy discourses because the country was 
an energy-intensive economy, where coal represents the lifeblood of the entire economy. Climate 
change mitigation required that countries divest from coal and reduce emissions by all possible 
means. Essentially, future energy plans (energy futures) determined how South Africa would 
manage to reduce its emissions. The second observation was that as the country sought to move 
away from coal, at least ideally, there had been optimism in technological and renewable energy 
interventions. The techno-renewable energy optimism had become so naturalised, at least at 
discourse and not implementation level, with hopes that this would lead to a more ‘successful’ 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction to thesis  
Climate change has become one of the critical threats to planetary and human existence. Climate 
change, itself a risk of modernity, engineered by unending exploitation, has and will continue to 
have disastrous impacts on life on Earth. This age of climate change(s) has been rightly labelled 
the Anthropocene, an epoch where humans have become an essential geological force, altering the 
metabolic balance that existed between the Earth and its inhabitants. The Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change1 (IPCC) in 20192, has predicted more severe impacts than had been reported 
before. A 2019 Pew Research Center3 survey noted that “people around the world agree that 
climate change poses a severe risk to their countries”. The observation from the Pew Research 
Center is also supported by the Global Risk Perception Survey (GRPS) conducted by the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) which found that climate change risks “accounted for three of the top 
five risks likelihood and four by impact” (WEF 2019, p.6). In the GRPS report, “extreme weather 
was the risk of greatest concern” triggering fears about “environmental policy failure” in the 
context of inaction post-Paris COP21 (WEF 2019, p.6). The United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), in its sixth Global Environment Outlook (GEO) report of 2019 saw 
“Providing a decent life and well-being for nearly 10 billion people by 2050, without further 
compromising the ecological limits of our planet and its benefits” as “one of the serious challenges 
and responsibilities humanity has ever faced” (UNEP 2019, p.04). The above brief synopsis of 
climate change is meant to show that climate change is a serious challenge that must be addressed. 
It is in the context of discourses to address the climate change problems that this study situates 




1 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) a United Nations body mandated with “assessing the 
science related to climate change. It was established by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1988 to provide policymakers with regular scientific assessments 
concerning climate change, its implications and potential future risks, and to put forward adaptation and mitigation 








itself, especially as these discourses play out in the mainstream news media in South Africa. The 
achievement of the objectives set by UNEP depends on the discourses that have salience and 
superiority in the news, policy, economic and political discourses. The discourses that become 
powerful will shape and direct how the world will respond to climate change. 
 
The tasks set out by UNEP are noble but difficult to achieve in the context of runaway climate 
change fuelled by the continued exploitation of fossil fuels and the never-ending consumerist 
culture. This study argues that the policy choices taken in South Africa and globally to address the 
climate crisis are either inadequate or incapable of preventing more climate change-induced 
catastrophes. The news media, with their ideal role as sources of public information and platforms 
for debate and engagement, are central to how the climate change crisis is addressed. This study 
concluded that the news media in South Africa, through their representation of climate change 
discourses, have reproduced solutions to climate change that essentially reproduced either the 
continued exploitation of fossil fuels or the transition to a ‘green economy’ anchored on 
technological optimism in renewable energy. The latter, the study contends, is inadequate as it 
replicates the very political-economic system of capitalism responsible for climate risks. As a way 
of argument, the study points towards solutions that put climate justice, social justice and economic 
justice at the centre of any solutions to climate change. Such approaches, it is argued here, can 
restructure the political-economic base and lead to ‘true’ sustainability that is collective and equal. 
 
1.2 Global Climate Change: Defining the Problem 
In 2013, the IPCC released its Fifth Assessment Report indicating that climate change was human-
induced and that the impacts could worsen further if no immediate actions to control greenhouse 
gas emissions were adopted. In a summary for policymakers in the Fifth Assessment Report, IPCC 
(2013, p.v) showed that there was scientific consensus (95 per cent) “that human activity is the 
dominant cause of observed warming since the mid-20th century”. The report showed that global 
warming was ‘unequivocal’, stating further that the “atmosphere and the ocean have warmed, the 
amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse 
gases have increased” (IPCC 2013, p.4). The report showed that the increased warming of the 
atmosphere and the oceans was a result of increased emissions and atmospheric concentration of 




(N2O) “due to human activity” since 1750 (IPCC 2013, p.11). IPCC (2013, p.11) estimated that 
between 1951 and 2010, greenhouse gases increased the “global mean surface warming” in the 
range of 0.5oC to 1.3oC” (IPCC 2013, p.17). Noting that the emission of GHGs was already 
unprecedented, the IPCC warned that further emissions would “cause further warming and changes 
in all components of the climate system” (IPCC 2013, p.19). As a corrective measure, the report 
called for “sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions” as a way of “[L]imiting climate 
change” (IPCC 2013, p.19). This call by the IPCC echoed sentiments expressed in 2004 by Farhana 
Yamin and Joanna Depledge, who stressed that climate change needed “continued urgent 
attention” (2004, p.xxi). This urgent action was to be based on “a broad understanding of its 
[climate change] social, economic, developmental, scientific, political and environmental aspects” 
(Yamin & Depledge 2004, p.xxi). Climate change impacts “will affect the environmental, social 
and vital economic interests of all states and have profound consequences for virtually every aspect 
of human society” (Yamin & Depledge 2004, p.1). 
 
Why is all this important to this study? The brief overview of the climate system shows that there 
is a consensus that climate change is a result of greenhouse gas emissions, and there is agreement 
that countries should reduce their greenhouse gas emissions if the world is to limit the impacts of 
climate change. South Africa’s global climate change profile is vital to consider in arguing why 
the country should drastically reduce its emission levels. First, the country’s economy is energy-
intensive, with coal accounting for over 70 per cent of total energy emissions (Nhamo 2011; 
Department of Environmental Affairs 2017; Hallding et al. 2011, 2013). Secondly, because of the 
energy-intensive economy, South Africa contributes 1.65 percent towards total global greenhouse 
gas emissions (Friedrich et al. 2017), coupled with the highest per capita emissions in the world 
and contributing over 40 percent of total African emissions (Human Development Index 2010; 








1.3 Climate Change in South Africa: Severity of the problem 
Climate change impacts are wide-ranging. Every part of the world has been affected or has 
witnessed the impacts and implications of climate change. Africa has been the most affected region 
due to the lack of adaptation capacity and financial constraints. The impacts of climate change 
include reduced precipitation in most areas and increased rain intensity in some regions leading to 
drought and famine respectively (IPCC 2013; DEA 2017). All these impacts combined may hurt 
food security systems not only in South Africa but globally. Higher temperatures are predicted to 
continue (IPCC 2013; DEA 2017). The Department of Environmental Affairs (2017), in the Third 
National Climate Change Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), reported that South Africa has witnessed an above-average warming 
from 1931 to 2015 where “most of the country has experienced warming of an estimated 
2oC/century or even higher” almost twice surpassing the average global warming in the regions of 
0.85oC/century (IPCC 2013). This sustained warming is linked to the increase in the “annual 
number of hot days” and “decreases in the annual number of cold nights over most of the country” 
(DEA 2017, p.ix). Global warming is predicted to worsen, and the future does not look good for 
South Africa.  The DEA (2017) warned of a drastic increase in temperature in South Africa if there 
is low or no mitigation.  It noted that for “the far-future period of 2080-2099, temperature increases 
of more than 4oC are likely, over the entire South African interior, with increases of more than 6oC 
plausible over large parts of the western, central and northern parts” (DEA 2017, p.ix-x). As the 
temperature increases, “increases in heat-wave days and hot days, with potentially devastating 
impacts on agriculture, water security, biodiversity and human health,” are anticipated (DEA 2017, 
p.x).  
The DEA concurred with recommendations of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report that a better 
“mitigation pathway can still significantly decrease the amplitude of this warming” (2017, p.x). 
Climate change has brought severe risks to the South African agricultural system. The DEA (2017, 
p.xiv) opined that the sector “is impacted directly by changes in precipitation, temperature, and 
evaporation”. Agriculture-related climate change-induced risks in South Africa “include 
increasing temperatures and more variable precipitation that are likely to have significant impacts 
on a wide variety of crops and forestry production” (DEA 2017, p.xiv). These conditions are 




due to increased temperatures” (DEA 2017, p.xiv). The impacts on agriculture are not limited to 
crops but extend to the livestock sector that is projected to continue suffering “under oppressive 
temperatures” (DEA 2017, p.xiv).                                                                                                                                             
The DEA (2017, p.xiv) noted that climate change impacts expose the country to health problems. 
Climate change is projected to have adverse impacts on human settlements. These impacts are 
linked to aspects of town and urban planning that expose some communities to adverse impacts. 
Communities with a “deficit in infrastructure and provision of services have increased 
vulnerability to climate change” (DEA 2017, p.xvi). The adverse impacts are worse in 
communities that do not have the necessary infrastructure and services in place as it will become 
difficult for the South African government to provide such services in an environment that is not 
conducive for human habitat as the environment is continuously exposed to climate change threats. 
The government, through the Department of Environmental Affairs, has blamed increased 
exposure to climate change risks for informal settlements and other vulnerable locations to what 
the government called the ‘apartheid legacy’ and also  “spatial variabilities, planned and unplanned 
growth and dispersion patterns, topography and numerous socioeconomic factors, human 
settlements will be exposed to climate change threats” (DEA 2017, p.xv).  DEA (2017) stated that 
informal settlements and their populations are the most vulnerable to climate-related hazards, yet 
they have the lowest capacity not only to cope but also to mitigate such disasters. South Africa, as 
a developing nation, has a large part of its population living in informal settlements (mainly in 
mining and agricultural places) both in urban and rural areas. 
It is essential for the media in South Africa when reporting on climate justice internally, to talk 
about the existing intra-national inequalities concerning climate change vulnerabilities as they 
compare to inequalities in responsibility. The media should interrogate how the government, 
through mitigation policies, either reduce or promote risks to vulnerable human settlements and 
societies. The media need to discuss the dualised nature of the country’s social and economic 
systems – highlighting how continued emissions are currently and will continue to impact societies 
differently based on inherent inequalities. The discussion should be a moral call for reduced 
dependence on fossil fuels in South Africa. It is the role of the media to represent, as a fourth 
estate, how the climate change policy and implementation discourses shape out and if the policy 




global warming and the consequent impacts that are dire for the country and the world. This study 
makes a strong contention that South Africa has a global and moral obligation to reduce emissions 
and help lead the world towards a cooler and safer atmosphere. However, this study also contends 
that whatever action is taken is mediated within and by South Africa’s self-positioning in related 
discourses around economics, politics, and power.  
1.4 The Media and Climate Change Re/presentation 
With the development of climate change coverage in the mainstream media, the debates and 
contestations on the subject have also increased and the mass media have become “a critical arena 
for this debate, and an important source of climate change information for the public” as what the 
media writes “influences public perceptions and thence policy” (Doulton & Brown 2009, p.191). 
In journalism and media studies, the media are perceived as the ‘fourth estate’ with the 
responsibility of holding public officials and the private sector accountable to the public. Jurgen 
Habermas (1989) argued that ideally, the mainstream news media should act as a ‘public sphere’ 
with the role of providing the public with information, giving equal access to the platform to enable 
debates, and providing crucial opportunities for participation to different groups in social, political, 
and economic processes that affect their lives and enabling them to reach informed decisions 
(Louw 2010). Anabela Carvalho and Jacqueline Burgess (2005, p.1458) argued that the news 
media “play a central role in the social construction of risk. Different social actors (scientists, 
politicians, policymakers, businesses, pressure groups, and media professionals) are locked in 
discursive competition around how climate change risk is to be framed in the media”. 
 
Pertinent to this study is how the news media in South Africa have accomplished these envisaged 
roles, whether or not they have afforded equal participatory opportunities to different people in 
relation to the debates on climate change. Mark Stoddart and David Tindall (2015, p.402) rightly 
pointed that the media offer “publicly visible sites for conflict” in relation to climate change 
governance, hence, those who want to appropriate, build and influence climate governance 
narratives use the media “to communicate to various audiences and engage each other in public 
debate; these social groups use media access to engage in the ‘cultural politics of climate change’” 
attempting to shape public understanding and influence decision-making. The news media are seen 




sources […] circulate representations of climate-change impacts and solutions and define for 
audiences who can ‘authoritatively speak for climate’” (Stoddart & Tindall 2015, p.402). This 
thesis sought to map how different groups defined climate change for the South African public and 
ascertain which groups were given more mediated visibility. 
 
The news media are important in the climate change discourse as they provide “public 
information,” set the agenda on issues to be discussed, how they are discussed, build, and maintain 
public perceptions on the subject (Carvalho 2010, p.1). Similarly, Maxwell Boykoff (2008) saw 
the media holding power to shape and influence “discourses and imaginaries circulating in cultural 
and political, [and economic] contexts” (p.550). In the same understanding, this study contends 
that the mainstream news media in South Africa are central to the climate change discourse. By 
providing ‘public information’ and setting the agenda on issues to be discussed and how they are 
discussed, the media become influential builders of understanding of climate change issues in 
South Africa and have the potential to influence policy and decision-making. Maxwell Boykoff 
and Tom Yulsman (2013, p.2) saw the media as strategic in the climate change discourse, pointing 
to the media’s access to the climate change scientific, social, economic, and political discourses. 
To this end, the media were better placed to communicate climate change compared to scientists 
as most people have no “direct access to peer-reviewed research that informs our understanding of 
climate change and rather that citizens more often rely on the mass media to gain access to news 
and information about climate change” (Boykoff & Yulsman 2013, p.2). 
  
Carvalho (2010) stressed the centrality of the news media in building public perceptions on climate 
and promoting public action on the issue. How the media provides access to different discourse 
actors to define the climate change problem determines how the issue is appropriated by the 
audiences (Carvalho 2010). Carvalho’s views conform with Alison Anderson’s (2009, p.166) 
argument that through mediating the “scientific, economic, social and political dimensions” of 
climate change and “giving voice to some viewpoints while suppressing others,” the media 
legitimise “certain truth claims as reasonable and credible”. As such, there is a need for inclusivity 
of divergent interests (economic, social and political) in the coverage and representation of climate 





1.5 Available Research and its Limitations 
Tanja Bosch (2012, p.44) observed that much research on media coverage of climate change is 
“located in the North”. Bosch (2012) observed that while  “the body of literature exploring links 
between the media and climate change grows,” there remained “a glaring absence of studies about 
and from the global South” (p.44) and called for “research on this topic from and on the global 
South” (p.47). Mike Shanahan (2009, p.145) noted that while studies have been done on climate 
change coverage in the global North, “less well understood is how journalists are covering this 
story in the rest of the world, both in rapidly industrialising economies with high greenhouse gas 
emissions and in the poorer settings that are largely vulnerable to climate change”. Drawing from 
the above observations, this study attempts to research media coverage of climate change in the 
global South and from the global South by examining climate change representations and 
constructions in the South African mainstream media through discourse analysis. While few 
studies on climate change and the media have been done in South Africa, “there have been few or 
no academic studies on climate change and the media in the rest of the global South” (Bosch 2012, 
p.47). Most importantly, studies on “content analyses…more detailed newsroom engagement and 
qualitative research (which might include interviews with journalists and news sources), the role 
of global news agencies or international comparative work, which help researchers analyse broader 
socio-political issues in the reporting of environmental affairs” are some of the grey areas (Bosch 
2012, p.47).  
 
Taking a cue from the West, the media are essential in climate change communication. Evelyn 
Tagbo (2010, p.6) saw the role of the media as central in “disseminating information to effectively 
guide public debate and understanding about weather and climate change”. Studies on climate 
change in Africa and South Africa (Tagbo 2010; Cramer 2008) mostly saw the media’s role as 
more important with regards to promoting adaptation. This frame of understanding has been 
pinned on the argument that the developing countries are still developing, confronted with high 
poverty levels and contribute the least to greenhouse gas emissions. The representations of climate 
change from the South African media influence public understanding and can contribute towards 
the need for mitigation dialogue. The need for a stronger emphasis on mitigation stems from the 




On the one hand, the country is developed with high emissions, and on the other, the country is 
still poor and with more people being more vulnerable to climate change than others. This dual 
nature of the South African system and the contradictions thereof were summarised by Jill 
Johannessen (2013, p.34) who noted that:  
South Africa is in an unusual position where it straddles the ‘carbon divide’ between 
industrial and developing economies. On the one hand, South Africa is relatively 
developed, economically powerful, and ranked as the 12th largest greenhouse gases emitter 
in the world [.…] On the other hand, South Africa is a developing country with domestic 
challenges that run deep, which means it needs economic growth to reduce poverty.  
 
However, this study contends that the politics of climate change in South Africa is characterised 
by discourses that blame climate change and global warming on the global North countries. These 
discourses of blame have led to the argument that the global North countries must be more 
responsible for emissions reduction and in funding climate change adaptation and mitigation in 
the global South. Tagbo (2010, p.10) argued that from the United Nations (UN) Copenhagen 
Climate Conference (COP15), South Africa has firmly maintained its accusation of the global 
North countries. The argument stresses that any unfunded and unsupported attempt towards 
mitigation will derail progress on developmental projects within South Africa.  
 
These arguments fail to account for the fact that the developing countries, especially those in the 
BRICS category (South Africa is a member of the BRICS group, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa), are the leading producers of greenhouse gas emissions (Human 
Development Index Report, 2010; Weston, 2012), with China being the largest polluter and South 
Africa ranked number twelve globally and again accounting for forty percent of total emissions 
from Africa. Johannessen (2013, p.34) noted that from the 1970s, “the greater part of the growth 








1.6 Rationale of the study  
While acknowledging that studies on the relationship between the media and climate change have 
increased (Boykoff 2007, 2008, 2009; Carvalho 2005, 2007; Carvalho & Burgess 2005), 
Takahashi and Meisner (2012) noted that most of the research focused on the global North 
countries. They argued that the trend was due not only to the predetermined neglect for the Global 
South nations but also lack of data. Few studies on general media coverage of climate change in 
the global South have been carried out (Joubert 2006; Tagbo 2010; Takahashi and Meisner 2012; 
Doulton & Brown 2009; Cramer 2008; Meiring 2013; Goodman 2014; Gess 2012; Jones 2012; 
Bosch 2012; Shanahan 2009; Mare 2011; Johannessen 2013). These studies primarily focused on 
three aspects of that coverage: a) the presence/absence of climate change coverage in the news 
media b) the frequency of the coverage of anthropogenic climate change in news media and c) the 
framing of climate change along with climate science consensus and denial. To the researcher’s 
knowledge, there are no studies that have been undertaken to focus exclusively on the 
re/presentation and re/construction of climate change in the mainstream media. Also, studies 
embedded within the critical theoretical and methodological approaches such as discourse 
analysis, political economy and articulation do not exist. This study complements what already 
exists by focusing on the above gaps.  
 
The empirical studies available (Cramer 2008; Mare 2011; Meiring 2013; Goodman 2014) have 
relied on quantitative methods on their analysis of climate change coverage. These studies were 
concerned with issues of frequency and accuracy of reporting in the media. Johannessen (2013), 
with a methodology close to discourse and representational analysis, only examined coverage 
during the Conference of Parties (COP17) held in Durban. As noted by Rouxnette Meiring (2013), 
a full investigation of media coverage and representation of climate change should be cast over a 
more extended period, maybe covering more years rather than focusing on a specific event. This 
study, thus, examined the re/presentation and re/construction of climate change from 2011 before 
the Durban (COP17) summit to 2017 (post the COP23 in Bonn). This period allowed the researcher 
to gain an extensive understanding of the issues at hand and enough depth to focus on contextual 
issues that influence climate change communication. Other scholarly articles, especially those 
published in 2012, (Jones 2012; Bosch 2012; Finlay 2012; Wasserman 2012; Gess 2012) mostly 




This study focused on the re/presentation of the global South concerning climate change in South 
African mainstream newspapers. While a lot of climate change communication research has 
focused on the global North, few studies have focused on the representation of climate change by 
the South African media, regardless of their reach and power to influence public opinion in the 
global South. The South African media, because of its broader coverage in Southern Africa, has 
more influence on climate change perceptions and attitudes not only within South Africa itself but 
throughout the Southern African region. More important to note, South Africa has been rated 
Africa’s best economy (Tagbo 2010, p.17) and its inclusion in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa) block of developing countries gives the country more power to influence 
regional and international climate change policies.  
 
The above selection of newspapers provides a sample made up of four weekly titles, each of which 
is owned by a different press conglomerate. Furthermore, the four selected newspapers are 
distributed nationally and regionally. This study notes that mainstream newspapers in South Africa 
are the dominant providers of climate change information (see literature review) and hence 
examined the way climate change issues in South Africa and developing countries (Global South) 
are reported on and framed.  
 
The assumption is that the news content produced by the newspapers in question inform and will 
influence the decisions of policymakers and opinion leaders both in South Africa and Southern 
Africa since these news outlets are distributed beyond South African borders into the wider region. 
The media in South Africa, because of their reach online, fit into what Daya Thussu (2010, p.228) 
defined as transnational/geocultural media that have regional influence and appeal to the diaspora 
and the global North at the same time. He noted further that these transnational media had 
redefined international communication from the one-way north to south even to mean south-south 
and south to north. This is evidenced by the regularity of how global media even get their news 
stories and leads from their global South counterparts. In this way, the media in South Africa have 
the power to shape the climate change discourse locally, regionally and globally. This study 




responsibility for addressing the climate problem and their overall representation and construction 
of global climate change policy negotiations and summits. 
 
1.7 Research aims  
The aims of the research were: 
i. Critically examined how the mainstream newspapers in South Africa (named in Section 
1.9) report on and represent issues of climate change in the global South; 
ii. Investigated and examined the emergent and recurrent themes throughout the news 
articles on climate change, the ideologies they represent and how the ideological 
legitimation is achieved through discourse; 
iii. Inductively explored the political economy of climate change as it plays out in the news 
media;   
iv. Situated climate change representations in the media within the broader geopolitical 
and ecopolitical struggles between the global South and the global North;  
v. Located the discussion of media representation of climate change into a critical political 
economy context of capitalism and the symbiotic relations between policy discourses, 
media discourses, and business discourses; and 
vi. Provided a theoretical framework for understanding the South African media 
re/presentation and re/construction of climate change.  
1.8 Objectives of the Study 
To achieve the above aims, the study set out: 
i. To analyse climate change news stories from four the selected national South African 
newspapers (named in Section 1.9 above); 
ii. To inductively analyse the news stories for emergent themes and sourcing patterns in 
the surveyed articles; and  
iii. To find out the key emergent and recurrent themes throughout news articles on climate 
change. 




1.9 Location and Scope of the study   
The study was conducted in South Africa. Mainstream quality weekly mainstream newspapers that 
are national were chosen, namely, the Sunday Times, the Sunday Independent, the Mail and 
Guardian and City Press.  
 
The Mail & Guardian 
The Mail & Guardian is a South African national weekly newspaper published by the M&G Media 
Limited.  The newspaper was founded in 1985 by journalists retrenched from the collapsed Rand 
Daily Mail and the Sunday Express (https://mg.co.za/page/about-us). It started as the Weekly Mail, 
and after acquisition by the United Kingdom Guardian Media Group, the newspaper changed its 
name to the Mail & Guardian. In 2002, the Guardian Media Group sold its majority stake to 
Zimbabwean media mogul, Trevor Ncube, who in 2017 offloaded his ownership of the newspaper 
to the Media Development Investment Fund. The Chief Executive Officer, Hoosain Karjiker, 
became the minority empowerment shareholder. The M&G Staff Share Trust holds about ten per 
cent of the shares, and the rest of the shares are owned by minority shareholders.  
 
Sunday Independent 
The Sunday Independent was established in 1995 and is published by the Independent Media 
group. Though mostly concentrated in the Gauteng Province, the newspaper carries stories that are 
national in character and is distributed across the country and outside. The Independent Media 
website notes that the Sunday Independent has a readership of 130 000 people and a circulation of 
21 205. The newspaper has a strong digital footprint as it has a competitive website hosted under 
the umbrella group site of Independent Online and operates social media handles accounts on 




Founded in 1982 as the Golden City Press, the City Press is a South African national weekly 
newspaper published on Sunday. The newspaper is owned by the Media24 group (itself a 
subsidiary of Sekunjalo Holdings). According to the Media24 website, the City Press has a 






The Sunday Times is the biggest weekly newspaper in South Africa. It was established in 1906. 
Currently, the newspaper is owned by the Tiso Blackstar group. According to the ABC Q2 
statistics of 2019, the Sunday Times has a circulation of 240 000 and over 3 411 000 readers in and 
outside of South Africa. 
 
1.10 Summary of chapters 
Chapter One: Introduction 
This Chapter introduced the research study and provided the background and outline of the 
research problem. It went on to provide the rationale and aims of the study, the research problems 
that necessitated the study, and which the study seeks to address. 
 
Chapter Two: Climate change, Institutionalisation, Internationalisation, and Political economy  
This chapter examined and discussed the politicisation of the climate problem and the resultant 
political ideologies that have attempted to shape climate governance. To achieve this, the chapter 
traced the internationalisation and institutionalisation of the climate problem. The chapter focused 
further on the political economies and ecologies of climate change in South Africa and globally. 
Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework – Ecological Rift and Capitalist Risk Society 
This chapter served as the grand theoretical foundation for the study. The chapter alluded to the 
idea that the problems of climate change that the world is facing are not isolated from the social 
relations of our existence. The chapter introduced and discussed the metabolic rift and ecological 
rift theories. 
Chapter Four: Climate Change and the Media – A Review of Literature 
Chapter four focused on exploring the role of the news media in relation to climate change 
coverage, representation, and construction. The chapter noted that research on climate change 
communication has substantially increased, albeit with more studies focusing on the global North. 
The chapter traced the historical development of climate change coverage in the news media, 




a literature background, the influence of media political economics on climate change news 
representation and construction. 
Chapter Five: The Theories and Methods of Articulation and Discourse Analysis 
This chapter developed from the previous chapter by presenting the theoretical and methodological 
frameworks that underpin the discourse analysis study being undertaken. This chapter introduced 
and extended the key theories necessary in examining the news media representations and 
discourses of climate change in South Africa. 
Chapter Six: Re-articulating media constructions of ‘dangerous’ climate change 
Chapter six traced how the newspapers in South Africa have re/presented the climate change 
problem between 2011 and 2018, questioning the drivers of coverage and the critical discourse 
sponsors and how the knowledges and discourses of the key actors resulted in a particular slant in 
coverage in the four newspapers analysed. The chapter discussed how the newspapers re/presented 
the theme of climate change impacts. 
Chapter Seven: Concealed agency and blame-shifting responsibility -The Politics of Global 
Climate change negotiations as represented in the South African Press 
This chapter built a historical re/presentational overview on how the South African news media 
re/presented climate change negotiations between 2011 and 2018. The negotiations are a major 
news feature in the news media coverage and re/presentation of climate change. 
Chapter Eight: Contradictory national discourses – Representing the political economy of 
climate change and energy in South Africa 
Chapter eight presented the analyses and interpretation of climate change mitigation debates as 
they permeated the South African news media, identifying the key discourses on mitigation and 
energy and linking discourses to the vested interests of the actors that promoted them. Discourses 
on coal indispensability, nuclear optimism, and shale gas optimism are a preserve of the minerals-
energy complex and the Department of Energy and that of Mineral Resources, the and beneficiaries 
of any developments in those sectors. 
Chapter Nine: Contested Landscapes and the Barriers to Action: Corporate South Africa and the 




This chapter rearticulated mitigation discourses that were premised on the carbon budget and 
carbon taxes. The chapter discussed how these discourses played out in the newspapers, examined 
whether the media took ideological positions that promoted and reproduced the interests of 
particular actors, especially those in the minerals-energy complex or reproduced the government 
discourse. Overall, this chapter provided a general critique of market instruments of a carbon tax 
and the included elements of carbon trade in the mitigation approaches pursued by South Africa. 
 
Chapter Ten: Media (re-)production of the neoliberal green economy: Towards Environmental 
Financialisation and Commodification 
The first section articulates the green economy optimistic discourses as they traversed the South 
African weekly newspapers. The news media representations of climate change in South Africa, 
as part of the solutions narrative, often reproduced the ideas of techno-optimism where buzzwords 
such as ‘green economy,’ ‘sustainable development’, and ‘green growth’ were used and 
reproduced as common-sense ideologies. The second section provides a re-articulation of these 
discourses by bringing out the ‘small’ but critical green economy disarticulating discourses. Most 
of the articles in the second section were in the form of Op-Eds from academics, environmental 
activists and the faith communities. 
Chapter Eleven: Summary and Conclusions 


















An articulation of media representations of climate change in South Africa demands a full grasp 
of the problems that have been brought by the warming climate, the politics that are at play in 
terms of governance as well as attempts to address the problem and the political economy of 
climate change in South Africa and globally. The chapter starts by discussing and tracing the 
internationalisation and institutionalisation of the climate problem. This is followed by South 
Africa’s response and mitigation mechanisms to climate change. The chapter goes on to examine 
and discuss the politicisation of the climate problem and the resultant political ideologies that have 
attempted to shape climate governance in South Africa.  The chapter further discussed the political 
economics and ecologies of climate change in South Africa. Allusions are made to the need to 
simultaneously curb emissions and achieve economic development, the latter requiring (as per the 
government of South Africa policy narratives) a reliance on fossil fuels.  
2.2 Climate change politics: Institutionalisation and Internationalisation 
Climate change is a major problem for the whole planet. The climate problem has been 
acknowledged globally starting with the Brundtland report published in 1987. The first discourses 
on climate change were dualised between those who denied the science (Carvalho 2005; Carvalho 
& Burgess 2005) and those who strongly believed that climate change was anthropogenic and 
human activities were worsening the state of the climate. (Carvalho & Burgess 2005). However, 
through continuous research by universities across the globe and by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) ranging from the first assessment report of 1990 to the fifth assessment 
report of 2014, governments globally now concur that climate change is real and human activities 
are responsible. This is evidenced by the broad consensus found in the Conference of Parties (COP) 
meetings held under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 






The key problems facing the world today are how the world should approach, respond and mitigate 
climate-induced problems. Key divisions exist between the global South developing nations such 
as South Africa, China and India, and the global North developed countries such as the United 
States, Canada and Australia. The latter have successively advocated for responses hinged on neo-
liberal market principles that commodify nature and subject it to the capitalist motives of profit. 
Contradictions are also prevalent within the global South nations who are now divided according 
to levels of development and exploitation of natural resources. Within this bloc, countries with 
high emission ratios are reluctant to cut their emissions using ‘the need to develop and catch up’ 
as a defence. Brazil, South Africa, India, and China (BASIC) are the countries whose emissions 
combined constitute over 40 percent of total global emissions (Friedrich et al. 2017)4. There have 
been calls for these countries to curb emissions and follow a sustainable future.  
This study, grounded within South Africa, examined the climate change discourse(s) as they have 
played out in the mainstream quality newspapers in the country. This is important as these 
newspapers are highly influential in terms of informing policy and public opinion (Carvalho 2010; 
Boykoff 2008). The newspapers selected here are key agenda-setters in South Africa. Combined, 
all the four newspapers are quality and have a wide national and regional reach, with enormous 
power on agenda indexing and being a key guide for what is in the public interest. Therefore, how 
the South African media covers and represents the policy positions and implementation is 
important.  
The next section discusses the international climate change response process.  
 
 









2.3 International Response to Climate Change 
Globally, climate change responses have been institutionalised and internationalised multilaterally 
through the establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in 1992 (Yamin & Depledge 2004, p. xxi). The UNFCCC is a product of the Rio de 
Janeiro Earth Summit of 1992. Steps towards institutionalising climate change can be traced to the 
publication of the Brundtland Report entitled ‘Our Common Future’ in 1987 (Böhm et al. 2012), 
a document that gave warning on global warming, and incubated the idea of sustainable 
development. Subsequent to the Brundtland report, Malta gave a request to the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1988 to seriously consider climate change. The General Assembly “took up 
the issue for the first time and adopted resolution 43/53, declaring climate change to be ‘a common 
concern of mankind’” (Yamin & Depledge 2004, p.22). The climate change institutionalisation 
process received momentum in 1990 when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) produced its First Assessment Report detailing that “although there were many 
uncertainties, human activity was leading to increased atmospheric concentrations of CO2 and 
rising temperatures” (Yamin & Depledge 2004, p.23). The report led to the Ministerial Declaration 
of the Second World Climate Conference “which recommended that negotiations on a framework 
climate convention begin without delay” (Yamin & Depledge 2004, p.23). 
While the UNFCCC was adopted at the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992, it only became 
operational in 1994. Post the 1994 operationalisation of the UNFCCC, the first Conference of 
Parties (COP1) met in Berlin in 1995 and “adopted a number of decisions elaborating on the 
Convention, including for example, guidance to the financial mechanism and guidelines for 
submitting national reports” (Yamin & Depledge 2004, p.24). As noted by Farhana Yamin and 
Joanna Depledge (2004, p.24), COP1 adopted the Berlin Mandate which found that the emission 
reduction commitments from industrialised countries were inadequate and called for a binding 
instrument. The Berlin Mandate called for renewed negotiations with the view of reviewing “the 
commitments of industrialised countries, but not introduce any new commitments for developing 
countries” (Yamin & Depledge 2004, p.24). As one of the key climate response tools, the Berlin 
Mandate concentrated on ‘historical responsibility’ and became blind to ‘present responsibilities’, 
thus, it shielded the global South fast developing economies from taking any reduction action. It 




countries in the global South have found refuge and continue to claim for ‘developmental spaces’ 
despite these countries being the biggest global carbon emitters combined. The news media reports 
analysed show that the mentality of the right to develop and escaping responsibility continue to 
characterise the attitudes of developing global South countries such as South Africa, India and 
China towards emissions reduction. 
In 1996, the IPCC released its Second Assessment report. The report was formerly adopted and 
endorsed at COP2 held in Geneva the same year. The IPCC’s first assessment report had indicated 
that despite the several gaps in science, human activities were likely to blame for the warming 
planet. The second assessment report brought more scientific evidence. The evidence was 
supported by many scientists who concurred that “human activities were indeed changing the 
world’s climate” (Yamin & Depledge 2004, p.24). Following the adoption and endorsement of the 
second assessment report in 1996, Parties to the UNFCCC, meeting as COP3 in Kyoto in 1997, 
began a process towards a binding roadmap on emissions reduction. Similar to the Berlin Mandate, 
the underlying argument at COP3 was that developed countries had to cut their emissions by 5.2 
percent of the 1990 levels (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2010). The result of the Kyoto summit was 
the Kyoto Protocol “which contains more specific, binding commitments and concrete reduction 
targets, within specific deadlines for industrialised countries” in terms of climate change mitigation 
(Yamin & Depledge 2004, p. xxi). The Protocol, which became operational in 2005 did not 
prescribe mitigation commitments to developing countries. Joanna Depledge (2006) has argued 
that the Kyoto Protocol and its Doha amendments of 2012 were ineffective as they were not ratified 
by some key emitting developed countries. For example, the United States which is one of the top 
emitters, refused to sign and ratify the protocol. In 2010 another top emitter, Canada, withdrew 
from the agreement. While the protocol has been lauded as an achievement, this study notes that 
the Protocol took a neoliberal approach by introducing the Clean Development Mechanism and 
the Emissions Trading Scheme, instruments that effectively began the process of commodifying 
nature (Kumi et al. 2014). In the last section of this chapter, a discussion of neoliberalism and 





Due to the poor ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the UNFCCC attempted to come up with a post-
2012 second phase of the Kyoto agreement. Meeting as COP13 in Bali in 2007, the UNFCCC 
again failed to achieve a binding agreement and only came up with amendments to the original 
Kyoto Protocol. The geopolitical divides between the global North versus the South made it 
difficult for an agreement to be reached. Global North countries insisted that the fast-developing 
countries be included in the mitigation action scenarios, while the fast-developing countries were 
reluctant to commit to any binding emissions reduction arrangement. They argued that they needed 
a ‘developmental space’ to catch up and improve their societies. Ultimately, the amendments 
agreed in Indonesia became known as the Bali Road Map, which was basically an agreement for 
a two-year negotiating period with the hope of coming up with binding climate change deal at the 
COP15 meeting in Copenhagen. Unfortunately, the hopes of a climate change deal in 2009 faded 
on the eve of the conference as leaks from the University of Anglia’s (Climategate) scientists 
revealed that scientists had manipulated data. New hopes were put on COP17 which was to be held 
in 2011, in Durban South Africa (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2010). The COP17 again failed to 
deliver a climate deal, only managing to come up with the Durban Platform which gave a roadmap 
for a global climate deal by 2015 and an agreement to a have second Kyoto commitment period, 
with the mechanism for this second phase being left to be decided at COP18 in Doha. Central to 
note is that that the news media in South Africa constructed and re/presented the Kyoto Protocol 
as a common sense and a best way to address the climate change crisis (see Chapter Seven). 
 In 2015, meeting as COP21, parties to the Conference of Parties in 2015 adopted the Paris 
Agreement, which became the new international mechanism towards addressing climate change. 
It is important to note that the Paris Agreement, rather than being an internationally binding 
agreement, is based on what is called the ‘name and shame’ principle where countries voluntarily 
put forward their intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) and thus mitigation is 
achieved through faith that the countries will meet their mitigation commitments. However, the 
United States, through its President Donald Trump in June 2017, notified the UNFCCC secretariat 
of the pulling out of the U.S. from the Paris Agreement describing the deal as a “hoax concocted 
by China to weaken the competitive industrial power of the U.S.”  (Zhang et al. 2017, p.213). 
President Trump asked for a renegotiation of the deal to accommodate the growth needs of the 




was “expected” because Trump “had claimed several times that climate change is a hoax”. The 
United States’ withdrawal could also be attributed to Trump’s desire “to re-stimulate the U.S. fossil 
energy industry” and his Republican party background, a party that “support the development of 
fossil fuel energy above all other aspects of energy policy” (Zhang et al. 2017, p. 214). Within the 
South African government and the news media terrains, Trump’s decision was described as 
‘heating’ the world and going against the spirit of multilateralism. Several Op-Eds and news stories 
across the newspapers criticised the United States withdrawal. 
Reaching a legally and internationally binding agreement, despite the need for such an instrument, 
has always been a challenge. The negotiations have often suffered due to aspects of sovereignty 
and geopolitical divides between the global North countries (especially the United States, Canada 
and Australia) and the global South. (mostly led by China, South Africa and India). As Depledge 
(2006, p.32) observed, the negotiations have been marked by geopolitical dichotomies with global 
South countries refusing to reduce emissions because they are not historically responsible for 
global warming. The global North has called for global South countries to curb their emissions 
based on present responsibilities, which largely point to developing countries such as China, India, 
Brazil and South Africa. These countries have become heavy emitters and thus need to reduce their 
carbon footprints.  Whilst failure by the international system to regulate greenhouse gases could 
be attributed to many reasons, Yamin & Depledge (2004, p.1) argue that the main reason is that of 
“sovereignty which states are reluctant to concede”. Drawing from this argument, the non-binding 
nature of the Paris Agreement could be explained from this perspective as nation-states are 
reluctant to have international monitoring and regulation of their emissions. This is even though 
emissions are not nation-specific but affect the globe as a whole and thus the need for an 
international instrument to protect and preserve life on earth. In the preceding sections, it was 
mentioned that South Africa and its members in the BASIC bloc of countries have the highest 
emission rates in the world. Having looked at international response to climate change, it is 
important to look at how the BASIC group and South Africa in particular, have or are responding 





2.4 South Africa’s response to climate change 
South Africa has responded to climate change both as an individual and by forming partnerships 
through joining BASIC, BRICS, Africa Group etc. Participation in the multilateral climate change 
regimes is diverse and includes governments, non-government organisations, corporations, and 
specialised United Nations institutions. According to the UNFCCC website as of 2018, the 
Convention has a membership of 196 countries plus the European Union (which works as a united 
economic and political bloc). The groupings or negotiating blocs are normally organised around 
similar interests, vulnerability to climate change and geopolitical reasons. The global South 
countries are mostly organised around the Group of 77+China (G77+China), and the Africa Group. 
Other small but equally important groupings are there, such as the grouping of Small Island 
Nations. South Africa is a member of the Africa Group, the G77+China and BASIC (Brazil, South 
Africa, India and China) grouping. The latter is composed of fast developing countries whose 
economies are based on the consumption of fossil fuels for their growth. In these countries, fossil 
fuels are viewed as engines of growth (Never 2012; Hallding et al. 2013). These countries have 
consistently rejected calls to drastically reduce their emissions, claiming the ‘right to pollute’ and 
catching up. These geopolitical aspects of the international climate change debates also played out 
in the news media, where for instance, through political indexing, newspapers in South Africa 
reproduced the climate change foreign policy frameworks of the government. The themes such as 
‘the right to pollute,’ ‘catching up’ and that South Africa was still a developing country in need of 
space to grow its economy, were reproduced and entrenched across the four newspapers. (the Mail 
& Guardian, the City Press, the Sunday Times and the Sunday Independent). This was part of the 
concealment of mitigation responsibility and the ‘clamour’ for climate change finance because 
‘the country was just a passive victim of climate change’ (see Chapter Seven).   
It is crucial to trace the genesis and development of discourses that re/present and construct the 
global South as not responsible for taking climate change mitigation action. These histories are 
partly found in the United Nations climate discourses and partially found in individual national 
discourses where sovereignty and the ‘right to develop’ are considered central. Climate change 
regimes from 1992 were primarily based on the principle of Common But Differentiated 
Responsibilities (CBDR) adopted in Rio de Janeiro. This principle allowed developing countries 




Common But Differentiated Responsibilities is defined in principle seven of the Rio Declaration 
as a process where:  
States shall co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the 
health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to 
global environmental degradation, states have common but differentiated responsibilities. 
The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international 
pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the 
global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command 
(UNCED 1992). 
In 1992, through the UNFCCC, a new dimension of Respective Capabilities was added. It 
emphasised that countries should reduce emissions in line with their specific national 
circumstances and developmental needs. The extended principle became known as the Common 
But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (Pauw et al. 2014). Pieter Pauw et 
al. (2014) argued that the principles of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and 
Respective Capabilities were included in the UNFCCC framework to cater for “countries’ different 
capacities and development levels” (p.1). At that moment, these were necessary to enable 
“negotiators to agree on an international legal framework for climate policy in the 1990s” (Pauw 
et al. 2014, p.1). According to Pauw et al. (2014, p.7), the concept of CBDR is based on “the 
ethical principle of consequentialism (i.e. justice based on outcomes of behaviour and decisions), 
polluters have a responsibility to act”.  
Based on historical responsibility, the principle placed responsibility for global warming squarely 
in the hands of developed countries. As such, developed countries were supposed to reduce their 
emissions and at the same time provide adaptation finance to global South developing countries. 
However, calls have been made by developed countries and scientists for a review of the original 
principle considering the developments in greenhouse gases emission scenarios. The balance in 
emissions has shifted from the industrialised countries being the major emitters to the developing 
countries, especially those in BASIC and Russia becoming the major emitters, accounting for more 
than 40 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions (Friedrich et al. 2017). South Africa, as a key 
global greenhouse gas emitter and a global South nation, has consistently refused to take climate 
mitigation action citing the CBDR principle. The principle, as Chapter Seven shows, has been 
central to the South African government’s negotiating tactics and the news media have largely 




with the rest of the ‘developing countries’ who are passive victims of climate change and in need 
of financial action to take action. 
Pauw et al. (2014, p.1) argued that the “dichotomous differentiation between the ‘Annex 1’ parties 
[developed/industrialised countries] and ‘Non-Annex 1’ parties [developing countries]” was 
problematic because it “reflects neither scientific knowledge nor current political realities”. As a 
result, the international climate change regime is viewed as “dysfunctional” because “mitigation 
efforts by industrialised countries alone would be insufficient to avoid dangerous climate change” 
(Pauw et al. 2014, p.1). This has reduced South Africa and its partners in the BASIC bloc to mere 
spectators despite having the highest combined emission rate. Important to this study is this lack 
of participation by South Africa and its implications and impact on climate change news reports 
in South African media.   
The “rise of emerging economies such as China and India – now among the world’s major 
greenhouse gas emitters” (Pauw et al. 2014, p.1), called into question the adequacy of the 
international climate change system that is based on Common But Differentiated Responsibilities 
and Respective Capabilities (CBDRRC). Pauw et al. (2014) saw the need for a reconfiguration of 
the “conceptualization and implementation of CBDR” pointing to the fact that Differentiated 
Responsibilities imply “adoption and implementation of different commitments for different states 
while taking into account their diverse circumstances and capacities, their historical contributions 
to CO2 emissions and their specific development needs” (Pauw et al. 2014,  p.2).  
Members of BASIC have received a lot of attention and criticism from the global North countries 
at the UNFCCC meetings that deal with climate change mitigation. As a result, BASIC countries 
feel “increasingly pressured by developed countries to take emissions limitations that they see as 
unfair due to their minimal role in creating the climate change problem in the first place” (Hallding 
et al. 2013, p.609)  As Babette Never (2011, p.4) argued, these countries “not only gain weight in 
the international political system, but also have a growing impact on ecosystems while they 
struggle to sustain economic growth and development”. Drawing from Karl Hallding et al. (2013, 
p.610), these countries see “natural resources” and especially “energy sources” as central to the 
development of their economies as they are regarded as “engines of development”. As such, 




and political power, noting that these countries’ “future prosperity” depends on energy utilisation 
hence they seek to reinforce their positions and fight for a “developmental space” in the “carbon 
space”. Delys Weston (2012, p.100) noted that “South Africa, in concert with China, India and 
Brazil, has argued it is a developing economy with large impoverished populations and, as such, 
cannot have restraints placed on its development trajectory”. 
 
South Africa together with other Global South countries (Non-Annex 1 as per the UNFCCC 
definition) see the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective 
Capabilities as an important principle of the international negotiation system. However, they view 
plans to revise it as curtailing their ‘right to develop’. This is in contrast with Pauw et al. (2014, 
p.3) who argued that CBDRRC as it is currently read, “hardly reflects … greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emission realities”. This shows that South Africa and her global partners are more concerned about 
development than reducing their emissions. It has been argued that all countries must act, and their 
contributions are subject to their ‘differing circumstances’. The differing circumstances refer to 
the developmental needs, especially those of developing countries.  South Africa has used this 
argument to allow for more allowances in the global carbon space/budget so as to meet its 
economic developmental needs and to catch up with the global North. The promotion of the notions 
of ‘the right to pollute’ and ‘a developmental space’ by the South African government, were 
re/produced without questioning by the news media. Analogous to Bernard Cohen’s (1963) 
observations, the news media often reproduce the foreign policy of their governments with little 
or no questioning. This is true of the mainstream newspapers in South Africa. Claims by the 
government were often reproduced directly and entrenched by the newspapers. 
South Africa is one of the main actors and capable of influence in international climate change 
governance through its membership of groupings such as BASIC, BRICS, G77+China and the 
Africa Group. However, due to its present socio-economic state of being partly a developed 
country as well as being a developing country, it has chosen to take the stance taken by developing 
countries. Throughout the UNFCCC framework, developing countries have treated themselves as 
passive victims of climate change and less attention has been paid to the increasing emissions by 




Pauw et al. (2014, p.27) noted that due to “high per capita emissions” South Africa pledged to cut 
its emissions by about 34% by 2020 at the Copenhagen COP15 in 2015. However, South Africa 
was not only criticised for these ‘unrealistic’ ambitions but also for dishonesty as the country was 
developing coal-fired power plants (Medupi and Kusile). This raised questions on how the 2009 
pledge was going to be achieved (Bond, 2012). The country further received criticism from the 
G77+China and the Africa Group who saw this move as moving away from ‘collective 
responsibility’ negotiating principle. The position taken by South Africa had deviated from the 
umbrella Africa Group negotiating platform. Godwell Nhamo (2011, p.5) observed that “South 
Africa surprised many when it pledged to reduce emissions by 34 per cent in 2020 and 42 per cent 
in 2025 a day before the Copenhagen Climate Summit of December 2009”.  
South Africa did not only face criticism from its negotiating partners and observers but there was 
also indecision within itself. The South African negotiators announced a reduction of 34 per cent 
in 2020 on the 7th of December in 2009. The following day on the 8th of December, the office of 
the Presidency issued a statement announcing that the country: “As a developing country with 
huge developmental challenges, South Africa cannot afford to take on any binding emission 
reduction targets” noting that South Africa had “an energy intensive economy” (The Presidency 
2009c cited by Nhamo 2011, p.18).  This shows that the pledge was an empty rhetoric riddled with 
internal policy inconsistencies.  Lumumba Di-Aping accused the South African delegation to the 
Copenhagen summit of 2009 of “actively [seeking] to disrupt the unity of the Africa bloc” (Di 
Aping cited in Bond 2012, p.152). South Africa, through its 2010 Green Paper noted that the 
country was both a big contributor to emissions and at the same time a key victim of the impacts 
of climate change. Patrick Bond (2012, p.152) criticised this position because it seemed to “fit 
within an all too predictable Pretoria formula: talking left, so as to more rapidly walk right”.  
At the global level, South Africa has been referred to as the “bridge builder” between the members 
of G77+China countries and developed countries with its flexible approach to the principle of 
CBDR (Pauw et al. 2014, p.28).  However, this flexible approach is nothing but a flip-flopping 





South Africa, operating under BASIC in 2011 and as part of the Africa Group in 2014, advocated 
for the adoption of a climate change deal based on the Equity Reference Framework (Ngwadla & 
Rajamani 2014, p.4). The Equity Reference Framework (EFR) included three elements “(a) a 
definition of the required global effort as informed by the temperature goal, (b) a definition of the 
relative fair effort by parties – who does what, and (c) an assessment process for adequacy of 
commitments by parties” (Ngwadla & Rajamani 2014, p.4). This ERF is also underlined in the 
proposals put forward by the Africa Group through a submission by Swaziland. The proposal noted 
that the Paris Agreement was to be modelled along the ERF principles: 
Determination of the required global effort to meet long-term goal agreed … comprising 
of the required mitigation and adaptation effort, including the associated finance and 
technology needs, noting the adaptation, finance, and technology needs depend on the 
depth of commitments by Parties (Ngwadla & Rajamani 2014, p.4). 
 
Despite both the Africa Group and BASIC bloc agreeing on the ERF, politics has shaped the global 
climate change negotiations. The BASIC bloc and the Africa Group often disagreed on response 
frameworks, where countries stuck to their national priorities and actions. This creates problems 
for South Africa as it is a member of both groups. South Africa is often conflicted, and this might 
explain why the country seems to be always suffering from indecision when it comes to tackling 
the climate change problem. However, South Africa’s actions within the negotiations framework 
shows that the country often put its national priorities first ahead of agreements within the 
negotiating groups. That is, it always goes against what would have been agreed within the groups 
as mentioned earlier in this section. However, generally, South Africa, as part of both BASIC 
group and the Africa Group, places more emphasis on the two aspects of historical responsibility 
and developmental needs.  Additionally, South Africa excludes the ‘present responsibility’ view, 
which lies mostly with its partners in BRICS, BASIC, and G77+China. This showed in the 
country’s proposals which lack any narrative on how the country seeks to correct present 
responsibility in relation to emissions inequality within the country and in Africa. The 
centralisation of two aspects of historical responsibility and developmental needs is an attempt to 
shape policy narratives and discourses by locating responsibility for mitigation ‘elsewhere’ 





The discourse on climate change is never value-neutral and is always characterised by ideological 
viewpoints of different discourse actors. While the global South countries pursued the path to 
development based on exploiting natural resources, it is important to understand how the 
mainstream newspapers selected for this study either challenged or strengthened such a 
developmental discourse built by the government and the corporate sector. The media are 
important in shaping discourses in society and hence play a central role in policy formulation, 
adoption and implementation. Studies have shown that the media tend to follow the foreign policy 
positions of their countries (Cohen 1963) and often consciously or subconsciously participate in 
legitimising ideological and policy positions of their countries. This study examined how the South 
African quality mainstream newspapers represented climate change discourses as they evolved 
and how they covered the policy positions taken by the South African government. How the media 
covered the policy positions of the South African government worked in legitimising such 
positions.  
The media is important in these debates because of their power to control discursive structures. 
The media selected for this study are also instrumental for their sheer capacity to define and 
determine the frames and representations within which climate change is to be articulated and 
understood in South Africa and outside. By either legitimising or delegitimising the views of the 
South African government, the media   can contribute significantly on how climate change 
governance is shaped and implemented both at national and international levels. This is because 
of the country’s strong influence on the climate change international scene as it belongs to 
powerful negotiating groups. The views of South Africa, BASIC countries and the Africa Group 
are becoming prominent at the international stage. As noted earlier, international climate change 
arenas are always characterised by geopolitical divisions. The legitimation of South African and 
global South viewpoints on climate change mitigation, especially on emissions reduction and 
redefining the CBDR, not only help shape climate change governance but also serves a political 
purpose of positioning the country as a key actor within the international community. The role of 
the media, therefore, becomes one of strengthening the image and power of the country. The media 
becomes a site of ideological signification and for promotion of global south ideologies against 




representations and cultural maps. The climate change responses discussed in this section can also 
be understood through reference to the internal national contestations and discourses. 
2.5 Climate change mitigation in South Africa 
Discussions on climate change mitigation in South Africa gathered pace post-2007 after the 
African National Congress (ANC) conference that adopted a resolution on climate change for the 
first time (Never 2011). Since then several proposals on mitigating climate change have been put 
through. These included the National Climate Change Response White Paper, the Long-Term 
Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS) study, the Mitigation Potential Analysis (MPA), the first, second 
and third national communications to the UNFCCC and the Carbon Tax Bill of 2015 and its revised 
version of 2018. Furthermore, the country’s energy policies bear weight on how the country 
develops and implements climate change policies. South Africa’s energy sector mitigation strategy 
is broad and focuses on diversifying energy sources, promote carbon sequestration (capture) and 
reduce the use of coal-bed methane (DEA 2017, p.xix). In terms of the transport sector, the 
government hopes to reduce emissions by promoting investments in electric vehicles and biofuels. 
However, this has been met with suspicion as there is no explanation as to the source of the 
electricity to be used by these electric vehicles. This study observed as a weakness the way the 
transport systems are to be transformed. If the electricity is from coal, then the demand for fuel is 
simply shifted from the oil sector towards the coal sector and there is no actual reduction in 
emissions that takes place. The data analysis chapters have revealed the reproduction of these 
policy imperatives, mostly uncritical, by the newspapers. For example, the energy futures 
discourse was characterised by nuclear and renewable energy optimism, while techno-managerial 
interventions such as carbon sequestration were reproduced by the news media as a common sense 
and rational way of reducing emissions. The news media, this study argues, reproduced and 
entrenched the policy discourses of the government and the minerals-energy complex because of 
the inherent reliance of journalists on official government sources (indexing). 
2.6The political economy and ecology of climate change in South Africa 
Weston (2012, p.13) posited that, a critical political economy approach enables one to “analyse 
and understand how particular ideologies serve particular social classes and how this is tied to 
concepts of power and hegemony”. The media do not operate in a political-economic or cultural 




how the context articulates and is also articulated by discourses. Articulation comes in to re-think, 
re-theorise and re-link this discourse to this context, this context to this politics and this politics to 
this practice (Grossberg 1992). Therefore, it is important for this study to interrogate and 
understand the relationship between politics, economy, social development and climate change in 
South Africa. 
South Africa has an energy-intensive industry and this impacts on its desired mitigation policies. 
This study examined, through media representations, and other prevailing discourses (political, 
policy and energy), the congruence between the proposed mitigation measures contained in the 
government proposals such as Third National Communication and others, against the actions on 
the ground. Globally, the country has taken an ambitious plan to curb emissions and the Third 
National Communication presents another ambitious commitment by the country. However, 
contradictions emerge between what is proposed and what takes place on the ground. While the 
government has proposed massive cuts in emissions, new coal mines and coal-powered power 
plants continue to be constructed, new oil refineries are built and old ones expanded, the transport 
sector continues to rely on diesel power and the investments in renewable energy are tiny. The 
news media analysed seldom critically talked about these contradictions and discourses, rather the 
media reinforced the preferred policy principles of the government through their representation. 
Below is a brief overview of South Africa’s preferred proposals towards carbon emissions. 
Following this section, is a discussion on the political economy and ecology of climate change and 
global warming in South Africa. This is done to juxtapose the gaps between the proposals and the 
actions on the ground. By so doing a better understanding of the climate change discourse in the 
country is developed. 
Weston (2012, p.iii) argued that “the Earth’s biosphere is approaching global warming tipping 
points which, if passed, will become irreversible, taking the planet on a trajectory to a new 
geological era, unsuitable for human life”. Noting that there has been little debate on the feasibility 
of the current market proposals to solve climate change (renewable energy, technology), Weston 
(2012, p.iii) argued that “the dominant political economy framework in which they are embedded, 
precludes real and effective alternatives”. Weston (2012, p.iv) noted further that “[T]he problems 
of global warming cannot be solved through capitalism”. Drawing from Samir Amin (1997), 




exemplifying the ecologically exploitative and destructive nature of the capitalist political 
economy” (Weston 2012, p.5). 
Weston (2012, p.5) noted that  
South Africa is run on neoliberal economic policies; it has enormous poverty and on some 
reckonings is the most unequal society on the planet; it exhibits the symptoms of a classic 
Marxist ‘metabolic rift’ – that is, the rift between the ecological and economic reproductive 
dimensions of society. South Africa demonstrates the traits of alienation in various forms; 
it reveals in various ways both the imperative and the expansion of capital accumulation 
and growth (and a failure of trickle down); it exemplifies the way that financialisation 
occurs and how that exacerbates not only inequality and class divisions but also global 
warming; it demonstrates the convergence of interests of the global elites; it provides a 
good example of the contradictory influences of international institutions and the capitalist 
model of development, particularly in the context of global warming…illustrates the lack 
of motivation on the part of the national government and of global institutions such as the 
World Bank when driven by the edicts of neoliberalism to address the problems of global 
warming. 
 
As noted by Hallding et al. (2013, p.49), the South African economy is energy intensive and “its 
per capita greenhouse gas emissions are high by world standards”. This view aligns with 
observations made by Nhamo (2011, p.6) who saw South Africa’s emissions as “too large 
compared to its population and economy” and are “by far the highest in Africa”. Coal is the biggest 
source of energy for both residential and industrial areas. In relation to the emission of greenhouse 
gas emissions, it has been argued that “the coal-burning power plants of the parastatal Eskom and 
the coal/gas-to-oil conversions of Sasol” (Bond 2012, p.145) are the key culprits. Weston (2012, 
p.99) observed that “South Africa, compared to the rest of Africa, is a disproportionately large 
producer of carbon emissions – emitting more than 40 per cent of Africa’s greenhouse gases from 
less than 8 per cent of Africa’s population – and with the majority of its electricity produced from 
coal”.  
 
The complexity of the energy and climate-mitigation nexus in South Africa needs evisceration. On 
the one hand, the country’s economy is dependent on fossil fuels and on the other hand the present 
climate change problems require the country to drastically reduce its carbon footprint. Cutting 
fossil fuels means at the same time cutting the ‘prospects of development’ and reducing 




better standards of living for the majority of South Africa. Rather, few industrial elites in the 
minerals-energy complex have benefitted. These observations are important when read together 
with the news stories. Government and actors from the minerals-energy complex often promoted 
climate change policy frameworks that sought to maintain the status quo. Discourses from 
companies such as Eskom, Sasol, BHP Billiton, and ArcelorMittal often revealed these tendencies 
of economising coal use in the name of ‘economic growth’ and job creation. This universalisation 
of interests that were necessarily of the minerals-energy elite, was used to interpellate the people, 
make them imagine and feel addressed by the voices of these actors. Overall, it is important to 
argue that South Africa’s climate change policy arenas are hugely polluted by vested interests from 
the minerals-energy complex. Together with government discourses, especially those emanating 
from the Department of Energy, these discourses became tendential forces with discursive 
superiority. 
 
Weston (2012, p.78) argued that South Africa “provides a snapshot of the contradictions and 
processes of capitalist system and capital accumulation both historically and in the contemporary 
neoliberal phase, from the viewpoint of a middle-income country which displays the considerable 
distresses of uneven and ecologically destructive development”. Furthermore, Weston (2012, p.78) 
saw South Africa displaying the contradictions of global warming noting that:  
on the one hand the economy is underpinned by coal as the primary source of energy and 
the extraction rate of South Africa’s vast reserves is being increased for domestic 
consumption, for the cheap/less-than-cost processing of materials for multinational benefit 
and export. On the other hand, South Africa, and Africa generally, is very vulnerable to the 
impacts of global warming. 
 
While energy consumption is high in South Africa and is often equated to economic growth, it has 
been shown that this development has not been helpful in uplifting the standards of living for many 
South Africans (Hallding et al. 2011, p.49). Inequalities and lack of economic opportunities for 
the majority remain rife. Governments within BASIC and the global South in general have in the 
past refused to curb emissions because they were still pursuing development for the betterment of 
their people. However, this is not the case for South Africa where only big corporations and 
industrial giants have benefited and not the majority of the population. Not only is there no benefit 




big corporations like in the case of children dying from cancer related illnesses in Mpumalanga 
province. Additionally, Hallding et al. (2011, p.49) observed that while electricity generation was 
high, “many people still have poor access to energy sources”. They further noted that South Africa 
“suffers from enormous levels of economic inequality” where “much of the population is yet to 
benefit from the country’s growing economy” (Hallding et al. 2011, p.49). These contradictions 
were best described by Amin (1997, p.np) who characterised South Africa as:  
a kind of microcosm of the global capitalist system, which brings together in a single 
territory a number of features peculiar to each constituent category of that system. It has a 
white population which, in its life style and standard of living belongs to the ‘first world’, 
while the urban areas reserved for blacks and coloureds belong to the modern day industrial 
‘third world’ and Bantustans (now ex-Bantustans) containing the ‘tribal’ peasantry do not 
differ from peasant communities in Africa’s ‘fourth world’. 
 
This underlines what Bond (2012) put forward that the levels of emissions in South Africa were 
not at par with economic development. He explained this disparity by drawing references to Ben 
Fine and Zavareh Rustomjee’s (1996) concept of the Minerals-Energy Complex where most of the 
emissions were due to coal-powered stations that supplied cheap electricity to the mining 
corporations and citizens had to pay more electricity rates to cover for the deficiencies created 
through these energy-mining subsidies. This culminates, in the words of David McDonald (2009), 
in ‘electric capitalism’. Importantly, these mining corporations who received cheap electricity did 
not reinvest the money locally but repatriated their profits back to Australia (in the case of BHP 
Billiton) and London (in the case of Anglo American) creating deficiencies in the country’s current 
accounts and balance of payment Bond (2012). Interesting to note is that the news media have 
reproduced the ‘myth’ of coal for development. The sponsors of the coal indispensability narrative 
were often drawn from actors in the minerals-energy complex, actors who propagated, through 
economisation and blackmail, the idea that coal was an indispensable resource in South Africa’s 
development trajectory.  Actors from the minerals-energy complex had power over both the media 
and policy discourses, as the policies that were and still being pursued by the government often 
followed the interests of the minerals-energy complex. A case in point is the Integrated Resource 
Plan of 2010 and its subsequent revisions, which have put coal at the centre of ‘energy security’ 




Thabametsi and Coal3 (discussed in chapter eight) is testament of the discursive power of the 
minerals-energy complex. 
Furthermore, Sam Ashman et al. (2010, p.178) contended that South Africa ran along the lines of 
mixed or dualised economy influenced politically and economically by the ‘Minerals-Energy 
Complex’, an economy heavily dependent on mining and coal powered power plants. Ashman et 
al. (2010, p.178) noted that in this economy “accumulation has been and remains dominated by 
and dependent upon a cluster of industries, heavily promoted by the state, around mining and 
energy”. Bond (2012, p.145) also noted that the “electricity produced by burning coal is cross-
subsidized so that it is the cheapest available anywhere in the world’s largest mining and metals 
corporations”. The biggest consumers of electricity are mining companies. These companies 
receive electricity at subsidised rates (Bond 2012; McDonald 2009; Fine & Rustomjee 1996) yet 
their activities do not benefit the majority of the South Africans both socially and economically. 
Anglo-American and BHP Billiton companies receive subsidised electricity for their smelter 
consumption at $0.02/kw/h, with other big mining companies also getting their electricity at 
extremely cheaper prices of $0.05/kw/h. Other beneficiaries of cheap electricity in South Africa 
are big mining corporations such as ArcelorMittal and Xstrata (Bond 2012, p.145).   Nhamo (2011, 
p.6) saw the “low energy prices” enjoyed by the “coal-energy economy” as responsible for “the 
development of energy-intensive industries” rather than social and economic development.  
Additionally, Fine and Rustomjee (1996) noted that the South African economy was organised 
around and controlled by what they termed the minerals-energy complex. They noted that the 
relationship between energy producers was too close and the mining companies paid too little for 
electricity. With the remaining balance being paid for by individual consumers who paid more for 
their home electricity. McDonald (2009), in furthering this conceptualisation, concluded that the 
South African economic matrix was characterised by what he termed Electric Capitalism 
(McDonald 2009). 
The political economy and ecology of South Africa has been widely defined as too neoliberal. 
Behind the soft climate change policies by South Africa (emphasising on the country’s willingness 
to curb emissions), Bond (2012) saw the expansion of fossil-fuel based energy industries in the 




to portray globally. While the country issued several policy documents such as the Green Paper of 
2010 and the Second National Climate Change Communication, on the ground, the country 
pursued an environmentally hostile path characterised by the introduction of the Medupi and 
Kusile coal powered power plants. The Medupi plant was financed through a World Bank loan of 
$3.75 billion in 2010 (Bond 2012). This shows contradictions and double standards not only by 
South Africa but also by international blocs/superpowers and financiers. On one hand they want 
to reduce emissions but on the other hand they are funding projects which increases emissions. 
Both the 2010 Green paper and the 2017 Third Climate Change Communication report noted that 
South Africa as a ‘good global citizen’ truly seeks to reduce its global carbon footprint. However, 
such a position sharply contrasts the developments on the ground (Bond 2012). Critical to note are 
the extensive developments that took place at Medupi power plant – with capacity to expand coal-
powered electricity generation, and the development of over forty mines across South Africa to 
act as feeders to Medupi and the successor Kusile (Bond 2012, p.157).  
To enhance the criticism, the Mail & Guardian in 20155 paid attention to the political economy of 
the Medupi and Kusile power stations. The political economy of the Medupi and Kusile coal-fired 
power stations, revealed that not only big corporations are part of the minerals-energy complex 
but also the South African government who benefited by being awarded a R40 billion tender to 
Hitachi Corporation, a company 25% owned by the ANC through its investment arm, Chancellor 
House. At the time of tender awards, Eskom Chairman, Popo Molefe, was also a member of the 
ANC’s Finance Committee and was Chairperson again of Chancellor House. These revelations 
help to bring to the fore the conflicts of interests and corruption that characterised South Africa’s 
energy plans. Key to note is; the government and actors in the minerals-energy complex continued 
to promote and propagate ideas that saw coal as a key ingredient of South Africa’s energy futures 
to satisfy ‘energy needs and national security’. These claims were again used to push against 
climate change mitigation policies that sought to do away with coal. 








It is clear that the global warming discourses in South Africa have two neoliberal and highly 
capitalistic fronts. One that seeks to perpetuate the exploitation of natural resources and the one 
that seeks to promote the emissions trading facilities. According to Weston (2012, pp.10-11), the 
“global warming debate is contextualised within the capitalist framework which is so hegemonic 
that it presents the world as if it is ‘how it is’, the one and only reality and possibility for human 
development”. Steffen Böhm et al. (2012, p.4) criticised responses to climate change on neoliberal 
prescriptions because they worsened “uneven growth and disparities of income” and promoted 
“unequal distribution of economic, social and environmental risks that global markets produce”.  
This study adopted the concept of discourse network analysis to examine how the companies and 
corporations that are part of the minerals-energy complex are covered and represented in the 
mainstream quality newspapers in South Africa.  This study interrogated through discourse 
analysis, how these companies influenced the prevailing climate change discourses in South 
Africa. This comes after a study in Canada (see Chapter Four), noted that key polluters were not 
active in the press but rather used environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to do 
the lobbying. Most importantly, these studies noted that these players influenced policymaking 
even though they did not participate in media-environmental discourses. These companies are 
active participants and have an influence on the prevailing climate change discourse. It has been 
noted that Eskom and Sasol exert considerable influence in climate change policy formulation as 
they have permanent members in the South African climate change negotiating group (Never 
2011). It was also noted that their relationship and influence in the Department of Energy (DoE) 
is also enormous. By using Discourse Network analysis this study explored groups that have 
influence in both the media and policy discourses. At a political level, the study attempted to 
address climate change discourses as they playout in parliament, political formations and 
gatherings. Research has shown that climate change in South Africa suffers from low political 
currency as the subject “barely registers as a political issue” (Hallding et al. 2011, p.50). The 
problem of climate change’s low political profile was blamed on the lack of discussion of the issue 
significantly in parliament “in which few voices raise climate change issues at national level” 
(Hallding et al. 2011, p.50). Inversely, it is assumed that since media and political discourses are 
constitutive, the lack of discussion in either discourse could have had a bearing on the salience or 




policy, or media, are often a preserve of a few actors in government, environmental non-
governmental organisations, the minerals-energy complex and academics. Discourse analysis pays 
attention to how the non-discussion of a key issue can be itself a strong discursive act,  hence the 
study interrogated the absence of climate change issues in parliament and investigated on the above 
issues and reflected on the underlying and some insidious issues and other connected discursive 
aspects surrounding the subject of climate change. The study was also interested in how the silence 
by the parliament legitimised the prevailing dominant neoliberal politics that characterise climate 
change mitigation in the country. The free passage of neoliberal climate change policies in South 
Africa could be blamed on the silence from political parties that have pronounced themselves as 
opposed to the doctrine of neoliberalism, for example, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the 
African National Congress (ANC) itself and the South African Communist Party (SACP). 
Important to this study is the fact that “climate change and our reaction to it are, at least partly, 
socially constructed” (Never, 2011, p.5) and the media, together with other discourse actors are 
key in the production and construction of knowledge (or the silence on knowledge) and the shaping 
of climate policy. It is important to understand how the media discourses on climate change build 
representations and perceptions on climate governance that resonate with the discursive interests 
of influential discourse network actors. The media and these other discourse actors are part of what 
Never (2011, p.6) called a ‘communities of practice’ which are “informal networks whose 
members are not only bound by the exchange of information, but by a sense of joint enterprise or 
a common identity”. These groups and their relationships become very important as their actions, 
when they act together, significantly shape the future of climate and people. This study, therefore, 
examined, through political economy and discourse analysis, how these groups (politicians, civil 
servants, the news media and the minerals-energy complex) represented aspects of climate change, 
define and determine policy and hence help build consensus on mitigation measures to be taken 
by the South African government. 
The economy of South Africa “is built heavily around its natural mineral and fossil fuel resources, 
and abundant coal” and this brings “powerful industry actors with interests aligned with this 
mineral-energy complex” (Hallding et al. 2011, p.51) to the climate change policy and media 
discursive spaces to control and define how these issues are discussed and thought about. As Never 




that functions ‘almost like a closed club’”. At national government level, Never (2011, p.18) 
observed that the individual actors were in the ranges of between 15-25 people. At institutional 
level, the Department of Environmental Affairs was seen to be the most engaged, and also to a 
“lesser extent” the Department of Science and Technology and the Department of Energy. 
Academics were seen to be active – working as “delegations at the international negotiations, and 
some form part of the transnational epistemic community IPCC, thus connecting domestic and 
global governance” (Never 2011, p.18). Within the NGO sector, Never (2011, p.19) saw the World 
Wild Fund (WWF) as the most influential and close to the Department of Environmental Affairs. 
Other notable organisations were the Earthlife Africa and Climate Action Partnership. The 
examination of sourcing patterns in the news stories analysed across the four newspapers concur 
with and confirm these assertions by Never (2011). For example, the news media drew most of 
their stories from events organised or attended by officials from the Department of Environmental 
Affairs. This inadvertently led to the inherent indexing of political voices. The Minister of 
Environmental Affairs, Edna Molewa, was by far the most referenced source across the four 
newspapers from 2011 to 2018. Furthermore, these sources also individually and sometimes in 
groups, wrote Op-Eds meant to outline policy frameworks and shape perceptions. In some cases, 
news reporters then produced stories that identically resembled the same views expressed in the 
Op-Eds. 
At corporate level “two major emitting companies, Eskom and Sasol” were seen to be highly active 
as a community of practice (Never 2011, p.18). Never (2011, p.20) established that energy 
executives were awfully close and therefore had an influence on the Department of Energy. Eskom 
and Sasol were “very close to the DoE [Department of Energy]” and because of this relationship, 
the companies had “a strong influence on the energy components of climate governance” in South 
Africa (Never 2011, p.20).  Hallding et al. (2011) supported this argument and noted that Eskom 
and Sasol have a very close relationship with government and heavily influence climate change 
policy formulation.  
However, it has been noted that “some individuals and units in the companies and the DoE 
advocate against climate protection – or for nuclear energy – while the climate change teams and 
other parts of the DoE favor renewable energy and greater climate protection” (Never 2011, p.20). 




important for this study to see how such contrasts and contradictions are reported in the mainstream 
media.  For its part Eskom, a state-owned monopoly electricity company, has been “criticized for 
an institutional culture that is openly hostile to renewable energy” (Hallding et al. 2011, p.51). 
Eskom reports more to the Department of Public Enterprises than the Department of Energy and 
the company has “permanent representatives on the country’s delegation to the UNFCCC” 
(Hallding et al. 2011, p.52). Sasol, “which produces liquid fuel from coal [and the] largest point-
source of greenhouse gas emissions” was described by Hallding et al. (2011, p.51) as a 
“strategically important and influential industry player” and “important factor in the domestic 
energy sector”. Key to observe is that in the newspaper stories analysed, the two companies, 
together with actors from ArcelorMittal and BHP Billiton, often got preferential primary 
definitional power in the news where they promoted discourses that were diffident towards 
renewable energy. This, they achieved, through a discursive strategy of de-economisation. 
Renewable energy sources were constructed by these actors as ‘unreliable,’ ‘inefficient,’ ‘unable 
to provide baseload’ and too expensive. Coal and nuclear on the other hand, were considered 
reliable, efficient and cheap alternatives. These discourses often cohered with key ideas coming 
from newspaper editorials and Op-Eds written by senior editorial staff. For example, at the Sunday 
Independent, Jovial Rantao, Editor of the Sunday Independent, often showed bias towards coal 
which he portrayed as providing reliable electricity supply and Don Derby, the Business Times 
editor, who argued against renewables because they could not provide baseload. Drawing from 
Hallding et al. (2011, p.51), as a result of these conflicted interests, the strong links between the 
energy industry, the news media and those drafting and implementing climate change policy in 
South Africa was also responsible for curtailing policies that are ambitious in curbing greenhouse 
gas emissions because “powerful economic interests feel threatened by the prospect of an 
ambitious mitigation policy” (Hallding et al. 2011, p.51).  
While there are key forces resistant to climate change mitigation based on reducing the use of 
fossil fuels, those, especially from the Department of Environmental Affairs who favour renewable 
energy are also contradicted. The South African response to climate change is highly contradictory. 
On the one hand the country seeks to continue with the exploitation of natural mineral energy 
resources, and on the other hand has actively participated in the UNFCCC sponsored Kyoto 




carbon trading. It can be argued that carbon trading cannot be a panacea to climate change 
mitigation as it allows those companies with enough money to pollute and pay off their emissions 
by actually buying more carbon credits (Cabello 2009). The carbon market has become a potential 
new global financial market where nature is being subjected to the neoliberal tenets of profit 
(Evans & Musvipwa 2017). Due to their neoliberal nature, carbon markets allow big polluters to 
pollute and buy credits to continue polluting through buying carbon credits from developing 
countries and communities. At policy level, the Green paper of 2010 and the Third National 
Communication to the UNFCCC, South Africa sees its participation in the carbon market as 
lucrative. For example, the Greenpaper endorsed “market-based policy measures” which include 
“carbon trading and offsets” (Bond 2012, p.157). South Africa, through its participation in the 
carbon market, has benefited from a World Bank grant of US$14.4 million to convert methane to 
electricity at the Bisasar Road dump in Durban. Communities around the Clare Estate have rejected 
the project and called for the closing of the dump that receives about 5000 tonnes of waste per day 
(Bond 2012). The news media often celebrated market-led climate solutions. Aspects of carbon 
trade, now included in the Carbon Tax Act of 2019, were celebrated as ways of addressing climate 
change. The uncritical reproduction of neoliberal solutions then led to capitalistic self-mutation 
where capital is viewed as capable of addressing the risks it produced. 
This section has discussed the political economy and ecology of climate change in South Africa. 
The next section is a critique of this political economy, showing how it continues the appropriation 
of ‘finite’ resources as though they were ‘infinite’. Ulrich Beck’s (1992) risk society thesis is used 
to illuminate these criticisms. 
2.7 Finite Resources and Risk Society: Capitalism with no guarantees 
This section discusses the shortcomings of neoliberal capitalist responses to climate change and 
emissions reduction as informed by Beck’s (1992) risk society thesis. Using Beck’s ideas, the 
study also examined how the political economy and ecology of climate change in South Africa are 
re/presented in the news media. The key actors within the risk society attempt to gain legitimacy 
through defining the climate problem and proposing solutions through discourse. While past 
responsibility for global warming rests with the industrialised global North, present responsibility 
points more to industrial activities in very few countries of the global South, with BASIC and 




accounting for 40 percent of emissions in Africa. This new scenario brings to the fore the need for 
mitigation commitments from global South countries, who for the past, have claimed a space in 
the global carbon space to achieve ‘economic development’.  
Informed by Beck’s thesis, it is important for this study to interrogate how elite actors within the 
minerals-energy complex and their proxies in the South African government  might achieve 
dominance in climate change governance through their access to the media and also provide a pool 
of sources for the media to rely upon when constructing climate news. By so doing, they are able 
to articulate their views on climate change that favour a developmental path characterised by 
continued use of fossil fuels to ‘achieve economic development’ and to ‘lift the masses out of 
poverty’. At a geopolitical level, the discourse sponsors push through the dichotomy of North and 
South and play South Africa victim to global capitalist machinations that seek to hinder economic 
development. Principles of historical responsibility are emphasised, and aspects of present 
responsibility are conveniently ignored. All these discourse practices help build public opinion 
around capitalist interests. It was important for this study to interrogate how the media reported on 
these discourses.  
Beck (1992, p.21) saw climate change problems as “risks of modernisation” and outcomes of 
industrialisation facilitated by the expansion of capitalism. Similarly, Felix Guattari (2000, p.15) 
saw climate change problems that face the world today as a wholesome product of exploitative 
tendencies symptomatic with capitalist expansion, arguing that a “capitalism that does not exploit 
resources – be they natural or human – is yet unthinkable. A capitalism that is symbiotic rather 
than parasitic may never be possible”. Importantly, Beck (1992, p.28) noted that the exploitation 
of natural resources led to the emergence of industrial society (risk society), which is characterised 
by the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere through industrial activities, leading 
to ecological risks such as increased land and sea temperatures, reduced precipitation and extreme 
weather. In his risk society thesis, Beck (1996) identified two phases that are between the industrial 
society (modernity) and risk society. Firstly, through industrial development, environmental risks 
in the form of an increase in atmospheric greenhouse concentrations and pollution are produced 
but are not subjected to public and political debate. Secondly, the “hazards of the industrial society 




society” acknowledges that it is a risk society but still continues to make decisions and act on 
patterns of the old industrial society.  
 
As these risks become evident and the need for change in our relationships with nature emerge, 
the dominant capitalist structures begin to provide prescriptions that ensure the survival of 
neoliberal capitalist systems at the cost of climate justice. Zygmunt Bauman (1991) cited by Beck 
(1996, p.38) criticised attempts to cure the climate change problem through neo-market principles 
arguing that such attempts bring more challenges than solutions:  
fighting against the risks of unrestrained business activity has itself become a ‘major 
business offering a new lease of life to scientific/technological dreams of unlimited 
expansions. In our society, risk-fighting can be nothing else but business – the bigger it is, 
the more impressive and reassuring. The politics of fear lubricates the wheels of 
consumerism and helps to ‘keep the economy going’ and steers away from the ‘bane of 
recession’. Ever more resources are to be consumed in order to repair the gruesome effects 
of yesterday’s resource consumption. Individual fears beefed up by the exposure of 
yesterday’s risks are deployed in the service of collective production of the unknown risks 
of tomorrow (Bauman 1991 cited by Beck 1996, p.38). 
 
Beck (1992) noted that the commodification and commercialisation of risks aligns so well with 
the capitalist logic of profit where environmental risks are seen as opportunities. 
 
The media are important in the social constructions of risk and contestation (Cottle, 1998) as they 
legitimise the neoliberal capitalist system through “creating a climate of unquestioning passivity” 
Guattari (2000, p.15) to both local and global mitigation proposals.  Jaclyn Dispensa and Robert 
Brulle (2003 cited by Boykoff 2011, p.4) saw “the news media [as serving] as an important 
institution for the reproduction of hegemony” where capitalist worldviews of climate governance 
are represented. For this reason, Boykoff (2011) suggested that any study of media representations 
of climate change should focus on the cultural politics of the representations to understand “how 
social and political framings are woven into both the formulations of scientific explanations of 
environmental problems and the solutions proposed to reduce them” (Boykoff 2011, p.5). Boykoff 
argued that the cultural politics that favour neoliberal responses and the “concomitant politics of 
interest groups have resulted in a naturalised consideration of market-led approaches to policy 




optimism, have been significant forces influencing the wider cultural politics of climate change” 
(2011, p.5). While condemnations abound on “the dangers of emergent carbon capitalism 
associated with commodifying the atmosphere, and the fixation with market mechanisms as 
primary tools to answer climate questions,” (Boykoff 2011, p.5). Boykoff (2011) argued that such 
criticisms are absent from the mainstream media and rather the media is inundated with 
representations of market-led solutions. This study examined the extent to which these neo-liberal 
cultural politics of climate change are embedded and entrenched in the chosen mainstream 
newspapers in South Africa. 
2.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter discussed the institutionalisation, internationalisation and politicisation of climate 
change. All these tasks were undertaken because an articulation of media representations of 
climate change in South Africa demands a full grasp of the problems that have been brought by 
the warming climate, the politics that are at play in terms of governance, attempts to address the 
problem, and the political economy of climate change globally and in South Africa. This chapter 
examined and discussed the politicisation of the climate problem and the resultant political 
ideologies that have attempted to shape climate governance. To achieve this, the chapter traced the 
internationalisation and institutionalisation of the climate problem. The chapter went on to discuss 
the political economics and ecologies of climate change globally and in South Africa. The 
contradictions in climate governance in South Africa were discussed. Allusions are made to the 
need to simultaneously curb emissions and achieve economic development, the latter requiring (as 
per the government of South Africa policy narratives) a reliance on fossil fuels. The formal and 
informal networks that shape climate policy in South Africa were also examined. The next chapter 
presents the theoretical framework. The chapter introduces and discusses the metabolic and 
ecological rift theories found within environmental sociology. These theories are used in the study 
to align the analytical framework to critical approaches that have politicised and problematised the 








Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework - Ecological Rift and Capitalist Risk Society 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed highlighted the institutionalisation and internationalisation of 
climate change issues. This chapter serves as the grand theoretical foundation to the study. The 
chapter alludes to the idea that the problems of climate change that the world is facing are not 
isolated from the social relations of our existence. Rather, they are intrinsically tied to the political 
economic system of capitalism. As a way of entry, this study argues that global climate change 
and its attendant sub-problems are products of capitalist accumulation and material reproduction. 
Any discussion of climate change should encompass critical views from environmental sociology 
that agree that unfettered and unbound capitalist interests all work in entrenching accumulative 
behaviour, ecological destruction, biospheric disruption and thus climate change. The chapter 
draws on the works of Karl Marx (1963) to elucidate the concept of metabolic rift, as well as John 
Foster (2000, 2010), Brett Clark and Richard York (2005) and Clark (2008) to extend Marx’s 
concept of metabolic rift to that of ecological rift. The concept of risk society (Beck 1992, 1996) 
is applied to draw attention to the risks produced by capitalism’s logic of accumulation and the 
never-ending desire to exploit both nature and labour. These theoretical underpinnings are 
necessary in unpacking capitalism as an exploitative regime that has huge negative impacts not 
only on the exploited labour but on nature which it views as given gratis (freely) and thus valueless. 
Studies on media representations of climate change have seldom drawn their theoretical inspiration 
from these concepts. It is the object of this study to situate the discursive analysis of climate change 
representation in the news media within these broad theoretical foundations to broaden the 
analytical field and account for whether the media re/presentations themselves pay attention to 
these structural and existential issues of capitalist political economy and its attendant consequences 
on nature. As a way of argument, the study contends that the solutions put on the table to deal with 
climate change have been hugely neoliberal, shy away from the real questions of political 
economy, and therefore prescribe solutions that extend and entrench the culture of self-mutation 
that characterises capitalism. Concepts such as sustainable development, it is argued, are meant to 
build an image of capitalism that can cure the ills it produced through the rhetoric of responsible 




Two key observations regarding South Africa’s climate change policy and discourse arenas are 
worthy describing. Firstly, the climate change discourses in South Africa are intimately linked to 
energy discourses. As noted earlier on in this thesis, South Africa is an energy-intensive economy, 
where coal represents the lifeblood of the entire economy. Climate change mitigation requires that 
countries divest from coal and reduce emissions by all possible means. To imagine this in the 
South African context also forces one to imagine the complex energy scenarios and vested 
interests. Radical coal divestments mean that the country will have to sacrifice its coal mines and 
coal-fired power stations, it means removing electricity subsidies for huge mining and processing 
companies, it means reduced profits for the mines and heavy energy consumers and it also means 
changed power relations. Essentially, the future energy plans (energy futures) determine how 
South Africa will manage to reduce its emissions. This observation is important as it illuminates 
the difficult terrains that characterise the South African economy and how the country will manage 
to truly reduce its emissions without breaking particular relationships. All it means is that coal 
interests are powerful in determining the climate change policy arenas. Continuing with coal use, 
as is argued later in this chapter, perpetuates the metabolic and ecological rifts, something not 
pleasant considering the state of the planet. The second observation is that as the country seeks to 
move away from coal, at least ideally, there has been optimism in technological and renewable 
energy interventions. The techno-renewable energy optimism has become so naturalised, at least 
at discourse and not implementation level, with hopes that this would lead to a more ‘successful’ 
green economy.  
 
All these two observations also shape out in how the news media in South Africa have represented 
the climate change response policy frameworks. The representations have been divided between 
coal indispensability and techno-renewable optimism leading to a green economy. All these 
divisions (discourse tribes) are firmly reproduced through the discursive strategies of 
economisation, coal for example, is represented as providing reliable electricity to power economic 
growth on the one side and renewable energy being constructed as energy of the 21st century 
providing clean energy solutions for economic growth under the green economy. All these 
discursive tribes, this study argues, promote the capitalist interests of elite groups. Coal use 




interests of the multinational renewable energy companies and their local proxies. None of the 
discourses propose a shift away from capitalism. At this realisation, the study then invokes the 
metabolic and ecological rift theories, as a way of unpacking the embeddedness of capitalism in 
the climate change risk and ecological rift society. These frameworks move away from neoliberal 
theories of economic modernisation, towards truly political projects of transformation informed 
by environmental sociology theories. 
 
The theoretical and methodological choices that have been made in this study are very subjective 
and move the study towards being a political project, one that is interested in capitalistic rupture 
and the ushering in of social, economic and climate justice. An argument is made for climate 
change approaches that seek a change in the nature-human relations based on reciprocity and 
metabolism. Through the examination of media representations of climate change issues and more 
specifically the energy debates, it was observed that news media in South Africa promoted climate 
solutions that put the market ahead in the form of coal-based capitalism or techno-renewable 
energy-based capitalism. This central issue encroaches across the entire work presented here.  
 
3.2 The Metabolic Rift Society: It’s Genesis 
The metabolic rift theory has its origins in natural sciences (Clark & York 2005, p.397). Marx 
(1973) brought the term into humanities following the writings of agricultural chemistry scholars 
such Justus von Leiberg (1859) who argued that “the intensive methods of British agriculture were 
a system of robbery” (cited by Clark & York 2005, p.398). The agricultural chemistry scientists 
saw urbanisation and the transportation of food from rural areas to urban areas as leading towards 
the depletion of soil nutrients.  This study adopted the concept of metabolism from environmental 
sociology, especially the Marxist reconstructions by scholars such as Clark and York (2005), Clark 
(2008) and Foster (2000, 2010). The metabolic and ecological rift theories are central because they 
are able to grapple “with both qualitative and quantitative dimensions of relationships” becoming 
frameworks that help one to “deal with both sides of the dialectic between society and nature 





Marx defined metabolism as the “complex, dynamic interchange between human beings and 
nature” (cited by Foster et al. 2010, p.141). Jason Moore (2011), while advancing the theory of 
capitalist-motivated environmental metabolic rift, noted that the theory is not only as important in 
understanding capitalist development but also as “indispensable”. According to Moore (2011, p.1), 
capitalism should not be seen as having an “ecological regime” but rather as “an ecological 
regime” itself. In advancing this premise, Moore (2011, p.1) sought the “dialectical unity of the 
accumulation of capital and the production of nature”. Similarly, Raymond Williams (1980, p.83) 
observed that the relationship between humanity and nature ought to be that of interdependence 
and symbiosis. However, because humans had “mixed our labour with the earth, our forces with 
its forces too deeply to be able to draw back and separate either out,” the relationship was no longer 
dialectic but one based on humans’ unending conquer of nature (Williams 1980, p.84). He asserted 
that “[W]e ourselves are products: the pollution of industrial society is to be found not only in 
water and in the air, but in the slums, the traffic jams, and not these only as physical objects but as 
ourselves in them and in relation to them” (Williams 1980, p.83-84). 
 
The exploitation of nature, to draw from Williams’ work, destroyed the metabolic/symbiotic 
interchange that humans ought to have with nature. The idea interchange, as Marx (1964 cited by 
Foster et al. 2010, p.142) argued was to be aligned to the recognition that nature was a finite 
resource and that “man lives on nature” where “nature is his body, with which he must remain in 
continuous interchange if he is not to die”. Drawing from Marx, Foster et al. (2010, p.142) noted 
that this metabolic relationship was destroyed through human interventions that saw nature as an 
infinite resource. Commercial agriculture, for example, was blamed for the first metabolic ruptures 
as land degradation due to excessive land use led to the loss of soil nutrients. Few proprietors 
sought to maximise their yields for profits by using “intensive methods of production”. These 
processes began the journey towards an ecological rupture in the human-nature interactions. As a 







This involved the application of artificial fertilisers to restore soil productivity. However, these 
artificial fertilisers or what Foster et al. (2010, p.94) called the ‘technological fix’  
created [more serious] additional ecological rifts and other environmental problems. The 
production of synthetic fertilizer produces airborne nitrogen compounds that increase 
global warming. Nitrogen runoff overloads marine ecosystems with excess nutrients, 
which compromise natural processes that generally remove nutrients from the waterways. 
The increased concentration of nutrients within the water causes eutrophication. This leads 
to oxygen-poor water and the formation of hypoxic zones—otherwise known as “dead 
zones” because crabs and fishes suffocate within these areas. 
 
Consequently, the “attempts to ‘solve’ the rift (loss of soil nutrients) created additional rifts and 
failed to solve the primary problem, given the continuation of production based on the 
accumulation of capital” (Clark & York 2005 p.398). Contrary to the traditional agricultural 
production systems where “essential nutrients were returned to the soil, capitalist agriculture 
transported nutrients essential for replenishing the soil, in the form of food and other crops, 
hundreds, even thousands, of miles to urban areas, where they ended up as waste” (Clark & York 
2005, p.397-398). 
 
Essentially, capitalist agriculture and trade within the global agri-food systems widened the 
metabolic rift. Owing to the logic of capital and its profit tendencies, Clark and York (2005) saw 
the “pursuit of profit” as a driver behind the “sacrificed investment in the land, causing the 
degradation of nature through depleting the soil of necessary nutrients and despoiling cities with 
the accumulation of waste as pollution” (p.399). Capitalism widened the metabolic rift, not only 
with regard to agriculture but “in other realms of the society-nature relationship” (Clark & York 
2005, p.399). As the demand for food increased, food production also increased “through 
expanding agricultural production to less fertile land – depleting the nutrients of these areas – and 
through the incorporation of large quantities of oil in the agricultural process, used in the synthesis 
of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, contributing to the carbon rift” (Clark & York 2005, p.399). 
Clark and York (2005) noted that because of mechanisation, agriculture had “become the art of 
turning oil into food” (p.399). While the objective of producing more food succeeded, the greater 
ecosystem suffered.  The effects of the technological interventions (artificial fertilisers) produced 
risks that affected the entire ecosystem through land, water and air pollution. The IPCC report of 




total atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions. These emissions are inherently coming from 
commercial ‘chemical-oil’ agricultural activities. As noted earlier in this chapter, chemical 
agriculture, not only does it cause pollution through chemical fertilisers, but because it is so 
mechanised, the oil used in commercial agricultural processes makes the emissions even worse.  
South Africa is heavily invested in commercial agriculture, with farms across the country that feed 
the growing cities and towns. Demand for food is growing, hence farming, through whatever 
means possible, is seen as central to ensuring the country’s food security. However, drawing from 
the arguments put forward in this chapter, the increased agricultural production to satisfy the 
capitalist system worsens the metabolic and ecological relationships between humans and nature. 
The South African government, as part of climate change response strategies, as envisaged in 
different policies such as the South Africa’s Third National Communication to the UNFCCC of 
2017, put agriculture as a central aspect to be taken care of. Agriculture, paradoxically, is both a 
key driver of climate change and at the same time a key victim. Extreme weather events have 
already shown how agriculture could be affected by severe climate change impacts (examples 
include the 2015-2016 and the 2018-2019 El Nino periods characterised by excessive flooding in 
some areas and unbearable drought in others). However, in the climate change response discourses, 
the government and consequently the media (because of excessive reliance on government 
sources) have not popularised responses that seek to alter agricultural practices towards the 
restoration of the metabolic relations between humans and nature, solutions that propose aspects 
of producing what is sufficient and not surplus-based agricultural forms. This study contends that, 
such discourses, if given discursive access, could become entry points to (dis)articulating 
agriculture from oil and chemicals, such ideals, if met, could then become re-tracing and re-
establishing forces, of course, with the ultimate goal being agriculture for food based on use and 
not exchange value. The agro-based climate change discourses represented in the news media only 
limited the discussion of agriculture as a passive victim of climate change, in need or urgent 
technological interventions. These interventions included techno-optimism what the government 
called climate-smart agriculture, a concept that the news media reproduced uncritically without 
paying attention to its processes and political economy. This study, as argued in Chapter Six, Seven 
and Ten, does not see climate-smart agriculture as a solution, but just another technological 




3.3  Capitalism and the Carbon-Ecological Rift Society 
While key social interactions with nature can be traced to the advent of the Homo sapiens, human 
species as they tried to control nature, especially through making fire, biospheric destruction can 
be acutely linked to the development of industrial capitalism (Clark & York 2005, p.403). 
Although human exploitation of nature began with the primitive man burning trees and plants for 
warmth and cooking, leading to the release of carbon dioxide (CO2) stored by the natural forests, 
the impacts were not drastic. As capitalism developed, industrial society’s desire to exploit and 
use resources at its disposal increased. The introduction of industries meant that human labour 
alone was no longer sufficient. New forms of energy were then necessary to sustain the ever-
increasing (population which led to the increase in mass production) demand for mechanical 
production. From its early phases, industrial society needed greater access to energy sources. As 
Foster et al. (2010, p.96) observed, nature began to suffer deforestation as the demand for energy 
increased with wood being the primary source of energy. Industrial processes such as metals 
smelting put “greater pressure on forests, as trees were fed to the fires” (Foster et al. 2010, p.96) 
leading to deforestation across Europe especially in those areas that were closer to production sites. 
As the rifts caused by deforestation emerged, industrial society managed to bring in fossil fuels 
(especially coal and gas) to address the imminent energy crisis. These fuels, more than just closing 
the gap left by deforestation, were much able to facilitate increased industrial production. 
Instructive, however, is that these very solutions are primarily behind the global warming and other 
environmental problems the earth faces today.  
 
It is important to note that the “same logic that dictated the expansion and intensification of 
agricultural production fuelled the drive behind the productive systems in cities” (Clark & York 
2005, p.404). As agricultural production intensified, ownership of the land became concentrated 
in the hands of few landlords and this forced people to move into cities “to seek work … struggling 







This was coupled with capitalist development of technology to complement human labour and 
energy for maximum productive efficiency. As Marx (1976 cited in Clark & York, p.405) averred: 
An increase in the size of the machine and the number of its working tools calls for a more 
massive mechanism to drive it; in order to overcome its own inertia, requires a mightier 
moving power than that of man, quite apart from the fact that man is a very imperfect 
instrument for producing uniform and continuous motion. 
 
In agreement with Marx, Clark and York (2005) noted that the era of industrial society required 
tools that could transcend human labour limitations to maximise production. This new industrial 
society requirement enabled the adoption of fossil fuel “for the new machines” (Clark & York 
2005, p.405). As industrial society evolved, coal-powered steam engines were developed to 
facilitate transportation, mass production and trade, thus causing “increases in the quantity of 
matter-energy throughput” (Clark & York 2005, p.405). All these developments had one objective, 
to oil the capitalist machinery and produce more profits for those who were in ownership and 
control of the means of production. Profit accrual, Foster et al. (2010, p.157) argued, “remains the 
primary objective in capitalist economies”. As industrial capitalism developed, its dependence on 
increased supply of raw materials increased and as a result the economy was structured “around 
fossil fuels (a reality that is now deeply entrenched) [where the] ability to take coal and petroleum 
from the earth accelerated the expansion of capital, releasing large quantities of CO2 into the 
atmosphere” (Clark & York 2005, p.406). As more fossil energy resources were exploited for 
capitalist accumulation, more carbon dioxide was dumped into the atmosphere thereby “placing 
greater demands upon the carbon cycle to metabolize this material” (Clark & York 2005, p.406). 
However, the ability of the of the natural atmospheric processes (carbon sinks) to absorb the excess 
carbon have been overwhelmed by the increased and undeterred emissions of greenhouse gases. 
This rupture (failure to sink the excess carbon) has resulted in catastrophic global warming and 









While consensus is there that industrialisation is the principal driver behind global warming and 
climate change, Clark and York (2005, p.404) argued that it is paramount to understand 
industrialisation as existing within “a particular global economic system” which puts profit 
accumulation above environmental concerns. In discussing the dangers of ceaseless accumulation, 
Paul Sweezy (2004, p.7-8) contended that: 
A system driven by capital accumulation is one that never stands still, one that is forever 
changing, adopting new and discarding old methods of production and distribution, 
opening up new territories, subjecting to its purposes societies too weak to protect 
themselves. Caught up in this process of restless innovation and expansion, the system 
rides roughshod over even its own beneficiaries if they get in its way or fall by the roadside. 
As far as the natural environment is concerned, capitalism perceives it not as something to 
be cherished and enjoyed but as a means to the paramount ends of profit-making and still 
more capital accumulation. 
 
Analogous to Sweezy’s thesis, Clark and York (2005) described the capitalist industrial society as 
a society that “freely appropriates nature’s supplies and leaves wastes behind” (Clark & York 
2005, p.407).  
Capitalism successfully conquers the earth (including the atmosphere), taking its 
destructive field of operation to the planetary level. The exploitation of nature is 
universalized, increasingly bringing all of nature within the sphere of the economy, 
subjecting it to the rationality of profitability” (Clark & York 2005, p.408). 
 
Critical perspectives on climate change have not been robust. Environmental sociology has been 
weak. The reconstruction of Marx’s writings on the value theory and the metabolic rift resurrected 
the consciousness of environmental sociology to the core problems and drivers of climate change. 
Scholars such as Clark, York, Foster, Beck and Maarten Hajer. have been able, to some extent, to 
bring in critical perspectives and show that climate change problems must be understood as 
problems of society and the dominant mode of production that has enjoyed over two centuries of 
hegemonic cultural monopoly. Foster et al. (2010, p.139) argued that capitalism  
has been the global hegemonic economic system, influencing human interactions with 
nature, shaping the particular organization of material exchange. Thus, it is important to 
grapple directly with how global climate change is related to the historical era of capitalism, 
which serves as the background condition influencing social development. Through 
understanding the logic of capital, it is possible to assess how such socioeconomic system 





Other proponents of this view such as Clark and York (2005, p.395) argued that most 
environmental sociology works have simply acknowledged that human activities have contributed 
to the ever accumulation of carbon dioxide and continues to do so resulting in planetary warming. 
However, simply acknowledging this trend is not enough but there is need to understand “the logic 
of capital and its development” (Clark & York 2005, p.396). The accumulation of carbon dioxide 
in the atmosphere was “tied to the accumulation of capital among the economic elite” (Clark & 
York 2005, p.396). Clark and York (2005) sought to develop a grand theoretical framework that 
could be used to understand “human influence on the carbon cycle and the influence of climate 
change (potentially stemming from ruptures in the carbon cycle) on societies” (p.391). They 
applied Marx’s metabolic rift theory in explaining the nature-society relationship by  
examining the connections between anthropogenic (human generated) influences on the 
carbon cycle and the accumulation of carbon in the biosphere, the inability of technological 
fixes to solve climate change…and the flooding and destruction of carbon sinks due to the 
ceaseless drive to accumulate capital (Clark & York 2005, p.392).  
 
Ecological and metabolic rift theories examine and seek to explain the “social problems that 
contribute to climate change” (Clark & York 2005, p.393). As the world continues to pursue 
industrialisation and development, something synonymous with global South political-economic 
ideology, Clark and York (2005, p.392) bemoaned that “waste emissions continue to be created at 
the rate faster than natural systems can absorb them, contributing to the creation of a global 
ecological crisis”. Eugene Rosa and Thomas Dietz (1998, p.421) noted that the relationship 
between the climate system and humanity was constitutive and interdependent. They argued that 
“[C]limate shapes human activity. Human activity shapes climate” (Rosa & Dietz 1998, p.421). 
This is contrary to postulations by theorists within the economic modernisation paradigm6 who 
see nature as a free gift ready for exploitation, disregarding this essential interdependence and 




6 Ecological modernisation theory “assumes that through the ongoing modernization/rationalization of 
productive systems and public and private institutions, society will progress to a ‘green’ state- i.e., 
environmental regulations and environmentally benign industries will produce a sustainable future, as 




ignoring the fact that nature itself is a finite resource with boundaries. Problems in this relationship, 
to borrow from Marx’s metabolic rift treatise, emerge as a result of humanity’s exploitative 
tendencies that deplete nature’s ability to support human systems. The quest for capital and 
accumulation are primary in the depletion of nature’s resources that are central to the survival of 
human beings. By extension, through destroying the metabolic relationship between humanity and 
nature, a rift emerges that leads to the current ecological rift crises characterised by climate change.  
“The capacity to support life on earth -and, therefore, all societies – depends on the moderating 
influences of gases that envelop the planet, warm its surface and protect it from harmful radiation. 
All plant, animal and human life on the planet is dependent upon the warming capacity of these 
gases, referred to as the ‘Greenhouse Effect’, for maintaining a habitable climate” (Rosa & Dietz 
1998, p.422). Rosa and Dietz (1998, p.423) argued that over the past billion or so years, the Earth 
maintained a “natural balance [of the gases] necessary for regulating temperature to life-supporting 
levels”. However, due to human activities through industrialisation and mechanised agriculture, 
this balance and the “proportions mix” have been disrupted and as a result the global mean and sea 
temperatures have warmed and continue to do so unabated resulting in the global warming crises 
that the planet is facing today. As Clark and York (2005, p.392) showed, any alterations on the 
earth’s natural energy balance systems and the natural process of “material exchange can 
potentially undermine the endurance of societies” stating that “nature and society influence and 
shape each other” (see also Rosa & Dietz 1998, p.421). While humanity’s destructive tendencies 
are well-documented, what had lacked was the uptake of the ecological discourse within sociology 
and humanities, especially the neo-Marxist branches of critical environmental studies and media 
and cultural studies.  
 
This study, informed by Marx’s metabolic rift theory, Beck’s ground-breaking risk society theory 
and Foster, Clark and York’s ecological rift theory, argues that any study on climate change 
politics and the communication discourses should be done with a strong affinity and fixation on 
these theories, for they provide researchers the ability to examine how capitalism, as a way of life, 
was being reproduced in the news media. Central to note in this study is that South Africa, already 
exhibiting essential characteristics of a risk society, still has strong discourses that promote the 




reducing poverty. The discourses on coal indispensability were being given extensive prominence 
in the news media and were sponsored by actors in the minerals-energy complex and in 
government. By re/producing these views, essentially the news media also re/produced the 
economic system that benefits from coal use, and industrial capitalism. While the coal 
indispensability discourse was being promoted through discursive economisation and as 
benefitting all, the news media largely failed to pay attention to the ideologies that were being 
propelled under the false pretence logics of ‘economic development’. Through translating coal use 
into oral models, the news media also constructed neoliberalism as a common sense. By advancing 
the interests of industrial capitalism, the news media at the same became culpable in the planetary 
ecocide7. 
 
South Africa, as an energy-intensive economy, is solidly built within a capitalist economic 
framework that survives on the exploitation of natural-mineral energy resources (fossil fuels). It 
has high per capita emissions globally. Despite the exploitation of fossil fuels in the name of 
economic development and social emancipation, the majority of its populations are within the 
lower hierarchies of society in terms of material possessions and they live in abject poverty. There 
is massive accumulation of material wealth at the top echelons of society. While calls are being 
made for reduced use of greenhouse gases, South Africa has continued and is expected to increase 
its fossil energy consumption in the name of catching-up and economic development. This 
developmental course of action being taken by South Africa and other economies in transition such 
as India, China, Brazil and Russia leave questionable the “ecological sustainability of human 
societies” (see Clark & York 2005, p.392). While the epistemic discourse on the destructive and 
disruptive impacts of climate change is now cemented (IPCC 2013 as reference), the energy, policy 
and media discourses in South Africa continue to point in the direction of coal.  




7 “the extensive damage to, destruction of or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given territory, whether by human 
agency or by other causes, to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants of that territory 




Peter Grimes and Jeffrey Kentor (2003, p.261), while acknowledging that global north countries 
were responsible for global warming, noted that the dependency on foreign investment by the 
global south countries allowed multinational companies to export their emissions from the north 
to the south. They argued that “foreign capital penetration in 1980 [had] a significant positive 
effect on the growth of CO2 emissions between 1980 and 1996” (2003, p.261), as the investments 
were “concentrated in those industries that require more energy” (Grimes & Kentor 2003, p.261). 
In their quest for ‘economic development’ under the ethos of catching-up, global south countries 
(South Africa included) have often opened up to and attracted foreign investments in sectors that 
are energy intensive. This has worked well in displacing emissions from the global north to the 
global south and fits well with the ideas of Lawrence Summers (1991), the then World Bank Chief 
Economist, where he saw as beneficial for the developed countries to transfer  dirty industries to 
developing countries. Summers, in a World Bank leaked internal memo of December 12, 1991 
argued for the following three points: 
'Dirty' Industries: Just between you and me, shouldn't the World Bank be encouraging 
MORE migration of the dirty industries to the LDCs [Less Developed Countries]? I can 
think of three reasons: 
1) The measurements of the costs of health impairing pollution depends on the foregone 
earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this point of view, a given 
amount of health impairing pollution should be done in the country with the lowest cost, 
which will be the country with the lowest wages. I think the economic logic behind 
dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should 
face up to that. 
2) The costs of pollution are likely to be non-linear as the initial increments of pollution 
probably have very low cost. I've always thought that under-populated countries in 
Africa are vastly UNDER-polluted, their air quality is probably vastly inefficiently low 
compared to Los Angeles or Mexico City. Only the lamentable facts that so much 
pollution is generated by non-tradable industries (transport, electrical generation) and 
that the unit transport costs of solid waste are so high prevent world welfare enhancing 




3) The demand for a clean environment for aesthetic and health reasons is likely to have 
very high income elasticity. The concern over an agent that causes a one in a million 
change in the odds of prostate cancer is obviously going to be much higher in a country 
where people survive to get prostate cancer than in a country where under 5 mortality is 
200 per thousand. Also, much of the concern over industrial atmosphere discharge is 
about visibility impairing particulates. These discharges may have very little direct 
health impact. Clearly trade in goods that embody aesthetic pollution concerns could be 
welfare enhancing. While production is mobile the consumption of pretty air is a non-
tradable.  
 
3.4 Neoliberal Green Responses and the Limits of Prometheanism   
Ecological modernisation theorists believe that technology has the potential to dematerialise the 
world. Proponents of ‘green capitalism’ argue that “through innovative technological development 
and appropriate reformist government policy, the economy can be dematerialized” (Clark & York 
2005, p.410). Technological developments were constructed as having the ability to disarticulate 
and decouple “the economy from energy and material consumption, allowing human society, 
under capitalism, to transcend the environmental crisis” (Clark & York 2005, p.410). To pacify 
fears of increased ecological rifts under “capitalist economic operations,” the neoliberal discourse 
has sought to portray capitalism as a force that “will lead to improved technologies and efficient 
raw material usage, and that this will decrease emissions and environmental degradation” Clark 
and York (2005, p.409). Through the neoliberal techno-optimistic discourse, ‘green capitalism’ 
was seen as “saving the planet from the ecological destruction” (Foster et al. 2010, p.60).  
 
However, in resisting the techno-optimistic neoliberal discourses, Foster et al. (2010, p.60), argued 
that those who advocate for sustainable capitalism do so on the basis of “a distorted accounting 
deeply rooted in the workings of the system that sees wealth entirely in terms of value generated 
through exchange. In such a system, only commodities for sale on the market really count. External 
nature – water, air, living species – outside this system of exchange is viewed as a ‘free gift’”. As 
observed by Clark and York (2005, p.410) the ecological modernisation paradigm  
is at base a functionalist theory in that it does not see the emergence of ecological rationality 




the key institutions in societies. Ecological modernization theorists contend, then, that 
radical ecological reform does not require radical social reform – i.e., the institutions of 
capitalist modernity can avert global environmental crisis without a fundamental 
restructuring of the social order. 
 
Similar to Foster et al. (2010) and Clark and York (2005), Polly Higgins (2012, p. xiv) noted that 
neoliberal solutions were unable to “disrupt the very system that is destroying our world”. 
Solutions to climate change need to address the capitalist roots of the ecological rift and risk 
society: 
Climate change is just a symptom. Like a cold, we hope we can brave it out until it recedes. 
But this is one cold that has turned serious, not just for you and me but for the whole of 
humanity. The problem is we are treating it with thinly disguised placebos in the hope that 
they will do the trick. Without addressing the source, the symptom has no chance of being 
cured. Instead the symptom returns time and again, each time worse and increasingly 
debilitating. In time we become accustomed to the debilitation and accept it. Yet still it gets 
worse: like a smoker who is hacking and coughing but nonetheless drags deeply on his 
cigarette, choking in the knowledge that his behaviour is facilitating his own painful death. 
So too are we continuing to indulge a habit that has no benefit for us either in the short or 
the long term (Higgins 2012, p.xiii). 
 
Capitalism could not be trusted with solving climate change because, as an economic system, 
capitalism was “a bubble economy, which uses up environmental resources and the absorptive 
capacity of the environment while displacing the costs back on Earth itself, thus incurring an 
enormous ecological debt” (Foster et al. 2010, p.53). In a similar argument, Felix Guattari (2000, 
p.28) contended that climate change problems could not be solved by prescribing the same 
solutions that, in the first instance, are responsible for the current ecological crises. He argued that 
a system “regulated in a univocal way by a profit economy and by power relations, would only 
lead, at present, to dramatic dead-ends” (Guattari 2000, p.28). 
 
Environmental sociologists refute the ability of capital to foster sustainability and the social good. 
Clark and York (2005, p.411), for example, agree that through capitalist innovations, new 
technologies have been birthed and that some of these have been able to eliminate some forms of 
pollution. Foster et al. (2010, p.94) warned that while capitalism, may at some moments, appear 
to be solving environmental problems, it is important to note that in doing so “new crises spring 




for the ecological and climate crises, “the proposed solutions are to shift the problem from one 
form of energy [fossil fuels] to a new form of energy” (Foster et al. 2010, p.96). The now promoted 
energy systems include nuclear power, which though unpopular because of past disasters, has risen 
back to the top “with new promises of how the new nuclear plants are safer—never mind the issue 
of radioactive waste” (Foster et al. 2010, p.96).  
 
The technological and market-driven solutions to climate change provide a scapegoat for the global 
elite and leaders “to avoid addressing greenhouse gas emissions, since they can claim that technical 
fixes make it unnecessary to take action to preserve forests and curtail the burning of fossil fuels” 
(Foster et al. 2010, p.96). These approaches  
avoid addressing an economic system that is largely structured around burning fossil fuels 
and must constantly renew itself on a larger scale as it runs roughshod over nature. Often 
techno-solutions are proposed as if completely removed from the world as it operates, 
without any sense of the social and economic relations of power. The irony is that such 
narrowly conceived ‘solutions’ would only serve as a means to prop up the very forces 
driving ecological degradation, allowing those forces to continue to operate, as they create 
additional ecological rifts (Foster et al. 2010, p.96). 
 
The desire to address climate change through a capitalist lens (market-driven solutions and 
technological fixes) obscures critical discussions on the need to challenge the mainstream mode 
of production and its limits in responding to the environmental crises it created. Capital’s desire 
for profit and never-ending accumulation only helps to reproduce more rifts and ruptures in the 
nature-human relations. As Foster et al. (2010, p.99) noted, market-driven solutions to climate 
change only help the system to “reproduce itself on an ever-larger scale”. While the problems of 
climate change are admissibly anthropogenic, and the international community has heed calls to 
address them, it is important to note that what the international community has sought to solve are 
not the root causes of the environmental problems (see Higgins 2012). The fixes that are being 
proposed are being done “without addressing the fundamental crisis, the force driving the 
ecological crisis—capitalism itself” (Foster et al. 2010, p.100).  
The global reach of capital is creating a planetary ecological crisis. A fundamental 
structural crisis cannot be remedied within the operations of the system. Marx explained 
that the future could be ruined and shortened as a result of a social metabolism that 
exhausted the conditions of life. Capital shows no signs of slowing down, given its 




and the most serious effects of continuing with business as usual will not fall on present 
but rather future generations…. Capitalism is incapable of regulating its social metabolism 
with nature in an environmentally sustainable manner. It’s very operations violate the laws 
of restitution and metabolic restoration. The constant drive to renew the capital 
accumulation process intensifies its destructive social metabolism, imposing the needs of 
capital on nature, regardless of the consequences to natural systems (Foster et al. 2010, 
p.100).  
 
In order to truly solve the problems of climate change and other attendant environmental crises 
there is “need to go to the root of the problem: the social relation of capital itself” (Foster et al. 
2010, p.99). Frank Fischer and Maarten Hajer (1999, p.5) also poked holes into the Promethean 
approaches dealing with climate change: 
We see various key practices of modernity working to further this political-economic 
dynamic: the dominance of scientific rationality and expert knowledge, the strong reliance 
on- and belief in – technological innovation as the agent of progress, the implicit 
legitimization of the use of violence, and the central tendency to see nature as an exploitable 
resource or as an externality. 
 
Fischer and Hajer (1999, p.3) noted that the solutions to climate change through the rhetoric of 
sustainability have been housed within the Promethean theoretical discourse of technological and 
scientific solutions where it is believed that “problems, once recognized and publicly 
acknowledged, can be handled by the institutions of science, technology, and management”. They 
concluded that “sustainable development [the discourse] has facilitated a project of institutional 
learning, according to which the existing institutions internalized the ecological dimension into 
their thinking but without addressing this cultural critique” (Fischer & Hajer 1999, p.3). This aligns 
with the criticisms put forward by Bauman (1991), who asserted that it is difficult for 
environmental problems to be solved by the very mechanisms that caused them in the first place. 
Guattari (2000) in his Three Ecologies, also noted that capitalist institutions would not work, 
arguing that a symbiotic relationship between capitalism and nature was unimaginable as 
capitalism relies on exploitation and alienation of both human labour and the natural environment. 
This argument is also widely supported by (Beck 1992, 1996; Foster 2010; Clark & York 2005 
and Foster et al. 2010). Joseph Schumpeter (cited by Foster et al. 2010, p.32) saw capitalism as a 
system of “creative destruction … a process [of accumulation and growth], stationary capitalism 




2010, p.7-8) argued that the movement on sustainable development is not primarily concerned 
with averting global warming but rather an attempt to stop climate change without structurally 
destroying the capitalist core. In criticising the sustainable development discourse, Jensen and 
McBay (2009 cf. Foster et al. 2010, p.8) argued that “[I]ndustrial capitalism can never be 
sustainable. It has always destroyed the land upon which it depends for raw materials, and it always 
will. Until there is no land (or water, or air) for it to exploit. Or until, and this obviously the far 
better option, there is no industrial capitalism”.  
 
Important for Fischer and Hajer (1999) is the cultural continuities symptomatic of the sustainability 
discourse where the “conceptual frame and specific actors through which environmental discourse 
get reproduced” have not changed. They argued that the “dominant discourse that shaped up 
around the notion of sustainable development was one that suggested that the major institutions 
could learn, had learned and would be able to reinvent themselves so as to become co-producers 
of a new sort of development that would be more environmentally sustainable” (Fischer & Hajer 
1999, p.4). Drawing from the environmental sociology paradigm, they noted that current 
prescriptions offered to deal with climate change were problematic because  “the insistence that 
the (existing) system [capitalism] could adapt, glosses over important characteristics of a 
globalized modern capitalist system” Fischer and Hajer (1999, p.5). In strengthening this view, 
they saw the “ecological crisis” as the unintended “consequence of some of capitalism’s essential 
features, such as the continued reliance on economic growth and its insatiable desire to create new 
markets, as well as its use of such growth to create space for political interventions”.  
 
Central to their argument was the need to understand capitalism as a cultural system and they drew 
their definitions of culture from Raymond Williams (1961 cited by Fischer & Hajer 1999) where 
culture is given three explanations. Firstly, Williams (1961 cited by Fischer and Hajer 1999) saw 
culture as art (aesthetic), secondly, he defined culture as cultura which means the cultivation of 
the mind and spirit. The third definition defined culture anthropologically, where he viewed it as 
a way of life. This study, similar to Fischer and Hajer (1999) adopts the third definition and 
throughout the dissertation capitalism is treated as a culture (way of life) that is predatory to nature 




nature/environment are ideologically represented and reproduced by the news media in South 
Africa. Such an attempt was central to sufficiently make clear the cultural politics of climate 
change within a capitalist economy like South Africa. 
 
Fischer and Hajer (1999, p.7) called for an investigation into the “cultural embeddedness of policy-
making, of our social life, and of the way of governing economic activity”. Drawing from this call, 
this study extends this examination into the cultural embeddedness of news production in the 
context of climate change. The study sees news production as culturally embedded, either in 
ideological cultures of capitalism or in opposition to them. How the media culturally produces and 
reproduces the climate change, environmental and sustainability discourses is important to 
understand. The cultural frames that they produce and reproduce shape the policy-making 
discourses, shapes social life and either legitimise or delegitimise particular ways of climate and 
environmental governance, and economic governance.  
 
Fischer and Hajer (1999, p.7) distinguished between cultural critique and cultural politics. Cultural 
critique “refers to the various utterances within environmental discourse that problematize existing 
arrangements and suggest alternative ways of living with nature” where the media criticises the 
“effluents of affluence”. Cultural politics “is about the way in which different systems of ordering 
are either maintained or imposed on others, how questions of identity feature within environmental 
discourse, how social relationships get redefined, or how particular ways of doing things either get 
reproduced or are changed” (Fischer & Hajer 1999, p.8). 
 
Hajer (1995, p.5) argued that “developments in environmental politics critically depend on the 
specific social construction of environmental problems”. In this study, discourse analysis became 
useful in the analysis of how climate change and environmental problems are reproduced in the 
news media. This was essential to gain an in-depth understanding of climate change cultural 
politics in South Africa. Specific to this study are the forces that are active in media constructions 






In his critique of the sustainable development mantra, Hajer (1995, p.12) argued that  
the present hegemony of the idea of sustainable development in environmental discourse 
should not be seen as the product of a linear, progressive, and value-free process of 
convincing actors of the importance of the Green case. It is much more a struggle between 
various unconventional political coalitions, each made up of such actors as scientists, 
politicians, activists, or organizations representing such actors, but also having links with 
specific television channels, journals and newspapers, or even celebrities (Hajer 1995, 
p.13).  
 
For Hajer “[T]hese coalitions are unconventional in the sense that the actors have not necessarily 
met, let alone that they follow a carefully laid out and agreed upon strategy. What unites these 
coalitions and what gives them their political power is the fact that its actors group around specific 
story-lines that they employ whilst engaging in environmental politics” (Hajer 1995, p.13). In the 
process the discourse coalitions “develop and sustain a particular discourse, a particular way of 
talking and thinking about environmental politics” (Hajer 1995, p.13). 
 
It is important to note that while the discourse coalitions may converge on particular storylines, 
their interests are often divergent with “different social and cognitive commitments, but they all 
help to sustain, in their own particular way, the story-line” of environmental issues (Hajer 1995, 
p.13). Important to this study is an understanding of who, among these discourse coalition actors, 
gets to define and control meanings of climate change and environmental problems that are 
produced in the South African mainstream news media. Hajer (1995, p.14) attached much 
significance to the concept of “representation,” notably, that our understanding of climate change 
and environmental politics are products of particular representations. This study used the concept 
of representation to understand how through discourse constructions, particular discourse 
coalitions re/present and construct particular cultural politics in relation to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. And by extension how the dominant capitalist coalitions get the 
definitional power and dictate how climate change politics are organised internally and globally. 
Drawing from Hajer (1995, p.15), discourse analysis was used in this study “to illuminate the 
social and cognitive basis of the way in which problems [climate change] are constructed” in the 
South African news media as part of climate change discourse coalitions. Examining discourse 




(Hajer 1995, p.15). This study examined the ‘agency’ of media systems in their construction of 
climate change stories. 
 
Scholarship on climate change and environmental sociology is often polarised between those who 
believe in ecological modernisation as a fix to the environmental problems and those that seek a 
new sustainable path. Environmental modernisation attempts “to bend nature even more to our 
will, to make it conform to the necessities of our production” (Foster et al. 2010, p.8). The latter 
view “involves an analysis that examines the social drivers of ecological degradation, illuminating 
the contradictions of the social order” (Foster et al. 2010, p.8). It is the latter view that this study 
draws upon. Any attempt to understand climate change communication should be made with a 
clear understanding of the social drivers of climate change and examine how the media deals with 
such key issues in its coverage. Such an exercise, achievable through employing discourse 
analysis, brings to the core whether the media, as part of climate change discourse coalitions and 
actors overtly or covertly promote ecological modernisation or are critical and bring to their 
re/presentation the social and ideological facets that underpin capitalist development.  
 
3.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter is critical in laying the possibilities of environmental sociology concepts in 
understanding the attendant foundations of the climate crisis and the application of these concepts 
in the study of news media representations of climate change. The argued that the problems of 
climate change are not isolated from the social relations of our existence. Rather, they are 
intrinsically tied to the political economic system of capitalism. The chapter conceptualised the 
global climate crisis and its attendant sub-problems as products of capitalist accumulation and 
material reproduction. As such, any discussion of climate change must encompass critical views 
from environmental sociology that contend that unfettered and unbound capitalist interests all 
work in entrenching accumulative behaviour, ecological destruction, biospheric disruption and 
thus climate change. The chapter drew on the works of Karl Marx to elucidate the concept of 
metabolic rift, on John Foster, Richard York and Brett Clark to extend Marx’s concept of metabolic 
rift to that of ecological rift. The concept of risk society was applied to draw attention to the risks 




nature and labour. These theoretical underpinnings are necessary in unpacking capitalism as an 
exploitative regime that has hugely negative impacts not only on the exploited labour but on nature 
which it views as given gratis (freely) and thus valueless. Studies on media representations of 
climate change have seldom drawn their theoretical inspiration from these concepts. Hence, the 
chapter sought to situate the discursive analysis of climate change representation in the news media 
within these broad theoretical foundations to broaden the analytical field and account for whether 
the media representations themselves pay attention to these structural and existential issues of 
capitalist political economy and its attendant consequences on nature. As a way of argument, the 
chapter argued that the solutions put on the table to deal with climate change have been hugely 
neoliberal and shy away from the real questions of political economy and therefore prescribe 
solutions that extend and entrench the culture of self-mutation that characterises capitalism. 
Concepts such as sustainable development, it was argued, are meant to build an image of capitalism 
that can cure the ills it produced through the rhetoric of responsible technologies and 
environmental engineering. The next chapter reviews the literature on the media and climate 
change. The chapter traces the profile of climate change in the news media, with a focus on how 
the coverage and representation have evolved. The chapter also examined and discussed the 


















Chapter Four: Climate change and the media 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the metabolic and ecological rift theories and their significance in 
unpacking climate change discourses. The metabolic and ecological rift theories provided an 
understanding of the social nature of climate change, thus, the need for this study to examine how 
the news media politicise or depoliticise the climate problem, away but not disconnected from the 
discourses hinged on science and economic modernisation. Further, the theories are useful in 
analysing the neoliberal climate change discourses in the news. This chapter concerns itself with 
exploring the role of the news media in relation to climate change coverage, representation and 
construction. The chapter noted that research on climate change communication has substantially 
increased, albeit with more studies focusing on the global North. There a significant gap regarding 
studies that specifically focus on the global South geopolitically, regionally and at national levels. 
It is therefore imperative for this study to significantly contribute towards the critical body of 
knowledge on climate change re/presentation and re/construction in the global South, specifically 
through studying how the subject is re/presented and re/constructed in the South African news 
media. The chapter identified gaps in literature and the study tries to fill up these. The chapter 
discusses the ideal concepts on the role of the media proffered by different scholars while at the 
same time appreciating the barriers that limit the media from accomplishing its duties. The chapter 
traces the historical development of climate change coverage in the news media, analysing the 
trends that have characterised this development. Further, the chapter discusses, from a literature 
background, the influence of media political economics on climate change news re/presentation 
and re/construction. Following this political economy discussion are analyses of the ideological 
representations of climate change in the news media. The chapter continues to discuss and present 
literature on how the global South news media have re/presented and re/constructed climate 
change. The last section in the chapter provides a concise summary of all key studies done on 
South African news media coverage of climate change and the issues that these studies sought to 
articulate. This discussion helped in the collection and analysis of data relating to news media 





4.2 Evolution of Climate Change Cover[age] in the News Media: trends and patterns 
Climate change presence in the media is traceable to the 1960s in the United States of America. 
During the early phase, the cover[age] went through peaks and downs and was indexed to major 
environmental disasters and key scientific publications. David Sachsman (2000, p.3) noted that the 
publication of the ‘Silent Spring’ by Rachel Carson in 1962 increased the mediated visibility of 
environmental problems and helped direct public perception to the subject. Important is the view 
that regardless of this emergent visibility, the coverage remained low and its influence limited. 
Mark Neuzil and William Kovarik (1996, p.xii) contended that the early forms of 
environmentalism were “likely to be local instead of national in scope”. Coupled with this 
observed localism and parochialism is the argument that climate change has been characterised by 
its relationship with ‘issues attention’ that led to inconsistent and short-lived coverage of the 
subject. In contrast to this local orientation of news stories, studies in South Africa observed that 
the news media covered climate change as something external and happening elsewhere (Tagbo 
2010). While the media gave attention to key environmental problems such as oil spills (Sachsman 
2000), the attention given to other critical issues (for example, the anthropogenic nature of climate 
change, the need to change unsustainable lifestyles and diminishing rainforests) was minimal.  
 
Scholars observed a marked shift in news media coverage of climate from around 1988 (Carvalho 
& Burgess 2005; McComas & Shanahan 1999). The shift coincided with the emergent definition 
of climate change from political spectrums such as Margaret Thatcher (the then prime minister of 
the United Kingdom), the Montreal Protocol that began to regulate ozone-depleting chemicals, 
and other environmental conferences. As noted by Katherine McComas and James Shanahan 
(1999), the media began paying attention to a phenomenon called the ‘greenhouse effect’ and 
between 1988 and 1992 the coverage of this phenomenon and related environmental problems 
increased. However, as they argued, this attendant trend in coverage subsided because it was linked 
to some environmental ‘drama’ and hence event-based. And then so what if it subsided? Strike the 
nail on the head!! 
 
Contrary to McComas and Shanahan (1999) who explained the downs in news media attention 
towards climate change after 1992 to the absence of constant dramatic environmental issues, 




and pronouncements relating to climate change as responsible for the diminished coverage. 
Carvalho and Burgess (2005) and Boykoff and Yulsman (2013) all concurred that politics and 
politicians were influential factors shaping the environmental and climate change discourses in the 
media than science. Their studies observed climate change coverage in the news media as 
cyclically evolving (following a similar thesis proposed by Downs in 1972), concluding that in 
both the United Kingdom and the United States, climate change visibility in the media was closely 
related to the attention the subject received from political and economic discourse actors and 
sponsors. In the United Kingdom for example, Carvalho and Burgess (2005) saw Margaret 
Thatcher and the conservative government as influencing media attention towards climate change. 
Climate change mediated visibility increased in correspondence with and to key speeches and 
announcements made by Thatcher at the Royal Society in 1988, and at the United Nations in 1989.   
 
Arguably, the role of politics in influencing the climate change discourse relates closely with 
Bennett’s (1990) concept of ‘indexing’ political debates in news coverage. The concept of 
indexing links media discourses to political discourses, showing how the media coverage of events 
and issues draws from the political activities and discourses. Further, drawing from Carvalho and 
Burgess (2005) and Carvalho (2005), this study considers the peak in climate change coverage in 
the media between 1988 and 1992 to be linked to the Brundtland Report published in 1987. This 
report became the red flag in relation to human agency in causing climate change. The report 
triggered the Montreal Protocol of 1988 that sought to regulate ozone-depleting chemicals and 
reduce carbon emissions. In addition, it led to the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit held in Brazil in 
1992, which began the process of institutionalising and internationalising climate change and saw 
the formation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. From the above 
discussions, this study examined the key factors behind the re/presentation and re/construction of 
climate change in South Africa, ascertained the power and involvement of politicians in defining 
or shaping the definition of, and issues around climate change. Further, the study attempted to 
relate peaks in climate change visibility in the media to external events (political, economic, 
environmental and scientific) and discussed and established how these influenced either peaks or 





This study contends that visibility and non-visibility of climate change in the news media at 
particular junctures all talk to and inform media coverage. While coverage resembles the 
importance of the subject to the media, non-coverage represents and constructs climate change as 
not important. Therefore, the study examined moments of media silence to determine why and 
how the media rendered climate change unimportant during those moments, understand which 
issues attracted media attention. Overall, the study examined developments in the climate change 
scientific, environmental and social discourses and determined media negligence and attention to 
these developments. This helped to understand and determine which groups and events in society 
are important for the media and thus, are given the power to shape how the discourse develops in 
the media public arena. This conceptualisation derives from Phil McManus’s (2000) study in 
Australia where the media were found to have collectively neglected to cover the Conference of 
Parties (COP4) meeting in Buenos Aires. By not covering the event, McManus (2000, p.307) 
concluded, the media diminished “the potential for debate and public concern”. McManus (2000, 
p.311) observed that newspapers in Australia turned a blind eye to COP4, except for The Age 
which published 12 articles from international wire services, local reporters and other international 
media. By so doing the news media constructed the “negotiations in Buenos Aires as happening 
elsewhere, with little attempt to link the causes of climate change with daily lives of people in 
Australia” (McManus 2000, p.316), noting that what “emerges, however, is a situation in which 
the Australian government has been relatively unchallenged in its attempt to define and negotiate 
climate change actions using the argument of protection of the national economy” (McManus 
2000, p.316). 
 
4.3 Political Indexing and Peaks in Media attention 
Boykoff (2007), like Carvalho and Burgess (2005), linked the peaks and falls in news media 
cover[age] of climate change to political and ecological developments in the United States. A 
“dramatic increase” in coverage was observed between 2003 and 2006 in both the United States 
and the United Kingdom. This increase related to political movements in climate change policy 
rhetoric at the G8 summit held in Scotland. Before the conference, the then president of the United 
States George Bush and the then United Kingdom prime minister Tony Blair had made strong 
climate-change statements which fed into United States “media speculation about a potential shift 




United States media coverage of climate change also link to key events such as the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations, the release of Al Gore’s Inconvenient Truth and the Stern reviews in the United 
Kingdom (Boykoff 2007, p.481). Doulton and Brown (2009, p.198) saw that the peak in cover[age] 
coincided with major events, noting that articles (majority) published in 1997/1998 drew mostly 
from events and discussions around the Kyoto conference and protocol. They noted that the two 
key prominent discourses (rationalism and potential catastrophe) were related (i.e. their peaks in 
coverage) to key events (the publishing of Bjorn Lomborg’s ‘Sceptical Environmentalist’ in 2001). 
 
Notwithstanding the increase in scientific knowledge on the climate change subject between 1991 
and 1997, the level of climate change coverage in the media declined. Carvalho and Burgess (2005, 
p.1465) explained this fall in terms of the lack of sustained political activity and political 
announcements during the period. This scenario showed that “there is little correspondence 
between scientific knowledge of climate change risk and media understanding of that risk”. Rather 
the subject gains high-mediated visibility when linked with political discourse actors. In the United 
States, Boykoff (2007, p.474) noted that politicians also usurped the definitional role of climate 
change from scientists. This often meant that the re/presentations sponsored by politicians 
promoted climate science denial and scepticism. The media construction of climate change 
differed “significantly from the scientific consensus” (Boykoff 2007, p.474).  
In their analysis of the controversies related to the coverage of climate change in the French media, 
Stefan Aykut et al. (2012, p.157) described the coverage of climate change as “an expression of a 
struggle over ownership and framing of climate change as a public problem”. Prior to the year 
2000, (Aykut et al. 2012, p.161), climate change coverage in France centred on international events 
such as the 1992 Rio conference in Brazil, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol negotiations and the subject 
was “not considered a major domestic problem, and climate policy was mainly reduced to its 
international component”. Aykut et al. (2012, p.161) observed that the subject of climate change 
attracted peaks in media attention after the 2000s, with domestic lenses being applied (linked to 
meteorological events such as heatwaves and winter storms). However, the coverage and “media 
attention still coincided with international events” such as The Hague Conference of 2000, the 
release of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) third and fourth assessment 




Aykut et al. (2012) explained the downs and peaks in climate change coverage in France by 
examining changes in journalism and climate science. They argued that before 2000, climate 
change journalism had not gained traction and after the millennium turn, more focused, 
professional climate journalism emerged. While the pre-2000 journalism re/constructed climate 
change in the “international tone”, the new crop of focused reporters took an “anecdote” approach 
focusing on “awareness raising”. These focussed reporters re/constructed climate change in terms 
of its “effects on people’s life-worlds, and options for mitigation were reduced to individual 
lifestyle changes”, shaping the climate change issue “as a matter of individual morality” (Aykut et 
al. 2012, p.162).  
Further, Aykut et al. (2012, pp.162-163) linked peaks and falls in coverage to “social and 
institutional changes” in the field of climate change science, noting that climate research in France 
was “weakly organised” pre-2000 and that the subject was not “a major research issue”. In 
addition, the peaks and falls were also linked to the “lack of institutionalised structures of 
communication to the media blurred the scientific message” (Aykut et al. 2012, pp.162-163). In 
the late 1990s to early 2000s, climate science research became progressively more professionalised 
(Aykut et al. 2000, p.163) and “climatologists began to invest time in communicating with or 
educating journalists” and scientists began to “play a central role in legitimising environmental 
journalists in their newsrooms”.   
Lastly, Aykut et al. (2012, p.164) noted that until the 1997 Kyoto conference, non-governmental 
organisations were not organised around climate change. However, this changed just before, 
during and after the Kyoto conference. They noted that these social and institutional changes also 
account for the peak in media-climate change attention after the millennium turn. Aykut et al. 
(2012, p.164-165) observed that climate change attention moved from coverage of uncertainties 
to a clear focus on the consequences, with the shutting-out of sceptical voices and denialists. 
4.4 Political Economy, the Media and Climate Re/presentation 
The political economy of the media influences how they re/construct and re/present issues of 
climate change (Anderson 2009; Boykoff & Yulsman 2013). The political economy approach 
“emphasizes the influence of media ownership, corporate finance and advertising upon news 
content” (Anderson 2009, p.170). The political economy of specific news organisations impact on 




dimensions, with Boykoff and Yulsman (2013, p.2) noting that “mass media representations arise 
from large-scale relations” with the political economic environment and newsroom structures of 
journalistic practice. They stated that political economic pressures imposed on the news media 
negatively impacted the media’s effort to produce fair and accurate news reports of “complex 
scientific, economic and political issues such as climate change” (Boykoff & Yulsman 2013, p.2). 
Carvalho (2007) noted that the reproduction of the capitalist ideology in relation to climate change 
representation went against the need to change the overall way of life, a change that requires a 
shift from consumerism and high energy use towards an equitable society based on 
environmentally-friendly energy sources. Ideally, Carvalho postulated:  
Effective climate politics would require changing some of the core characteristics of 
market-based democracies: moving from short-term goals to political far-sightedness, 
decoupling good government from economic growth and correcting imbalances of the 
global economic order (2007, p.180).  
In such instances, Carvalho articulated, the media would then be required to explore “the impact 
of big business – especially transnational corporations - on climate change” as “a necessary 
(though insufficient) condition of informed economic and political citizenship. Yet, their primarily 
commercial logic means that the media continue to be silent accomplices [and enablers] of the 
damaging practices of those agents” (Carvalho 2007, p.181). 
The capitalist political economy of climate change was blamed for how the news media construct 
and represent issues of climate change (Boykoff & Yulsman 2013, pp.2-3) in a manner that 
reproduces the dominance and hegemony of the capitalist system, observing that “state or 
corporate control of media through ownership or other means influences media coverage 
differently in different countries”. The political economy of the media and climate change should 
be understood from the mainstream political economy theoretical perspective. Robert McChesney 
(1999, p.31) argued “profit motivations can go a long way to providing context for understanding 
the nature of media content.” The same profit motivations can also influence the media cover[age]. 
This argument was amplified by Carvalho (2005, p.21) who asserted that “factors like ownership 
and the wider political economy of the media can provide significant contributions [to media 






The current disinvestments in the media industry “through decreases in mass media budgets for 
in-depth journalism, and the huge cuts in manpower” (Boykoff & Yulsman 2013, p.3) affects the 
cover[age] of climate change as reporters are left reliant on second-hand information produced by 
public relations services, lobby groups and think-tanks. Such second-hand information sources 
become very powerful in deciding how the climate change issue is re/constructed and re/presented. 
They become strategic discourse actors and sponsors whose discursive strategies are uncritically 
reproduced by the news media. As Diaz Nosty (2009, p.103) argued, “Opinion generating 
institutions, such as foundations” are used. Further, industrial companies whose activities attract 
public backlash due to their environmental effects “have now become pillars for the environment 
through ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’” initiatives (Nosty 2009, p.104). Through “advertising, 
sponsorship and public approaches, they make people believe that major energy companies are 
environment friendly and that they even promote world sustainability” (Nosty 2009, p.104). Thus, 
most of the information on climate change, it has been argued, find its way into newsrooms without 
routine critical checking and thus reducing journalism to a mere megaphone for the discourse 
sponsors (Boykoff & Yulsman 2013).  
Mark Stoddart et al. (2017, p.386) argued that the news media “promote a field of engagement 
among a range of actors with a stake in climate change policy debate” and these can include 
corporations, environmental organisations, governments, scientists etc. It is important to study the 
political economy of the news media and consequently their re/construction of climate change in 
countries whose overall political economies are closely linked to fossil fuels. As such Stoddart et 
al. (2017) examined how the media in Canada constructed and represented climate change. They 
noted that “Canada has one of the highest per-capita carbon footprints in the world, coupled with 
a poor record of performance on climate change mitigation. This is at least partly because the 
Canadian political economy is deeply intertwined with the carbon complex,” which is constituted 
by “oil and gas exploration, producing and refining companies; [and] vehicle, plane and ship 
manufacturers; media, advertising and cultural corporations that promote high-carbon lifestyles” 
(Stoddart et al. 2017, p.388 citing Urry 2013, p.76). Importantly, Stoddart et al. (2017, p.388) 
argued that the “economic power of the carbon complex, particularly the Alberta oil industry, has 




Stoddart et al. (2017) argued that the “political economic context of climate policy debate provides 
a foundation for interpreting the mediated policy networks that are enacted by national news 
media” (Stoddart et al. 2017, p.388). In their hypothesis, they expected “fossil fuel interests to 
have high mediated visibility and to be well-connected to other key actors in challenging climate 
change mitigation […and] environmental organizations to have lower levels of mediated visibility 
and to be weakly connected to other key actors in promoting climate change mitigation”. However, 
their study revealed that the environmental organisations together with the national and provincial 
governments enjoyed more mediated visibility compared to fossil fuel industries. This did not 
mean, however, that the fossil fuel industry was weakly organised or that the media tried to fend 
off their influence. Rather, there was an ideological collusion between and among the fossil fuel 
industry, government and non-governmental organisations. 
Environmental organisations  
had limited political efficacy during 2006-2010. Instead, the news sources that appear to 
be able to serve as switchers between communication networks and policy networks are 
those representing the federal government and Environment Canada, the Liberal and NDP 
opposition parties, and the provincial governments of British Columbia, Ontario, and 
Alberta (Stoddart et al. 2017, pp.396-397).  
 
However,  
Environmental organizations are key actors in mediated policy networks and are linked to 
other actors through common discursive orientations, including provincial governments 
[…] are part of a constellation of news sources that promotes cap and trade and carbon 
taxes as solutions, and is openly critical of federal government performance on climate 
change (Stoddart et al. 2017, p.397). 
 
Though the fossil fuel industry did not enjoy any mediated visibility, neoliberal responses to 
climate change were still mediated in the media through government representatives, think-tanks 
and even environmental organisations. Stoddart et al. (2017, p.397) observed that  
During the period 2006-2010, the political economic importance of the oil sector did not 
translate into speakers from this industry appearing as central actors in mass mediated 
policy networks [….] Claims that addressing climate change will be an economic disaster, 
support for carbon capture and storage, or opposition to carbon taxes and cap and trade 
policies – positions we might associate with the carbon complex- are articulated by 






The interests of the fossil fuel industry were communicated by other news sources indirectly who 
acted as 
switchers between economic networks, communication networks and policy networks. 
Where low mediated visibility is coupled with this proxy effect, it may not indicate 
disempowerment or marginality, but rather is consistent with the notion that media 
visibility and invisibility may both be used strategically by key actors in environmental 
conflicts (Stoddart et al. 2017, p.397). 
 
Regardless of the absence of the fossil fuel ideologies in the Canadian news media coverage of 
climate change, the government was seen to be acting in their interest (for example the pulling out 
of Canada from the Kyoto protocol), thus allowing Stoddart et al. (2017, p.397) to conclude that 
“economic networks may carry more weight than communication networks in influencing 
Canadian policy network responses to climate change” (Stoddart et al. 2017, p.397). 
In a study of how fossil fuel companies (specifically ExxonMobil) sought to promote climate 
change doubt, Geoffrey Supran and Naomi Oreskes (2017) argued that ExxonMobil (one of the 
biggest oil and gas companies globally) successfully misled the public on climate change science 
by promoting ‘doubt’ through their advertorials in the New York Times and other key newspapers 
in the United States. They noted that the advertorials that appeared in the New York Times and 
came from ExxonMobil did not consistently communicate the truth about climate change being 
real, human-induced, and a serious problem. Supran and Oreskes (2017) analysed peer-reviewed 
and non-peer-reviewed articles published by ExxonMobil scientists, internal company 
communications and advertorials published in the New York Times between 1977 and 2014. They 
found that as the “documents become more publicly accessible, they increasingly communicate 
doubt” noting that;  
[T]his discrepancy is most pronounced between advertorials and all other documents. For 
example, accounting for expressions of reasonable doubt, 83% of peer-reviewed papers 
and 80% of internal documents acknowledge that climate change is real and human-caused, 
yet only 12% of advertorials do so, with 81% instead expressing doubt (Supran & Oreskes 






The advertorials were more accessible than the scientific journals and again the scientific articles 
were written for scientists not the public. Therefore, Supran and Oreskes (2017) concluded that 
ExxonMobil advanced climate science “through its scientists’ academic publications – but 
promoted doubt about it in advertorials” and thus misled the public on climate change. 
It is important to argue that the media in South Africa also operates in political economic 
environments (with powerful fossil fuel industries) and thus it is imperative for this study to 
interrogate this environment with the view of explaining and examining how the political economy 
of the media in South Africa conditions how the news media re/produces and re/constructs the 
climate change discourse. Studies elsewhere have noted the influence of the energy industries 
(Supran & Oreskes 2017; Stoddart & Tindall 2017) on how the media constructs and represents 
climate change. It has been found that these energy and fossil fuel-based industries provide 
misleading information on climate change, especially on human-agency and counter the narrative 
of alternative energy as this threatens their own industrial existence. Anderson noted that fossil 
fuel companies had engaged lobbyists and think tanks together with public relations companies to 
undermine science, especially in the United States. “PR, then, has played a highly significant role 
in the climate change debate and claims-makers are employing increasingly sophisticated 
strategies to target the media” (Anderson 2009, p.171). The media’s dependence on official 
sources make these people the ultimate definers of reality. Anderson avowed:  
Control over the media is as much about the power to silence and suppress issues as it is to 
publicise them. Moreover, claims-makers are engaged in continual definitional struggles, 
requiring an in-depth and multi-faceted analysis of the factors influencing the effectiveness 
of media strategies over time (2009, p.173). 
 
 
A close examination of the political economic environment of the media in South Africa helped in 
understanding the role of the mining-energy industrial complex’s relationship with the media and 
how this relationship impacts on the re/production and re/presentation of climate change in the 
country. Anderson (2009, p.170-171) contended that “media corporate interests and the vested 
interests of advertisers […might] discourage criticism of the government’s inaction over climate 
action or industry’s role. A dependency on advertising revenue from fossil fuel industries may lead 




4.5 Ideological Re/presentations of Climate Change 
Climate change discourses in the media are affected by a wide range of factors. Hugh Doulton and 
Katrina Brown (2009) posit that climate change coverage and representation are influenced by 
science, political actors, sources used by the media, reporters’ knowledge of the climate change 
subject, journalistic norms, newsrooms practices and newspaper ideological affiliations. Because 
of these factors, certain worldviews are privileged in the media over others, through selection and 
exclusion (Bennett 1988).  Carvalho (2007) perceived the media as crucial in the manner in which 
certain climate change political and economic discourses and ideologies are constructed and 
represented. She defined ideology as “a system of values, norms and political preferences, linked 
to a program of action vis-à-vis a given social and political order” where “people relate to each 
other and to the world on the basis of value judgments, ideas about how things should be, and 
preferred forms of governance of the world” (Carvalho 2007, p.225). The media discourse and 
media ideology are “mutually constitutive” and the media produce texts embedded with 
ideological closure and constructed and represented to reinforce and reproduce particular 
worldviews (Carvalho 2007, p.225). Carvalho (2007) argued that “science is reconstructed and not 
merely mirrored in the media” and that “Particular values and worldviews are produced, 
reproduced and transformed in media discourses” (Carvalho 2007, p.223). The media achieved 
this by “allowing or disallowing other social actors to advance their ideological standings” 
(Carvalho 2007, p.223).  
The media are both important arenas and important agents in the production, reproduction 
and transformation of the meanings of social issues [….] The particular discourses that 
they amplify strongly affect the social construction of problems and of ‘authorized voices’. 
Therefore, media(ted) discourses play key roles in social life as they are both conditions of 
intelligibility of the world and conditions of possibility of action (Carvalho 2010, p.2). 
 
Appreciating the importance of these conceptualisations, this study examined how particular 
discourses and ideologies (of both discourse sponsors and actors together with those of the news 
media) precondition the re/construction and re/presentation of the climate change discourse as it 
traverses the South African media-informational economy. This is important as those ideologies 
and discourses privileged by the media influence public understanding of the climate change 




worldviews that are given salience in the news media attain a powerful discursive position and 
become naturalised and are understood as common-sensical by the public (Gramsci 1971).  
4.5.1 Media-political Ideology and Climate change cover[age] 
How the media re/presents and re/constructs issues of climate change follows the ideological 
leanings of individual newsrooms. This trend is more noticeable in the global North media systems 
where studies have shown that the media tended to construct climate change according to their 
ideological systems and normally follow the inherent political divisions between left-leaning 
liberalism and right-leaning conservatism (Carvalho 2005; Carvalho & Burgess 2005; Stoddart et 
al. 2015, 2017).  
While studying media representation of climate change in the British mainstream newspaper 
industry, Carvalho and Burgess (2005, p.1467) observed that newspapers constructed and 
represented climate change according to their ideological standpoints. They pointed out that the 
conservative newspapers tended to construct climate change and the science as not proven and 
usually followed the discursive strategies used by the conservative governments. At the same time, 
the left-leaning newspapers such as the Guardian and the centre-left Independent constructed 
climate change as a reality and a problem needing urgent solutions.  
 
Ideological orientations of the media do not only affect the re/presentation and re/construction of 
climate change, but also the level of attention the subject receives from the media.  As concluded 
by Boykoff and Mansfield (2008), the ideological affiliations of newspapers played significant 
roles in determining the level of attention afforded the subject in both the United States and United 
Kingdom mainstream media. Cementing this observation, is the discovery by Carvalho and 
Burgess (2005) that left-leaning newspapers such as the Guardian and the Independent gave 
climate change more mediated visibility compared to the conservative neo-liberal newspapers such 
as The Times and the Daily Telegraph and their Sunday stable-mates.  
 
The construction of climate change in the mainstream British press between 1988 and 1990 
followed the ideological standpoints of each publication (Carvalho & Burgess 2005). As such, the 
Guardian (left-centre leaning, social democratic ideology) and The Times (conservative, right-




as consensual and reliable” and their reports relied on scientists as news [climate change] sources 
(Carvalho & Burgess 2005, p.1462). Though they defined climate change in the news, the 
scientists’ “capacity to influence the media agenda and therefore the public and political agendas 
– remained very limited as suggested by the number of articles” (Carvalho & Burgess 2005, 
p.1462). While the media represented climate change with scientific confidence, the media failed 
or was unwilling to show “traits of catastrophism” and refrained from projecting the risks and 
consequences. As Carvalho and Burgess (2005, p.1462) noted, “newspapers remained silent about 
responsibility for the problem, not only leaving unquestioned the economic and social practices 
that generate greenhouse gases (GHGs) but also omitting references to the role of political 
institutions”. However, after the United Kingdom prime minister Margaret Thatcher’s speech to 
the Royal Society in September 1988, there was an increase in the volume of stories on climate 
change in the mainstream newspapers, hence showing “the weight of political leadership in the 
definition of risks [and ...] after Thatcher’s speech, climate change was often narrativized as a 
major risk for human security […] for the first time, scenarios of impacts were brought forward” 
(Carvalho & Burgess 2005, p.1462). 
The Independent began publishing stories on the subject, and The Times (a conservative paper) 
published stories showing catastrophic consequences of climate change. Interestingly, the 
newspaper (The Times) changed course as “the range of political measures, economic 
transformation, and lifestyles necessary to address climate change became evident” and took a “a 
more sceptical position […] emphasizing the lack of evidence and the exaggeration of the problem 
by the other media (Carvalho & Burgess 2005, p.1463). The Guardian, coming from a different 
pro-environment, liberal social democracy ideology, amplified its narrative on climate risks 
(Carvalho & Burgess 2005, p.1463). The newspaper criticised government policies on energy 
(especially the proposal towards nuclear energy solutions) (Carvalho & Burgess 2005, p.1463). 
Carvalho and Burgess (2005, p.1463) noted that the Independent provided mixed representations, 
with some articles aligning with “the government’s discursive construction of climate change but 
others showed a more critical attitude”. 
The ideological representations of climate change also played out in the media after the publication 
of the first Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report on climate change in 1996 




the science, with the Guardian writing more articles that criticized “official positions or policies” 
(Carvalho & Burgess 2005, p.1463). However, the conservative neo-liberal newspapers, especially 
The Times and their Sunday-mates, questioned the veracity of the scientific claims, using what 
Carvalho and Burgess (2005, p.1463) described as a “rhetorical strategy of de-legitimating 
unwelcome scientific or political knowledge claims by discrediting the agents of such claims”. Of 
interest, however, is that The Times, though conservative in character and ideology, found itself 
opposed to the conservative government policies of Thatcher because of what Carvalho and 
Burgess labelled as “The Times’ allegiance to values of individual freedom, free market, and the 
preservation of the status quo [….] In this period, the paper’s core values were dominant in its 
discourse” (Carvalho & Burgess 2005, p.1464). 
The climate change discourse as sponsored by Margaret Thatcher was re/presented in a polarised 
manner by the mainstream news media. The left-leaning liberal newspapers acknowledged the 
importance of the government conceding to climate change scientific consensus but differed with 
the neoliberal solutions that the government offered and they also rejected the de-centring of the 
global warming problem from the industrialised countries. For example, the Guardian 
acknowledged “the importance of Thatcher’s speech” but “largely contested her propositions” 
while the Independent did not publish any articles based on Thatcher’s United Nations speech, a 
decision “equivalent to refusing to view it (publicly construct it) as significant” (Carvalho 2005, 
p.9). 
In contrast to the left-leaning news media, the conservative newspapers reproduced Thatcher’s 
views and at the same time presented oppositional opinion pieces from activist groups, which 
Carvalho argued “is representative of a discourse that has a minority status” (Carvalho 2005, p.9). 
For example, Carvalho (2005, p.9) observed that “The Times consistently awarded Thatcher the 
predominant framing power in debating the issue, reinforcing and legitimating her views” noting 
that the “negative reactions of opposition parties and non-governmental organisations were often 
listed at the bottom of articles, in an apparent attempt to meet the professional principle of balance” 
(Carvalho 2005, p.9). Synonymous with conservative newspapers in Canada and the United States, 
the conservative newspapers questioned the authenticity of climate science, for example, “The 
Times and especially the Sunday Times often dismissed climate change by discrediting and de-




Similar to the discursive strategies of the National Post in Canada (Stoddart & Tindall 2015), The 
Times disagreed with discourses that advocated for radical change in lifestyles, especially those 
that sought to overthrow neoliberalism. The newspaper “often fought claims for a need to change 
the economic, social, and political status quo and advanced a Promethean perspective of humans 
relations with the environment, which suggests an infinite capacity for man to exploit nature” 
(Carvalho 2005, p.9-10). 
There were dual representations of climate change and the government position on the issue in the 
Independent. The constructions depended on individual authors and the paper had both uncritical 
and critical constructions of climate change and government construction of the subject (Carvalho 
2005, p.10). By using a variety of sources (such as environmental groups, scientists, political 
parties), the Guardian chose a “precautionary approach to [challenging] government policies and 
debated alternatives” (Carvalho 2005, p.10). After Thatcher was replaced by John Major in 1991, 
Carvalho observed that The Times adopted the strategy of personalisation, helping “the prime 
minister’s claim to international leadership in addressing climate change by awarding him full 
protagonism” (Carvalho 2005, p.11). 
Throughout the conservative government stay in power from Margaret Thatcher to John Major, 
the conservative news media “continually anchored [their] representation of the issue in official 
sources and clearly contributed to reinforcing both Major’s power and the government’s standing 
in the debate” (Carvalho 2005, p.11) while the left-leaning news media challenged “the position 
of the British government on climate change by exposing the fact that its concessions to the US 
position weakened the UNFCCC” (Carvalho 2005, p.11). The left-leaning liberal news media such 
as the Guardian took the strategy of shifting perspectives and “looked at the problem in a few 
articles through the eyes of other actors such as developing countries or NGOs” often contesting 
“dominant ideologies, like economic liberalism” (Carvalho 2005, p.11).  
However, all the newspapers, both left-leaning and right-leaning were found to be conveying “a 
reductionist representation of international environmental politics. Constructing an opposition 
between North and South, the press simplified the causes of international conflict and often 
enhanced a biased reading of climate change by filtering the problem through northern lenses” 




Within the broad ideological parameters of free-market capitalism and neo-liberalism, 
avoiding a sustained critique of the possibility of constant economic growth and increasing 
consumption, and the profound international injustices associated with the greenhouse 
effect (Carvalho 2005, p.2). 
 
According to Carvalho (2005, p.11), “fundamental issues [were] being reduced in the press to 
‘squabbles between rich and poor’ [….] Strategies of de-legitimation and dismissal of the claims 
of developing countries, often positioned as extorting money from the North, were on display” 
(Carvalho 2005, p.11). Carvalho blamed the way climate change was institutionalised and 
internationalised starting from the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth summit in Brazil. She argued that the 
summit had (Carvalho 2005, p.11-12)   
consolidated the ideology of sustainable development. Claiming to harmonize economic 
growth with environmental protection, this discourse was hard to resist and harder to 
contest. Such a consensus became hegemonic, despite the fact that it continued to privilege 
a capitalist logic and promote consumerism, and the promises for the environment were 
quite vague (Carvalho 2005, p.12).  
Consequently, the news media appropriated the sustainability discourse “by displaying an 
optimistic view of its potential and thus naturalizing mainstream political discourses” (Carvalho 
2005, p.12). 
In their examination of media representation and construction of climate change in the United 
Kingdom mainstream newspapers, Doulton and Brown (2009) identified eight major discourses 
that prevailed in the media. The first discourse was the optimism discourse, a discourse that did 
not see climate change as problematic but rather viewed climate change as beneficial to humanity. 
Climate change “predictions and their likely effects are viewed with scepticism and climate 
scientists are seen as doom-mongers” (Doulton & Brown 2009, p.194). This discourse gave 
primacy to the benefits of a warmer climate and saw no need for action to fight it (Doulton & 
Brown 2009, p.194). The second discourse was the rationalism discourse, a discourse that sought 
to prioritise other developmental issues (which were thought to be more current than climate 
change) and deferring climate action to such a time when the need arise. This discourse 
acknowledged the severity of climate change but argued that the costs for adaptation and 
mitigation are too high hence the need to deal with problems as they occur, noting that climate 




this discourse encouraged developed countries to lead in mitigation activities based on historical 
responsibility and blamed global North countries such as the United States for non-action. It is 
relevant to point out this discourse relates to what studies on media representation of climate 
change in the global South (Billet 2010; Johannessen 2013) have observed, that the media in the 
global South are likely to promote this kind of discourse and blame the global North for current 
climate change problems using the historical responsibility pretext.  
Similar to this ethical mitigation discourse in the United Kingdom news media, is how the media 
in Sweden constructed climate change in a manner that encouraged the global North to lead in 
mitigation efforts and also blamed the United States for non-commitment to mitigation actions. 
Ulrika Olausson (2009, p.426) noted that the Swedish media constructed climate change mitigation 
in relation “to international political events such as G8 summits” etc. Olausson (2009, p.426) 
argued that mitigation was constructed as an international issue that requires international 
corporation. This is synonymous with what Carvalho and Burgess (2005) noted with the British 
right-leaning press that framed climate change as an international problem requiring collective 
mitigation. Contrastingly though, while the right-leaning conservative media in the United 
Kingdom blamed population growth and deforestation in the global South as the causes of global 
warming and thus the need for these countries to join mitigation efforts, the news media in Sweden 
gave responsibility for mitigation to actors in the industrialised global North countries, arguing 
that that would allow developing countries to develop.  
An interesting turn is that there are divisions on mitigation responsibility even on the corpus of 
developed countries. As Olausson (2009, p.426) observed, the news media in Sweden constructed 
key dichotomies between the European Union “who treat global warming as a serious problem 
and want to take action” against the United States “who neglect the global impact of the changing 
climate and refuse even to discuss regulations”. The media in Sweden constructed the European 
Union “metaphorically […] as the ‘engine’ of climate change negotiations,” opposed to the 
“stubborn” United States who were seen as impediments to climate change mitigation (Olausson 
2009, p.27). Even though the European Union and Sweden are discussed separately in the Swedish 
press, “they are both described as being part of the group of ‘good guys’, they appear side by side 





The fourth discourse that Doulton and Brown (2009) uncovered was the self-righteous discourse, 
a discourse that blamed the developing global South countries such as India and China for the 
increasing emissions, noting that the Indochinese position was threatening the future of the planet. 
This kind of discourse resonates with what Phil McManus (2000) called ‘distanciation’ – a concept 
where the media attempts to situate the problem elsewhere, creating the dichotomous notion of 
‘them’ and ‘us’ which basically imply and are founded on power hierarchies or superiority and 
inferiority complexes. Not only global North media use this discursive concept of distanciation, 
but rather studies on the global South media systems have arrived at the conclusion that the same 
tactic is employed where mitigation action is pitched as the responsibility of the global North to 
allow the global South space to develop without any emission caps in order to meet the global 
South developmental objectives. 
The fifth discourse identified by Doulton and Brown was the discourse on disaster strikes. This 
discourse constructed climate change as a current problem and called for action to help 
communities adapt and mitigate the negative impacts of climate change. In opposition to the 
rationalism discourse, the discourse on disaster strikes constructed climate change in the present 
tense, highlighting extreme weather events as evidence of a changing climate. This kind of 
construction is similar to what Olausson (2013) observed concerning the Swedish media coverage 
of climate change where climate change was viewed as a current problem requiring urgent 
collective action. The sixth discourse was on potential catastrophe, the discourse emphasised 
future impacts of climate change especially for the developing countries. The seventh discourse 
was the crisis discourse, which argued for the need to balance global imbalances and inequalities 
in order to address climate change. The eighth and last discourse that Doulton and Brown 
discovered was the discourse on opportunity, where it was thought that overcoming climate change 
could help the poor through the use of clean energy thereby harmonising economic growth with 
economic development.  
Potential catastrophe was the most prominent discourse (Doulton & Brown 2009, p.197). 
However, the discourse on potential catastrophe was more prevalent in the Guardian and the 
Independent newspapers (36% and 45% respectively) and was less prominent in the Telegraph and 
The Times (Doulton & Brown 2009, p.197). Rationalism was the most common discourse in The 




less in the Guardian and never in the Independent (Doulton & Brown 2009, p.197). Self-righteous 
mitigation was rare in the Independent and The Times and never in the Guardian. The discourses 
on disaster strikes and crisis were more prevalent in the Independent and the Guardian, with the 
opportunity discourse featuring less (Doulton & Brown 2009, p.198). It was observed that all these 
three discourses did not feature in the Telegraph and The Times. Doulton and Brown’s (2009) 
study found that ethical mitigation discourse was covered though not prominently in all the 
newspapers. 
Contrary to the view that the journalistic norm of balance influences climate change stories 
(Boykoff & Boykoff 2004; Boykoff 2007; Nosty 2009), Doulton and Brown (2009, p.199) saw 
that different newspapers had different preferred discourses (thus diminishing) the view on 
balance. Rather, there was no indication of “a strong attempt to represent a balanced mix of the 
different views surrounding climate change and development” because each newspaper had more 
prominent discourses, for example the Independent and the Guardian had crisis discourses 
dominating, while rationalism dominated coverage in the Telegraph and The Times (Doulton & 
Brown 2009, p.199). Doulton and Brown (2009, p.199) noted that the distinctions in discourses 
for each newspaper could be a result of newspaper ideology. They noted that The Times and the 
Telegraph are conservative newspapers that identify more with neoliberal political economics, 
hence the prevalence of discourses on optimism and rationalism “discourses that deny the need to 
do anything about climate change and shy away from the idea of potentially severe problems for 
the developing world” (Doulton & Brown 2009, p.199).  
Similar to these observations, ideological polarisation of climate change in the media emerged as 
an active element of how the media in Canada represented and constructed climate change. 
Stoddart and Tindall (2015) sought to explore the links between media representations and 
“understand the cultural politics of Canadian involvement in the climate change” in the overall 
climate change politics in Canada. In doing this, they analysed the coverage of climate change in 
Canada (the Globe and Mail and the National Post). Their study revealed that climate change is a 
divisive issue in Canada as much as it is in other developed global North countries. The divisions 
in the representation and construction of climate change in the Canadian news media were found 




Analogous to left-leaning liberal media coverage of climate change in the United Kingdom 
(Doulton & Brown 2009; Carvalho & Burgess 2005), the Globe and Mail (liberal left-leaning) 
focused on debates around the responsibility of the government, ecological and meteorological 
impacts and corporate responsibility (Stoddart & Tindall 2015, p.411). In the same manner as the 
neo-liberal conservative newspapers in the United Kingdom (Doulton & Brown 2009; Carvalho 
& Burgess, 2005), the National Post (conservative neo-liberal right-leaning) had themes on the 
“reliability of climate science, international negotiation, and the ecological and meteorological 
impacts of climate change” (Stoddart & Tindall 2015, p.411). The National Post questioned 
whether climate change was a “significant environmental problem” (Stoddart & Tindall 2015, 
p.411). The National Post in 2006 was found to have focused its climate change debates on the 
“reliability of climate science” (Stoddart & Tindall 2015, p.411). The Globe and Mail in 2010 was 
found to have presented a number of issue categories that included government responsibility, 
reliability of climate science, international policy negotiations and Canada’s dependence on oil. 
Coverage treated Canadian dependence on oil as a barrier to effective action on climate change 
while the National Post focused its attention on the negative impacts to the economy and markets 
of climate change mitigation, especially to oil industries and regions dependent on oil such as 
Alberta. (Stoddart & Tindall 2015, p.412). 
Noting that South Africa as a country is inherently dependent on fossil fuels and that the fossil fuel 
industry is such a big industry that exerts its influence across the whole economy (Weston 2012), 
this study theorised how the news media in South Africa affords mediated visibility to different 
actors, especially the fossil fuel industry. This study navigates if the fossil fuel industry receives 
greater mediated visibility and how that visibility relates to discourses that seek to ‘other’ the 
responsibility of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by exporting that responsibility to the global 
North. The study interrogated the presence of a symbiotic relationship between the worldviews of 
these industries and those of the news media. This was done by examining how such worldviews 
or discourses were either critically or uncritically re/produced or rejected by the news media. 
Further, the study compared the discourses of the fossil fuel industries in and outside of the media 
and those that are re/produced by the government, specifically the national response policies. This 
helped to understand who, between the news media and the fossil fuel industry, holds much power 




Furthermore, the study examined newspaper specific re/presentations of climate change among 
the four newspapers that are the focus of this study. The analysis focused on whether particular 
newspapers construct climate change from a neoliberal perspective or rather call for radical politics 
(Carvalho 2007) that seek to alter the status quo by rejecting neoliberal solutions to climate change. 
The perspectives or ideologies that specific newspapers promote helped to understand that 
particular newspaper’s ideological orientation.  
4.5.2 Political re/constructions and climate change re/presentation in the media 
Politicians and not scientists, are often offered the definitional role of climate change by the media. 
Carvalho (2005) argued that between 1988 and 1990, the then United Kingdom prime minister 
Margaret Thatcher was able, through the media “to control the definition of the climate change 
issue: instead of ignoring the problem, she appropriated it and made several high-profile 
interventions to set the agenda in line with neo-liberal principles” (Carvalho 2005, p.5). The 
appropriation of climate change by a conservative government was seen as unusual because of the 
conservatives’ pro-neoliberalism ideological orientation. However, as Carvalho (2005) argued, the 
conservatives upheld climate change “as a useful justification for maintaining and increasing 
investment in nuclear power, and for strengthening the wider Thatcherite agenda, especially 
privatisation of the electricity industry and destruction of the coal-mining industry” (Carvalho 
2005, p.5). “Thatcher and other officials presented nuclear power as the solution to the problem of 
the greenhouse effect” and the media (especially The Times and the Independent) “prominently 
and uncritically reproduced” the government’s policy choice. This reproduction of the 
Conservative government’s views could be explained by reference to the newspapers’ right-
leaning ideologies. However, the Guardian, with a more centre-left ideological stance, rejected 










The ideological “lines were drawn between neo-liberal politics, which framed climate change as a 
global threat that required every country to act and share the burden, and a side of more radical 
politics which argued that adaptation and mitigation costs should be met by industrialised nations 
most responsible for the production of greenhouse gases” (Carvalho & Burgess 2005, p.1462). As 
Carvalho and Burgess argued, 
The discursive construction of climate change into a public risk was clearly tied to the 
government’s initiative to situate the risk within a neo-liberal economic program, sharing 
the costs globally while reaping potential economic benefits nationally (Carvalho & 
Burgess 2005, p.1464). 
 
Carvalho and Burgess (2005, p.1462) showed the power of politicians in influencing the discourse 
on climate change. They argued that “political actors have played by far the most powerful and 
effective role in shaping climate change in the public affairs” and that their views were mediated 
through the media’s “preferred ideological worldview” (Carvalho & Burgess 2005, p.1458). They 
noted that in the United Kingdom mainstream media, coverage mostly resonated with political 
statements. Of note was the “direct intervention” into the climate change debate of the then prime 
minister Margaret Thatcher. Her intervention, they argued, “usurped” the definitional power of 
climate change from scientists to politicians (Carvalho & Burgess 2005, p.1462). 
Discourse sponsors are able to employ discursive moments and sway the media to re/produce their 
worldviews in a manner that legitimises their ideological positions. Thatcher’s United Nations 
speech in 1989 (Carvalho 2005, p.6), made climate change her central message, focusing on the 
risks it posed to all nations. Carvalho (2005) argued that Thatcher sought to project climate change 
as an international problem in need of collective global mitigation not just by the industrialised 
countries. The problem with such a re/construction of climate change is that causation and agency 
of the global North industrialised countries is deleted (Carvalho 2005, p.6) and climate change is 
made ahistorical and everyone is required to self-righteously mitigate (Doulton & Brown p.2009) 
and reduce their carbon footprint regardless of historical responsibility. Carvalho (2005, p.6) 
observed that “Thatcher put the emphasis on world population growth and deforestation as sources 
of the problem, thus de-centring the analysis from the sphere” of industrialised countries. 
Borrowing from McManus (2000), it can be argued that Thatcher adopted the discursive strategy 




Kingdom and hence blame the global South’s population growth and deforestation as the global 
warming problem sources. The strategy entailed not mentioning the historical responsibility of the 
global North industrialised countries, thus de-centring the problem from the historically emitting 
countries.  
This worked “to globalize the greenhouse effect and thereby re-locate responsibilities from 
specific agents in specific places to a generalized, globalized physical problem” (Carvalho 2005, 
p.7). According to Carvalho, such a construction of the climate change problem had “a prescriptive 
function” and hence supported “the passivity of policy-makers at local, regional, and national 
levels, justifying and excusing inaction” (Carvalho 2005, p.7). Further, “the discursive 
construction of climate change into a [global] public risk was clearly tied to the government’s 
initiative to situate that risk within a neo-liberal economic program, sharing the costs globally 
while reaping the potential economic benefits nationally” (Carvalho & Burgess 2005, p.1464).  
Carvalho and Burgess (2005, p.1462) in their analysis of climate change coverage in the British 
quality newspapers discovered that from 1985-1990 the discursive construction of climate change 
evolved due to usurping of definitional power from scientists by the then prime minister, Mrs. 
Margaret Thatcher. They argued that between 1985 and 1988, the newspapers in Britain relied on 
scientific sources, within this period the scientists remained the key definers of climate change and 
its processes. Unfortunately, the news media “underestimated the risks associated with climate 
change and refrained from presenting its possible consequences [remaining silent] about 
responsibility for the problem, not only leaving unquestioned the economic and social practices 
that generate greenhouse gases (GHGs) but also omitting references to the role of political 
institutions” (Carvalho & Burgess 2005, p.1462). The change in media climate change discourse 
came in 1988 after Thatcher’s speech to the Royal Society where she admitted that humans 









As argued by Carvalho and Burgess (2005, p.1463), Thatcher’s speech became a “turning point in 
media” in the representations of climate change and consequently “was able to set the terms for 
debate, and that the press discourse on climate change departed from science and was shaped by 
the discourse framework defined by the government”. They observed that 
The impact of her intervention has been widely commented upon and the sharp rise in the 
volume of subsequent press coverage on the greenhouse effect clearly indicates the weight 
of political leadership in the definition of risks (Carvalho & Burgess 2005, p.1462). 
 
As climate change became a highly politicised issue, political actors sought to offer their 
interpretations of scientific claims in a bid to promote their agendas (Carvalho & Burgess 2005). 
Climate change was framed by the British government as an “existential threat” (Carvalho & 
Burgess 2005, p.1463). Carvalho and Burgess (2005) noted that as political and economic 
measures necessary to address climate change became evident, a division in media representation 
of climate change arose. They argued that The Times shifted to a more sceptical position and 
emphasised the lack of proof and the exaggeration of climate change by the media. The Guardian 
maintained the risks associated with climate change and was very critical of the Thatcher 
administration proposals of using nuclear energy as an alternative to coal and petroleum (Carvalho 
& Burgess 2005) and The Times aligned with the government.  
 
Sources play important roles in determining issue-definitions. This is also true of climate change 
communication. The sources that the media rely on shape how the climate change discourse is 
appropriated in the South African national context. This study put emphasis on the need to examine 
the trends in climate change mediated visibility, exploring the factors and actors behind this 
visibility and showing how particular actors and events attract attention from the media. By getting 
this attention, the study regards how these actors attempt to construct climate change in a way that 
advances their ideological and discursive worldviews as important and worth critiquing. In this 
arena, the influence of politics and politicians, the business elites (especially the fossil fuels 
industry and other interested groups) become apparent to understand how they have appropriated 
the climate change discourse, and sought to influence how it is constructed in both the public and 
the media. The study’s strength lies in comparing and discursively analysing the influence of 
politicians and business elites on the hand and that of scientists on the other. Essential to note is 




international stage have evolved, moving from denial/consensus discourses to discourses that seek 
to influence global response to climate change. This study aimed to understand how the news 
media in South Africa have navigated and mediated this new discourse and the solutions they 
privileged and why. 
4.6 Climate change scepticism and denial in the media 
Studies on media representation of climate change have noted that in some instances, especially in 
the United States, United Kingdom, France and Canada, the media often promotes sceptical and 
denial voices. To explain this, scholars have examined the effects of journalistic norms of balance 
and objectivity, influence of sources (think-tanks, lobby groups, non-governmental organisations, 
academics, fossil fuel industries’ representatives, public relations), newspaper ideologies and 
political discourses in determining how climate change gets to be represented in the media.  
 
The media in the United States has been found to lead in sceptical and denialist voices. For 
example, in a 2007 study of news media representations of climate change in the United States and 
United Kingdom, Boykoff (2007, p.477) discovered that there was a contrast in coverage between 
the two countries. He noted less prevalence of sceptics and denialists in the United Kingdom news 
media and concluded that while climate change remained a high “politically divisive issue” in the 
United States, both the Conservative and Labour governments in the United Kingdom had 
embraced climate science though they differed on solutions. Further, Boykoff argued that in the 
United States, resistance to international climate policy has been a concern of the Republicans 
(Boykoff 2007). Boykoff (2007, p. 477 citing McCright, 2007) posited that  
despite the fact that carbon-based industry interests have exerted considerable influence 
over climate change policy in countries, associated scientists and policy actions who have 
questioned the significance of human contributions have been housed in the United States 
universities, think tanks and lobby organisations.  
 
Bernardo Nosty (2009, p.101) explained the existence of climate scepticism and denial in the 
media by arguing that media representations of climate change follow “different narrative 
patterns”, noting scepticism and discrepancies between the media reports and scientific reports 
originate from the journalistic norm of seeking balance. Nosty also blamed the journalistic reliance 
on non-science sources and experts that led to news articles that avoided “scientific explanations” 




and why US media have represented conflict and contentions, despite an emergent consensus view 
regarding anthropogenic climate change science” between 1995 and 2006, Boykoff (2007, p.478) 
also drew attention to journalistic norms as a potential factor in the “discontinuities” and denial 
and scepticism that characterised the United States media coverage of climate change. He argued 
that  
US mass media coverage of anthropogenic climate change is not a simple collection of 
news articles and clips produced by journalists and producers; rather, media coverage 
signifies key frames derived through complex and non-linear relationships between 
scientists, policy actors and the public that is often mediated by journalists’ news stories 
(Boykoff 2007, p.478).  
The United States media covered climate change as “contentions”. These representations were 
influenced by “Political economic factors as well as social and cultural influences” (Boykoff 2007, 
p.481). Results presented by Boykoff (2007, p.481), essentially on the coverage of climate change 
as a contentious issue, reflect and reveal how discourse sponsors (in this context the United States 
then president George W. Bush, Exxon) influenced this trend and journalists paid little attention 
or no attention to scientific consensus but rather, through selection of sources, privileged some 
views of political and economic sponsors and actors/agents over scientific agreement. Boykoff 
concluded that 
media coverage of nature’s agency in response to human influences is the often subsumed 
by socio-political and economic concerns, such as how certain greenhouse gas reduction 
efforts may restrict economic activities. With such socio-political concerns at the fore, 
greater stress is placed on the danger of climate policy on trade and economy, rather than 
also considering how trade and the economy may have detrimental effects on the global 
climate (2007, p.485). 
 
While the media in the United States and United Kingdom construct climate change along the 
contention and scepticism frames (Boykoff 2007; Carvalho & Burgess 2005), the Swedish press 
constructed climate change along the lines of “scientific consensus and consequences clearly 
expressed” (Olausson 2009, p.429) . There is “an unquestioned and taken-for-granted frame of 
certainty […] in the Swedish press” and  
[T]here seems to be no room for scientific uncertainties or conflicts about the existence, 
extent, and current effects of climate change. The phenomenon has become a naturalised 






The media in Sweden did not construct climate change as a futuristic distant problem, warranting 
a wait-and-see attitude – like in the United States (Boykoff 2007; Boykoff & Yulsman 2007) but 
linked climate change to present extreme weather (Olausson 2009, p.430). Where scientists are 
hesitant to link current extreme weather phenomena to climate change, the press gave space to that 
but however,  
[H]andled [the matter] in a manner that reduces its salience in all essentials. The frame of 
certainty is built by means of the collection and presentation of arguments from actors with 
strong ethos and a high level of legitimacy, to de-legitimize the skeptical perspective [….] 
Political or environmental actors outside the sphere of institutionalized politics are to a 
large extent omitted from the reporting, as are skeptics of human-induced global warming 
(Olausson 2009, p.431).  
 
The press in Sweden legitimised the certainty frame through the use of “scare stories” where “the 
news stories are fear-generating and explicitly relate serious risks and various sorts of harm to the 
phenomenon of climate change” (Olausson 2009, p.431). 
In France, the climate change consensus discourse was met with resistance during the 1990s from 
the “political, intellectual and scientific elite” who felt that “the growing political focus on 
ecology” threatened to change the existing status quo by bringing “a new ‘ideology’ or ‘new 
ecological order’” (Aykut et al. 2012, p.165). These forces of resistance saw “the values of state-
led progress as being endangered by ‘irrational environmentalism’” (Aykut et al. 2012, pp.165-
166). However, from 2000 onwards, attention given to contesting actors was limited in the media, 
with scientists taking a more pronounced stand (Aykut et al. 2012, p.166) and sceptics’ access to 
the media became restricted in the public discourse. An analysis of the Le Monde showed that 
“while the first phase [the 1990s] was characterised by sporadic but persistent attacks on the 
hypothesis of human-induced climate change and the ‘new green ideology’ expressed in 
international climate negotiations, such voices received little media attention in the second phase 
[the 2000s]” (Aykut et al. 2012, p.166).  
James Painter and Neil Gavin (2016) examined the accommodation of sceptics in climate change 
news coverage in the United Kingdom. They found that right-leaning/conservative newspapers 
had a higher percentage of sceptical stories compared to the left-centre-leaning newspapers. They 




2007 and February 2011. Painter and Gavin (2016, p.444) found right-leaning newspapers to have 
the highest number of scepticism “of articles with skeptical voices within the articles covering 
climate change” noting that there was “closer correspondence between ideological leaning and the 
prevalence of skeptical voices” in opinion pieces. The left-leaning papers such as the Guardian 
and the Independent had less articles that included sceptical voices both in news stories and opinion 
pieces (though between 2009 and 2010 these newspapers had an increase in the number of sceptical 
voices). Painter and Gavin (2016) linked this peak in the left-leaning press to the leaking of climate 
change emails from the scientists at the University of East Anglia (popularly referred to as 
climategate). The peaks in cover(age) during climategate could also be linked to aspects of news 
values where negative news attract more media attention. 
While this study did not primarily seek to study the presence or absence of sceptical voices in the 
news media, it was beneficial to build on this literature to understand how the news media in South 
Africa constructed climate change. Central to this is to know the forces at play that either help to 
accommodate or reject scepticism. This study developed scepticism from the traditional questions 
of whether climate change is a reality or not, to questions of scepticism regarding the solutions to 
addressing the problem. This was achieved by examining the mediated struggles between different 
policy options. 
4.7 Re/constructions of climate change in the global South media 
Studies on news media representation and construction of climate change have given much 
attention to the global North media systems compared to the global South. This section is testament 
to the dearth in research focusing on the global South as few studies were done. Simon Billet 
(2010, p.2) summed this gap in research as follows “To date, almost all research on communication 
of climate change has focused on Western social contexts and norms, with little consideration of 
how the issue is being framed in other countries where the macro-scale normalising values in the 
public sphere are different” (Billet 2010, p.2).  
The global South news media, in a similar manner as some sections of the global North news 
media, has re/constructed climate change as an existential problem. However, divergences have 
emerged regarding how these two geopolitical regions re/construct climate change adaptation and 
mitigation. Where the global North largely constructs climate change as distant, affecting countries 




constructed climate change as a local problem (Billet 2010; Olausson 2009). This re/construction 
has been linked to current extreme weather events that are already affecting most countries in the 
global South. On the other hand, where the global North has sought a collective agenda on 
mitigating climate change through greenhouses gases emissions reduction, the global South has 
sought to locate and situate that responsibility outside, calling for the historically responsible 
global North countries to act. It is important to note that the global South, especially the BRICS 
countries, are presently significant emitters of greenhouse gases and therefore ethically required 
to reduce their global emissions.  
Billet (2010) examined how the English-language newspapers in India construct and represent 
climate change issues. Billet began his analysis by appreciating that “India is a major producer of 
global greenhouse gas emissions” and that the country’s energy consumption continues to rise 
(Billet 2010, p.3). How the news media in India represent and construct climate change is 
important (Billet 2010, pp.2-3) because the country is a big greenhouse gases emitter and again 
while the country has registered massive growth post-2000, the country remains relatively poor, 
with more than 70% of the population still living in rural areas and in abject poverty. The Indian 
case relates to the South African context, where the country’s socio-economic structure is dualised, 
on the one hand the country is poor (high levels of poverty characterised by increasing of 
inequalities between the rich and poor) and on the other hand the country is developed 
(contributing significant amounts of greenhouse gases emissions).  
In describing the Indian news media, political and economic construction and representation of 
climate change, Billet (2010, p.3) observed that the country “remained politically defensive both 
in response to these national physical threats and also in terms of international action to fight 
climate change” maintaining that “historic responsibility for climate change resides with the 
developed world”. Think-tanks, lobby groups – opinion leaders on climate change and discourse 
sponsors in India such as the Centre for Science and Environment (Billet 2010, p.3),  
have regularly used the term ‘carbon capitalism’ to describe current climate negotiations, 
arguing that efforts by developed countries to ‘force India’ to reduce its emissions are yet 





Geopolitical definitions of climate change were present in how climate change was constructed 
and represented in the Indian news media where “Climate change is viewed primarily through a 
North-South perspective, where responsibility for present and future change lies with developed 
countries, the international, postcolonial ‘other’” (Billet 2010, p.3-4). Contrary to the scepticism 
in the global North newspapers (Boykoff 2007), Billet (2010, p.5) found that in India, climate 
change was represented along consensus discourses. The climate change problem was seen as a 
current problem affecting India but caused outside of the country. Further, climate change threats 
were represented as already in existence with attribution to human causes “98% of [news] articles 
directly attributed climate change to anthropogenic causes” (Billet 2010, p.5). The news media 
“directly attributed their certainty about climate change to current, observable environmental 
change” (Billet 2010, p.7). In contrast to the global North news media that located the impacts of 
climate change outside national borders (Doulton & Brown 2009), the Indian press constructed 
climate change risks locally seeing India as a country “under threat” (Billet 2010, p.8) without 
“othering’ them from the national scene” as is common practice in the global North. The effects 
of climate change were “located within the State that define the frame of risk. This placement of 
threat reflects the wider Indian political position that climate change is a phenomenon caused 
outside of India but which India is suffering from nonetheless” (Billet 2010, p.8). 
There are similarities on how the media in Sweden (representing the global North) and India 
(representing the global South) constructed climate change. Climate change adaptation in the 
Swedish news media, just like in India, was localised and constructed as the responsibility of 
municipalities, politicians, and national authorities where the “risks connected to climate change, 
as portrayed by the press, all call for action at the national or local levels” (Olausson 2009, p.427). 
However, the international and transnational perspective which characterised news media 
construction of climate change mitigation was missing from the adaptation perspective in Sweden. 
The problem with this “neglect of a transnational perspective on adaptation is the fact that the 
Third World is not incorporated into the frame. Instead, the reporting in this area remains within 
the conventional frame of pity” (Olausson 2009, p.429). “Hence, the frame of pity and postcolonial 
guilt, by which the Third World is more or less mechanically constructed in the press, could be 
said to obscure the possibility of including Third World countries in the collective action frame of 




In contrast to the localisation of climate change risks, the media in India “placed the responsibility 
and demand for action resolutely outside the country” (Billet 2010, p.8). By emphasising the global 
North historical responsibility and omitting the present complicit of the global South on global 
greenhouse gases emissions, the news media constructed climate change in way as to make people 
understand “that ‘developed countries’ could not avoid ‘the mess they created,’” (Billet 2010, p.9). 
The emphasis on the historical aspect of greenhouse gases emissions “was used by the press to 
underpin the dominant discourse on actual ‘action’ […] 38% of the articles dealing with mitigation 
believed that only the North should cut its emissions […] 55% of the articles advocated that action 
should be approached globally but in a differentiated way” (Billet 2010, p.9). The articles gave 
salience to the view that “India must instead prioritise its commitments to poverty reduction and 
economic growth” (Billet 2010, p.10). To Billet, the construction “against responsibility and action 
over climate by the English-language press reflects the wider governmental approach to climate 
change in India” (Billet 2010, p.10). 
This study contends that the omission of the global South in the mitigation discourse builds on the 
discourse of ethical mitigation (Doulton & Brown 2009) and works to subject the global South to 
pity. The Indian news media, thus, constructs climate change mitigation as a reserve for countries 
in the global North with the European Union and the United States being the major players. This 
fails to account for the increase in greenhouse gas emissions from the global South, especially 
those within the BRICS association. Failure to involve these countries in mitigation solutions runs 
the risk of reverse transfer of emissions from the global South to the global North. Further, this 
kind of climate construction helps to ‘other’ climate change “at the international scale in a strongly 
reactionary narrative that clearly situates the causes of climate change” outside the global South 
(Billet 2010, p.10-11). Drawing from McManus (2000), Billet (2010, p.11) argued that the causes 
and effects of climate change are “distanciated” and constructed “along developmental and 
international North-South lines”. The media constructed India and other global South countries as 
unfairly targeted by the international community who sought to limit their progress. For example, 
Billet (2010, p.11) analysed how the media in India represented the Kyoto Protocol, and found that 
the press represented the negotiations and the protocol negatively in a manner that suggested that 
the “policy is focused on trying to relocate responsibility for emissions cuts to India, even though 




From the media perspective, “not only does India face the threats and impacts of climate change, 
but also suffers from an international political system that seeks to create emissions caps for the 
third world” (Billet 2010, p.11). The global North was framed as failing to reduce their emissions. 
The news media re/presented other developing global South countries as in the suffering position 
of India, arguing that climate change was facilitating imperialism. However, the “frame of 
southern cohesion or uniformity in both the impacts and policies of climate change extended the 
international division of risk and responsibility to a global North-South divide” (Billet 2010, p.12). 
Billet (2010, p.13) noted that the international focus on climate change responsibility diminished 
the “coverage of differences in domestic responsibility or of the potential for domestic mitigation 
action within India” (Billet 2010, p.13). The media failed to report on the stratified nature of Indian 
society in relation to emissions with news articles “making no reference to stratification in 
emissions or capacity to adapt to climate change” (Billet 2010, p.13). Therefore, the “absence of 
coverage on domestic stratification, and so on potential climate mitigation within India, reflects 
the press’ use of historical emissions profiles as the foundation for the entire climate change 
discourse within the country” (Billet 2010, p.13). Drawing from Watkins (2007), Billet argued that  
The focus on historical, international, inequalities in greenhouse gas emissions creates a 
discourse that is not only biased towards coverage of international divides but also neglects 
the issue of domestic emissions divides within India – emissions divides that are of the 
same absolute magnitude as those at the international scale (Billet 2010, p.13).  
 
The media coverage of climate change  
is based around a divisive allocation of risk and responsibility in a narrative that separates 
climate change across North-South lines. By defining these clear lines, the press created a 
narrative based on international postcolonial divides, portraying the south as a single 
homogenous entity at risk from global climate change (Billet 2010, p.13).  
 
In Nepal, the construction and representation of climate change is influenced by the media’s 
overreliance on official sources. Sangita Shrestha et al. (2014, p.167), while doing content analysis 
of the Nepalese radio program ‘Batabaran Dabali’ found that the radio program used official 
sources more. They noted that in Nepal, “elites tend to have the most newsworthy voices” as they 
“define the problems associated with climate change […] ordinary people were largely excluded 




communities. These findings from Nepal, a global South country, are important in the 
understanding of how elites and officials in the global South play a central role in influencing the 
climate change discourse and defining the problem for the general people. These sources become 
discourse sponsors and inform how climate change is constructed in the media and ultimately in 
the policy and social networks.  
The radio program (Batabaran Dabali) “largely served as a forum for elite environmental 
discourses primarily for exchanging environmental knowledge among elites themselves rather 
than communicating with ordinary Nepalese people” (Shrestha et al. 2014, p.167). Like 
observations made by Billet (2010) in India and Olausson (2009) in Sweden, Shrestha et al. (2014, 
p.167) noted that climate change was constructed as a current national problem, linking 
environmental problems to climate change. The vulnerability of Nepal was strengthened by using 
evidence from international assessments and at the same time “was framed more in terms of 
certainty than future risk” (Shrestha et al. 2014, p.168). Following the pattern noted by Billet 
(2010) regarding the construction of climate change adaptation and mitigation in India, the news 
media in Nepal constructed climate change impacts as a local problem, and saw climate change 
responsibility lying with the developed global North nations (Shrestha et al. 2014, p.168). Nepal 
was constructed as a “helpless and unable to avoid the punishing impacts of climate change” 
(Shrestha et al. 2014, p.169) and the country was seen as constrained by mitigation obligations, 
rather calling for the country to be allowed space to develop (Shrestha et al. 2014, p.169). 
In China, Jingrong Tong (2014) examined the role of investigative journalism in response to 
environmental (not necessarily climate change) problems in China. As China’s economic 
development is linked to the growth in greenhouse gas emissions, Tong argued that it is difficult 
to expect the media to reflect on “risks posed by environmental problems” as doing so is similar 
to reflecting on the “consequences of economic modernization” which is the priority of the Chinese 
government (2014, p.346). The situation is compounded by restrictive and controlled operational 







However, Tong (2014, p.346) argued that the media in China  
represent environmental problems in a way that tends to oppose […] national priority for 
economic growth, challenge rather than reinforce the current institutional discourse of 
development, and criticize rather than uphold the present structure of the capitalist mode 
of production in China (Tong 2014, p.346).  
While the news media in China constructs environmental problems as social problems that are 
human-induced and a product of modernisation (Tong 2014, p.354), “topics like climate change 
and global warming […] are extremely marginalized” rather attention is given to pollution, health 
and geological problems without linking them to either climate change or global warming (Tong 
2014, p.355). The media reports link the “causes and consequences of environmental problems 
[…] to social injustice and inequality” constructing a dichotomy between the “politically and 
socially advantaged versus disadvantaged people and institutions, producing a crisis discourse of 
the current capitalist mode of production” (Tong 2014, p.357). The media reports blamed 
economic development for the environmental problems, poor government practices, operations of 
big commercial organisations and the coal miners (Tong 2014, p.358). This study found that within 
the South African climate change discourses in the news, climate change was seldom linked to 
aspects of capitalist agency, rather the climate crisis was largely re/constructed as a simple problem 
of the environment. Discursive strategies of scientisation could be blamed for how the news media 
diminished a focus on the cultural politics of climate change in South Africa. 
4.8 Media re/presentation and re/construction of climate change in South Africa 
In South Africa (Tagbo 2010, p.25), the coverage of climate change is poor, with the newspapers 
only having a peak in coverage during United Nations climate conferences and publication of 
scientific reports. Tagbo observed that climate change coverage was closely linked to international 
events and more distanced from the local problems facing Africa. The most dominant sources of 
climate news were identified as global news agencies with very few articles originating from the 
internal reporters. Further, climate change was framed as a problem of those in decision-making 
positions with much of the focus being placed on the political and economic impacts of climate 
change (Tagbo 2010, p.29). Shanahan (2009, p.146) noted that just nine per cent of all journalists 
who attended the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) summit 
in Bali in 2007 were from the global South “and nearly the entire UN list of 50 Least Developed 




from the global South at UNFCCC summits “prevents relevant information from reaching people 
in such nations and means that negotiators are under little public scrutiny” (Shanahan 2009, p.146).  
 
Tagbo’s findings are supported by the findings of Carolyn Cramer (2008) who used quantitative 
analysis to examine the coverage of climate change in three Western Cape daily newspapers (Cape 
Times, Cape Argus and Die Burger). Her study analysed 513 articles, downloaded from the 
newspapers’ websites (Cape Times 229, Cape Argus 148 and Die Burger 135). Cramer (2008, 
p.57) observed that most of the news articles in all the three newspapers were linked to 
conferences, scientific reports and summits. Climate change was framed according to the impacts 
it posed, linking climate change to ecological problems where climate issues that were discussed 
related to the “melting of the ice caps and the rising sea levels” (Cramer, 2008, p.58). Cramer 
(2008, p.63) noted that the stories that were studied were mostly irrelevant to the local context, 
“nearly half of all the articles had no African, South Africa or Western Cape context at all”. She 
noted that “Just over 10% gave some African context” observing that “More than 35% of articles 
had South African context and a little over 25% of articles had localised Western Cape context” 
(Cramer 2008, p.63). Rouxenette Meiring (2013) used quantitative methods to examine how the 
broadcast media framed the COP17 negotiations in Durban. Her study revealed that the South 
African broadcast media had more stories on climate change during the negotiations. Meiring’s 
study showed that coverage was dominated by the political and economic frames, followed by 
stories that focussed on climate justice and that climate change sceptics received little attention. 
 
Tagbo (2010, p.18-19) examined climate change coverage frequency in South Africa and Nigeria 
using four newspapers, two from each country. The research revealed that in Nigeria, out of the 
estimated 86 760 stories published by the Guardian and the Vanguard in the six months of the 
research, only 79 stories (0,091%) focussed on climate change. For the South African media, out 
of the total estimate of 28 800 stories published by the Star and the Mail & The Times only 96 
(0,33%) stories focussed on climate change. Tagbo (2010) noted that most climate change reports 
were driven by scientific reports, conferences, regional events, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and religious groups.  The dominant frames that Tagbo (2010) discovered were political 




for the Star, most of the climate change stories it published originated from news agencies, mostly 
with issues outside South Africa. Twenty-three per cent of the articles by the newspaper were 
about international events and scientific reports and “70% of the stories in the Mail & The Times 
were tied to international events with neither a South African nor African background. 18 per cent 
were for other international events” (Tagbo 2010, p.27). Her study further revealed that stories by 
the local reporters only accounted for six per cent of total coverage. The stories presented climate 
change as a political issue (34%), mitigation (24%), adaptation (16%), and impacts of climate 
change (18%). Climate change surfaced as a concern for those in government and with power 
(Tagbo 2010, p.29). 
 
Tagbo (2010) argued that climate change received little attention in both the South African and 
Nigerian media because it is not a “front page subject except when - there is a strong local, political 
or economic dimension to it” (Tagbo 2010, p.34). She cited lack of specialisation from journalists 
and understanding in newsrooms as some of the barriers to climate change cover[age] in Africa, 
arguing that “Lack of understanding of the issues on climate change makes it difficult for most 
African journalists to do a good job in reporting it” (Tagbo 2010, p.34). At most times, the 
journalists always look for the dramatic and catchy angle, which the environmental issues rarely 
provide, the environment is given less attention in the media, except in cases of major disasters 
(Gess 2012, p.55). Harold Gess (2012, p.55) argued, the “Natural or man-made environmental 
disasters, with human casualties and heroism, offer a chance for the environment to become a 
dramatic ‘event’ that contains many of the ‘news values’ which can push it up the news rankings 
[…] ... Such stories may then linger lower in the story matrix for a week or two, before 
disappearing altogether”. Alan Finlay (2012, p.16) noted that studies on climate change and its 
coverage in the media have often reached the same conclusions and results. The most arrived at 
results include lack of specialisation, lack of interest, under-resourced newsrooms, dependence on 
wire services and the failure to provide a local perspective in the stories. Finlay (2012, p.18) argued 
that “the systemic social consequences of climate change are complex” not that the impacts were 
not immediate and the science still confusing, making it difficult for the journalists to determine 




Nicola Jones (2012, p.31) argued, “the environment beat is still considered a ‘lower-order’ genre 
in South African newsrooms,” pointing out that there “is dearth of ‘science’ or ‘environmental’ 
reporters”. Jones contended that “climate change and other environmental stories rarely make the 
front page, unless official or celebrity figures are attending a conference or supporting a particular 
event or issue” (Jones, 2012, p.31). Jones (2012, p.33) argued that in South Africa “journalists 
battle to find new and interesting angles for stories in this area, which raises the notion of ‘sexing 
up’ issues – using sensationalism in order to sell stories”. However, this is contrasted by Tagbo 
(2010) who argued that the environment and climate change beat has several attraction points 
noting that “the concept has so many dimensions that could excite public interest as much as 
traditional politics and corruption stories” (Tagbo 2010, p.36). 
 
Jill Johannessen (2013, p.32) investigated how the “media constructed representations of climate 
change” in South Africa focusing on the “interface of climate change, poverty and justice”. 
Johannessen (2013, p.33) noted that the coverage of COP17 was low compared to the coverage of 
COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009. This study put emphasis on the mainstream elite media in South 
Africa because “serious coverage of climate change in the tabloid press is very limited” 
Johannessen (2013, p.36). During the COP17 summit, the Business Day, the Mercury, and SABC3 
news had climate change as a key subject between 25 November and December 14, 2011 
(Johannessen, 2013, p.44). The SABC3 had 18 news stories with long news stories “mostly lasting 
around five minutes and containing two or three story lines” (Johannessen 2013, p.45). The 
Mercury published an estimated 111 stories both online and offline (excluding non-staff items) 
and the Business Day, which “has a history of covering international climate change negotiations,” 
published 101 news articles excluding non-staff items. All the three outlets had significant 
numbers of the articles put on the front pages or bulletin headlines (Johannessen 2013, p.45). 
 
Johannessen (2013, p.45) noted that the media largely framed COP17 as a political game where 
“political solutions, the political game, or positions taken by different parties topped the list of 
topics reported”. She observed that stories that make it to the headlines “were concerned with the 
political side of the climate negotiations” (Johannessen 2013, p.45). The frames were distributed 




3%, Science 6%, other global challenges 14%, South Africa hosting 5%, problem 6%. The media 
coverage did not focus on the negotiations but also on the side events such as demonstrations (at 
least half of the stories the stories). The coverage on business solutions to climate change discussed 
“green solutions, renewable energy, and innovations” (Johannessen 2013, p.46). The coverage also 
touched on climate justice, concerns such as threats on food security, and improving copying 
mechanisms. Johannessen (2013, p.47) argued that the stories from SABC3 gave prominence to 
political solutions, often taking the official agenda while the mainstream newspapers gave space 
to ideologies from non-governmental organisations (NGOs). However, the SABC3 also gave some 
space to the concerns of activists who were demonstrating in the streets. This cover[age]’ as 
Johannessen (2013, p.47) suspected, could have been triggered by the news outlets’ need for live 
coverage, noting that “thousands of people in the streets demonstrating or doing different stunts is 
more eye-catching than grey suits”. 
 
Johannessen (2013, p.47) revealed that the Business Day gave less attention to the political issues 
and climate justice, rather framing the stories from economic lines “beneficial… to their affluent 
audience”. This was opposed to the Mercury that had more stories on climate justice and criticism 
of big corporations such as Eskom, Sasol and “coal-powered stations in general, big corporations, 
and banks that lent money to fossil fuel energy and mining” (Johannessen 2013, p.48). At the same 
time the newspaper reported on “the wary of South Africa’s reliance on coal, less attention was 
given to criticise market mechanisms” and published articles criticising capitalist market 
mechanisms (Johannessen 2013, p.48). “The Mercury clearly prioritised climate justice issues…. 
It embraced events that were organised by the climate justice movement” (Johannessen, 2013, 
p.49). She observed that the Mercury had more articles “reporting on other global or development 
challenges than Business Day…[that] was more concerned with how climate change was affecting 
human development and to some extent the environment, Business Day gave more attention to 
how society could adapt to a changing climate. Some of the Business Day stories related adaptation 
to climate finance and the Green Climate Fund”. Cramer (2008, p.63) noted, “The most common 
source of information in all the articles analysed were scientists, scientific reports and research. 




articles. Wire copy was used for little over 15% and other newspapers were quoted in 6% of the 
articles. Less than 10% of articles used NGOs as a source”. 
 
Sourcing patterns 
Johannessen (2013, p.50) detected that during the COP17 negotiations or international climate 
negotiations in general “politicians and chief negotiators” are given more space and afforded “the 
greatest power to define what climate change is all about in the mainstream media,” constituting 
the major social actors in the news. The NGOs were mentioned by Johannessen (2013, p.50) as 
the second group of social actors to receive more attention from the media, especially the Mercury. 
“The Business Day viewed negotiations through an economic lens in which business/private sector 
has an important role to play in solving the problem – a much less threatening option than activists 
hammering on the door of the corporate world” (Johannessen 2013, p.50). Helge Rönning and 
Tawana Kupe (1999, p.24) argued, “Often the only way for media personnel to get into the disaster 
area is courtesy of the aid organisation” where the journalists “get powerful stories, dramatic 
pictures. The NGOs get their message about the suffering through to millions of viewers and 
readers in the North, which again generates millions of dollars for the NGOs and their operations”.  
 
Ordinary people rarely made it into the news as sources. The ordinary people, whenever they were 
included in the news, often came out as victims. These victims of climate change were described 
in general terms as “African/Africans, poor people/countries, developing countries, small island 
nations, or the least developed countries” (Johannessen 2013, p.51). Johannessen (2013, p.51) 
contended that the “non-personalised, broader level of depicting the affected parties, such as cities, 
nations or continents in order to emphasise the dramatic outcomes of climate change is a general 
trend in climate change reporting”. In addition, Johannessen (2013, p.52) posited that few stories 
covered the victims as people “of flesh and blood”. According to Johannessen, both the Mercury 
and Business Day used language that constructed climate change as an economic problem, with 






4.9 Chapter summary 
This chapter has discussed the role of the news media in society in relation to climate change 
representation and construction. The key normative and functional scholarly arguments related to 
the duty of the media as a public sphere and watchdog were discussed. However, the chapter has 
highlighted that the ideal functions of the media are not always achieved and various factors such 
as media political economy, journalistic norms, influence of sources and experts, and the 
ideological orientations of the news media affect the way climate change come to be constructed 
and represented.  The chapter examined the evolution of climate change news in the media, 
articulating key concepts and hypotheses. Through this examination, the chapter noted that climate 
change news in the media are indexed to natural disasters and political activity. Further, the chapter 
discussed the ideological construction and representation of climate change in the media, 
observing that the news media are largely influenced by their already existent ideological stance. 
In the global South, the chapter noted that the news media largely constructed climate change 
along the consensus discourse and saw adaptation as urgent. However, the same global South 
media de-centred mitigation efforts from the global South, rather putting responsibility on the 
shoulders of the global North. In South Africa, the chapter noted that climate change coverage is 




















The previous chapter reviewed the literature on media representations of climate change in South 
Africa and globally. The chapter drew attention to the fact that media representations of climate 
change across the world are not value-free but embedded in ideological constructions. This chapter 
develops from the previous chapter by presenting the theoretical and methodological frameworks 
that underpin the study. With its focus on articulation and discourse analysis, the study details how 
climate change and environmental discourses are naturalised and legitimated through the news. 
Articulation and discourse analysis become useful tools and methods in deconstructing ideologies 
in the news, the role of language, the sponsors of such discourses and the power they hold in 
society. Articulation and discourse analysis helped analyse news stories to understand how climate 
change is re/presented, the discursive strategies used, the relations of power inherent in news media 
coverage, and to critically understand how particular discourses are taken-for-granted, legitimated 
and naturalised through their reproduction and maintenance in the news. The study adopted a social 
constructivist approach embedded in social/critical theory to account for underlying forces that 
influence discursive practices.  
5.2 Articulation and the News Media Re/presentation of Climate Change 
Discourse analytical studies focussing on news media representations of climate change in the 
global South are few (examples include Billet 2010; Johannessen 2009). While at a global level 
discourse analysis has begun to enjoy widespread appreciation, concepts emanating from Cultural 
Studies, utilising articulation, and focusing on the global South, have not been used for the analysis 
and examination of news media representations of climate change. Examples of discourse 
analytical studies on climate change and news include the following Carvalho (2004 2005, 2007), 
Doulton and Brown (2009), Carvalho and Burgess (2005), Pepermans and Maeseele (2018) and 
Kotyeko and Atanasova (2016). Studies on global South media and climate change have often 
shied away from critical studies towards an interest in ‘coverage’, presumably because of the poor 





Central to this study is how the news media in South Africa, regardless of the frequency and 
popularity of climate change, have re/presented the climate change discourses. The concern is not 
with the figures (something central to quantitative content analysis studies); instead, it is on how 
in those instances when the subject is discussed, climate change is re/constructed, how particular 
worldviews are re/produced and consequently are rendered rational and reasonable. Tied to this 
critical agenda is the need to understand the ideologies inherent in the re/presentations, the 
structures and discursive strategies that work in re/producing structures of dominance and the 
interests served by the same. Lawrence Grossberg (1992) noted the need to question “the structure 
of the relationships within which cultural practices and effects have to be located” (p.52). 
Articulation, together with discourse analysis, can help in achieving these tasks. This study, 
therefore, introduced the concept of articulation, combined with discourse analysis, as a 
methodological and analytical framework in the study of news media discourses on climate change 
in the global South.  
 
These two approaches combined, allow for the examination of all the structures that shape news 
re/production. Such an assessment can answer the critical questions of ideology, inequality and 
political economy. The study employed articulation because of its origins in structural theory. The 
word articulation “suggests some kind of joining of parts to make a unity” (Slack 1996, p. 116). 
Articulation developed in the 1970s as a response to the increase in theoretical positions within 
Marxism that were reductionist. Bruce Berman (1984) noted that articulation “was initially 
developed from the structuralist concept of ‘social formation’ consisting of the hierarchic linkage 
of several modes of production under the dominance of the capitalist system” (p.129). Berman 
(1984) linked the development of articulation as a theoretical and methodological approach in 
social sciences to the need for an approach that could account for under-development and the 
continuities of pre-capitalist forms and relations of production at the periphery of the global 
system. Articulation rose to question the Marxist traps of economic and class reductionism. 
Jennifer Slack (1996) saw articulation as “a way of characterizing a social formation without 
falling into the twin traps of reductionism and essentialism” (p.112). As a cross-cutting theoretical 




temptation to reduce all environmental problems to capitalist determination. The study is alive to 
the need to take a path clear of these traps.  
 
With its origins in structuralism, and having been an asset of Cultural Studies, articulation has been 
predominantly defined from within the confines of conceptualisations of scholars such as Ernesto 
Laclau (1977), Stuart Hall (1978, 1983, 1986), Jennifer Slack (1996), and Lawrence Grossberg 
(1992, 1996). These scholars have immensely contributed to the understanding and application of 
articulation as both theory and method, from whose richness, this study is indebted. Stuart Hall 
(1985) defined articulation as: 
a link which is not necessarily given in all cases, as a law or a fact of life, but which requires 
particular conditions of existence to appear at all, which has to be positively sustained by 
specific processes, which is not ‘eternal’ but has to be constantly renewed, which can under 
some circumstances disappear or be overthrown, leading to the old linkages being 
dissolved and new connections - re-articulations - being forged (p.114).  
 
Important to note in Hall’s definition is that the new connections forged were not a guarantee of 
the forged unities becoming ‘identical’ or ‘dissolving into the other’. Instead, the elements of the 
forged connections maintained their “distinct determinations and conditions of existence” (Hall 
1985, p. 114). In 1986, Hall expanded his conceptualisation of articulation, defining it as:  
the form of the connection that can make a unity of two different elements under certain 
conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all 
time. You have to ask, under what circumstances can a connection be forged or made? The 
so-called ‘unity’ of a discourse is really the articulation of different, distinct elements 
which can be rearticulated in different ways because they have no necessary 
‘belongingness’. The ‘unity’ which matters is a linkage between the articulated discourse 
and the social forces with which it can, under certain historical conditions, but need not 
necessarily, be connected (Hall 1986, p.53). 
 
In extension to the 1985 definition, Hall in an interview with Lawrence Grossberg (1996) 
elaborated that articulation in English “means to utter, to speak forth, to be articulate” and used 
the metaphor of a lorry where the front cab and the back trailer “can, but need not necessarily, be 
connected to one another” (p.141) and where the “two parts are connected to each other, but 
through a specific linkage, that can be broken”. John Clarke (2015) noted that Hall’s use of the 




is often taken up in terms of how different elements are articulated in a discursive or 
ideological formation, in which the elements have no necessary belonging - it is the way 
in which they are assembled together, the forging of specific links and connections that 
gives them their social, cultural or political force (p.4). 
 
Similar to Hall (1985, 1986, 1996) and Slack (1996, 2006, 2016), articulation, in Lawrence 
Grossberg’s (1992) arguments, sees “nothing as guaranteed” - “that no correspondences are 
necessary, that no identity is intrinsic” (p.53). For Grossberg, articulation provided the ‘starting 
point’ in explaining  
the process of forging connections between practices and effects, as well as of enabling 
practices to have different, often unpredicted effects. Articulation is the production of 
identity on top of difference, of unities out of fragments, of structures across practices. 
Articulation links this practice to that effect, this text to that meaning, this meaning to that 
reality, this experience to those politics (Grossberg 1992, p.54).  
 
Similar to Hall’s conceptualisation of articulation, Grossberg (1992) saw articulation as involving 
“delinking or disarticulating connections in order to link or rearticulate others. Articulation is a 
continuous struggle to reposition practices within a shifting field of forces, to redefine the 
possibilities of life by redefining the field of relations” position within a context (p.54). 
Articulation is the connection that brings two or more different elements together under particular 
conditions. They are linked to each other through specific linkages that can be broken and be re-
linked or de-linked. Articulations are not absolute but fluid and change between time and space in 
historical moments. The links between practices, cultures, classes, social formations and ideologies 
are not permanent, guaranteed, essential or determined. The connections exist within particular 
conditions. In an interview with Grossberg (1996), Hall argued that  
a theory of articulation is both a way of understanding how ideological elements come, 
under certain conditions, to cohere together within a particular discourse, and a way of 
asking how they do or do not become articulated, at specific conjunctures, to certain 
political subjects (p.142-3).  
 
Analysing discourses and events, therefore, involves a process of ‘re(constructing)’ them by 
“fabricating the network of relationships into which it is [they are] articulated, as well as 
possibilities for different articulations” (Grossberg 1992, p.54). To understand the re/presentation 
of issues in the news media, Grossberg (1992) observed that three critical aspects were important 




theory of effects (product of discourses). Grossberg (1992) brought in and emphasised the aspect 
of ‘context’ within articulation, to the extent of arguing that, articulation was basically “a theory 
of contexts” (p.55). He argued that one could understand phenomena from their “specific contexts” 
because practices only had effects in particular contexts and that “identities and relations” existed 
within specific contexts. Therefore, he argued, “articulation does not separate the focus from the 
background, instead, it is the background that actually articulates the focus” (Grossberg 1992, 
p.55). Similar to Grossberg (1992), Slack (1996) also emphasised the importance of contexts in 
researching through articulation. Context, it was argued, “is not something out there, within which 
practices occur or which influence the development of practices. Rather, identities, practices, and 
effects generally, constitute the very context within which they are practices, identities or effects” 
(Slack 1996, p.126).  
 
Augmenting Hall’s conceptualisation of articulation, Slack (2016) postulated that the articulation 
theory is concerned with understanding how “elements are linked in a social formation and the 
way in which change happens within it” (p.1). Articulation is about joints/links of fragments that 
make particular formations possible at particular times and conditions (contexts) and also how the 
same connections can be (dis-)joined or (de-)linked (disarticulation) at particular moments and 
contexts. These connections are not necessary, permanent and determined but contingent because 
“the work of making or breaking connections and the unities they form are dependent on specific 
conditions, which are other elements and forces in the social formation” (Slack 2016, p.2). From 
this understanding, there are no permanent connections; instead, connections are time and context-
dependent and can be broken and remade. The theory of articulation, therefore, helps “to explain 
how articulations create, enable, empower, and privilege certain possibilities and disable, 
disempower, and marginalize others” (Slack 2016, p.1).  
 
For cultural theorists, articulation “suggests two critical dynamics: a contingent joining of parts to 
make a unity or identity that constitutes a context, and the empowerment and disempowerment of 
certain ways of imaging and acting within that contexts” (Slack 2006, p.225). Slack (2006) argued 
that “articulation refers to the way different things (values, feelings, practices, structures, 




conjuncture” observing that these relations are “contingent” and could have “come together 
differently” (p.225). This view sees communication and discourse practices having no necessary 
guarantees and that ideological practices from different social actors can converge at a particular 
time and place to serve shared interests. However, these relations are not necessarily determined 
but are conjunctural and contingent. Discourses and ideological practices can come together in 
unity to constitute a particular moment as social forces, social formations and cultural forces. 
These forces/blocs can converge and share similar interests at a particular time without any 
guarantee that any coherent unitary class or ideology have substantially determined these relations. 
Neither the character of an articulated conjuncture nor the possibilities thus empowered are 
guaranteed … a conjuncture never is ‘sewn up’, or an absolutely fixed unity, but a web of 
articulating, dynamic movements among variously homogenous and heterogeneous forces 
and relations. Consequently, articulation is an ongoing process of disconnecting, 
reconnecting, reinforcing and contradicting movements (Slack 2006 p. 226).  
 
Analogous to the concept of intertextuality (see Fairclough 1992, 1995), Grossberg (1992) 
contended that texts do not exist independent of other texts because the “beginning point of one 
story … is the end of another story which has to be told” (p.55). To rearticulate discourses, 
therefore, means going back by relating texts to previous texts and forth relating texts to subsequent 
texts. These precedent and subsequent texts form the discursive context that is necessary to 
understand the present text. These texts should be understood within their contexts and be related 
to the present one, an exercise necessary to understand discourse development, evolution and 
transformation and to account for contexts that necessitated either discursive change or continuity. 
In emphasising contexts, Grossberg (1992) maintained that “What we take for granted, what we 
use as the resources of our storytelling, is often what is most in need of having its own story told” 
(p.55). Rearticulating discursive constructions meant the ability to observe the intrinsic meaning 
of statements, the positions of political activities, the experiences derived from particular economic 
relations, the correspondences between stories and inherent meanings (ideological closure) and 
how all these become naturalised, legitimated and taken for granted (Grossberg 1992, p.53). 
 
This thesis and the theoretical frameworks that underpin it, are indeed practices of articulation, 
linking and relinking somewhat different theoretical and paradigmatic points to charter a new way 




African news media. These theories are not necessarily unidirectional or determined but are linked 
in the exercise of articulation to find new ways of understanding the research question at hand. 
The theories are used at particular conjunctures to respond to specific analytical and theoretical 
demands of the study. The articulation and re-articulation of the theoretical and methodological 
positions was done to provide tools to rethink news media discourses on climate change.  
 
The use of articulation served two essential purposes. Firstly, articulation was deployed due to its 
ability to account for the media-climate political economy, media contexts, influence of structures 
in both media organisations and news structures, and news media ideology. This was necessary to 
avoid results that reduced the re/presentation of climate change in the news media to some 
deterministic forces; instead, articulation enabled one to examine all conditions existent without 
falling into the traps of reductionism and essentialism. Secondly, Cultural Studies, as a scholarly 
discipline - characterised by the need to open-up and re-theorise, has not been able to embrace 
ecoculturalism within its analysis. Instead, the discipline has resisted ecoculturalism due to its 
obsession with studying popular culture (Slack 2008, p.478). This study is useful in unlocking the 
potential of Cultural Studies in unpacking the ecocultural and hence contribute to the development 
of Cultural Studies in environmental analysis. Cultural Studies has been concerned with popular 
forms of media, and its focus has been on how the subordinated groups appropriate the popular. 
By making use of the mainstream newspapers in South Africa and how they re/produce dominant 
worldviews of climate change, the study enhances Cultural Studies’ analytical fields. 
 
Further, while Cultural Studies has been committed “to the anthropocentric concepts of discourse 
and apparatus”, this study notes that ecoculturalism and discourse analysis could be 
complementary (Slack 2008, p. 482). Slack (2008, p.483) argued that while cultural theorists might 
as well defend the anthropocentric nature of Cultural Studies because it is “cultural studies after 
all, not eco studies”, ‘nature’ is also ‘cultural’ (see also Williams 1980).  
 
Through using the theory and analytical method of articulation, this study utilised the opportunity 
it provides in answering questions of inequality at both global and local levels and the conditions 




method, it “entails [the examination of] linkages among utterances, statements, texts, practices, 
meanings, ideologies, experiences, politics, structures, effects, material conditions, and other 
elements that can be considered ‘realities,’ such as the environment” (Slack 2016, p.3). In the 
context of climate change re/presentation and re/construction in South Africa, this study 
questioned how the media discursively promoted particular ideologies and re/presented the 
interests of the global South, for example, navigating the contradictions of market mechanisms 
and the refusal to cut greenhouse gas emissions. The study, thus, rearticulated the re/production of 
climate news through the examination of the contexts within which such news flows and 
exchanges took place. This study benefits from re-articulating the climate change news discourse, 
not only by examining the theories of capitalism but also the structural conditions within the South 
African economy and media landscapes that shape the existing news informational terrains. 
Primarily, the study examined how the South African media terrain, in some ways legitimate and 
reinforce the same structural inequalities in the overall climate change political economics.  
 
The study rejects the perspective of news re/production being determined by only capitalistic 
forces and imperialism – where everything is reduced to the economic base. Instead, the study re-
articulates the social, economic and political formations within both the global and the local 
contexts that account for discursive representations of climate change in South Africa. While 
accepting the existence of innate inequalities and biases in climate change discourses, the study 
adopted articulation as a way of not limiting all things to the economic determinism thesis, but, 
rather providing a focus that accounts for both the internal and external contexts. This study goes 
along with what Slack called “the need to retheorize processes of determination” by providing 
other ways of theorizing the elements of a social formation and the relations that constitute it not 
merely as relations of correspondence “but also as relations of non-correspondence and 
contradiction, and how these relations constitute unities that instantiate relations of dominance and 
subordination” (Slack 1996, p.117). 
 
This study adopted articulation as an analytical method because of its ability to account for both 
the global and the local forces that influence media re/presentations of climate change. Rachid 




the global” (p.13), accounting “for the responsibility of both the local contexts and the global 
factors in the shaping of cultural configurations” contrary to the notion of cultural imperialism and 
dependency theorists who always view the global South from a position of global passivity. 
Articulation as an analytical tool enables one to explore issues of political economy as the method 
is “not blind to the question of ownership” allowing for a better understanding of both internal and 
external dynamics that influence media representations of particular discourses in society 
(Boumashoul 2009, p.13). Boumashoul (2009) criticised the taken-for-granted blaming of the 
global North for all the problems in the global South thus diminishing the focus on global South 
internal contradictions and failures. Similarly, this study draws from this criticism and argues that 
often the global South blame the global North for all the climate problems, in the process 
passivising responsibility where climate change action, both adaptation and mitigation, have been 
put as a responsibility of the global North. The global South countries have successively tried to 
evade responsibility even in the context of evidence that carbon emissions are mostly from the 
developing countries post the 1970s. In studying the news media, there is a need for a 
methodological framework that appreciates these geopolitical structural dynamics in relation to 
the media – a method suitable to account for the internal global South dynamics that help maintain 
unequal relations at the local and global levels (Boumashoul 2009, p.15). A method that “could 
rethink the local processes that have kept their methodological complacency and found subterfuge 
in blaming the ‘West’ for their internal failings through theories like ‘dependency models” 
(Boumashoul 2009, p.15).  
 
This study considered how climate change discourses are articulated in the news media in South 
Africa. The links that are established between contexts, news events, news sources, the produced 
news stories, the language of discourse, and the media-political economy are essential in 
understanding how particular ideologies/discourses/cultures, especially the dominant capitalist 
discourses are re/produced and maintained. As a method, articulation gives room to the 
interrogation of how through news re/production (itself not a culturally, politically and 
economically exclusive act), distinct possibilities (ideological cultures) are created and empowered 




5.3 Climate Change News, Articulation and Discourse Analysis 
The application of articulation in this study transcends the theoretical level to include a concern 
for methodology. Because of its concern with structures, articulation has a role in discourse 
analysis by way of thinking and examining structures of society, and structures of discourse. This 
concern with structures accounts for dominance, power and relations in society as represented in 
discourses. Slack (1996) saw the possibility of articulation operating at an epistemological level 
as “a way of thinking the structures of what we know as a play of correspondences, non-
correspondences and contradictions, as fragments in the constitution of what we take to be unities” 
(p.113). The combination of articulation and discourse analysis strengthens the transdisciplinary 
nature of this study where the methodological foundation is not fixed on some “rigid templates or 
practical techniques” but draws from Cultural Studies’ definition of methods to mean “practice” 
where “techniques are borrowed and combined, worked with and through, and reworked” (Slack 
1996, p.114). Borrowing from Slack (1996, p.114), articulation is used in the study to “create 
conditions” within and between the news media discourses, political, economic and environmental 
discourses and their coalitions and actors.  
 
This study notes that critical environmental sociology, has often at times, fallen into the excesses 
of reductionism and essentialism thinking, where “economic reductionism maintains that 
economic relations, thought of as a virtually static mode of production (the base) controls and 
produces (determines) everything else in a society (superstructure)” (Slack 1996, p.114). Similarly, 
economic determinism has been a strong position in environmental sociology where arguments of 
causation have been promoted. All climate change and environmental problems have been 
explained from and as products of capitalist exploitation. While this is largely correct, this study 
takes a position that accounts for factors (fragments both capitalist and non-capitalist) that shape 
climate change discourses in political, economic, social and media discourses. By applying 
articulation, this study managed to approach media re/presentations of climate change in South 
African news media with clarity and awareness, especially regarding the normative temptation of 
reducing everything to the economic base and see all discourse re/constructions as products of the 
capitalist formulation. However, while the desire to avoid reductionism is noble, it is essential to 




some moments, scholars fell back into the trap, for example, scholars such as Raymond Hoggart 
attributed “the post-war changes in English working-class culture essentially to capitalism, via the 
imposition of mass culture” (Slack 1996, p.117).  
 
Articulation essentially becomes much vital as an instrument to ‘retheorise processes of 
determination’. While in Chapter Three, the work of Foster, Clark, York and Moore can be thought 
of as falling into the traps of reductionism and essentialism, this study contends that their 
application in this thesis is another way of (re-)theorising and (de-)theorising. This is an exercise 
within Cultural Studies’ definition of theory. That a theory is not to be thought of as a fixed body 
of knowledge that is “objective, formal tool, or even value-free ‘heuristic device’” instead, theory 
is taken to mean a detour “to help ground our engagement with what newly confronts us and to let 
that engagement provide the ground for re-theorising (Slack 1996, p. 114). 
 
For example, the metabolic and ecological rift theories are not taken as ‘formal’ or ‘objective’ 
tools for understanding the underlying climate change and environmental crises, preferably, they 
are used to ground the study’s engagement with the climate change and environmental crises and 
how these are re/presented in the news media. The study, hence, becomes an opportunity to 
rearticulate and disarticulate the positions of these theories and in so doing help in re-linking them 
to the present understanding of the climate change discourses(s) as they traverse the South African 
economic, social, political and cultural spheres. Drawing from Kuan-Hsing Chen (1994), 
articulation becomes that sign/instrument “to avoid reduction” and opens the possibilities of 
theorising and understanding climate change and the environmental crises and the social 
formations around them. Such attempts see the relations between these problems and the social 
formations not as based on correspondence “but also as relations of non-correspondence and 
contradiction, and how the relations constitute unities that instantiate relations of dominance and 
subordination” (Slack 1996, p.118). 
 
The theory of articulation is alive to the power of ideologies in discourse. This study contends that 
the discursive constructions of climate change in the news media are ideological and ideology 




reproduction. Discourses are instrumental in this naturalisation process of particular worldviews. 
For Ernesto Laclau (1977), ideologies were central in discourse. Laclau (1977) argued that 
reductionism could not account for some behaviours of the working class. He suggested for the 
replacement of the logic of economic reductionism with articulation. Laclau (1977) applied Plato’s 
allegory of the cave where prisoners’ backs face the cave entrance and incorrectly link the voices 
in the cave to the shadows they see. In Laclau’s conceptualisation, articulation becomes the “links 
between concepts” (1977, p.7) wherein Platonian discourse, the object of articulation is to remove 
(disarticulate) the wrong connections and re-link (re-articulate) them with the correct links.  
 
Consequently, the study of news media representations of climate change through articulation and 
discourse analysis means that one has to search for and examine the connotative links inherent in 
the discourses, those links that render the discourse a unit, an exercise to disarticulate these links 
and being able to analyse the complex, “multiple, and theoretically abstract non-necessary links” 
(Slack 1996, p.120). Parallel to Norman Fairclough’s (1992) conceptualisation of discourse 
translation, Hall et al.’s (1978) concept of the public idiom and Teun van Dijk’s (1985) concept of 
oral models, Laclau argued that discourses seldom have “class connotations, the meanings within 
discourse are always connotatively linked to different class interests or characters” (p.7). Class 
hegemony, Laclau (1977) noted, is achieved by that class that can interpellate the subordinated 
groups by articulating and pretending to be representing their interests. Hegemony was not 
achieved violently but through the consent of the subordinated groups in society: 
A class is hegemonic not so much to the extent that it is able to impose a uniform 
conception of the world on the rest of society, but to the extent that it can articulate different 
visions of the world in such a way that their potential antagonism is neutralized (Laclau 
1977, p.161). 
 
By extension, the discursive hegemony of particular worldviews about climate change is achieved 
by those discourses that are successfully constructed in the ideology of common sense and 
‘imagined universal consent’, where the interests of some social formations/blocs are 
mainstreamed through discourse and are naturalised and legitimated. The neoliberal market-driven 
responses to climate change problems, for example, through the rhetoric of sustainable 
development and rationalism, have been made commonsensical and have gained political-




Articulation is also interested in understanding hegemony and how it is achieved and maintained. 
Hegemony is understood, not as static and permanent but as a site of ideological struggle. The 
social formations and forces that can maintain their hegemonic status, regardless of the struggles 
for signification, acquire what Antonio Gramsci (1971) called 'tendential forces' (see also Hall 
1996, 1985, 1986). When rearticulating media re/presentations of the climate crises, one must 
question, for example, the structures of dominance that have sustained the neoliberal way of life 
(capitalism) and these answers are found in how the capitalist material forces have been 
re/produced through discourse (language) to the extent of naturalisation. As argued earlier in this 
chapter, articulation, because of its stance on rejecting determinism and reductionism, also sees 
hegemonies as sustained by discourse(s) of consensus and common sense. Gramsci (1971) defined 
hegemony as a site of alliances and blocs that blurs the simplicities of class relations, domination 
and subordination.  
 
Hall (1983) argued that for Gramsci, hegemony is “the process by which a historical bloc of social 
forces is constructed, and the ascendancy of that bloc secured” (p.82). Similarly, Clarke (2015) 
noted that hegemony should be understood as the “construction of popular consent to the project 
and programme of a ‘ruling bloc’” by way of articulating the subaltern (subordinate) groups 
“through material and symbolic concessions in which they are ‘taken account of’ in such ways that 
they can come to identify themselves in the leading project” (p.5). This is achieved through 
“borrowing and bending the forms and styles of popular thought” and by elaborating “ways of 
addressing, appropriating themes attached to, and speaking for subordinate social groups” (Clarke 
2015, p.5). There is a need to rethink the relationship between hegemony and common-sense and 
how this relationship is achieved. Fragments of common-sense discourses are galvanised to create 
“the appearance of a shared, unitary and coherent understanding of the world” (Clarke 2015, p.5). 
Slack (2016) noted that the  
process of articulation links common sense, ideology, social practices, economics, and 
politics as a bloc (an alliance) that becomes dominant in a social formation. The bloc asserts 
its dominance through leadership that is naturalized in the articulation of these links. Such 
a process was seen as shaping the consent of the working class to structures of capitalism 





In elaborating how hegemonies are produced and sustained, Hall paid attention to language and 
how through language, subjects were interpellated into the language of the dominant and begin to 
identify and act in the interests of the dominant ruling social formations and blocs. Hall (1987 as 
cited in Clarke 2015) argued that:  
Since, in fact, the political character of our ideas cannot be guaranteed by our class position 
or by the ‘mode of production’, it is possible for the Right [Conservatives - neoliberals] to 
construct a politics which does speak to people’s experience, which does insert into what 
Gramsci called the necessarily fragmentary, contradictory nature of common sense, which 
does resonate with some of their ordinary aspirations, and which, in certain circumstances, 
can recoup them as subordinate subjects, into a historical project which ‘hegemonises’ 
what we used- erroneously - to think of as their ‘necessary class interests’. Gramsci is one 
of the first modern Marxists to recognise that interests are not given but have to be 
politically and ideologically constructed (p.5). 
 
Common sense, in Gramsci's view (1971) referred to “the uncritical and largely unconscious way 
of perceiving and understanding the world that has become ‘common’ in any given epoch” (p.322). 
Stuart Hall and O’Shea (2013) observed that political elites often attempt to win popular consent 
by claiming that their policies appeal to the interests of the commonsensical and to the popular 
people (common sense is also a site of political contestation) (p.8). The elites appeal to what Hall 
and O’Shea referred to as ‘what everybody knows’. However, as Hall and O’Shea contended, 
“what they are really doing is not just invoking popular opinion but shaping and influencing it so 
they can harness it in their favour. By asserting that popular opinion already agrees, they hope to 
produce agreement as an effect” (2013, p.8). Hall and O’Shea (2013) defined common sense as  
a form of ‘everyday thinking’ which offers us frameworks of meaning with which to make 
sense of the world. It is a form of popular, easily-available knowledge which contains no 
complicated ideas, requires no sophisticated argument and does not depend on deep 
thought or wide reading. It works intuitively, without forethought or reflection. It is 
pragmatic and empirical, giving the illusion of arising directly from experience, reflecting 
only the realities of daily life and answering the needs of ‘common people’ for practical 
guidance and advice. It is not the property of the rich, the well-educated or the powerful, 
but is shared to some extent by everybody, regardless of class, status, creed, income or 
wealth. Typically, it expresses itself in the vernacular, the familiar language of the street, 
the home, the pub, the workplace and the terraces (pp.8-9). 
 
Hall and O’Shea (2013) observed that the common-sense discourse of neoliberalism as perpetuated 
by the Conservatives - key among them Margaret Thatcher, George Osborne and David Cameron 




those with lower wages. This common-sense discourse (though appearing logical) was built on 
lies about the number of people who received benefits and called for a fair system where people 
were rewarded for their hard work and not get the same treatment as those that the discourse 
labeled ‘workshy’ ‘lazy’ etc. People were supposed to be paid based on hard work. The discourse 
was premised on using the language of ‘othering’ the benefits claimants and ‘immigrants’. As 
noted by Hall and O’Shea (2013) the “neoliberal discourse is increasingly hegemonic and setting 
the agendas for debate” (p.21). Because of its pervasiveness, and its appeal to common sense 
(which is the opposite of good sense), the discourse managed to steer the debate and receive 
support from the public. Hall and O’Shea (2013) demonstrated the power of this discourse among 
the public by examining comments to a story by the Sun of 18 January 2013 of Iain Duncan Smith’s 
introduction of the bill to cap benefits below the rate of inflation.  
 
They noted that the comments/contributions accepted  
Cameron’s definition of ‘fairness’ as a ‘system that matches reward with effort, a right to 
get out only what you put in. The reasonable-sounding nature of this position serves to 
deflect the criticism one might expect toward xenophobic undercurrents it relies on. It 
represents a success for neoliberalism- dismantling of any collective social responsibility 
and a reduction of citizens to barterers - ‘something for something’: worlds away from the 
collective social model (2013, p.19). 
 
Relating these arguments to this study, it is contended that the dominance and hegemonic nature 
of capitalist/neoliberal discourses on climate change is not necessarily achieved through the crude 
imposition of neoliberal worldviews, relatively, the capitalist blocs have managed to use the 
discourses of the subordinated groups in articulating the capitalist class interests of profit-making. 
Still, in this way of thinking, it is argued here that the dominance of sustainable capitalism is 
achieved in news and international policy discourses through the appropriation of populist 
discourses of ‘development’ and ‘sustainable development’, concepts which by themselves appeal 
across class divisions.  
 
Slack (1996), drawing from Hall (1980), argued that discussing articulation in relation to 
communication calls for a rethinking of the processes of communication - the “who says what in 




seen as an articulation with no necessary relationship of correspondence with the other elements. 
However, particular elements and practices are more important as they operate from privileged 
positions. In terms of climate change communication, there are particular elements (who) that have 
access to the media and have a definitional role of climate change (says what) through news media 
institutions (channels) with the effect of naturalising and rendering capitalist responses to climate 
change common-sensical. The sources used, and the sponsors of the discourses have more power 
in the communication process as they operate from positions of privilege defined by access to the 
media and thus the power to define the problem and offer solutions that appear common-sensical. 
 
Citing Hall (1989), Slack (1996) argued that communication institutions and practices “have 
become a ‘material force’ dominating the cultural” (p.125), hence when examining climate change 
representations in the news media (articulated structures), it is crucial to interrogate “the ways in 
which the ‘relatively autonomous’ social, institutional, technical, economic and political forces are 
organized into unities that are effective and are relatively empowering or disempowering”. 
Examining the re/presentation of the climate change discourse(s) as they traverse the South African 
mainstream news media necessitates the interrogation of how the particular worldviews on climate 
change are made into consensus discourses and appeal to what can be called common-sense and 
how in so doing they help entrench the capitalist system. These forces ‘enter the circuits of culture’ 
and have a role to play in shaping cultural practices and “understandings and conceptions of the 
world of men and women in their ordinary everyday social calculations, construct them as potential 
social subjects, and have the effect of organizing the ways in which they come to or form 
consciousness of the world” (Hall 1989, p. 49). 
 
For instance, the unity of the climate change discourse (the dominant) Promethean discourse in 
the South African news media representation should be understood as a unity of distinct and 
different elements whose connections are made necessary because of particular moments. The 
political economy of climate change and the media and the ideologies of news producers combine 
with the views of the minerals-energy complex and those of government not necessarily because 




what circumstances are the connections forged” (Hall 1996, p.141) to produce a particular view of 
climate change that assumes dominance and gets represented as a consensus view.  
 
Drawing from Grossberg (1992), this study notes that the climate change re/presentations in the 
South African media can be fully understood through a process of re-articulation where the 
discourse players, the forces at play and the possible outcomes of their articulation are reimagined 
and rearticulated. The object of this process requires the study to identify the politics of the climate 
change discourse using a map “not only of the actors and agents, but of … agencies of this 
struggle” (Grossberg 1992, p.113). The analytical frame encompasses practices of understanding 
“the relationship of subjects, actors and agency. This relationship holds the key to understanding 
how history is made, how articulations are put into place” (Grossberg 1992, p.113).  
 
The climate change discourse should be necessarily understood as a political and cultural 
discourse. The discourse of, for example, green capitalism (erroneously called sustainable 
development) has been re/constructed and risen to be a hegemonic force within the contours of 
climate change responses. The successes of this discourse can be traced to the 1992 Rio Earth 
Summit in Brazil where the aspect of ‘sustainability’ was introduced as a way of responding to the 
climate problems, albeit without structurally reforming the cultural politics of greenhouse gas 
emissions and capitalist consumption tendencies. The discourse on green capitalism has been 
re/constructed through the lens of common sense where the need to reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions is recognised and at the same time improve industrial efficiency and hence lead to 
economic development. 
 
The discourse is ideologically constructed to render it natural and common-sensical. It was critical, 
hence, that this thesis dissected the South African informational economy (news media) to 
understand how these common-sense constructional planes have traversed the news cycles and try 
to rearticulate the media-climate change ideological and discursive construction with 
developments in policy-making, politics, science and the green businesses. It is essential to 
understand how for example, the South African government, claims to avoid reducing greenhouse 




companies. It does not mean that their interests are the same but could be an aspect of the 
government attempting to avoid economic downturn and the fossil fuel companies trying to remain 
in business. All these forces will make their claims in the name of ‘national interest’, ‘economic 
development and employment creation’, claims that appeal to what could be called the ‘aspirations 
of the people’. So, by appropriating the ‘national’ and the 'rational', the capitalist motives of profit-
making win over the environment. The elite successfully talk about issues that directly appeal to 
the subordinated groups and hence green capitalist policies are mainstreamed.   
 
The discourse actors helpful in re/constructing green capitalism as a necessity should not be 
thought of as a ‘unity’ or a social/economic class but rather as fragmented and existing in non-
necessary discursive coalitions conjuncturally and as meeting at contingent points as they seek to 
protect and promote their different political and economic interests - all achievable by promoting 
a kind of capitalism that is ‘green’ and appear ‘sustainable’. This is of course achieved by 
borrowing and bending the popular interest of clean and sustainable lifestyles (in the real sense). 
This study notes that the ideological hegemony of green capitalism is achieved, in the words of 
Clarke (2015) by the construction of “popular consent to the project and programme” of the ruling 
bloc and alliances (p.5).  
 
The subaltern/subordinate groups are drafted into this project by way of articulating their interests 
and accounting for them (at least ideologically) through ways of interpellation, address and 
symbolic representations in a manner that they think and feel to also belong. The study, at an 
analytical level, questioned the strategies of address used in news media discourses on climate 
change, the symbolic re/presentations that appear to account for popular consent and interests, 
essentially how popular thoughts are galvanised and utilised/ritualised in service of interests that 
belong to ideological and discursive elites as far as climate change is concerned. This task involved 
questioning how the notions of sustainability, economic development, clean energy, employment 
creation and equality were used to interpellate the masses into the rhetoric of sustainable 





While theorists like Hall and Slack have insisted that articulations cannot and will not remain 
permanent, it is crucial to argue that in line with what Gramsci (1971) and Hall in Grossberg (1996) 
noted, some articulations remain in force for a longer timeframe and these are called “tendential 
forces” taking account of how difficult it is to disarticulate them. This study classifies the 
sustainable green capitalism discourse as a tendential social force that continues to enjoy 
articulative hegemony in the climate change discourse and this discourse has powerfully 
permeated the news media climate change reportage in South Africa as well as elsewhere with 
relative force and resolve. Important to note is that hegemony is not just established but maintained 
in place and time if the different social forces (blocs/alliances) continue to converge and articulate 
their positions in a way that maintains their perpetuity. The green sustainability crusade can, in 
Hall’s logic, be called ‘common-sense neoliberalism’. This study combined and linked a number 
of theories (political economy, discourse analysis, articulation, metabolic rift) to transcend the 
limits of singular frameworks and approaches.  
5.4 Discourse Analysis and (re-)articulating media re/presentations of climate change 
For one to do discourse analysis, the term discourse itself must be defined. Discourse, as a term, 
enjoys definitional fluidity. However, in the interest of this study, the definitions put forward by 
Fairclough, Hall and van Dijk are given much attention. Norman Fairclough (2003) defined 
discourse “as ways of representing world views, the structures of material world, the mental world 
of thoughts, feelings, and beliefs” (p.87), a way of representing certain “aspects of the world” 
arguing that “different discourses are different perspectives on the world”. He noted that discourses 
shape “relations people have to the world, their positions in the world, their social and personal 
identities and their social relationships in which they stand to other people” (Fairclough, 2003, 
p.87). Correspondingly, Hall (1992) defined discourse as “a group of statements which provide a 
language for talking about, that is, a way of representing a particular kind of knowledge about a 
topic” (p.201). Drawing from Michel Foucault, Hall (1992) argued that “discourse does not consist 
of single statements, but rather several statements that work together to form a ‘discursive 
formation,” positing further that “discourse is about the production of knowledge through 
language” and is itself produced by a “discursive practice”- the practice of meaning production 
(p.201). All social practices have meaning and therefore all aspects of the social are discursive, 




In expanding the ‘discursive concept’, Hall saw discourses functioning as ideologies that produce 
knowledge in service of group interests in society (1992, p.202). Knowledge is produced within a 
competitive struggle between discourses and that each discourse “is linked to a power struggle and 
the outcome of this discursive struggle” (Hall 1992, p.204) will decide on what is true or false, and 
that discourse is not innocent and is always projected in ways of the “us” versus’ “them”. There is 
always the representation of the “other” (alterity) in every discourse. Hall (1992) argued that 
representations are based on stereotypes and dualised oppositions where the world is divided into 
the symbolic representation of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ and the “good-bad, us-them, attractive-
disgusting, civilised-uncivilised, the west-the rest” dichotomies (p.215). Sander Gilman (1985) 
noted that these dualised systems generate bi-polar “pairs of antithetical signifiers (i.e. words with 
apparently opposing meanings” (p.17).  
 
The discourse analytical framework advanced in this study draws from such strands as semiotics, 
critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis. From semiotics, the study argues for the 
centrality of language in constituting social formations. Most importantly that discourses acquire 
their meaning by way of a priori bi-polar oppositions (see also Foucault 1971, Hall 1980). 
Discourses are constructed from particular points of view which are different from those they 
oppose in structured relationships dictated by the discursive strategy of othering where things are 
put in antithetical positions of ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘subaltern’ and ‘alterity’, ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘the 
global South’ and ‘the global North’. The analysis of the selected newspaper articles paid close 
attention to how binary oppositions were re/constructed and from whose point of view, which 
ideologies/worldviews were privileged in opposition to ‘others’. These re/constructed oppositions 
“become entangled with certain meanings and values which lie beyond the mode and form of any 
specific sign-vehicle and are associated with more general recognitions and expectations of the 
social identities, roles and relations of the two geopolitical poles” (Deacon et al. 2007, p.143). 
These expectations become mentally institutionalised and thus “exert normative pressure on the 
mode and form of signification involved” (Deacon et al. 2007, p.143) and through such cognitive 
and mental processes, the expectations become “social consensus, legitimising tradition or social 
myth”. The viewpoints and ideologies naturalised and made commonsensical in discourse render 




reality and thus the concealment of hierarchical social structures ordered in dominance and 
subjectivity. This essentially works in entrenching hegemonic grip of the capitalist system as a 
preferred of life and as a solution to the environmental and climate crises the planet faces today.  
 
Discourse analysis has been used in the study of news beginning in the 1970s (see Fowler et al. 
1979; Hall et al. 1978; van Dijk 1983, 1985, 2008; Fowler 1991; Fairclough 1989, 1992, 1995, 
2003) and also in examining media representations of climate change (see Carvalho 2004, 2005, 
2007; Carvalho & Burgess 2005; Doulton & Brown 2009; Pepermans & Maeseele 2018). The 
analyses firstly took a critical linguistics approach (Fowler et al. 1979; Fowler 1991; Fairclough, 
1992) and was expanded to a more cultural and sociological approach by Hall et al. (1978) where 
discourse analysis was applied in the study of crime coverage and representation in the news. Teun 
van Dijk (1983, 1985, 2007, 2008) introduced the concepts of ideology in the news, specifically 
in the study of how racism was reproduced in the Press. Studies by Fowler (1991) and Fairclough 
(1992, 1995, 2003) elaborated further the strength of discourse analysis in news analysis. The 
theory and method of discourse analysis was critically brought into the analysis of climate change 
in the news by Carvalho (2005, 2007), Carvalho and Burgess (2005) followed by Doulton and 
Brown (2009). John Dryzek (1995, 2005) included discourse analysis in relation to the analysis of 
earth and environmental discourses. Neyla Koteyko and Dimintrinka Atanasova (2016) provided 
a biography of discourse analytical studies focussing on climate change while Pepermans and 
Maeseele (2018) expanded and elaborated on how to do a discourse analysis of climate change 
news.  
 
The theory and method of discourse analysis used in this thesis has no unitary and formal routines 
that are universal and standardised but is flexible. Discourse is a problematic concept, and this is 
primarily due to "so many conflicting and overlapping definitions formulated from various 
theoretical and disciplinary standpoints" (Fairclough 1992, p.3). The theory itself has so many 
variants and because of this, it enjoys transdisciplinarity and multidisciplinarity. Discourse 
analysis developed and applied in this study is critical and sought to understand news texts in 
relation to their production and contexts. It investigated dominance in and outside, before and after 




it. The attempt to go beyond the text enables one to account for aspects of power, domination and 
ideology and maybe the transformative abilities of discourse. Drawing from Deacon et al. (2007, 
p.151), this study avoided strictly linguistic paradigms because they reduce language to “an 
abstract system in isolation from the social, cultural and historical contexts”. Deacon et al. (2007) 
have discarded purely linguistic approaches as “sociologically and historically sterile for media 
studies” (p.151). 
 
Due to the interpretive/constructivist paradigm informing the ontological and epistemological 
values of this study, it is argued that the climate change representations found in the South African 
quality mainstream newspapers are not in any way ‘reflections’ of ‘objective reality’ out there, 
somewhat they are inherently ideological constructions of those with access and power to, and 
over public discourse. Discourse is important in society as it governs what is written or said in 
society and how these are written or said by way of inclusion and exclusion. Discursive formations 
and strategies are deployed to benefit the existing power relations. For Deacon et al. (2007, p.154), 
undertaking a discourse analytical study is a way of exposing the “systematic links between texts, 
discourse practices, and sociocultural practices” and enables researchers to critique “how relations 
and structures of power are entrenched in everyday language use, and thus how language 
legitimises existing social relations and the hierarchies of authority and power”. 
 
Discourse is not an expression of reality independent of discourse. The news stories are a 
construction of the social actors (and their interests) who are given the primary definitional role 
by the journalists. Newspapers, it should be noted, play a central role in the domain of public 
communication (maybe better than other mediums) because the printed/written version “is usually 
better recalled than is television news” (van Dijk 2008, p.55) and they are “perceived to be 
qualitatively superior”. Drawing from van Dijk (2008, p.58), the mainstream quality newspapers 
in South Africa have enormous “power potential”, making it necessary to probe “the schemata, 
topics and style of news” (van Dijk 2008, p.58) about climate change. This critical examination is 
necessary to deepen “our understanding of the exercise of political, economic, social and cultural 
power, and of the communication and acquisition of the ideologies that support it” (van Dijk 2008, 




ideological force, standing in a dominant position with respect to the way in which social relations 
and political problems were defined and the production and transformation of popular ideologies 
in the audience addressed”. 
 
The role of the news media in communicating climate change is crucial. Very few people have 
access to or power over the debates and decisions (which have been highly condomised and made 
a preserve for a 'club' of experts, policymakers and industry players) concerning climate change in 
South Africa. The debates are highly centralised in policymaking, business, academia and the 
science community. The entry into these debates is not easy for many, hence the role of the media 
in providing the necessary mediation. By playing this mediation role, the news media become 
connective and actively participate in the construction of public opinion(s) on climate change in 
society. The opinions built resonate (mostly) with the reigning dominant ideas of the moment and 
hence have what can loosely be called 'legitimacy' because they are believed to be widely shared 
by the public. As primary sources of public information, the news media have “a near-monopoly 
over ‘social knowledge’” (or lack of thereof) and they use this position to allow “the free passage 
of the dominant ideologies” (Hall et al. 1978, p.64).  
The media thus help to reproduce and sustain the definitions of the situation which favour 
the powerful, not only by actively recruiting the powerful in the initial stages where the 
topics are structured, but by favouring certain ways of setting up topics, and maintaining 
certain strategic areas of silence. Many of these structured forms of communication are so 
common, so natural, so taken for granted, so deeply embedded in the very communication 
forms which are employed, that they are hardly visible at all, as ideological constructs, 
unless we deliberately set out to ask, 'what, other than what has been said about this topic, 
could be said?', 'what questions are omitted?', 'why do the questions - which always 
presuppose answers of a particular kind - so often recur in this form? Why do certain other 
questions never appear?  
 
By examining the climate change discourse(s) re/presentations in the mainstream quality South 
African newspapers, this study appreciates and takes language as central to understanding social, 
cultural, economic and political phenomena. For example, discourse analysis allowed the 
researcher to understand how capitalist ideas (one of the main ideologies re/produced in the news) 
was re/produced by the news media through language. Climate change is itself a product of a risk 
cultural language (capitalism), a culture that has found force across the global social system, a 




the most 'preferred way of life' through some conspiratorial organisation, but through how it is and 
has been constructed through language (discourse). Key to note is that the climate change debate 
has been and continues to be represented within the parameters set by capital, either by promoting 
further exploitation of fossil fuels (through the rhetoric of catching-up and development in the case 
of the global South countries) or through the appeals towards Promethean neoliberal approaches 
that see solutions through the lenses of capital and the never-ending desire for profit and nature 
exploitation (see Chapter Three and Ten for detailed analysis). The re/construction of nature (as a 
gift ready for exploitation) has only worked to put through the interests of capital and accumulation 
ahead of metabolic relations that are mutually inclusive and self-preservatory. Thus, this study 
used discourse analysis as both theory and method in unpacking how language was used to 
re/construct and reinforce certain ideologically laden views on climate change in South Africa. 
Through language, worldviews were legitimised and delegitimised, naturalised and condemned. 
The language and resultantly the discourses produced by the language of news “influences 
thought” by channelling “our mental experience of the world” (Fowler 1991, p.4). For example, 
how the news media accepted the taken-for-granted language of neoliberalism in relation to 
climate change solutions, i.e., Promethean approaches that place neoliberal accumulation (carbon 
markets for example) at the epicentre of addressing climate change. In this examination, the task 
included an attempt to elucidate the aspects of climate change and global warming that were 
re/presented as natural and thus taken for granted. 
 
Further, through language, the news media can unconsciously endorse neoliberalism and fail to 
provide a critical lens for the reading public to understand climate change as a risk produced by 
the unrestrained clamour for accumulation and consumption. The extent to which the media 
represent the climate change problem as a risk of modernisation or re/produce the normative values 
of capital and expansion should be interrogated. As argued by Fairclough (1992), language is 
important as an agent of social change (p.26). Fairclough regarded language as encompassing a 
turn towards the neoliberal agenda in all aspects of life such as labour, education and the 
environment. Because “languages embody particular worldviews” and that “particular texts 




“the social meanings expressed in discourse” (Fairclough 1992, pp.26-27) that deals with aspects 
of climate change and global warming in South Africa. 
 
Since the entrance of climate change into the public arena in the1980s, the subject has been defined 
mostly from science, politics, and economics. The news media have been very much part of this 
evolution and have constructed and reconstructed views from scientists, politicians, and 
economists. The language used in the news has ideological value because there “are always 
different ways of saying the same thing, and they are not random and accidental alternatives. 
Differences in expression carry ideological distinctions” (Fowler 1991, p.4). Key worldviews on 
climate change have emerged dominant, especially those that advocate neoliberal solutions to the 
climate crisis and that depoliticise the subject. The climate crises have been defined as a problem 
of excessive greenhouse gas emissions (physical), with the support of unequivocal scientific 
reports (scientisation) and that these emissions are responsible for the warming of the planet 
resulting in climate change and the associated problems (increases in land and sea temperatures, 
extreme weather, displacements, arctic ice melting, droughts). The root of these crises in the 
social/cultural has not been entirely criticised in the news media. That climate change is necessarily 
a risk of capital and the never-ending accumulation of wealth alongside the infinite exploitation of 
both nature and labour has received less attention. 
 
Discourses on the subject have moved from scientific and political consensus towards ‘solutions’. 
The solutions which re/produce capitalism as a way of life have become dominant. These include 
forms of addressing climate change through the rhetoric of sustainable development (a polite name 
for green capitalism). Carbon markets, geoengineering and technological-managerial solutions 
have taken a dominant global discursive position. This dominance has “led to the dominance of 
techno-managerial approaches and the marginalization of calls for addressing structural issues at 
the root of climate change” (Carvalho 2018, p.1). Carvalho (2018) argued that ideologies  
construct the meaning of both climate change and the practices and structures that are at its 
root, thereby influencing understandings of those issues, constraining social and material 
action and contributing to the institutionalization of given ideas and values, all of which, 
in a dialectical manner, contributes to the production of (given) discourse(s) on climate 





The news media, through their failure “to convey more radical views on the relation between 
humans and nature and the associated social arrangements, most media have legitimated and 
reinforced the existing social order [capitalism]” (Carvalho 2018, p.5), resulting in the hegemonic 
status enjoyed by “free-market capitalism, individualism and neoliberalism” in the climate change 
discourses. Ideals strictly but unfortunately Promethean, have been successfully institutionalised 
as the panacea to addressing the attendant climate problems. This has been achieved through the 
discourse of sustainable development, ecological/economic modernisation and geoengineering.  
Critical approaches to discourse analysis are used in this study because they can account for how 
the climate change discourses(s) are shaped by "relations of power and ideologies" (Fairclough, 
1992, p.13) and further show the effects of discourse upon social systems of climate change 
knowledge and beliefs. Fowler et al. (1979) argued that “language serves to confirm and 
consolidate the organizations which shape it” (p.190). The language used in the newspaper 
re/presentations of climate change has the capacity to re/construct, re/produce and naturalise the 
ideological structures and interests that shape the climate narratives in South Africa and outside. 
Important to note in this study is that language shapes and embodies worldviews that have an in-
built bias towards dominant social systems, organisations, ideologies and thus ways of life. 
Through language, discourses “do not just reflect or represent social entities and relations, they 
construct or 'constitute' them” (Fairclough 1992, p.3). This viewpoint is made stronger by Hilary 
Janks (1997) who argued that language is a “form of social practice” through which “existing 
social relations are reproduced or contested and different interests are served” (p.329). Examining 
discourse (language use) and the strategies of discourse is important in unbolting the 
re/presentation of climate change in the news media. As Gramsci (1971) argued, “in ‘language’ 
there is contained a specific conception of the world” (p.323).  
5.5 The Social Re/construction of News 
It is crucial to critique news re/production to open understandings of the preferred ideological and 
value systems in the news and how these preferred or taken for granted views lead in the 
re/production and transformation of climate change worldviews in the global South, the 
re/construction of the climatic in the mental, social and cultural relations of humans toward nature. 
As Roger Fowler (1991) argued, news go through a process of gatekeeping (selection, priming, 




unconscious reference(s) to particular ideas and beliefs. The analysis of news "can reveal abstract 
propositions which are not necessarily stated, and are usually unquestioned, and which dominate 
the structure of presentation" (Fowler 1991, p.2). The ideas promoted in the news often relate 
positively to the "ideas of the controlling groups in an industrial-capitalist society" (Fowler 1991, 
p.2). This conceptualisation of news is important in this study as it highlights the centrality of key 
participants and controlling institutions/groups or individuals in the climate change discourses 
presented in the news. The neoliberal ideas on life in general and climate change in particular, 
because of their privileged access to the news media gain the primary role of defining the problem 
and offering 'neoliberal profit oriented' solutions without facing criticism or questioning. Thus, for 
Fowler (1991) news are "a practice: a discourse which, far from neutrality reflecting social reality 
and empirical facts, intervenes … [in] 'the social construction of reality'" (p.2). News is understood 
“as a social and ideological produce” (Fowler 1991, p.3). 
 
Fowler (1991) was interested in the role of language “in the construction of ideas in the Press" 
arguing, news "is not facts about the world" rather ideas, beliefs, values etc (p.1). Accompanying 
this conceptualisation of news is the view that language is not value-free/neutral "but a highly 
constructive mediator". In spite of the journalistic claims to objectivity and impartiality, news are 
"socially constructed" and instead of communicating facts, the news media propagate value 
systems and ideologies (Fowler 1991, p.2). The epistemological vision underpinning this study 
involves conceptualising news as a social construct. News are social products that have a key role 
both in the discursive and ideological. In terms of climate change re/presentation, the socially 
re/constructed news build particular worldviews, promotes particular narratives over others and 
essentially have a role to play in how climate change related knowledge(s), actions, policies, and 
attitudes are formulated, reformulated and maintained.  
 
Similar to Fowler’s (1991) conceptualisation of news, Peter Vasterman (1995) argued, journalists 
do not report events but are producers of news and reality. Fowler (1991) described news as;  
a representation of the world in language; because language is a semiotic code, it imposes 
a structure of values, social and economic in origin, on whatever is represented; and so 
inevitably news, like every discourse, constructively patterns that of which it speaks. News 






Journalists construct reality, they construct facts, they construct statements and they re/construct a 
context in which these facts make sense. This is because journalists rarely  
witness events firsthand. They have to rely on the accounts of others... Readers, whether 
they are attentive citizens or interested officials, tend to lose sight of the fact that news is 
not reality, but a sampling of sources’ portrayals of reality, mediated by news 
organisations.... Newspapers can do little more than establish some standard operating 
procedures for sampling potential sources. Whatever procedure they adopt unavoidably 
biases their selection of content (Sigal, 1973 as cited in van Ginneken 1998, p.81). 
 
What is represented in the news is seldom “direct representation” (see also Fairclough 1992; 1995) 
because journalists rarely become “direct witnesses to events; rather, their data are mostly other 
discourses, such as eye witness reports, press conferences, press releases, statements of officials, 
interviews [etc.] …. Hence, the construction of news is most of all a reconstruction of available 
discourses” (van Dijk 1983, p.28). Hall et al. (1978) argued that news sourcing, selection and 
representation work towards formalising and operationalising certain ideologies over others. From 
this argument, it can be noted that news production and representation are ideological practices 
and hence the need to study the structures that produce and are produced by these discourses.  
 
Carvalho (2008) saw news production as “a discursive re-construction of reality” (p.164), because 
journalists rarely see/witness events first-hand, rather they rely on the information from others. 
The representations in the news media are more/less claims by those people (sources) used as 
primary definers by the news media. The media constructions and representations of climate 
change, therefore, build “on the ways other social actors construct issues in their multifarious 
discourses” (Carvalho 2008, p.164). This study examined the discursive strategies of sources 
(social actors) in their re/constructions of climate change for the news media and how their views 
were re/produced or rejected by the journalists. For Jaap van Ginneken (1998), what the media 
presents as ‘news’ is in fact a representation of the ideological interests of the producers, where 
the “quasi-consensual” ideologies of the powerful are portrayed in the media as “natural and 
common sense” (p.33). van Ginneken concluded that: 
News production and news consumption can also be seen as a twenty-four hour ideological 
repair shop for our world order and our world-views. Possible anomalies are identified, 





The advantaging of one worldview over another is not an act of overt bias but an object of how 
representation works. Bias, Fowler (1991) argued, should be thought of in terms of deliberate 
attempts to distort reality while representation is manifest in anything that is written or spoken. 
Because there is no neutral news or news media, representations in news are determined by 
ideological, institutional, economic and political interests of the news medium where the news are 
"reported from some particular angle" (Fowler 1991, p.10). The events reported in the news "are 
not intrinsically newsworthy, but only become 'news' when selected for inclusion in news reports. 
The vast majority of events are not mentioned, and so selection immediately gives us a partial view 
of the world" (Fowler 1991, p.11).  
 
Hall et al. (1978) noted that the news media “do not simply and transparently report events which 
are 'naturally' newsworthy in themselves” rather news must be understood as “the end product of 
a complex process which begins with a systematic sorting and selecting of events and topics 
according to a socially constructed set of categories” (p.53). Therefore, news is not gathered, but 
made by journalists who editorially and unconsciously follow a set of guidelines to determine 
newsworthiness. Su Jung Min (1997) noted that news production processes such as selection, 
interpretation and presentation “construct reality in a manner underlying the ideologies of the 
producers” (p.147). 
Anything that is said or written about the world is articulated from a particular ideological 
position. A news report imposes a structure of values on whatever it represents, and so 
inevitably news reports produce meanings that construct ideological representations of the 
social world (Jung Min 1997, p.147). 
 
Discourse Actors and Sponsors 
As part of discourse analysis, the study examined the sourcing patterns manifest in news stories. 
This study acknowledges the centrality of sources in defining the agenda and promoting particular 
viewpoints over others. In examining the stories, the researcher analysed how sources were used 
in news articles and how they were balanced. van Ginneken (1998) pointed out that if one “has the 
power to set other people’s agenda, one does to a certain extent have the power to influence what 
they will think and talk about, to draw attention to certain elements and divert it away from others” 
(p.87). The researcher analysed the sourcing patterns employed in the articles with the view of 




views were represented along the common-sense paradigm (see Gramsci, 1971). Governments, 
political, economic, environmental elites have the power to affect the agenda of the press and hence 
at the same time affect the agenda of the public (van Ginneken 1998). This is consistent with what 
Ginneken (1998) observed, that, “news is based on a selective articulation of certain voices about 
supposed events, not only the voices of the journalists get articulated but also those of their 
sources” (p.85). Studies have shown (Johannessen 2013; Cramer 2008) that the media in South 
Africa tend to use politicians, activists, scientist and business people as sources. Through the 
selection of official, political, activist and business sources, the media allow a particular section of 
society to have ‘definitional power’ over climate change issues in the global South. These sources 
become dominant voices in the construction and definitions of solutions to climate change while 
oppositional views are left out through non-representation.  
 
The task of examining news sources is supported by Carvalho (2005) who noted that the news 
media’s “depictions of social problems depend on their institutional affiliations, preferences, and 
news values but invariably build on ways other social actors organise their claims and draw 
attention to issues” (p.3). Because of this reason, discourse analysts should probe both sources’ 
discursive strategies and the journalistic interventions. There is need to explore “source strategies” 
and “media representations” (Carvalho 2005, p.3). These sources are often people with access to 
the media and are powerful in business, politics, academia, etc. and when their voices are translated 
into everyday language of everyday people, their superior identities are collapsed and they 
become:  
represented as speaking in a language which readers themselves might have used, which 
makes it so much easier to go along with their meanings …. [Thus the] news media can be 
regarded as effecting the ideological work of transmitting the voices of power in a 
disguised and covert manner (Fairclough 1992, p.110).  
 
This process of intertextual translation naturalises the dominant viewpoints and allow them to 
acquire hegemonic status in the struggle for signification. Discourse representation entails that 
when journalists report on a particular story, they make a choice to re/present it in one form and 





In discussing the power of news sources, van Dijk (2008) drew attention to the fact that discourse 
is about power and that power is needed for purposes of domination and control both the discursive 
and the material aspects of social life (p.vii). This control extends to mean control over the 
cognitive abilities of the audiences and hence their worldviews and actions. This realisation of the 
power of control calls for attention towards those who have "access to the fundamental power 
resource of public discourse, who have access to political discourse, to media discourse [etc.], to 
the climate change discourse and to the policymaking discourse” (van Dijk 2008, p.viii). This 
power to control the climate change narrative in South Africa is held by those who have access to 
discursive resources in the environmental and climate change debates. Those given access, get the 
power to define (for everyone else with no access), the climate change narratives, they become 
dominant and their ideas on climate change become ruling ideas of the epoch. This control is also 
achieved through the ability of those with access to forms of public communication to control and 
determine the re/production of the climate discourse. This could be through press conferences, 
press releases, seminars, and publications. Drawing from van Dijk (2008), those with access and 
control over the re/production of the public environmental/climate change discourse(s) "also 
control part of its contents, and hence, indirectly, the public mind - maybe not exactly what people 
will think, but at least what they will think about" (p.viii). Johannessen (2013) noted, “journalists 
do not only convey ‘objective’ news stories, but also establish interpretative schemes in 
communication with their readers within which those stories acquire meaning” (p.40).  
 
According to van Dijk (2008), “power is related to control, and control of discourse means 
preferential access to its production and hence to its contents and style, and finally to the public 
mind” (p. viii). He argued further that dominance, for example, “involves differential access to 
social power" and that "access to public discourse … [is] one of the resources of social power” 
(2008, p.34). van Dijk (2008) argued that the dominant groups:  
tend to conceal their ideologies … aim to get their ideology generally accepted as 'a general' 
or 'natural' system of values, norms and goals .... [where] ideological reproduction assumes 
the nature of consensus formation, and the power derived from it takes on a hegemonic 
form (p.34).  
 
Media power derives from the news media's ability to 'exclude' and 'undermine' "alternative 




2008, p.58). Access to the news media is crucial for the re/presentation of climate change: how the 
subject is re/presented, who gets the definitional power and how the problem is defined. The 
inclusion and exclusion of different social actors guarantees that only those whose worldviews are 
given access to the media-climate change discourse at the same time enjoy access to the audiences 
(public discourse) to the detriment of those whose worldviews are excluded and undermined by 
the news media. Thus, differential and preferential access to the news media legitimises and 
delegitimises worldviews about the subject. A priori bi-polar subject positions surface, with those 
with access having their ideologies and definitions governing narratives about climate change and 
the environment - while 'others' - alternative or oppositional voices earn re/presentation in terms 
of either negativity or passivity.  
 
Elites enjoy privileged access and positions in climate change news while the ordinary people 
seldom participate as active and meaningful contributors to the debates. This study critically 
examined the elite localisation and parochialisation of sources that were given access to define the 
narrative parameters and structures of climate change in the South African quality mainstream 
newspapers studied. Official sources (government), experts, policymakers, think-tanks and 
industry people were found to dominate the climate change discourses permeating the news 
ecosystems in South Africa. Analogous to Fowler (1991), the members of the public (ordinary 
people) seldom made it into the news as credible sources except if they happened to be witnesses 
to some disasters or events and "their status as sources is accidental rather than privileged" as 
opposed to the elite club sources whose credibility was "established by official authority, by social 
status or by commercial success; they are organized, with a bureaucratic structure which embodies 
spokespersons … have the resources to pay for the publicity and public relations" (p.22).  
 
These sources also have privileged access to the media and at the same time the journalists have 
privileged access to these institutions and people. Fowler (1991) argued that this access is 
"reciprocal" where the "media conventionally expect and receive the right of access to the 
statements of these individuals, because the individuals have roles in the public domain, and 
reciprocally these people receive access to the columns of the papers when they wish to air their 




discursive access imbalance "results in partiality, not only in what assertions and attitudes are 
reported - a matter of content - but also in how they are reported" (Fowler 1991, p.23). Because of 
the reliance on official sources, the discourses produced, and the language used in the news media 
reproduce the ideologies of the sources used. The institutions and people used as sources in the 
re/presentation of climate change in South Africa, to draw from Fowler (1991) "provide the 
newspapers with modes of discourse which already encode the attitudes of a powerful elite. 
Newspapers in part adopt this language for their own and, in deploying it, reproduce the attitudes 
of the powerful" (p.23). 
 
Stuart Hall et al. (1978) noted that the "media define for the majority of the population what 
significant events are taking place, but, also, they offer powerful interpretations of how to 
understand these events" (p.57). The re/production of dominance by the media is not an aspect to 
be thought of in terms of conspiracy theories but answers should be sought in the "routine 
structures of news production" that enable the media to "reproduce definitions of the powerful" 
(Hall et al. 1978, p.57). The reliance by journalists on “readily available and credible sources and 
the general professional and ideological aspects of newsworthiness, all concur in social cognitions 
and text production that favour stories about the most powerful people, groups, or institutions in 
society" (van Dijk 2008, p.55). Because of their reliance on experts, institutional sources (see also 
Fowler 1991; van Dijk 2008), the media do not primarily define/create news autonomously but are 
led to "specific" topics and events by the sources. Through this reliance on 'credible' sources, the 
news media "reproduce symbolically the existing structure of power in society's institutional 
order" because the opinions and definitions of the powerful, highly-positioned and government 
sources are accepted as they are thought to have access to reliable and specialised knowledge and 
information" (Hall et al. 1978, p.58) and thus these sources become "the primary definers of 
topics".  
 
While journalists function through the rhetoric of balance, objectivity and impartiality and this rule 
often requires them to bring 'other' views, it is critical to underline that the accession of the primary 
issue definitional status to elite and institutional sources and experts serves to give them an upper 




dominant in the discourse and acquire legitimacy at the expense of the 'less-important other' voices. 
As Hall et al. (1978) argued, the structural relationship between the news media and the primary 
institutional definers enables the institutional definers to  
establish the initial definition or primary interpretation of the topic in question. This 
interpretation then 'command the field' in all subsequent treatment and sets the terms of 
reference within which all further coverage or debate takes place. Arguments against a 
primary interpretation are forced to insert themselves into its definition of 'what is at issue' 
- they must begin from this framework of interpretation as their starting-point (p.58). 
 
Arguably, these are powerful in deciding what society talks and thinks about and the frames of 
reference applicable in the debates and discussions. They set the public agenda and set parameters 
for discussion. Whatever issues arise, should be discussed from the frames put in place by the 
primary definers. In the realm of climate change re/presentation, issues could be about whether 
reducing emissions will affect jobs and stifle economic growth. Those who share a different 
viewpoint would have to begin by debunking these prior assertions. The frame of debate would 
have been set by the primary definers thereby closing out any other ways of debating the topic. 
Drawing from Hall et al. (1978) 59), "the primary definition sets the limit for all subsequent 
discussion by framing what the problem is" (p.59). Hall et al. (1978) went on to argue that the 
news media do not conspiratorially reproduce the ideologies of the elite but achieve this by “their 
structured relationship to power” which make them “play a crucial but secondary role in 
reproducing the definitions of those who have privileged access, as a right, to the media as 
'accredited sources’” (p.59). In this view, the news media function from the position of "structured 
subordination to the primary definers" (Hall et al. 1978, p.59). This structured relationship between 
the news media and their powerful sources opens "up the neglected question of the ideological 
role of the media" giving much credence to Karl Marx's view that “the ruling ideas of any age are 
the ideas of its ruling class” where the class that owns and controls the means of production, has 
more crucially, the means of mental and cultural production and reproduction at its disposal (as 
cited in Hall et al. 1978, p.59). By subordinating themselves to the dictates of powerful sources, 
the news media begin their cultural role of constructing social reality that depicts "a particular 
image of society which represents particular class interests as the interests of all members of 
society" (Hall et al. 1978, p.59). This conceptualisation of the news media fits into what has been 




superimposing the views of the elite on wider society through translating the language and views 
of the dominant into everyday language of the ordinary people (interpellation) where the audiences 
are put into positionalities of consent and thus achieving the reign of the dominant. 
5.6 Discursive Strategies and the reproduction of dominant worldviews 
Key to this study is how the neoliberal approach to understand and address climate change has 
been able to dominate the ideological and definitional minefield and continue to wield ideological 
control at a multilateral and intra-national level. This dominance is accounted for by Gramsci and 
Hall in dealing with articulation. The study appreciates that neoliberalism has dominance and has 
acquired the definitional power concerning climate change and global warming. Articulation (Hall 
1996; Slack 1996; Grossberg 1992, 1996) describe this dominance (notwithstanding the struggles) 
as an aspect of the ideology having traits of a tendential force (see the discussion of the concept 
above). The consolidation of the tendential force attribute of neoliberalism can be explained by 
examining the language and discursive strategies that naturalise the capitalist culture as given and 
commonsensical. Through discourse and discourse coalitions of different institutions, players and 
individuals that converge at particular moments and spaces, the tendential forces are strengthened, 
not through conspiracy but rather through convergence and accidents.  
 
Passivisation and Nominalisation 
The discourse analytical approach used in this study helped in examining texts to show how, 
through the discursive systems of nominalisation and passivisation, the agency of capitalism and 
the global South in present greenhouse gas emissions was concealed. For Fairclough (1992), 
nominalisation and passivisation “may be associated with ideologically significant features of texts 
such as the systematic mystification of agency: both allow the agent of a clause to be deleted” 
(p.27). Nominalisation obscures agency and thus deletes questions of responsibility and culpability 
(Deacon et al. 2007, p.155). van Dijk (1988) argued that passivisation serves to “dissimulate the 
negative actions of elite or powerful groups” (as cited in Deacon et al. 2007, p.155). The study 
examined how the discursive devices of nominalisation and passivisation are used in the news to 






De-politicisation and labelling 
The researcher also examined definitions, strategies and labels that are used in news media texts 
about climate change. Carvalho (2018) alluded to the power of labels that are used to describe 
climate change. As an example,  
terming climate change as an ‘environmental issue’ may create (somewhat) distorting 
conceptual lens. By reducing it to the realms of nature and ‘the environment,’ this 
commonly found language practice detaches climate change from the economic, social and 
political sites and systems that produce it and that need to be transformed (Carvalho 2018, 
p.5).  
 
In a way these language practices essentially de-politicise a subject that is highly political. De-
politicisation of climate change “refers to the deletion of alternatives and of democratic debate 
about alternatives regarding climate change from public spheres” (Carvalho 2018, p.6). The 
techno-managerial depiction of climate change in the news media discourses has been rendered 
natural and citizens have been left with no role to play (regardless of the people being more 
affected) (Carvalho 2018, p.6).  
 
The climate change discourse in the South African mainstream news media may re/present climate 
change as a natural problem. What is not discussed is that it is a risk created by capital’s excessive 
exploitation of nature and labour. The source of the problem is deleted through language. Through 
passivisation and nominalisation, the agency of capitalism in the global warming and climate 
change crises is hidden and problems are presented as things that were bound to happen. In the 
same understanding, it follows therefore, that particular solutions (neoliberal) are to be followed 
to address the problems.  
 
Yves Pepermans and Pieter Maeseele (2018) examined “how news media contribute to 
manufacturing consent by disabling ideological disagreement about established social structures 
underlying climate change” (p.621). They used discourse analysis to account for how the Belgian 
newspapers de-politicised climate change. They defined de-politicisation as “any communication 
practice that misrecognizes or conceals the ideological values, perspectives and choices at work 
in, for instance, a given policy decision or framework, thereby shielding the latter from 




example, in the case of the de-politicisation of climate change in South Africa may refer to how 
the government and institutions with interest in energy (Eskom, Sasol, mining companies) claim 
that the continued utilisation of coal is rational/moral because it provides energy. This claim is 
then represented in the news media as the “only rational or moral way to define or deal with the 
problem, while the values, interests, and assumptions informing this representation remain 
concealed, and dissent is delegitimized as ‘immoral’ or ‘irrational’” (Pepermans & Maeseele 2018, 
p.623).  
 
Pepermans and Maeseele noted that the “characterization of depoliticization is used to criticize 
technocratic or consensual discourses that reduce action on climate change to market-driven 
technological innovation or green consumerism, without addressing the root causes of climate 
disruption” i.e. capitalism and its exploitative tendencies (2018, p.623). The justification of the 
continued use of coal by South Africa through the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP), Eskom, and 
government energy discourses on the logic of economic growth and development are also a 
mechanism meant to depoliticise the climate problem in South Africa. The opposite of de-
politicisation is politicisation of the climate crisis by way of rejecting imagined universal 
consensus constructed by primary definers, the rejection of specific neoliberal solutions. An article 
by the City Press (Yolandi Groenewald “Coal still on 2050 agenda,” City Press, November 26, 
2016), used Non-Governmental Organisations to reject the South African energy policy that seeks 
to retain coal powered power plants by 2050. A politicised discourse would transcend the surface 
descriptions of climate change “scientists say,” or “physical causes are,” to a more socially active 
approach that searches for “societal root causes” (Pepermans & Maeseele 2018 p.624). A critical 
analysis of the climate change discourse accounts for “the role of ideology in media representations 
of science” (Carvalho 2007, p.225) by questioning the agents, their interests and ideological 
inclinations. 
  
The Public Idiom and the Ideology of Consensus  
Fowler (1991) saw representation as "a constructive practice" not that news production techniques 




structure of news, structures of news organisations, and medium choices, all have specific social, 
economic and ideological contexts which determine how they function.  
 
Through the use of 'oral models' in newspapers, a kind of writing that appeals to the reader as an 
individual, and writing in an interpersonal way, the newspapers are able to normalise and naturalise 
ideologies by transmitting elite discourses into everyday language - thus interpellating the 
audiences through language. The elite discourses are accepted as common sense by the 
interpellated audiences. Hall et al. (1978) observed that the common sensing of elite discourses is 
achieved through “translation of official viewpoints into a public idiom” where the viewpoints are 
invested with “with particular force and resonance” and bringing them “common-sensically within 
the horizons of understandings of various publics” (p.61). The news give “an illusion of 
conversation in which common sense is spoken about matters on which there is consensus” 
(Fowler 1991, p.np). The success of the Promethean and sustainable capitalism neoliberal climate 
change discourses can largely be accredited to the use by newspapers of the 'public idiom' (Hall et 
al. 1978) or what Fowler (1991) called 'oral models' which represent issues in a common-sense 
discourse through the consensus ideology. For example, such expressions as 'everyone agrees that 
...'. This imagined social consensus is built by the primary definers and is incorporated into news 
language by journalists who translate the 'common sense' and 'consensus' views of the elite and 
dominant into a socially agreeable public language thereby naturalising and automatising elite 
worldviews.  
 
Fowler (1991, n.np) argued that "[A]rticulating the ideology of consensus is a crucial practice in 
the Press's management of its relations with government and capital, on the one hand, and with 
individual readers on the other". This study addressed questions such as:  
(a) How the newspapers use the language of consensus to naturalise the views of elite sources, 
capital and the government. 
(b) How, through the same vices, the news media propel the exploitation of nature by capital 
under the common sense pretext and the interpellation of audiences and discourse subjects. 
(c) Whose interests are established and re/produced by the ideology of consensus? 




The ideology of consensus is promoted by the use of such words as 'we', 'our', 'us' South Africans. 
Fowler (1991, p.np) defined the consensus discourse as assuming  “that, for a given grouping of 
people, it is a matter of fact that the interests of the whole population are undivided; and that the 
whole population acknowledges this 'fact' by subscribing to a certain set of beliefs”. As Fowler 
(1991) argued, those who attempt to project a different view from the consensus view could be 
labelled negatively through such words as ‘deviants’, ‘trouble-makers,’ ‘enemies of progress’. 
They are "subjected to marginalization or repression" and boundaries between 'us' and 'them' are 
enacted and enlarged by the default perception of seeing those who view the world differently as 
working against 'facts' and what is socially agreeable. The use of the public idiom/oral models is 
to accomplish an ideological function of naturalising "the terms in which reality is represented, 
and the categories whose terms represent …. Conversation implies a commonly held view of the 
world, a shared subjective reality that is taken for granted and does not have to be proved" (Fowler 
1991, p.np). Berger and Luckman (as cited in Fowler 1991, p.np) stated: 
The most important vehicle of reality maintenance is conversation. One may view the 
individual's everyday life in terms of the working away of a conversational apparatus that 
ongoingly maintains, modifies and reconstructs his subjective reality …. Most 
conversation does not in so many words define the nature of the world. Rather, it takes 
place against the background of a world that is silently taken for granted …. If this is 
understood, one will readily see that the great part, if not all, of everyday conversation 
maintains subjective reality. Indeed, its massivity is achieved by the accumulation and 
consistency of casual conversation - conversation that can afford to be casual precisely 
because it refers to the routines of a taken-for-granted world. The loss of casualness signals 
a break in the routines and, at least potentially, a threat to the taken-for-granted reality … 
language realizes the world, in the double sense of apprehending and producing it. 
 
Through ownership of both the means of production and the means of mental production, the 
worldviews of the elite become readily available, acquiring the status of universality in defining 
the "social world", thus, re/producing the way of life of the powerful as natural and legitimate. The 
universality of elite worldviews ensures that they "are shared to some degree by the subordinate 
classes of the society" winning the consent of the governed, not only through "overt coercion" but 
through "ideas" (Hall et al. 1978, p.59). By using the language of the:  
supposed would-be readers/audience" (the public idiom) the "newspaper's own version of 
the language of the public to whom it is principally addressed: its version of the rhetoric, 
imagery and underlying common stock of knowledge which it assumes the audience 




investing them "with popular force and resonance, naturalising them within the horizon of 
understandings of the various publics (Hall et al. 1978, p.61).  
 
Intertextuality as a discursive tool and strategy 
Michel Foucault (1971) argued that "there can be no statement that in one way or another does not 
reactualize others" (p.98). Intertextuality was conceptualised as a discourse analytical tool by 
Fairclough in 1992 drawing upon the earlier work of Kristeva and Bakhtin. Mikhail Bakhtin (as 
cited in Fairclough 1992, p.101) noted that "texts and utterances are shaped by prior texts that they 
are 'responding' to, and by subsequent texts that they 'anticipate'". For Fairclough all texts spoken 
and written are intertextual and "constituted by elements of other texts" (1992, p.102). 
Intertextuality was applied in this research as part of the discourse analytical framework that 
examining the discursive re/presentations of climate change in the South African mainstream news 
media. The idea is to be able to examine how particular media re/presentations are in effect linked 
retrospectively and prospectively to other texts. The referenced texts have a bearing on the 
ideologies and discourses promoted. Intertextuality works well in analysing news because, by way 
of journalism standards, journalists make implicit and explicit references to other texts, and to 
news sources and in giving background to their news articles. The references work in building 
particular worldviews, ways of seeing the world from the viewpoints of sources, from the 
viewpoints of other texts that they reference. By making these references, and using language 
(metaphors, euphemisms etc.) the news media contribute in the legitimation or delegitimating of 
particular worldviews.  
 
The climate change news stories published by the news media, to borrow from Kristeva (1986 as 
cited in Fairclough 1992, p.102) insert history into their stories, that is, "the text absorbs and is 
built out of texts from the past". Through intertextuality there is the insertion of "the text into 
history" which means that "the text responds to, reaccentuates, and reworks past texts, and in so 
doing helps to make history and contributes to wider processes of change, as well as anticipating 
and trying to shape subsequent texts" (Fairclough 1992, p.102). Climate change news stories are 
not history-free but strongly attached to other texts belonging to other discourses (government, 
academics, energy, environment etc.). These other discourses shape and are shaped by the news 




change knowledge(s), attitudes, actions and experiences. Intertextuality is useful in unpacking how 
hegemonies are re/produced and sustained because of its ability to account for "the productivity of 
texts, … how texts can transform prior texts and restructure existing conventions … to generate 
new ones" (Fairclough 1992, p.102). The productivity of these texts is "socially limited and 
constrained, and conditional upon relations of power" (Fairclough 1992, p.103). It is possible to 
"conceptualize intertextual processes and processes of contesting and restructuring orders of 
discourse as processes of hegemonic struggle in the sphere of discourse, which have effects upon, 





The selection of newspapers for analysis was based on their greater chance of covering climate 
change news, their wider geographic distribution both online and the physical copies, thus, giving 
them a more pronounced advantage to influence the climate change discourses within South Africa 
and the Southern Africa region. More critically, these are well established newspapers and have 
acquired a stature for themselves for defining serious news and creating a framework for major 
news and thus wielding control in terms of setting the news agenda for South Africa. The 
newspapers selected for the study are the Sunday Times, the Mail and Guardian, the City Press 
and the Sunday Independent. These newspapers were selected because they are ‘quality, elite and 
mainstream’. These four weekly quality mainstream newspapers selected were chosen despite their 
relatively depressed circulation figures compared to dailies and tabloids because “they have an 
important agenda-setting function for opinion leaders, the public, other media” (argument drawn 
from Pepermans & Maeseele 2018, p.628).  
 
Stories’ selection 
The news stories selected for analysis were downloaded from the websites of the newspapers, 
Pressreader and the online database Sabinet Online. For the purposes of this study, 290 stories 
focusing on climate change issues in the global South (Southern hemisphere) were analysed, 106 
from the Mail & Guardian, 61 from City Press, 65 from the Sunday Times and 58 from the Sunday 




search on the websites of the newspapers, Pressreader and online database Sabinet Online. The 
study used news articles published between 2011 (prior to the Durban COP17) and December 2018 
(after the COP24 in Poland). This time span is in line with recommendations put forward by 
Carvalho (2008) for analyses that account for “the time sequence of texts” and therefore the eight-
year period satisfies this need thus making the study longitudinal (p.161). In addition, Carvalho 
(2008) noted that discourse analysis needed to take account of “the time plane,” that is “the time 
sequence of texts and its implications” (p.162). Discourse analysis accounts for the “social 
processes ‘outside’ the text”, which is necessary to understand the discursive strategies employed 
by social actors “in a variety of arenas and channels ‘before’ and ‘after’ journalistic texts” 
(Carvalho 2008, p.161). The examination of time planes in discourse analysis allows the researcher 
to understand the “implications of previous discursive positions on subsequent ones” and to extend 
this argument, to account for changes in discursive positions over time and the factors necessitating 
such changes. Texts are retrospectively responding to previous texts and prospectively anticipating 
subsequent ones (see Fairclough, 1992 on his discussion of intertextuality) because they “build on 
previous ones, taking up or challenging former discourses” (Carvalho 2008, p.163). The time plane 
analysis, as Ruth Wodak and Theo van Leeuwen (1999) argued, provides the much-needed 
historical background and this accounts for any changes in discourses over time. 
 
While most discourse studies examine news texts over shorter time spans, this study appreciates 
the importance of longitudinal (longer time planes) studies that give the historicity of discourses 
because climate change is still evolving in terms of knowledge and the phenomenon. The 
discourses about it are likely to evolve, change or be transformed over time. The study accounted 
for the development(s) and changes (if any) in the discursive constitutions and re/constructions of 
climate change in South Africa between 2011 and 2018, at the same time being critically aware of 
key critical discourse moments, the key actors and the history. This historical approach allowed 
the researcher to understand that 2011 became the key entry moment of the climatic into the 
mainstream South African social discourse (due to COP17). For Carvalho (2008) “a time-sensitive 
discourse analysis also means considering the particular context of a given period, from specific 





The keywords used were climate change, climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation, 
emissions reduction, global warming, renewable energy, carbon tax and developing countries. All 
the articles on the websites and electronic databases that included these keywords were included 
in the population sample. A total of 736 stories were collected from this exercise. The researcher 
moved on to identify the news hole from this first sample, identified the formats of the articles in 
the sample (for example news items, lead articles, commentary and analysis, opinion pieces, and 
letters to the editor) and lastly the sections they appeared in. 
Having done the above, the researcher moved to sample two, where the researcher sifted the first 
sample for particular characteristics. This section was based on purposive sampling. Only news 
stories produced by the local staff, opinion pieces, commentary and analysis, and lead stories were 
considered (internal news reporters and not news agencies and letters to the editor). These articles 
selected were to be from and about South Africa, and the global South/developing countries. 
After sifting sample one and building sample two, the researcher moved on to build sample three. 
In the case where sample two had more articles than the desired ones, the number of articles were 
narrowed down using random sampling proportionate to each individual media outlet to maintain 
equity and representation. This process was complemented by “scan-type reading” (Carvalho 
2005) of all the texts to select those that had ‘climate change/global warming/emissions 
reduction/climate mitigation and adaptation’ and ‘developing countries’ in the headline or had 
orientations to these subjects occupying a significant position in the article and were both presented 
as central themes. 
After establishing the third sample, the researcher applied a number of measures. The researcher 
recorded the main and sub-topic for each story, date, page/section (specifically the headline and 
the lead paragraph: Stories were broken down into several categories (this enabled the researcher 
to do the quantitative distribution of the topic across different media outlets. The following were 
also analysed; subject category/theme, source of item (official, expert, political actor, activist, 
celebrity, popular perception), context of the story (response to a crisis, conference/gathering, 
response to activism, news briefing etc.), framing of item (discursive analysis), policy 
issue/outcome at stake, type of intervention (adaptation/mitigation). This thematic structure and 




stories. Thematic structure and form – consists of an event or chain of events, behind which one 
or more news actors stand (Johannessen 2013, pp.41-42). Johannessen (2013) defined an agent as: 
the narrative subject of the narrative predicative, described in the statements in the form of 
‘do’. The importance of an agent can be seen in the extent that he/she takes significant 
action. Major agents are those who play a leading part in the stories, while minor agents 
could have been omitted without destroying the story even though it would impoverish it. 
 
5. 8 News Data Analysis 
As a primary step preceding the actual analysis of news stories, the study identified the range of 
arguments and viewpoints that existabout climate change in South Africa. For instance, this 
process yielded themes that include: the need to catch-up and the indispensability of coal, the need 
to abandon fossil fuels, climate justice, technological optimism (clean coal and nuclear), carbon 
markets, carbon tax, and foreign policy Drawing from Philo (2007), these themes/arguments 
“showed what was available for journalists to choose from, as well as which arguments ‘belonged’ 
to different interests” (p.179) and the conditions or contexts within which these arguments were 
made. The study went on to examine how these arguments were re/presented, re/produced or 
challenged in the mainstream newspapers. This process began by an attempt to map the public-
policy debates prior and post the Conferences of the Parties (COP17) in 2011 up to COP24 in 
2018. Having established this map, the study moved to “analyse how different parts of the debate 
were featured in news … and the manner in which some accounts were highlighted or ‘preferred’ 
in the text” (Philo 2007, p.179). 
 
The process of news analysis began by “an open-ended reading of texts without very specific 
questions and hypotheses” which enabled the researcher to identify “the most significant 
characteristics of the data, without the filter-effect” (Carvalho 2008, p.166). The initial reading 
(open-ended) of texts included all the texts that were available (on websites, on Sabinet and 
Pressreader), a close attention was paid to the news headlines and the leads of the stories that 
constituted the corpus. From this open-ended reading phase, a scan-type reading was also done to 
further narrow the number of all the articles to those that specifically dealt with issues of climate 
change (the phenomenon [science], politics, economics, responses) and global warming and 





The above process yielded 290 stories that were then set for analysis. Articles that were written 
during the critical discourse moments were given close attention. Years with higher frequencies 
allowed the researcher to make informed decisions about identifying the critical discursive 
moments across the eight-year period (See Carvalho 2007, 2008). These critical discourse 
moments allowed for a closer examination, taking account of the key actors, their agency and the 
forces sustaining the coverage. According to Carvalho (2008, p.166), critical discourse moments 
are “periods that involve specific happenings, which may challenge the ‘established’ discursive 
positions” - these can be seen by “political activity, scientific findings, or other socially relevant 
issues”.  
 
After the scan-type reading of news stories suggested by Carvalho (2005, 2007), news articles 
were selected based on the scope and form that they used. More broadly, the study adopted and 
modified the discourse-analytical framework for the scope and form of climate change discourse 
developed by Maeseele and Raeijmaekers in 2017. Scope “informs us on what is being addressed, 
while form pays attention to how this is portrayed” (Pepermans & Maeseele 2018, p.626). Scope 
examines the prominence or exclusion of particular topics/angles, social actors (who sets the terms 
of debate or achieves primary definitional power), and viewpoints. Through the examination of 
scope, one is able “to identify the ideological preferences at play in a particular discursive 
construction” (Pepermans & Maeseele 2018, p.626). Form examines the layout, style, linguistic 
and discursive strategies. Following suggestions from Pepermans and Maeseele (2018) and part of 
analysis, each article was treated “as a unit of analysis,” was “read, reread, and compared in terms 
of scope (prominence or exclusion of particular topics/angles, social actors, and 
viewpoints/preferences) and form (layout, linguistic choices, discursive strategies)” (p.629).  
 
Recurrent discursive strategies and ideological inclinations across the four newspapers were 
identified and examined. Some of the emergent discursive re/constructions included but were not 
limited to: Coal is indispensable, Climate change justice, Optimism in market-led and techno-
managerial climate solutions (clean coal, nuclear energy, carbon markets), Carbon tax, South 
Africa within the International Climate System, The global North should lead emissions reduction 




5. 8.1 Textual Analysis 
The first level of analysis under text layer and organisation examines the surface of the newspaper 
and the article. These included the section in which the article was published, the page number, 
whether it was accompanied by visual elements (photographs, graphics etc.), the title of the article 
and the author. The headline, the lead and the first three paragraphs of the story were carefully 
examined to understand the preferred readings built within them. The second level examined the 
objects re/constructed in the news texts. The objects included themes/topics, for example 
economics of climate change, climate change impacts on agriculture and solutions to the climate 
crises. Events or issues related to the broader issue under discussions were considered. The third 
level identified the discourse actors (people or institutions) mentioned in the news articles. The 
stage also critiqued the interests of the actors in the article, and the level of influence they held in 
the article by shaping the overall meaning of the story. Further, at this stage, the study explored 
and described the dominating perspectives in the text (which actors were afforded primary 
definitional role) and how the power of social actors was framed (the capacity of one actor to 
convey his/her views through the media in quotes or by reference). Carvalho (2008) noted that 
those actors with a predominant framing position had social influence. The fourth analytical level 
examined the key metaphors and other rhetorical devices used to build ideological closures and 
preferred readings. At this level attention was paid to the vocabulary used in re/presenting the 
issues, ideologies and realities. Semantics, syntax and lexicalisation were also analysed. 
Nominalisation and active/passive sentences were analysed as part of the syntactic analysis in the 
news media discourse. Metaphors, metonyms, euphemisms and rhetoric were identified and 
examined.  
 
The fifth level of analysis examined the discursive strategies used in the news text. The researcher 
examined the forms of discursive manipulation of reality by the social actors and journalists to 
build preferred readings and achieve ideological closure. Carvalho (2008) defined discursive 
manipulation as a form of “discursive intervention” and includes aspects of discourse framing by 
claims-making and directing attention to something (p.169). “Framing is to organize discourse 
according to a certain point of view or perspective” (Carvalho 2008, p.169). This can include 
“selection and composition” where certain facts are included, and others excluded (also includes 




‘facts’ in the stories were organised to produce a particular ideological meaning and how the 
sponsors of these views (actors) framed ‘reality’. The analysis sought to differentiate between the 
discursive strategies of social actors to those of journalists. Attention was paid to aspects such as 
legitimation where particular actions or powers were sanctioned based on normative reasons, the 
positioning and construction of viewpoints of social actors “into a certain relationship with others” 
(Carvalho 2008, p.169), politicisation or de-politicisation (see sections above for definitions), 
othering, distanciation, labelling, passivisation and nominalisation, common-sensing, and 
constructing responsibility.   
 
The six-level of analysis under the textual layer and structural organisation was concerned with 
the ideological standpoints embedded in the news articles. Further, in examining the ideologies 
built into the story, the analytical process sought to understand how preferred readings and 
ideological closures were built into news stories through language, discursive strategies, text 
structure and layout. Further, it was key to understand how all these factors naturalised particular 
worldviews and rendered them natural and common-sensical. Noting that ideological standpoints 
are always implicit, through comparative synchronic analysis, the analysis , explored how the same 
events/issues and social actors were re/presented in the same news media and in other newspapers. 
As Carvalho (2008) argued, one should look for what is absent/excluded and the one which is 
included/present in the article because “silence can be as performative as discourse” (p.171). What 
is obscured in the text is very important because the inclusion and exclusion of some voices and 
issues create a particular meaning and a particular reality. The study moved on to focus on how, 
through discursive re/presentations of climate change in the South African mainstream news 
media, ‘a particular policy approach is (de-)legitimized or (de-)naturalized’. The ideological 
interests underpinning the news re/constructions were analysed. The seventh level of analysis 
involved an investigation on the ontology of the discourse (specifically how the climate change 
phenomena are understood, the discursive authority afforded to different sources, the role of 
science and evidence and the policy directions envisaged for both adaptation and mitigation).  The 
eighth analytical level draws drew attention to the taken for granted assumptions about natural 
relationships (the likely impacts of climate change in South Africa, where, when, how effects 




political and economic dimensions of the climate change discourse, systematised the main 
strategies of the press and of political actors by reading strategies directly from texts authored by 
political actors and indirectly from quotes and reports (non-linguistic) actions that are compared 
in the four newspapers.  
 
5.8.2 Contextual Analysis 
After going through the outlined textual analytical stages, the analysis moved to a comparative 
contextual analysis which involved looking “beyond the text to the overall coverage of an event 
or issue in one news outlet and examine the wider social context” (Carvalho 2008, p.171). This 
stage involved examining the amount of coverage dedicated to one issue/event over a certain 
period to understand the importance attached to the issue by that particular news organisation. This 
stage of the examination paid key interest towards what Carvalho (2007) called “simultaneous 
depictions” of the same events, reports or stories across all the four newspapers (p.227). This 
enabled one to understand how the same event/issue was re/presented by the different media 
institutions. This also fulfils the call by Carvalho (2008) for a comparative-synchronic analysis, 
which by extension, demystifies the inherent ideological viewpoints held within stories. Further, 
this also helps in understanding the discourses of newspapers outside of those of the social actors. 
Comparative-synchronic analysis - “means looking at the various representations of an issue at the 
time of the writing of one specific news text (unit of analysis)” (Carvalho 2008, p.171). It involves 
comparing “one text with other representations of the issue: texts published on the same day (or 
another time unit) by different authors in the same news outlet or others” (Carvalho 2008, p.171). 
The comparative-synchronic analysis is important in:  
attempting to reconstitute the original events (discursive or non-discursive). By cross-
referencing news outlets and checking original documents, researchers can form their own 
image of reality, which is hopefully more accurate and/or complete than each individual 
media representations (Carvalho 2008, p.171). 
 
Having done the comparative-synchronic analysis, the researcher, conducted a historical-
diachronic analysis - this stage involved accounting for the social context able to “produce a history 
of media constructions of a given issue” by examining the “sequence of discourse constructions of 
an issue and assessing its significance” (Carvalho 2008, p.172). This stage helped to re/construct 




worldviews were re/produced or contested, which alternative arguments were available at the 
moment, how were they accounted for or excluded from the public agenda and why. The historical-
diachronic analysis is a biographical study of issues as they evolve in the news over time. 
 
5.9 Chapter summary 
This chapter discussed the twin concepts of articulation and discourse analysis and their 
application in examining how the news media articulate, re-articulate and dis-articulate climate 
change discourses in South Africa. The chapter laid a methodological foundation for the study of 
climate change representation in the news through articulation and discourse analysis. The 
theoretical and methodological frameworks advanced in this chapter show the possibilities of these 
concepts and the advantages of such methodological and theoretical hybridity. Used together, the 
concepts are useful in analysing the neoliberal climate change discourses in the news. Hence, this 
chapter, with its focus on articulation and discourse analysis, details how the neoliberal climate 
change and environmental discourses are naturalised and legitimated through the news. Critically, 
they help understand how dominant ideologies are legitimised and they achieve their status through 
discourse practices. Articulation and discourse analysis become useful tools and methods in 
deconstructing ideologies in the news, the role of language, the sponsors of such discourses and 
the power they hold in society. This chapter introduced and extended the key theories necessary 
in examining the news media representation and discourses of climate change in South Africa. 
Articulation and discourse analysis are used as foundations for the methodological framework. 
The next five chapters present the results of this study. The analysis and presentation of the results 
is being done thematically and each chapter presents the results and analysis of news media 











Chapter Six: Re-articulating media constructions of 'dangerous' climate 
change 
6.1 Introduction 
Anthropogenic climate change is a crucial global challenge characterised by rising sea levels, 
rising temperatures, and incessant extreme weather events (including droughts and flooding). 
South Africa, due to present and anticipated climate change impacts (DEA, 2011, 2017), has 
participated in global and local initiatives to map response mechanisms to mitigate and adapt. 
Alongside the evolution in policy initiatives, the news media coverage and representation of 
climate change have also evolved, from a representation centred on doubting the science to a 
consensus climate change discourse. This chapter traces how the newspapers in South Africa have 
cover(ed) and re/presented the impacts of climate change in South Africa between 2011 and 2018. 
Further, the chapter questioned the drivers of cover(age) and the critical discourse sponsors. The 
Mail & Guardian, followed by the City Press, gave extensive coverage to the climate change 
impacts theme, where the newspapers attempted to localise the climate problem and to project it 
as both a present and future problem. Overall, climate change was re/presented through the 
discursive devices of scientisation and depoliticisation. Science reports and experts gained 
discursive power in defining the climate change problem, science was re/presented as 
‘unequivocal’ and ‘unquestionable,’, and resultantly, the solutions proposed by the scientists were 
to be followed. Further, through depoliticisation, the media portrayed climate change as an issue 
of the environment, de-linked from aspects of cultural politics and political economy. However, 
the Sunday Times gave space to sceptical actors and views that questioned climate change science. 
From the final sample that was analysed, there was no story from the Sunday Independent that had 
climate change impacts as a key theme.  
6.2 Climate change and extreme weather: Drought and Floods 
The re/presentation of climate change impacts in the newspapers analysed was linked to extreme 
weather events, the release of scientific reports, and international climate change conferences. The 
news stories on climate change impacts were premised on the views of ‘established’ scientists and 
experts. The Sunday Times gave different messages about the science of climate change, and this 




questioned climate science were drawn into the stories and often wrote their own articles. 
However, through analysing the stories and editorials, the messaging was mixed, though, at 
editorial level, the scientific consensus discourse was accepted. In contrast to the mixed messaging 
characteristic of the Sunday Times, the Mail & Guardian advanced a scientific consensus ideology 
and discourse. For the newspaper, science was unquestionable and urgent action was needed. The 
newspaper sought to mobilise public awareness and action by portraying climate change impacts 
as ‘grave’ and likely to worsen if no action was taken soon. The predictions from science were 
represented as certain and unequivocal. Science journals were utilised the most in the Mail & 
Guardian, especially in stories written by Sipho Kings. Kings drew his stories from various global 
academic journals and international organisations dealing with climate change, such as the World 
Meteorological Organisation (WMO), the National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA-United States), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA – United 
States). These were then presented as undisputed authorities. The discursive strategy of 
authorisation (Carvalho 2007) was extensively used to legitimise scientific sources/experts. The 
stories here portrayed the extreme weather events, especially in South Africa (case in point storms 
and fires in January 2015) to global warming. The City Press reported on climate change impacts, 
relying, especially on climate change conferences and the C40 Cities project. The coverage was 
event-oriented, and rarely did the newspaper produce stories that relied on scientific journals. 
 
In the story “Man’s impact ‘disrupting natural cycles,’” Sashni Pather (Sunday Times, 09 January 
2011) attributed climate change to human activities. This view was first expressed in the headline: 
“Man’s impact ‘disrupting natural cycles’”. The story referred to the “wettest December in 150 
years,” further alluding to extreme weather in Australia and the United States. The extreme weather 
had “wreaked havoc locally and across the globe, with floods, blizzards and torrential rain affecting 
millions of people”. In the same newspaper, a similar attempt to link extreme weather to a climate 
problem was given in a story by Bobby Jordan, “Get used to the weather…,” (Sunday Times, 30 
January 2011). The story argued that the weather in South Africa was getting extreme and 
“weirder” and that these “extremes of drought and flooding are the new normal”. The story, 
“Prepare for long season of drought, and some floods, too” (Bongani Mthethwa, Sunday Times, 26 




newspaper wrote about climate change impacts linked to extreme weather events, essential to note 
is that often, this theme also came out from conferences or press releases. For example, this story 
was a product of the World Water Summit conference held in Durban in 2017. The story directly 
represented the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research’s Dr Asmerom Baraki arguing that 
“due to climate change, Southern Africa might see more of these extreme situations”. The story 
depoliticised climate change because of scientific instrumentalisation,  
Sipho Kings, the environment reporter at the Mail & Guardian, often made attempts to link the 
present extreme weather events in South Africa to climate change and in doing so localise climate 
change problems. The journalist used scientific research findings together with extreme weather 
to build a discourse that saw climate change as a present problem, not a futuristic one. Unlike early 
coverage where reports were about events happening elsewhere (distanciated), Kings constructed 
a climate change that was local and relevant to different South African communities. For Kings, 
climate change was not just happening elsewhere but was a threat to life in South Africa. In the 
story “Climate change evident in Cape storm and Knysna fires,” (Mail & Guardian, 14 June 2017), 
Kings argued that “South Africa’s climate is changing and with that comes extreme weather. 
Events such as crippling storms and droughts, which used to happen once a century will happen 
every decade, or more frequently”. Climate change was responsible for extreme weather: “In Cape 
Town, the worst storm in two decades saw 8m waves thundering into the coastline. In Knysna, 
that storm drove fires, which spread for 100km and destroyed several homes. Seven people died. 
Initial estimates by disaster management officials are that overall damage will amount to more 
than R4-billion” (Sipho Kings, “Climate change evident in Cape storm and Knysna fires,” Mail & 
Guardian, 14 June 2017). 
 
The extreme weather events were seen to be worsening with rising sea levels in South Africa’s 
coastal cities a notable example. (Sipho Kings, “Climate change will worsen flooding in SA’s 
coastal cities,” Mail & Guardian, 02 June 2017). The story drew this conclusion from a journal 
article published in Scientific Reports which noted that “One metre of sea-level rise is going to be 
a game-changer for the coastal zone …. [and] Storms and floods that already eat away at cities 
such as Durban will not only be more intense, they will also start off from a higher point - because 




was written by Monica Laganparsad, “City not ready for ‘climate-change’ rain,” (Sunday Times, 
13 November 2016). According to the story, climate change was responsible for extreme weather 
events such as floods, and cities such as Johannesburg were “not ready for climate-change’ rain”. 
Dhesigen Naidoo (CEO Water Research Commission) was directly quoted arguing that “Climate 
change had brought with it ‘high-intensity’ rain which falls over a short period of time” which led 
to urban flooding and destruction of property. As discussed in the next paragraph, the ‘climate-
rain’ would overwhelm the already ‘crowded’ cities.  
 
Analogous to the construction of climate change and its impact on urban areas, the story “Climate 
change among the most significant risks facing humanity,” by Vuyo Mkize (City Press, 27 June 
2018) documented what different cities were doing to adapt to climate impacts. Additionally, the 
story saw “rapid urban migration and growth” as increasing climate risks. Just like the Mail & 
Guardian, this story failed to link urban migration and growth to the capitalist economic system 
among other things. The story, by failing to address the political economy of rural-urban migration, 
essentially depoliticised the climate problem. Urban migration and growth are seen as natural and 
inevitable processes. This fails to account for the factors (capitalistic) that pull people to urban 
centres. 
Climate change was a threat to South Africa’s water resources, affecting the already ‘fragile and 
inadequate’ water resources. This posed a danger to the well-being of the country and more 
importantly, people living in informal settlements. Fiona Macleod, in “Climate change a policy 
watershed,” (Mail & Guardian, 31 March 2011) noted that South Africa’s water resources “will 
be hardest hit” with the impact more severe “in urban areas, with about 61% of the population”.  
Macleod asserts that these urban areas were overcrowded because of the “rapid influx of people” 
into cities that were already suffering from “large service delivery backlogs” and “informal 
settlements”. While this is true, the nexus between social and climate justice was not discussed. 
The “influx of people” into cities was blamed for the overcrowding and the mushrooming of 
“informal settlements” and not the failure by government to provide decent accommodation and 
basic services both in and outside of cities. The article opened the possibility of a discourse that 
would combine social and climate justice, a discourse that will manage to link climate vulnerability 




and the minerals-energy complex in exacerbating these inequalities and subsequent vulnerabilities 
is hidden. The article used passivisation and nominalisation to diminish inequalities.  
The story relied on a government green paper that was used as part of consultations for a 
whitepaper in preparation for COP17. The green paper was used as the only source and had overall 
definitional power, which by extension made the government the only definer of reality.  The paper 
points out that “if negotiations do not succeed in decreasing the average global temperature by at 
least 2oC, ‘the potential impact on South Africa in the medium to long term is potentially 
catastrophic’”. This resulted in the production of a notion of ideological agreement, manufacturing 
‘imagined consensus’ and a one-dimensional discourse. The article, together with the direct 
discourse of the green paper, scientised the climate change problem. Climate change was 
constructed as strictly an environmental problem, depoliticised with no attempt made at linking 
climate change to anthropogenic activities that have led to the risk society.  
To address climate change, the story focused on adaptation and renewable energy. Climate change 
was to be addressed through UNFCCC multilateral arrangements and techno-managerial 
innovation. Ideologically, the article indirectly naturalised and moralised multilateral techno-
managerial responses which are inherently market-led and Promethean in nature. Excluded from 
the story are debates/views on emissions reductions and responsibility. This contributed to the 
depoliticisation of climate change. The scientisation of the discourse (allusions to science and 
impacts) left out questions of present responsibility and agency. While the global multilateral 
system was constructed as the best platform to address climate change, the story was silent on the 
local responsibility of South Africa in emissions and the need for their reduction. The emphasis on 
a global framework generalised responsibility and diminished a clear focus on South Africa as a 
key global emitter of greenhouse gases. The depoliticisation, together with the strategies of 
passivisation and nominalisation ensured that South Africa’s responses and emissions are left 
without scrutiny. The article’s focus on adaptation essentially excluded any discussions on 
mitigation. In addition, a focus on adaptation, though important, is critical as a discourse strategy 
that constructs South Africa as a victim of climate change, with its historical and present emissions 
hidden. This strategy diminished scrutiny and discussions on the need for effective reduction at a 




A similar focus on climate change impacts on water resources came from the City Press. The story 
“Climate change: Will SA run out of water,” (No author, City Press, 23 November 2015) discussed 
climate change impacts in South Africa and was based on the book: Climate change: Briefings 
from South Africa, by Robert Scholes, Mary Scholes and Mike Lucas of Wits University. The story 
quoted the book noting that the “warming trend is already apparent, and it is much higher than the 
global average rate. Temperatures in the interior of the country could rise by 3oC by the end of the 
century if the world greatly and urgently reduces its greenhouse gas emissions, but by up to 6oC if 
it does not” adding that  “the rate of warming in South Africa is near twice the average rate recorded 
worldwide so far”. The story relied on the discursive strategy of scientific instrumentalisation. 
 
While the Sunday Times has given access to climate change denialism and scepticism, this editorial 
“Our water woes are a collective burden,” reflects the editorial thinking relating to climate change 
(31 January 2016). Climate change was constructed as real and already affecting South Africa’s 
water resources. Because of global warming, “it feels like it’s getting drier by the day”. The dry 
conditions were affecting tourism, agriculture etc. “Climate change is altering rainfall patterns 
significantly, resulting in lower rainfall in some parts of the country. Rising sea levels … are real 
and present threats to our water table”.  
In addition to worsening water woes in South Africa, the changing climate was also constructed 
as inducing food insecurity across the country and the continent. Niren Tolsi’s story “Alarm raised 
over decline in maize crop,” (Mail & Guardian, 09 June 2011) saw climate change as exerting 
strain on agricultural productivity and thus leading to food insecurity. The impact on agriculture 
was mostly felt in maize production, a staple food for the country. Maize production was projected 
to “plummet by 35% in Southern Africa by 2030 if climate change continues unabated”. The 
newspaper discourses attributed food insecurity to and blamed “western governments for their 
inertia over response strategies to climate change”. Raj Patel (author of the book ‘Stuffed and 
Starved’), was directly represented in the story warning that Southern Africa was “likely to be one 
of the epicentres of hunger and malnutrition in decades to come”. Patel’s discourse constructed 
climate change and the threat of hunger as a result of the capitalist international food system: “the 
real culprit is the international food trade system, which discourages grain reserves, encourages 




ideological alternative to the mainstream capitalistic structures of world trade, of subduing 
everything under the logic of capital and profit. Most importantly, Patel criticised industrial 
agriculture, the real culprit behind the metabolic and ecological crises. In this discursive 
construction, food security could not be achieved if the world relied on the capitalist structures of 
agricultural production and trade. This study argues that industrial agriculture is not good for the 
environment and will not lead to food security. 
Similar to Niren Tolsi’s story above, Kwanele Sosibo, in “Women at the mercy of climate change” 
(Mail & Guardian, 15 September 2011), focused on climate change impacts on agriculture and 
how this would affect women. “Small-scale and subsistence farmers will play an increasingly 
important role as climate change takes its toll on Africa, but they will need more support from 
governments”. The story was based on the report produced by the Famine Early Warning Systems 
Network. William Barclay (Senior Regional Programme Advisor for the World Food Programme) 
was directly represented arguing that “Climate change is expected to play havoc with the region’s 
food security in the future”. The newspaper discourse supported this argument by noting further 
that “Agronomists predict that yields of corn, soya bean, maize, wheat and rice will decrease 
dramatically as temperatures rise”. Africa and other developing countries were constructed as 
passive victims of climate change. Due to climate change “65% of the global total increase in 
climate-related hunger was likely to occur on the African continent”. 
Government ministers also sought to advance the notion of ‘dangerous’ climate change impacts 
on agriculture, a sector that was “extremely vulnerable to climate change” in South Africa (Maite 
Nkoana-Mashabane, Minister of International Relations and COP17 President, in Yolandi 
Groenewald, “The good and bad of farming,” Mail & Guardian, 03 November 2011). Nkoana-
Mashabane used the public idiom to translate elite government views: “There is consensus that 
climate change will have a significant impact on agriculture in developing countries”. The use of 
the consensus discourse was meant to construct the issue as a topic where universal consent was 
available. 
News stories that highlighted the climate change impacts on food security had the undertones of 
empathy with the affected people and panic-inducement. For example, these discursive qualities 




2013: “The drought has highlighted the climate change and socio-economic challenges Namibia 
faces” (Jana Marais, “A long, dry season of hunger,” Sunday Times, 18 August 2013). “Namibia, 
the driest country in sub-Saharan Africa, is feeling the effects of climate change, with droughts 
and flooding threatening the traditional way of life of many of its tribes”. To address the impacts 
of climate change, Jana Marais’ feature story sought to promote local adaptation: “There was need 
to improve the seeds, soil fertility, farming methods and weed control by small-scale farmers”. 
Tueemuine Mbendura (elderly Himba woman from Kunene province), was quoted in the story 
observing that in “the olden days, the old men would go and build a fire and consult with the 
ancestors about rain. The young ones don’t do that anymore”. 
Impacts of climate change were widespread and included the negative ones on agriculture in 
general and forestry in particular. The story “Climate change may shrivel forestry, agriculture” 
(Lucas Ledwaba and Nicola Lazenby, City Press, 16 January 2011), addressed the issue of dealing 
with the impacts of climate change in South Africa, especially in forestry and agriculture. The 
story drew from a handbook by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) which 
according to the story, painted “a gloomy picture for South Africa’s forestry” and warned that 
“some areas may no longer be suitable for commercial forestry due to a projected increase in 
rainfall and temperatures”. The handbook by the CSIR concluded: “Climate change is likely to 
exacerbate existing declines in river run-off due to water use by commercial plantations, 
agriculture, and urban and industrial land use”.  
In addition to the impacts on forestry, climate change had a footprint on wine production as estates 
were affected by droughts. The story “The days of wine aren’t rosy,” (Sipho Kings, Mail & 
Guardian, 02 May 2013) drew attention to impacts of climate change in South Africa, specifically 
the wine estates in the Western Cape. The story relied on farmers, academics and environmental 
NGO representatives for its discursive construction. A research paper from Conservation 
International was used to scientise the climate change impacts: “climate change would destroy 
25% to 75% of all the areas currently used for wine cultivation around the world. South Africa 
stands to lose 55% of its wine-cultivating land”. Ultimately climate change impacts were 
depoliticised through scientisation because the problems of climate change were constructed as 




transformations of the capitalist economic system. For example, the wine estates were already 
trying to make their estates resilient by adopting solar to replace reliance on the Eskom grid. While 
this is good for the survival of the estates, it downplays the need for the radical transformation in 
the consumptive and exploitative culture of capitalist political economy. Simon Grier, wine estate 
co-owner, criticised the provision of cheap electricity as the major problem behind the high 
emissions: “Cheap power was the biggest disservice made to this country and our industry because 
it made us wasteful and inefficient”. Grier used the discursive strategy of delegitimising cheap 
electricity given to polluting industries. Indirectly, Grier critiqued the industrial minerals-energy 
complex beneficiaries of cheap electricity. 
 
The Sunday Times also linked the 2015 drought that affected the greater part of South Africa to 
climate change. The drought destroyed crops across the country. This representation was manifest 
in the story “It’s growing too hot for growing” (Monica Laganparsad, Sunday Times, 01 March 
2015). The headline warned that due to global warming, “it’s growing too hot for growing”. The 
story cited Dr Francis Engelbrecht from the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) 
noting that “The African continent has a very strong temperature signal”. Through indirect 
representation, the story cited Engelbrecht observing that “over the past century, the global 
temperature had increased by about 2o Celsius over the interior region of South Africa”. Climate 
change is depoliticised by way of scientific instrumentalisation. Farmers were represented only 
 as victims of the climate-induced drought but not agenda-setters and discourse sponsors. The 
newspaper discourse noted: “Unless greenhouse gas emissions are reduced and climate change is 
slowed, Southern Africa faces an even higher increase in temperatures over the next century”. 
6.3 Climate change and increasing temperatures 
The transition from fossil to renewable energy was often described as slow and thus leading to 
increased global warming. A report from PricewaterhouseCoopers and the International Energy 
Agency, in “Emissions set to exceed tipping point,” (Sipho Kings, Mail & Guardian, 28 June 
2012), argued that the transition “from fossil fuels to renewable energy has been too slow to keep 
global temperature increases within the threshold needed to avert serious disaster”. Drawing from 




Africa was “projected to increase from 17 200 terawatt-hours in 2009 to 31 700 TWh in 2035” 
something that made emissions reductions “unlikely”. It is clear from the story that the increase in 
demand would fuel emissions. This study contends that the demand for electricity is directly linked 
to processes of increased industrial production, extensive urbanisation and rural-urban migration. 
Consistent with this reality, a reduction in consumption is needed to lower the electricity demand. 
The realisation of the notion of living well opposed to ‘good life’ and promoting the idea of ‘small 
is beautiful’ is important. More importantly, decreased consumption is key to climate change 
mitigation. The reduction requires a transformation in definitions of good life and development, a 
shift from modes and cultures of production that stimulate consumption, towards social cultures 
that promote use and not exchange value, systems of de-development and decrease in social and 
capital inequalities. This requires a new kind of thinking that challenges the inherently dominant 
culture of capitalist accumulation. There is need to disarticulate society from the capitalist chains 
of accumulation and exploitation. The story regretted “slow transitions” to renewables and saw the 
transition as the most necessary route to decarbonise the atmosphere. Excluded from the discourse 
are worldviews that seek emissions reduction through transforming the system of accumulation 
responsible for the risks not a transition from one system of exploitation to the other. 
Some stories directly linked the activities of the minerals-energy complex to the dangerous 
temperature increases. Climate change was portrayed as a result of greenhouse gas emissions from 
heavy industries. For example, the story “Carbon report puts SA in the hot seat,” (Sipho Kings, 
Mail & Guardian, 05 December 2013) lightly attempted to politicise climate change in South 
Africa by pointing out the country’s culpability in present emissions. The mining companies 
together with energy companies were portrayed as responsible for the higher per capita emissions 
of South Africa. Because South African companies were at the top in emitting greenhouse gases, 
the story legitimised the calls for the inclusion of countries such as South Africa in a new and 
wider Kyoto Protocol/agreement. More importantly, the story exposed the duplicity of economies 






Furthermore, “a new report on carbon emissions shows that only 90 international entities are 
responsible for two-thirds of all the greenhouse gas emissions in the past 250 years”. Citing a 
report by the Climate Accountability Institute, the story noted that these entities also included big 
South African mining giants: “The report shows that Anglo American has been responsible for 
0.5% of all historical emissions and Xstrata for 0.15% …. Sasol has been responsible for 0.24% 
of all emissions globally”. The lack of reduction action in South Africa was blamed on the big 
South African industrial and mining companies who used the ‘development’ narrative to evade 
emissions: “South African companies have avoided responsibility when it comes to lowering 
emissions by using the argument that they are responsible for a negligible amount of carbon 
emissions”. This story discredited South Africa’s calls for the developed global North to act 
because developing countries still required a ‘developmental space’. Kings showed that South 
African companies were part and parcel of the historical emissions and are still responsible for 
present emissions. 
 
Steve Kretzmann, in the story “UN report urges drastic action for SA climate change,” (City Press, 
17 October 2018) argued that South Africa needed to “cut coal faster than planned if the country 
intends on honouring international commitments to play its part in keeping global warming below 
1.5oC”. The story relied on a report by the IPCC which warned that “a further 0.5oC temperature 
increase spells exponential increases in climatic extremes across almost all natural systems and 
human activities”. The IPCC report also noted, “the use of coal globally will have to be phased out 
completely by 2050 and halved by 2030 (45% below 2010 levels)”. This, the story argued, meant 
that South Africa needed to phase out Kusile and Medupi and any other coal projects. The story 
called for a just transition, expressing optimism in renewables. University of Cape Town’s Energy 
Research Centre director, Harald Winkler called for the need for “a just transition away from coal, 
and towards community renewables and low-carbon energy systems” leading to the “redistribution 
of resources, both across and within countries”. South Africa’s continued use of coal was blamed 






Citing the Rockefeller Foundation-Lancet Commission Report on Planetary Health, Sipho Kings, 
politicised climate change and planetary health, blaming humans for the ‘Anthropocene’ age where 
humans are the main driver of ecological disruptions (Mail & Guardian, 16 July 2015). Climate 
change was linked to increased planetary warming and data from the NASA -United States was 
used to support these claims: “Last year was 0.6oC warmer than average, meaning it was over half 
a degree warmer than it should have” (Sipho Kings, “A ‘new state’ for the planet will jeopardise 
human life,” Mail & Guardian, 18 January 2015).  
 
The story directly represented Gavin Schmidt (Director of NASA’s Goddard Institute of Space 
Studies) noting that “We expect that heat records will continue to get broken - not everywhere and 
not every year - but increasingly, and that does not bode well for a civilisation that is continuing 
to add greenhouse gases to the atmosphere at an increasing rate”. The story employed the 
discursive strategies of science instrumentalisation. Climate change was constructed as a reality 
and that science is unequivocal. The warming temperatures were evidence of the warming 
atmosphere: “the last 38 years were warmer than the average for what they should have been”. The 
story used language that assumed universal consensus. Climate science was constructed as 
“consensual, certain and authoritative” (Pepermans & Maeseele 2018, p. 633). “The data released 
by Nasa on Friday - and supported by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in 
the United States” (Sipho Kings, “A ‘new state’ for the planet will jeopardise human life,” Mail & 
Guardian, 18 January 2015).  The fact that the data was released by NASA and supported by the 
NOAA authenticated and legitimised the science and the worldviews expressed. Science is 
advanced as “a normative basis for policy, thereby implying that debate is unnecessary” 
(Pepermans and Maeseele, 2018). Scientisation was sustained by another discursive element of 
demoralisation and problematisation where NASA’s Schmidt demoralised “a civilisation that is 
continuing to add greenhouse gases to the atmosphere at an increasing rate”. Schmidt 
problematised climate change as a result of a civilisation whose path is sustained by greenhouse 
gases. The framing and primary definitional power are given to scientists. While the civilisation 
was continually emitting greenhouse gases, the danger was already being felt. The story 
demoralised the global political system for lack of action citing island states, such as Kiribati, 




The effects of rising temperatures were seen to be “relentless and irreversible (Sipho Kings, “IPCC 
report: Climate change will be ‘irreversible’,” Mail & Guardian, 04 April 2014). Increased 
temperatures were seen to be leading to both flooding and droughts. These two consequently led 
to climate change-induced migration. The story “Intense heat will drive migration,” by Sipho 
Kings (Mail & Guardian, 06 May 2016) linked climate change-induced temperature increases to 
forced environmental “migration”. The lead paragraph of the story went on to state that “climate 
refugees are already a reality”. The story used research reports from the Max Planck Institute for 
Chemistry and the Cyprus Institute in Nicosia. The research showed “that vast swaths of the 
Middle East and North Africa will become inhabitable by 2050”. Science was used in the story as 
a normative basis for knowledge. Monette Zard, from the Forced Migration and Health Programme 
at Columbia University, saw climate change as responsible for increased forced migration globally 
and argued that “If climate change continues, some places will become inhabitable and people will 
need to be relocated” (Joan van Dyk, “Prepping for the world’s biggest move,” Mail & Guardian, 
16 November 2018). Environmental migrants would increase as “Several small island states such 
as Tuvalu in the South Pacific and the Marshall Islands farther north are already exploring options 
[and] …. Rising sea levels will eventually force populations on those islands” to become 
environmental refugees. 
 
The Op-Ed “Latest data proves world is heating up,” (Mail & Guardian, 13 January 2017) by 
Sipho Kings stressed that climate change was happening, and the scientific data was 
unquestionable. The headline “Latest data proves world is heating up” put science at the forefront 
of the debate. The data was legitimised because of being “latest” and came from the NOAA which 
is “one of the world’s most important climate observation groups”. The story used direct 
representation in reproducing the views of NOAA: “The rate of warming over the first 15 years of 
this century has, in fact, been as fast or faster than that seen over the last half of the 20th century”. 
Science from NOAA was contrasted with the ‘faulty’ data from other unreliable sources. The data 
from NOAA was reproduced as legitimate and reliable. Science was used as a normative basis for 
knowledge and addressing climate change. The discourse of scientific certainty was entrenched 




Using The Anthropocene Review as the sole discourse sponsor, Sipho Kings, in “Planet of the 
Humans ends badly,” (Mail & Guardian, 17 March 2017) constructed climate change as a certainty 
caused by anthropogenic (human) forces. The actions of humans had led to the Anthropocene age 
(the geological age where humans were a dominant force on climate and the environment). 
Capitalism was criticised for being a geological force: “if little is done to curb global warming and 
the extreme rate of climate change, ‘societal collapse’ will ensue … because the dominant 
economic logic of today - that of neoliberal market economics - is based on the idea of ‘endless 
resources on an infinite planet”. The Anthropocene Review was directly quoted arguing that “In 
the last six decades, anthropogenic [human-driven] have driven exceptionally rapid rates of change 
in the Earth’s system” due to “purely a function of industrialised societies”. 
The Op-Ed “Earth faces climatic moment,” by Sipho Kings (Mail & Guardian, 12 October 2018) 
noted that climate change impacts were dire, noting that “In Southern Africa, we have already had 
a taste of the worst. By 2040, nowhere will be safe. By the end of this century, life will be terrible 
for everyone”. Kings criticised governments for being irresponsible because they delayed climate 
action notwithstanding all the impacts of climate change. Furthermore, he noted that the Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) that governments put through under the Paris 
Agreement were inadequate in reducing emissions and averting intense warming. He concluded 
that, “the current plans by all governments will mean the world will warm by 4oC this century”. 
However, he also contended that there is optimism in technological fixes as governments move to 
green energy and electric vehicles, this will reduce carbon emissions resulting in less pollution. 
Sustainable capitalism through neoliberal techno-fixes is promoted. 
 
The story “Why things are really hotting up for SA,” by Bobby Jordan (Sunday Times, 25 June 
2017), attributed the hot temperatures in South Africa to climate change. This was supported by 
the “latest data” which showed that “Southern Africa’s climate is changing faster than global 
average”. The story noted that climate change had “a range of effects and this is expected to 






The sub-theme on climate change and increased temperatures impacts was relatively given 
prominence in the City Press. Phelokazi Mbude’s story “Climate change: How hot the world will 
be in 2050,” (City Press, 26 June 2018) discussed the impacts of climate change on cities. The 
story was based on the report produced by the C40 Cities’ project called the Future We Don’t 
Want which revealed that “in 2050 more than 970 cities will be regularly exposed to the hottest 
three-month average temperatures reaching at least 35oC”. The story did not localise and detail the 
climate impacts even though it claimed to rely on the Code for Africa’s online tools for predicting 
future climate change impacts. The story was reliant on the discursive strategy of scientisation 
which effectively depoliticised the climate problem. 
 
Mandi Smallhome’s story “Be prepared: It’s getting hotter and drier,” (City Press, 10 September 
2018), a feature series that is a product of a partnership called Our Land between City Press, 
Rapport, Code for Africa and Landbouweekblad, attempted to map and visualise the impacts of 
climate change in South Africa’s different regions and to different species. The headline revealed 
the central theme: “Be prepared: It’s getting hotter and drier”. The story quoted the report: State 
of Climate Change Science and Technology in South Africa which also expanded the theme: “in 
the next 30 years, the western parts of South Africa are expected to be hotter and drier than the 
rest of the country. More extreme weather, droughts and floods can be expected. All the viewpoints 
and actors in the story depoliticised climate change and thus diminished scrutiny of the mode of 
production responsible. The story depoliticised climate change by limiting the discussion to 
science and constructing climate change outside of the political-economic forces that gave rise to 
the climate and ecological risk society.  
The research cited, although not directly acknowledged, a key rebuttal of the capitalist system of 
ever-increasing consumption, globalisation and production - the world food system. “Farming 
meat uses a huge amount of energy, food and space. Each part of the process of growing an animal 
- feeding it, killing it, packaging it, shipping it and packaging it again for people to buy at shops - 
requires materials that are bad for the planet”. This sentence demoralised capitalist agricultural 
systems. The article, in a subtle way, mobilised for a discourse that disrupts the capitalist 
globalisation and consumption patterns in the beef and dairy industries. Such a transformation, 




diminishes the call for political-economic transformation by minimising climate action to the 
individual rather than corporate behaviour. 
As part of efforts to avoid extreme warming, the feature story “Cutting out meat and dairy slashes 
your carbon footprint,” (Sipho Kings, Mail & Guardian, 31 August 2018), relying on the 
University of Oxford’s Reducing Food’s Environmental Impacts Through Producers and 
Consumers study, suggested the need for people to cut meat from their diet to reduce the emission 
of greenhouse gases from animals and thus also reduce climate change impacts. The Oxford study 
had “found that meat and dairy products make up 60% of agricultural greenhouse gas emissions 
but provide only 18% of all calories and 37% of the protein that people ingest”. Furthermore, the 
study was directly quoted noting that “Cutting out anything that comes from an animal reduces 
each person’s carbon footprint by 73%. This would drop the amount of land used worldwide for 
farming animals by 75%,”. Thereby recommending a “move away from intensive feedlots to 
letting animals graze on natural fields. If 50% of animals that produce dairy and meat products 
were produced this way, there would be a two-thirds reduction in carbon emissions”. Critical to 
note in this article is the underlying connotative argument that delegitimises capitalist agricultural 
systems. 
The editorial “We must act now to save the world” by the Mail and Guardian (12 October 2018) 
argued that climate change posed a threat to life. The article implicitly legitimised neoliberal green 
economic, something that in the beginning, it had sought to denounce. “Wind and solar energy, 
batteries and all sorts of industrial efficiencies mean we can do it”. Important to note is the 
confidence in neoliberal climate responses. By interpretation, one could argue that the discourse 
on the green economy has been successfully mainstreamed to an extent that it has become a 
common sense and a tendential force. Business is demoralised as pursuing their selfish interests at 
the expense of the environment. “The only things stopping us are politicians and their funder 
masters”. Climate change is constructed as a problem of “our obsession with neoliberal 
capitalism”. “Large corporates aren’t doing anything about climate change because they only care 
about returns on profit this quarter”. “In South Africa, it is kleptocrats who make energy decisions 
based on what cut they can take. It is the lie of trickle-down economics, favouring big projects by 




6.4 Climate change and the Seas 
Fiona Macleod’s story “Ocean acidity is on the rise,” (Mail & Guardian, 14 December 2011) 
focused on climate change impacts, especially ocean acidification as the oceans absorb more 
carbon dioxide. The story relied on scientific experts for the primary definition. The discourse 
strategy of scientisation, thus, took centre stage and the story became wholly depoliticised. Though 
the story warned that “Continued carbon emissions will put the world’s seas under increasing 
pressure,” it did not place responsibility for carbon emissions reduction on anyone. Carol Turley 
from the Ocean Acidification Research Programme was directly represented noting, “changes 
caused by climate change will affect the ocean in ways we are only beginning to understand …. 
Research has shown that the ocean absorbs about 26% of global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
every year …. The rising acidity and decreasing pH levels are bad for marine organisms”. The 
scientific plane used in the story constructed climate change as a physical problem, the discourse 
is scientific and depoliticised, and the agency of capitalist risk culture is passivised and deleted 
from the discussion.  
Climate change, in some stories, was blamed for mass extinctions of ocean species. While most 
news reports have used the future tense when discussing extinction, Sipho Kings’ story “‘Mass 
extinction may have already begun’,” (Mail & Guardian, 10 October 2013) linked and constructed 
the extinctions as a present problem. The headline helped to construct climate change, not as a 
future problem but a present crisis that had a dangerous footprint: “Climate change is making the 
world’s seas more acidic and warmer. They hold 90% of all life and this will lead to mass 
extinctions, with dire results”. Climate change was constructed as anthropogenic: “the blame lies 
firmly with the emissions of carbon dioxide from human-driven burning of fossil fuels”. The story 
used a report by the International Programme on the State of the Oceans of 2013. The report noted 
that “The risks to the ocean and the ecosystems it supports have been significantly underestimated 
…. We are entering an unknown territory of marine ecosystem change and exposing organisms to 
intolerable evolutionary pressure”. The discourse in the story is scientised and depoliticised 
climate change.  The governments were constructed as environmental villains: “For the most part, 
the public and policymakers are failing to recognise, or choosing to ignore, the severity of the 




Climate change was responsible for arctic sea melting and the resultant threat to the survival of 
polar bears. The story “Polar bears in struggle to survive,” (Sipho Kings, Mail & Guardian, 24 
April 2016) directly quoted Dena Cator from the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN) who noted that polar bears were being forced to swim long distances as “a result 
of the warming climate shrinking the extent of Arctic sea ice. The ice provides a habitat for polar 
bears” leading to “a high risk of extinction and the threat is serious”. The stories on climate change 
impacts in the Mail and Guardian were consistently based on scientific experts, thus 
instrumentalising science and ignoring the political economy and cultural politics of climate 
change, leading to a depoliticised climate change discourse. 
Sipho Kings’ story “Arctic melt threatens life as we know it,” (Mail & Guardian, 02 December 
2016) contended that climate change-induced arctic ice melting posed a threat to life. The story 
was based on the Arctic Resilience Report of 2016 produced by the Stockholm Environment 
Institute and the Stockholm Resilience Centre. The report, as quoted in the story, noted that “The 
Arctic is now changing at an unprecedented pace, on multiple levels, in ways that fundamentally 
affect both people and ecosystems”. The story used science as a normative discursive basis. 
Climate change is depoliticised. Arctic melting is reduced to global warming without paying 
attention to social and economic faces behind global warming, the need for transforming social 
forces that are harmful to nature. 
Suthentira Govender’s story “Climate change threat to sardine run,” (Sunday Times, 06 August 
2017) portrayed climate change to marine life and subsequently to tourism: “Marine scientists and 
conservationists have warned that the sardine run, which generates an estimated R500-million in 
tourism for the KwaZulu-Natal South Coast, could be under threat because of climate change”. 
Citing Lesley Rochat, Marine Conservationist, the story noted that climate change was a threat to 
marine life as “60% of ocean species could be extinct by 2050 if climate change is not addressed 
as a matter of urgency by all nations”. The theme on climate change impacts in South Africa is 
tied to extreme weather events, this is especially true for the Sunday Times. In some news stories, 
extreme weather events were then directly linked to climate change. Outside of the extreme 




6.5 Climate change and Health 
Climate change was linked to extreme heat because of increasing temperatures in South Africa. 
This heat was not good for workers, especially those who worked outside. The story “Protect 
workers against the heat,” by Mia Malan (Mail & Guardian, 01 December 2012) described the 
impacts of climate change, especially increased temperature on people’s health and more 
importantly outdoor workers, with the result being reduced productivity. The news story used the 
discursive strategies of scientisation and moralisation with little economisation. The story called 
for the South African government to “act immediately to protect workers”. The impact of high 
temperatures called for immediate action because workers “in many parts of the country are 
already working in conditions that are so hot that it is very uncomfortable for them.'' The 
intervention needed was that of enhancing adaptation to the new temperatures scenarios through 
“a lot of basic public health measures that we could put in place right now to increase workers’ 
comfort and protect their health.'' This type of intervention, this study contends, is micro and fails 
to address the climate change problems by way of reducing greenhouse emissions and more 
essentially the transformation of a mode of production that promotes consumption and exploitation 
of both workers and the environment.  
Climate change was depoliticised through scientisation where the solutions to climate change were 
reduced to ‘public health interventions’ with no role to play in the overall transformation from 
capitalism to true sustainable social change based on human-nature metabolic relations. Important 
to note also is that the interventions being promoted have nothing to do with addressing climate 
change per se but improving the working conditions in order to enhance productivity and the well-
functioning of the capitalist system of production. By referring to experts/scientists, the story 
excluded views from the workers themselves and other actors. While the story discussed issues of 
workers, there was no attempt to involve them in the discourse and rather they were talked about 
and not talked to. Elite views were reproduced and naturalised as the only available ones, closing 
out ideological disagreement and thus manufacturing consent and one-dimensional discourse. 
 
Yolandi Groenewald linked increased “children’s springtime sneezing and wheezing” to climate 
change (Yolandi Groenewald, “Climate change to blame for early sniffles,” City Press, 06 June 




story noted that “climate change - spurred by fossil fuel gases - increases the production and spread 
of airborne allergens and is causing asthma and hay fever”. This argument was supported by a 
local South African aerobiologist, Dilys Berman, who argued that “predicted climate change will 
have a profound effect on airborne allergens like pollen, fungal spores and house dust mites”. The 
story also quoted a mother of asthmatic children confirming increased incidence. Interesting to 
note is that ordinary people are only used in the news where they appear as victims and never as 
discourse sponsors. 
 
In an Op-Ed “Will our grandkids inherit a liveable world,” Bob Scholes, an academic from Wits 
(Sunday Times, 27 September 2015), underlined the need to curb emissions as a moral duty to 
leave a liveable world for future generations. If ‘we’ care about the welfare of future generations, 
then we will take action to reduce emissions that will make their world warmer and intolerable. 
The failure to reduce emissions or to act towards such reductions was seen as failure and lack of 
responsibility, as seen in this sentence : “Why, then, are we so reluctant to curb our burning of 
fossil fuels, so that future generations can inherit a liveable world?”. There was no need to debate 
whether climate change was real or not because the science was unequivocal. “Climate data have 
been collected in South Africa since 1856. The overwhelming majority of stations show that 
warming over their period of record, averaging about 1.2o C per century”. “Sea levels have also 
been measured in South Africa for a long time and show an accelerating rise that can only be 
explained by warming of oceans and melting of ice on land”. Bob Scholes warned: “If we continue 
on our current path, temperatures in the South African interior will be up 6oC warmer than at 
present by the end of the century”. “Water shortages in South Africa, already a challenge, will very 
likely become more acute”. 
6.6 Climate change or variability 
News stories under this sub-theme were exclusively from the Sunday Times. The stories here, not 
only questioned the science, but at some moments, the reporters were cautious to link the extreme 
weather events to climate change, settling rather for the more comfortable ‘climate variability’ 
approach. There was no uncertainty in the Mail & Guardian and the City Press, while there was 
no explicit coverage of climate change impacts in the Sunday Independent. Dual representations 




example is the story, “Man’s impact ‘disrupting natural cycles’,” (Sashni Pather, Sunday Times, 
09 January 2011). While the framing of the headline sought to portray humans as responsible for 
climate change and global warming, which led to the extreme weather events, the sources used 
constructed the topic differently and promoted a totally different discourse of ‘climate variability’. 
The news reporter was clear to link the extreme weather, as indicated in the section above, but the 
actors used de-linked the extreme weather from climate change and chattered a more cautious 
‘variability’ narrative. For example, the story directly represented weather forecaster, Puseletso 
Mofokeng, arguing that the extreme weather “isn’t a rare occurrence in summer and would soon 
abate”. The actor, in contradiction to the story headline, reproduced the discourse on scientific 
uncertainty and scepticism. Professor John Meiklejohn of Rhodes University extended the 
discourse on scientific uncertainty arguing that climate change was a natural occurrence because 
“the climate is ever-changing”. The construction of climate change as ever-changing promoted 
scepticism and scientific uncertainty. The snowstorms experienced in South Africa were attributed 
by Meiklejohn to “the eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland, which would have 
emitted matter into the atmosphere, which may have reduced the quantity of solar radiation 
transmitted to the Earth’s surface, causing temporary cooling”.  
 
Similarly, the story “Get used to the weather…,” (Bobby Jordan, Sunday Times, 30 January 2011) 
recognised the extreme weather as a serious problem but did not link the extreme weather to 
climate change. Rather, the story used discourse actors who preferred linking the extreme weather 
events to climate variability and not change. While extreme weather was the “new normal”, the 
story argued that “top scientists, however, say it is too soon to confirm that global warming is 
behind the increasing number of droughts and floods - including countrywide floods that have now 
claimed at least 88 lives in the past six weeks”. The story avoided describing the extreme weather 
events in the name of climate change, opting rather, for a safe term “climate and weather 
variability”. Scientists and the government had “warned of dire consequences if South Africans 
did not fast adapt to ‘increasing variable’ (or unpredictable) weather”.  
 
Another opponent of the view, Themba Dube, a senior manager of climate services at the South 




term changes, it was too soon to say whether the latest floods were the direct result of human-
induced climate change”. Dube’s definition of the problem was reproduced, and the worldview of 
scepticism was promoted. The idea of climate change as the reason behind extreme weather was 
questioned and diminished. Thus, therefore, in a way, discredited climate science views of 
consensus and diminishing calls for responses. Scepticism became a major theme across the story. 
Peter Lukey, Chief Director of Air Quality in the Department of Environmental Affairs was 
represented denying the link between extreme weather and climate change: “it is not possible to 
link specific extreme weather events to climate change directly”. Willem Landman, principal 
researcher at CSIR described the extreme weather events as part of climate variability and not 
change. This construction represents climate change as something yet to happen and futurises 
events and responses: “Seasonal forecasters said as early as August that there was a likelihood of 
it being extremely wet (in December/January). If we can’t deal with climate variability, then how 
will we be able to deal with climate change. It irks me that so much attention is given to long-term 
climate change while people are drowning now because of climate variability”. All the actors 
constructed climate change as a future problem, not something to worry about now. The current 
weather issues were related to climate variability and not change. This was also reproduced by the 
story by disabling ideological disagreement and using actors that share the same worldviews. The 
scepticism was promoted by way of discourse exclusion of alternative actors and viewpoints. 
 
6.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter, the first one in a series of data chapters, presents and analyses the results of how the 
news media in South Africa covered and represented climate change impacts. The chapter revealed 
that the news media largely represented climate change as a present anthropogenic challenge that 
needs urgent remedy. The news media constructed the ‘anthropogenic’ climate change as a key 
global challenge characterised by rising sea levels, rising temperatures and incessant extreme 
weather events such as droughts and flooding. This chapter traced how the newspapers in South 
Africa have represented the climate change problem between 2011 and 2018, questioning the 
drivers of coverage and the key discourse sponsors and how the knowledges and discourses of the 
key actors resulted in a particular slant in coverage in the four newspapers analysed. While climate 




consensus issue in the Mail & Guardian, the City Press and the Sunday Times gave space to 
sceptical actors and views that questioned climate change science. From the final sample that was 
analysed, there was no story from the Sunday Independent that had climate change impacts as a 
key theme. The Mail & Guardian, followed by the City Press gave extensive coverage to the 
climate change impacts theme, where the newspapers attempted to localise the climate problem 
and projecting it as both a present and future problem. Overall, climate change was represented 
through discursive devices of scientisation and depoliticisation. Science reports and experts gained 
discursive power in defining the climate change problem, science was represented as ‘unequivocal’ 
and ‘unquestionable’ and resultantly the solutions proposed by the scientists were to be followed. 
Further, through depoliticisation, climate change was portrayed in the media as an issue of the 
environment. The political economy and cultural politics of climate change were therefore not 
addressed, leading to solutions that sought to reproduce capitalism as a magic bullet for action 




















Chapter Seven: Concealed agency and blame-shifting responsibility: The 
politics of global climate change negotiations as re/presented in the South 
African Press 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter builds a historical representational overview on how the South African news media 
represented climate change negotiations between 2011 and 2018. The negotiations are a major 
news feature in the news media coverage and representation of climate change. The negotiations 
are represented and constructed as a site of geopolitical contestation and struggle between the 
developed global North and the developing global South. The global North is predominantly 
constructed as a blockade and stalling the achievement of a globally binding climate change deal. 
They are constructed as selfish, unwilling to honour their historical responsibility and truant. The 
developing global South is represented as a passive victim and this category even economies in 
transitions such as Brazil, China, India and South Africa are lumped into ‘poor’ countries in the 
south. The global North is ‘othered’ and must bear the cost of emissions reduction and adaptation 
because they are ‘historically responsible’. Interesting to note from this discursive strategy is that 
while ‘historical responsibility’ is emphasised, there is silence on ‘present responsibility’ which is 
more crucial and where South Africa is a key culprit. Geopolitics in the news is achieved by 
othering the global North as ‘villains’ while the global South is constructed as ‘victims’ whose 
agency in the climate problem is immaterial. The appeal towards the principle of Common But 
Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) by the South African discourse actors, a move necessarily 
meant to moralise South Africa and hence its pursuit of coal and other fossils are reproduced by 
the press as legitimate if not moral. By this discursive effort, the discourse achieves 
delegitimisation of the calls towards another equally bad principle of ‘equal responsibilities’ touted 
by neoliberalists in the global North. South Africa’s high per capita global emissions thus are saved 
from scrutiny and exposure. The exclusion of emissions contributions from BRICS and BASIC 
countries and other nations in transition is pervasive in the media representations of climate change 






The global South is represented as unequally related to the North in terms of emissions. This 
contradicts the fact that BRICS countries are significantly contributing towards global warming 
through massive industrialisation, for example, South Africa, China, India and Russia. The agency 
of the North (which is represented as the ‘other’) is emphasised when it comes to greenhouse gases 
emissions while at the same time the activities of the South are passivised and nominalised through 
discourse. 
7.2 Manufacturing Multilateral Consent in Global Climate Governance 
Through reading news and comment articles in the four newspapers, it was discovered that 
scientisation and moralisation were used effectively as discourse strategies. South Africa is seen 
to be pursuing a binding multilateral climate deal. This is reproduced by the media through 
replicating the ideologies of the elite, especially the official South African government position. 
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, together with the Paris Agreement are seen as inevitable 
mechanisms to deal with climate change. Outside of the multilateral system, all the four 
newspapers failed to provide alternative viewpoints, especially the voices of those who advocate 
for minilateralism. Science is seen as the moral normative authority informing policy ‘because the 
science is unequivocal, action should be taken now, as a planetary moral standard’. Framing power 
is given to government ministers, spokespersons, elite business leaders and science experts. 
However, the Mail & Guardian and City Press afforded some framing power to non-governmental 
organisations and civil society groups. Responsibility for global emissions is attributed and 
distanciated to the global North because of historical responsibility at the same time allowing 
developing global South nations a ‘developmental space’. The four newspapers actively 
contributed towards manufacturing consent about multilateralism, Promethean/neoliberal market-
led responses to climate change. 
The international multilateral system, though characterised by mistrust and geopolitical divides 
between the global North and the global South, is constructed as the only available platform for 
solving climate change problems. The actors used to mainstream this worldview all agreed on the 
supremacy of the international multilateral system and countries/leaders who seem to deviate from 
the ‘rules-based’ multilateral processes are portrayed as deviants and isolationists. This is true of 




sought to cripple the Kyoto Protocol and Donald Trump who withdrew the United States from the 
Paris Agreement. While these ‘deviants’ were against addressing climate change, climate science 
was against their stance. Science is put forward as a normative basis for policy and action and 
scientisation became a discursive strategy to delegitimise the deviants. The multilateral system is 
seen as common sense and part of this construction included the legitimation of neoliberal 
responses such as the Kyoto Protocol, Promethean solutions anchored on techno-optimism, and 
carbon trade.  
7.2.1 COP17 and the ‘fight’ for a second Kyoto Commitment Period 
The discursive strategy of consensus-oriented multilateral optimism is used in almost all the stories 
that dealt with the global climate change negotiations between 2011 and 2018. In 2011, the 
multilateral system ‘hope’ included the renewal of the Kyoto Protocol. Fiona Macleod, in “EU has 
high hopes for climate talks,” (Mail & Guardian, 14 April 2011), naturalised and common-sensed 
the need for a second Kyoto Protocol, a neoliberal response instrument. The discourse sponsor for 
the second commitment in this story was the European Union. The renewal of the Kyoto 
commitment period, it is noted, was a divisive issue at COP17. The European Union, China, South 
Africa and India were in support of a second commitment period while the United States (which 
refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol), Canada (was threatening to withdraw), Japan and Australia 
were against the Kyoto process. The European Union saw the extension of the Kyoto Protocol 
beyond 2012 as one of the markers of success at the COP17. South Africa is represented as ‘under 
pressure’ to secure a second Kyoto commitment agreement. Macleod noted that the European 
Union wanted “a second commitment under Kyoto and developed countries to commit to 
emissions reductions”. In the same story, Canada, Japan, Russia and Australia are portrayed as 
villains who opposed “a second Kyoto”.  
 
The European Union’s support for a second commitment period was also covered by Yolandi 
Groenewald in the story “COP17: Deal or no deal”.   
The European Union, the main player in the Kyoto Protocol due to its carbon market, is 
willing to commit to a second commitment period of Kyoto if there is a ‘wider agreement’- 
meaning that the United States must make comparable commitments to those of Europe in 




Similarly, in the story “Crunch time for Kyoto” (Yolandi Groenewald, Mail & Guardian, 06 
October 2011), the need to revive Kyoto is constructed as a moral imperative only curtailed by 
villainy behaviour from environmentally irresponsible countries such as the United States. “The 
United States … wants nothing to do with Kyoto”. The ‘rebellious and deviant’ United States is 
represented in a bi-polar opposition to South Africa and the European Union who were working 
hard to revive the Protocol: “The European Union believes it is important to negotiate some kind 
of settlement on Kyoto’s second commitment period.” The European Union wanted a legally 
binding climate deal. The French climate change negotiations ambassador, Serge Lepeltier, is 
directly represented arguing: “We as the European Union want to go further than a second 
commitment period.” 
Articulating with the European Union position, South Africa also supported a second Kyoto 
commitment period. In the story “Pledge to Kyoto the bottom line” (Yolandi Groenewald, Mail & 
Guardian, 11 August 2011), Maite Nkoana-Mashabane (International Relations Minister and 
COP17 President) and Edna Molewa (Environmental Affairs Minister) are represented in support 
of the second commitment period and the newspaper reproduced their views uncontested. The 
officials are given the overall definitional power and their views are constructed as the only 
available worldviews on the subject. Discourse, as Foucault (1978) argued, operates by way of 
inclusion and exclusion. The exclusion of alternative actors and worldviews helps in building 
ideological closure and the manufacture of consent. The story outlined the key agenda of South 
Africa towards COP17 and cast a pessimistic overview of the global leaders ‘reaching a globally 
binding’ climate agreement in Durban. Edna Molewa was quoted in the story arguing that COP17 
was going to “be a step towards a fair global regime on climate rather than concluding a 
comprehensive agreement”. Amid this pessimism, the realistic hope for South Africa was to try 
and “fight to ensure that the Kyoto Protocol does not die at the United Nations’ big climate 
conference”. Saving the Kyoto Protocol was on top of the South African agenda because South 
Africa was perceived as a major actor in climate diplomacy. A key characteristic of the story is 
also on South Africa’s diplomacy that needed to be saved at all costs. It was not just about the 
Kyoto for its sake but to appease the international community: “Much is expected of South Africa 





It is interesting to note that the ‘need’ for a second Kyoto commitment period became an 
overarching sub-theme of the negotiations for a global climate change deal. Several actors from 
the European Union and the global South converged ideologically. The European Union, South 
Africa’s International Relations Minister, also COP17 President Maite Nkoana-Mashabane and 
her counterpart in the Department of Environmental Affairs, Edna Molewa, and actors from 
Greenpeace Africa are major sponsors of this discourse. Stories by Yolandi Groenewald on a 
second Kyoto commitment period are consistent in rationalising and naturalising the idea, 
constructing those in support of the idea as ‘responsible’ actors while labelling and othering those 
seen to be ‘blocking’ this rational and common-sense idea. In an article, “Kyoto at heart of brewing 
climate storm” (Mail & Guardian, 13 October 2011), Groenewald continued to represent Russia, 
Japan, the United States and Canada as obstacles to the second Kyoto commitment period: “old 
battle lines were redrawn when Japan, Russia, Canada and the United States insisted they would 
not sign up to a second commitment period for Kyoto”.  
The opposition to a second Kyoto commitment period was to be understood as a matter of going 
against a ‘rules-based’ international system and global common sense. On the other hand, the 
global South “insisted that Kyoto should not die”. Pa Ousman Jarju of Gambia and also Chairman 
of Least Developed Countries at COP17 is indirectly represented in the same story demoralising 
the stance taken by the ‘deviant’ countries because “poor countries needed financial mechanisms 
embedded in Kyoto to help them cope with climate change” and thus considered “a second 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol to be of great importance”.   
Similar to Fiona Macleod’s story, the article by Yolandi Groenewald (“COP17: Deal or deal,” 
Mail & Guardian, 20 October 2011), saw geopolitical divisions as potential impediments to a 
second Kyoto Protocol commitment period. The need for a multilateral deal is seen as the best 
possible outcome of COP17 though not promising, opting to settle for a second Kyoto commitment 
period as an ideal outcome from COP17. The global South was in support of the second 
commitment period: “Africa, including South Africa, also wants a second Kyoto.” Canada, the 
United States and Russia were represented as the stumbling blocks. “Japan and Russia are also 
reluctant to move without the United States”. The story showed disagreements within the climate 




Kyoto. The story is silent on the root causes of the divisions, in the end, the global North is blamed 
and othered. The United States expected developing countries such as India, China, Russia, South 
Africa, Brazil to also commit to emissions cuts due to their present responsibilities. These 
countries, in turn, were against this idea claiming a developmental space to ‘catch-up’ with the 
developed world. India was in support of a second commitment period and insisted “that the 
developed world must agree to a second commitment period, while it is given the chance to grow 
its economies without further legally binding carbon targets.” 
 
In Ngoako Matsha’s story: “Call for climate financing,” (Mail & Guardian, 03 November 2011), 
the need for another Kyoto commitment period is emphasised. The developing global South 
wanted Annex 1 countries to recommit to a second Kyoto period. Bernarditas Muller (Chief 
Negotiator for the G77) is directly represented arguing that “Durban will not be a burial ground of 
the Kyoto Protocol”. Failure to secure another commitment period was seen to be catastrophic for 
the global South countries: “Poor countries have so much to lose if we don’t get this right”. The 
global South had no trust in the global North agreeing to a second Kyoto commitment period and 
were constructed as likely “to dodge any existing commitments”. Muller was sceptical of the 
developed global North countries arguing that they could not be trusted: “They want to get rid of 
legally binding commitments. They want new ones which [will allow them] to continue their 
wasteful lifestyles”. The only actor in the story, Muller, alleged secrecy in the negotiations and 
that the developed global North countries were “denying their historical responsibility”. The Kyoto 
Protocol and its renewal are constructed as common sense and natural. The story wholly 
reproduced the worldviews of the G77. 
 
The story “Half-backed forecast for climate talks,” (Suthentira Govender, Sunday Times, 27 
November 2011) was pessimistic about the success of COP17. “The city is gloomily being touted 
as the graveyard of the Kyoto Protocol - the most significant treaty on climate change, adopted in 
1997 in Japan”. The fears for a no-deal COP17 would soil South Africa’s diplomatic reputation 
and the International Relations Minister, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane is represented through the 
newspaper discourse as “desperately” in need to “dispel” the graveyard perception: “fears are 




Nkoana-Mashabane was directly quoted stressing that “There is an urgent need for all parties to 
approach this year’s negotiations with an element of maturity”. The preservation of the Kyoto 
Protocol is taken as a given, a doxa, the story did not challenge it or provide other actors with the 
discursive access to enable ideological disagreement. The Sunday Times constructed the Kyoto 
Protocol, and its preservation, as marking the success of COP17. The neoliberal nature of the 
Kyoto Protocol became an issue where the consensus ideology existed, it became a common sense, 
naturalised and automatised. The neoliberal language and instruments such as Emissions Trading 
and CDM that commodify and financialise nature are reproduced and legitimised. By excluding 
alternative actors and viewpoints, the story helped to build a preferred reading that reproduced 
South Africa’s policy discourses - thereby creating a one-dimensional society. The failure of 
COP17 is indirectly attributed to unnamed but existing climate villains. 
The global North countries are consistently represented as blockades to both a global climate deal 
and a second Kyoto commitment period. For example, in “‘Wayward’ Canada draws flak,” 
(Faranaz Parker, Mail & Guardian, 08 December 2011), Canada is represented as a “wayward” 
country seeking to pull out of the Kyoto Protocol. This decision by Canada is criticised in the story 
as being motivated by Canada’s investments in the oil sands. Alden Meyer (from the Union of 
Concerned Scientists) is cited criticising Canada: “Canada was the only signatory to the Kyoto 
Protocol that simply ignored its responsibilities”. The Canadian Environment Minister, Peter Kent, 
is quoted saying the Kyoto Protocol was “in the past” and a “job-killing, economy destroying” 
accord. Hannah McKinnon from the Climate Action Network Canada is directly represented 
arguing that the decision by Canada to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol was due to the country 
having “sunk hundreds of millions of dollars into promoting the tar sands as an oil source abroad 
to ensure that no doors are closed to its use of the fuel”. Canada is portrayed as an environmental 
villain, whose activities were only meant to benefit its selfish national interest. Canada is thus 
juxtaposed against progressive countries that sought to address the climate problem, with Canada 
being the stumbling block. The Canadian decision is demoralised and delegitimised as an attempt 





Although Canada had sought an agreement that included all key carbon emitters, the story does 
not include this narrative. The exclusion of Canada’s clamour for all key global carbon emitters to 
be included in the second Kyoto commitment period passivised and deleted the possibility of 
scrutiny and the assessment of the merit of the Canadian position.  Although Canada is constructed 
as environmentally retrogressive, the story diminished the centrality of Canada’s argument that 
fast-emerging economies (India, Brazil, South Africa, China and Russia) be included in the Kyoto 
process and be compelled to reduce their emissions based on present responsibility. The politics 
of climate change is outlined by these sharp differences where the fast-emerging economies sought 
to be allowed further use of fossils to catch-up and receive funding from the developed global 
North as part of the ‘historical guilt payment’. On the other hand, the global North countries sought 
those responsible for present emissions to also be compelled to reduce their emissions. 
The Canadian position is delegitimised as wayward and against international consensus and 
common sense (doxa) that was prevailing at COP17. Important to note is also how global South 
countries, including South Africa, saw an opportunity to address climate change through neoliberal 
approaches of carbon trading. The neoliberal narrative is so dominant that it seems there is no 
alternative. It is entrenched and made a common-sense discourse. Reading the story, it is clear that 
the Kyoto revival crusade is represented as the only available avenue- with wayward Canada 
standing in the way of common sense and multilateral consent. 
Contrary to Yolandi Groenewald’s stories that disabled ideological disagreement and presented a 
one-dimensional discourse on the common sense of a second Kyoto commitment period, Fiona 
Macleod, though still portraying a second Kyoto commitment period as common sense, at least 
attempted to draw from the worldviews of the ‘deviant actors’ thereby enabling ideological 
contestation and disagreement. In the story entitled “Protocol ‘needs new worldview,’” Macleod 
used Peter Kent (Canada Environment Minister) as the primary discourse sponsor. Masahiko Horie 
(Japan’s global climate change ambassador), Jonathan Pershing (United States deputy special 
envoy for climate change) and Connie Hedegaard (European Union Commissioner for Climate 
change) are the co-discourse sponsors. The global North requested the global South to “take 
responsibility for their carbon emissions and stop expecting ‘guilt payments’ for past mistakes” 




global North opened debate around the present agency and responsibility of the global South’s 
rapidly industrialising countries in emissions. “Disputes about sharing responsibility for 
atmospheric pollution lay at the heart of the stalemate among delegates this week … Canada threw 
down the gauntlet, saying Kyoto was based on an outdated view of developed and developing 
countries”. The Canadian Environment Minister, Peter Kent, is quoted noting that the “Kyoto is 
ineffective and unfair because the major emerging economies - which still like to consider 
themselves, when convenient, developing economies - are obviously the largest emitters”. The 
European Union, Japan and the United States also supported the need for developing economies 
to “take on more responsibility”. In the build-up to COP17, the developing countries and South 
Africa had promoted a worldview where the global North needed to take responsibility based on 
historical responsibility - a discursive strategy of blackmail and exporting responsibility, 
passivising and nominalising the present emissions emanating from the south. 
Key to note was the uncommon alliance between Russia, Japan, India, China and the United States 
and Canada. These countries objected to the second Kyoto commitment period, not necessarily 
because they had one common purpose. Their articulated positions only promoted the rejection of 
a second commitment period but coming from distinct geopolitical and ideological premises. For 
Canada it was about the unwillingness to reduce emissions in the case of the United States, for the 
European Union, it was about Canada taking firm action reducing emissions and the United States 
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and taking firm action against emissions. This is expressed in the 
story by the European Union’s Connie Hedegaard (European Commissioner for Climate Change) 
who argued that: “current and future emissions had to be factored in at the negotiations …. A 
second Kyoto period with only the EU, representing 11% of global emissions, [adhering to it] is 
clearly not enough for the climate.” The United States wanted emerging economies to be “brought 
into the mix”.  Jonathan Pershing (deputy United States envoy for climate change negotiations) 
argued the United States position where he noted that: “The major emerging economies represent 
a much larger and growing share of global emissions than a decade ago. We can’t be in the same 
discussions as a decade ago around their engagement”. While for Russia, India, Japan and China, 
it was more to do with the need to develop their economies to catch-up with the developed world. 
These countries (India and China) have very high global emission ratios but sought to passivise 




Their (all these countries) stances - ultimately made it difficult to have a coherent global 
framework towards a second Kyoto commitment period. China wanted “developed countries to 
‘rise up’ to their historical responsibility and take the lead by undertaking ambitious and robust 
mitigation commitments consistent with science”. Su Wei (Deputy Head of the Chinese 
delegation) is directly represented arguing that the global South could “implement enhanced 
mitigation actions in the context of sustainable development and enabled and supported by finance, 
technology and capacity building”. This is regardless of China being the world’s largest present 
emitter of greenhouse gases. “The South African delegation said the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de 
Janeiro had established the ‘polluter pays’ principle”.  Edna Molewa noted in the story that: “This 
implies the responsibility of developed nations to not only mitigate their emissions but take a 
degree of responsibility for the consequences of their emissions on the developing world.” These 
constructions by the Chinese and South African delegations attempted to passivise their present 
emissions responsibilities. The discourse strategy constructs China (biggest emitter) and South 
Africa (12th biggest emitter) as part and parcel of the passive victims in the global South. The 
construction of victimhood would then justify their stance in refusing to commit to emissions 
reduction. It will delete their agency in current emissions debate and thus allow them to 
substantially develop their economies through business as usual dirty principles. 
 
The Sunday Independent, like the Mail & Guardian and the Sunday Times, also reproduced the 
need for a second Kyoto commitment period as central to the success of COP17 in Durban. 
Environmental Affairs Minister Edna Molewa was used as the key sponsor for this discourse in 
the Sunday Independent. Again, the need for a second Kyoto commitment period was represented 
as common sense in the Sunday Independent. The continuous reference to the need for the second 
Kyoto commitment period reinforced and reproduced its neoliberal apparatus and further 
subordinated environmental action to the whims of capital that see carbon as a commodity. In the 
story “All eyes on UN climate talks” (Eleanor Momberg, Sunday Independent, 27 November 
2011), Molewa was directly quoted emphasising the centrality of the second Kyoto commitment 
period: “We must confirm the mitigation pledges of the Kyoto Protocol’s signatories and obtain a 
commitment from those who did not sign up to it. We also need to ensure there is a second 




Africa was not part of the Annexure 1 countries expected to reduce emissions due to their historical 
responsibility under the Kyoto Protocol. She successfully lobbied for a second Kyoto commitment 
period because it did not come with a cap on South Africa’s emissions. This chapter argues that 
the Kyoto Protocol did not meet its goal on emissions reductions. This is why countries like South 
Africa hoped that by securing the second Kyoto commitment period, economies in transition will 
be excluded from emissions reduction commitments, and global North countries will continue 
benefiting from carbon trading. The story naturalised the neoliberal preferences of responding to 
climate through a) the Kyoto Protocol process, which essentially commodifies carbon and creates 
a new financial market and b) a development of a green economy benchmarked on technological 
optimism.  
 
The story lacked ideological disagreement because of its exclusive reliance on one actor: Edna 
Molewa. The government position is given the exclusive discursive privilege. By allowing the 
government to define the problem and then offer solutions, the story helped in constructing the 
legitimacy of the government agenda. Through the exclusion of alternative viewpoints and actors, 
the world of climate change is constructed as that of ideological consensus. The structure and 
representation of the story point to constructions that actively close out the possibility of other 
voices elsewhere. The views of Edna Molewa have discursive access to the readers of public 
discourse and thus, also to the cognitive choices given to the readers.  
 
The representation of the need for a second Kyoto commitment period as common sense is also 
present in the City Press. The story “COP17: Hope for SA to pave way,” (Yolandi Groenewald, 
City Press, 06 November 2011) is an example. Basic countries are represented as countries that 
were trying their best to be environmentally responsible. The overall mentality within BASIC can 
be summarised by reading the argument expressed by India which is described in the story as 
having “taken a hardline approach to the Kyoto dilemma, demanding rich nations to sign on to a 
second commitment period without developing countries taking on any responsibilities”. Further, 
the story noted that “the four [BASIC] nations agreed that developing countries had already done 
a lot and gave even further than rich countries”. Here the views of the BASIC group were 




Protocol show that the neoliberal economic responses have acquired the status of a tendential force 
in climate change discourses. The Kyoto Protocol is reproduced as a rational and natural 
instrument - the need for a second commitment period that further excluded non-Annex 1 countries 
is constructed as a consensual ideology.  
 
Through bi-polar distinctions, the story represented BASIC countries in opposition to the 
environmentally immoral “rich countries” who were refusing to sign up to a second Kyoto 
commitment period. Their refusal is constructed as counterproductive. By blame-shifting, the story 
passivised the role of BASIC in the present emissions scenario. BASIC, being responsible for more 
than half of the present global emissions, escapes responsibility and their claim for a second Kyoto 
commitment period allows them to continue exploiting fossils in the name of catching-up and 
development. By claiming for a developmental space, BASIC countries pursued a path that is 
based on business as usual. 
 
The newspapers analysed blindly reproduced these ideologies and constructed them as common 
sense and, in a way, helped to demoralise and delegitimise countries who were in opposition to a 
second Kyoto commitment period. The Press took neoliberal market responses to climate change 
for granted. A second Kyoto Protocol commitment period is constructed as common sense and 
having ‘universal consent’ from all progressive countries except those environmentally 
irresponsible like the United States, Canada, Russia and Australia. The discourse on a second 
Kyoto Protocol commitment period excluded contrarian views on the continued reliance on 
market-led responses to climate change. The first Kyoto Protocol created the European Union-led 
Emissions Trading Scheme and the Clean Development Mechanism, both of which have been 
criticised for their commodification and financialisation of environmental common goods where 
polluters are rewarded through carbon offset mechanisms. The story reproduced the mainstream 
European Union and South African ideologies and closed out ideological disagreements thereby 
promoting the manufacturing of consent around neoliberal responses to climate change. 
Regardless of the failures of the previous Conference of Parties (COPs) to come up with any 
solutions, the idea of the United Nations system offering solutions to the global climate problems 




government position without asking what and how exactly was the Kyoto Protocol could be an 
answer to the climate change problems. The Kyoto Protocol extension meant a continuation of the 
market-led climate responses such as the CDM and carbon trade. 
 
Central to note in the discourse on a second Kyoto commitment period is how different actors, 
with different interests and ideological imperatives cohered and conjunctured to produce the need 
for such a second commitment period as common sense and thus legitimised the neoliberal tenets 
that underpinned it. The European Union’s support for the second Kyoto Protocol commitment 
period should be understood with the contours of the Union’s active development and participation 
the Emissions Trading Scheme and the Clean Development Mechanism, all neoliberal market 
instruments, where big polluting companies are allowed to pollute and offset their emissions by 
buying carbon credits from the global South and also fund clean development projects that have 
an additionality value to curbing emissions from the global South. This maintains the 
operationality and profit accumulation by European companies. The global South, in general, as 
beneficiaries of selling carbon credits and clean development grants from the Europeans, supported 
the second commitment period for the continued inflow of revenue. Specifically, fast-developing 
economies in the global South such as India, South Africa, Brazil and China supported the second 
commitment period because of two key reasons. Firstly, these countries, regardless of their present 
huge global emissions, were not part of the Annex 1 countries obliged to curb emissions under the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, a second commitment period would mean that these countries 
would continue their business-as-usual emissions tendencies without global legal bottlenecks. This 
kind of ideological foundation has its genesis in the Rio 1992 Earth principle seven of Common 
But Differentiated Responsibilities where countries not historically responsible for global warming 
and climate change were exempted from taking drastic carbon cuts to allow them to ‘catch-up’ and 
grow their economies. These countries, it is argued here, were part and parcel of the stampeded to 
a global climate change deal and a second Kyoto commitment period because of their refusal to 
acknowledge their ‘present’ emissions responsibility. Secondly, the fast-developing economies 
were also beneficiaries of carbon trade proceeds and therefore were unwilling to a revised global 
emissions curbing framework that would have taken away their privileged access to ‘clean 




7.3 Negotiating for a Global Change Deal 
The need for a globally binding climate deal was central to the climate change negotiations. 
Between 2011 and 2015, newspapers in South Africa saw the need for a globally binding climate 
change deal as a prerequisite and a necessity. Whereas the global temperatures were increasing, 
global political actors were seen to be delaying or stalling climate action. The discursive strategy 
of scientisation was often used to demoralise and delegitimise the non-action. Fiona Macleod’s 
story, “Emissions turn on heat on COP17,” (Mail & Guardian, 09 June 2011) used the increasing 
emissions to delegitimise this non-action. Firstly, the story depicted a dire climate situation, noting 
that scientific evidence called for “urgent climate change action” because “greenhouse gas 
emissions last year were the highest in history”. This ‘reality’ required the negotiators “to deliver 
a binding settlement at global climate talks in Durban.” South Africa’s climate change negotiator, 
Alf Wills, was pessimistic that COP17 would deliver a binding climate change deal despite the 
increase in emissions, conceding that: “We face real difficulties in delivering a big bang in 
Durban.” According to the newspaper, the key impediments to a global deal “included Japan’s 
refusal to undertake emissions reductions post-Fukushima, political opposition in the US, the 
global recession and differences between developed and developing countries”.  
Scientific evidence from the “International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates this week showed that 
30.6 gigatons of CO2 were released into the atmosphere in 2010, a rise of 1.6 gigatons compared 
to 2009”. The increase in emissions meant that the goal of keeping temperature increases below 2o 
Celsius was too ambitious. The story directly quoted the IEA’s chief economist, Fatih Birol 
expressing worry at the rate of emissions increase: “I’m very worried. This is the worst news on 
emissions …. It is becoming extremely challenging to remain below two degrees. The prospect is 
getting bleaker - that’s what the numbers say.” Lord Stern (author of the famous Stern Review) is 
cited arguing that: “These figures indicate that emissions are now close to being back on a 
‘business as usual’ path … such a path … would mean about a 50% chance of a rise in the global 
average temperature of more than 4o C by 2100” adding that “I hope these estimates provide a 





These scientific figures were then used in the story to justify calls for a globally binding climate 
change agreement. The story further cited Greenpeace Africa’s Fiona Musana concurring that the 
“carbon tipping-point is very nearly upon us. The world’s heavy dependence on fossil fuels has 
brought us to the brink of runaway climate change”. This new reality, Musana was cited arguing, 
required “now, more than ever, action and leadership through the international negotiations”. 
Musana’s optimism in the multilateral system is strong and unopposed in the story. In support of 
the multilateral system, the newspaper further quoted the World Wide Fund for Nature’s (WWF) 
Richard Worthington who contended that: “It is imperative that the rest of the world be prepared 
to move forward - without the United States for now - particularly with extending the Kyoto 
Protocol”.  
Fundamental to note is that while there is a general lament regarding increased emissions, albeit 
with the root agent (capitalism) passivised and nominalised, the actors were optimistic that 
capitalist institutions and mechanisms such as the Kyoto Protocol could help solve the problem. 
The faith in Kyoto was blind to its neoliberal nature and failure to curb emissions. The Kyoto, 
through the CDM and the Emissions Trading Scheme, essentially financialised and commodified 
nature, offsetting carbon emissions in the global North through purchasing polluting rights 
(credits) in the global South. 
 
The global climate deal, which the news media represented, was a step forward in addressing 
climate change. This global legally binding deal was to be based on the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) framework. This multilateral-consensus discourse is 
constructed as a given and without alternatives or opponents. In 2011, though prospects of reaching 
a global climate deal are represented with pessimism in the Press, it still remained an ideal 
achievement, that if failed to be reached in Durban at COP17, at least, the COP17 should produce 
a way forward in reaching such a deal at a later COP meeting. The hope for a climate deal was a 
moral one and the one ‘everyone’ looked forward to. The prospects of a global climate deal in 
Durban seemed elusive: “it seems increasingly unlikely that a legally binding agreement will 
emerge from the talks [in Durban COP17],” (Yolandi Groenewald, “Crunch time for Kyoto,” Mail 
& Guardian, 06 October 2011). In the same story, South Africa is constructed “as a historical 




negotiating stumbling blocks”. Through newspaper discourse, South Africa as COP17 president 
was expected “to secure a legally binding commitment that is ‘a great step forward’” (Fiona 
Macleod, “EU has hopes for climate talks,” Mail & Guardian, 14 April 2011). The story by Fiona 
Macleod promoted optimism in ‘consensus-led’, multilateral legally binding frameworks: “The 
most important discussions will be around a legally binding global framework”. However, 
attempts at reaching such a deal were being scuppered by the self-interests of countries such as the 
United States and China, “the world’s two biggest polluters”, who are constructed as 
‘environmental deviants’ (Fiona Macleod, “EU has hopes for climate talks,” Mail & Guardian, 14 
April 2011). 
 
Government ministers, especially the Environmental Affairs Minister, Edna Molewa and 
International Relations Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane contributed their own Op-Ed articles 
that set the tone for government policy discourses in the news media. Towards the COP17 meeting, 
in the article “Eyes of the world on Durban’s climate conference,” (Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, 
Sunday Independent, 16 October 2011), International Relations Minister and incoming COP17 
President, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, constructed climate change as an existential challenge which 
needed urgent solutions. These solutions included the operationalisation of the Green Climate 
Fund and a second Kyoto commitment period. The ‘urgent’ need for these two was moralised by 
the prior portrayal of climate change as a problem with “an impact on both our way of life and our 
ability to feed our societies”. It thus became a moral duty to fund the Green Climate Fund and to 
extend the Kyoto period. Nkoana-Mashabane saw the role of South Africa at COP17 as that of 
providing global leadership towards “a common consensus in terms of reversing these adverse 
impacts of climate change”. The consensus involved seeking “an outcome which is fair, 
transparent, inclusive and upholds the Convention [UNFCCC] principle of Common But 
Differentiated responsibilities and capabilities”. The reference to this principle invoked by the 
Minister emphasised historical responsibility and concealed the present emissions responsibilities 
which South Africa is morally obligated to ensure are reversed. For Nkoana-Mashabane, the best 
way to address climate change was to be found at the multilateral COP17 which ensured “rules-
based multilateralism as one of our fundamental interests to which we aspire globally”. While 
criticisms have been advanced against the multilateral, bureaucratic and unequal elite-based 




interest. This negated views that have often correctly criticised the multilateral approach because 
of its construction of climate governance as a preserve for the political and economic elites at the 
expense of climate justice and poor people and solutions that seek structural transformations of the 
political-economic system of capitalism that are responsible for climate risks.  
 
The journey towards COP17 witnessed the culmination of several ideas on what different actors 
thought should be the defining feature of a successful climate deal. Using actors in the global 
South, especially South African government officials, the Sunday Independent, of all the 
newspapers analysed, was interested in stories on agriculture as part of a global climate deal. These 
stories were based on actors who saw ‘climate-smart agriculture’ as a common sense that needed 
to be included in the global climate negotiations. In one story, “Agriculture cornerstone of any 
deal at COP17, says Minister,” (Eleanor Momberg, Sunday Independent, 27 November 2011), all 
the discourse actors supported a move towards climate-smart agriculture. All the sources except 
for Lindiwe Sibanda were government officials. Their interests are political and sought to 
mainstream the South African diplomatic efforts and foreign policy. Lindiwe Sibanda, from the 
think-tank Food, Agriculture and Natural Resource Policy Analysis Network (FARNPAN), co-
sponsored the centrality of agriculture discourse. The story, by being one-sided, reproduced and 
legitimised the elite views and helped in automotising them. The inclusion of agriculture as a main 
negotiation subject was normalised and rationalised because the continent was envisaged to be the 
“food basket of the world”. 
 
The negotiations were to be premised on efforts to fund agriculture. Agriculture had the potential 
to contribute to adaptation and mitigation but was being neglected as the subject was peripheral 
during climate negotiations. The story took a focus on agriculture as a moral point and one that 
involved the duty to feed the world “especially since the continent was supposed to be the food 
basket of the world”. Regardless of this importance, the subject had been neglected and Molewa 
is represented in the story speaking from a position of everyone in Africa and as a moral voice, 
bringing the subject of agriculture into the mainstream negotiations. A deal that did not include 
agriculture as a priority was “a betrayal to the farming sector and anybody who needs food to 




are translated to become the language of the common people. Those calling for the inclusion of 
agriculture were constructed as ‘responsible’ and having ‘duty-care’ because they wanted 
‘everyone’ to have access to food. These responsible actors (Edna Molewa, Jacob Zuma, Lindiwe 
Sibanda, Xolisa Ngwandla etc.) are dualised against the present but not mentioned ‘irresponsible’ 
actors who are against feeding people. FARNPARN is quoted arguing: “No agriculture, No Deal”. 
The FARNPAN discourse is constructed from the planes of morality and common sense. ‘Without 
a deal on agriculture, people would die of hunger’. While this call is important, it is key to question 
the kind of agriculture that was being sought. The story reproduced climate-smart agriculture as 
an ethical and moral imperative. Hidden is the neoliberal nature of climate-smart agriculture 
(especially its reliance on geoengineering agriculture) and how it has key capitalist exploitative 
tendencies and fits well within the neoliberal discourse of globalisation and benefits a few food 
suppliers who benefit from the global food distribution chain (Taylor, 2017, p.1). 
 
For Edna Molewa (quoted directly), agriculture was to be discussed “within the context of other 
agenda items, including the adaptation or the discussions to secure a Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) deal”. The reference to REDD reveals that South 
Africa’s preferred climate change response mechanisms were always neoliberal. The construction 
of REDD at the level of ideological consensus helped in entrenching and representing neoliberal 
discourses as natural and consensual. REDD and REDD+ have been criticised for their 
commodification of nature and especially the commodification of ‘the air we breathe’8 (Kulick 
and the case of Papua New Guinea). The references to REDD are made also in the story by Alf 
Wills (Chief Climate Negotiator for South Africa) who “emphasized that agriculture and the 
reduction of emissions by the sector was placed firmly within REDD, which included positive 
incentive-based means to lower carbon emissions from agriculture in developing countries”.  
 








Neoliberal responses are mainstreamed and reproduced by being produced as the only available 
solutions to address the climate change problem. The story depoliticised climate change and 
promoted worldviews that sought climate change solutions in the neoliberal frame. The ‘air we 
breathe’ thesis by Don Kulick is central to this argument. The approaches sought by the global 
South political and climate elites commodified nature instead of seeing nature as a natural good. 
The South African president Jacob Zuma is quoted in the story constructing climate change from 
a scientised and depoliticised basis by defining climate change as simply “changing weather 
patterns [which] are affecting the environment, health, natural resources, agriculture and food 
production”. For Zuma, climate change effects were to be seen from a physical science perspective 
not the social interactions between the environment and people. 
 
Through discourse synchronic analysis, the study found a keen interest in agriculture as a key 
element of climate change negotiations in the Sunday Independent, specifically stories by Eleanor 
Momberg. In the story “Greater focus on farming urged in climate change fight,” by Eleanor 
Momberg (Sunday Independent, 27 November 2011), agriculture is primed as central to the climate 
change negotiations to be held in Durban. The story was based on the resolutions by African  
agriculture ministers meeting held in Johannesburg in September 2011. The ministers wanted more 
“attention to be given to farming and food production as mitigation and adaptation factors in the 
fight against climate change”. The story referred to the need for finance to “enable climate-smart 
agriculture”. The African agriculture ministers called on:  
Developed countries to support the scaling-up of early action programmes, including best 
practices and technologies in climate-smart agriculture and to prioritise food security.  
Greater investment in research, technology and information dissemination to facilitate 
adaptation and application of climate-smart agriculture. International financial support for 
climate-smart agricultural projects that benefit small-holders. Africa is represented in the 
story as a passive recipient of climate change and thus a victim.  
 
This representation translated into representing the continent from a position of dependence. The 
solutions to food security and climate change were to be found in technologies transferred from 
the global North. The adaptation and mitigation efforts in the global South were to be predicated 





The techno-optimistic discourse constructed by the story left out the embeddedness of ideologies 
of dominance in technology. This chapter contends that technology transfer involves the transfer 
of both hardware, software and more critically, the human capital from the technology producers. 
Technologies from the global North countries carry with them the neoliberal ideologies and values 
of their producers. They perpetuate dominance and unequal relations further entrenching 
dependence. Furthermore, while the story advanced the need for climate-smart agriculture, absent 
is what is meant by this ideologically laden concept. The agency of technology in geoengineering 
and the consequences on nature are not discussed as part of the culprits of the risk society. Climate-
smart agriculture is represented in the story and the resolutions of the agriculture ministers meeting 
as common sense. The neoliberal and globalist language of climate-smart agriculture acquired 
what Hall and O’Shea (2013) called the ‘neoliberal common-sense language’. By naturalising 
climate-smart agriculture, the story at the same time legitimised the neoliberal expansionist 
policies of chemical production, the appropriation of genetically modified products hidden beneath 
the ‘common’ and ‘natural’ agenda of climate-smart agriculture. The costs of these measures on 
people and environmental health are not highlighted or problematised. The health hazards and the 
related costs to the poor are not discussed. By producing the views of the ministers, the story 
legitimised the embedded ideologies of neoliberal global food systems. The interests of key actors 
are enhanced by the unquestioning reproduction of views that seek to benefit from climate change. 
The story reproduced the need for technology and technology transfer from the “developed” 
countries without questioning the ideological inclinations of those technologies. 
 
The discourse on climate-smart agriculture gained discursive hegemony and was rendered natural. 
It became a common-sense language whenever issues of global food security were raised during 
global climate talks. However, missing from the discourse “is a fuller theoretical account of 
the  forms of discursive, institutional and material power which are driving and shaping this agenda 
and drawing boundaries around the diagnosis of the drivers of climate-(in)compatible development 
and the solutions that are therefore advanced as ‘climate-smart’ agriculture’” (Newell and Taylor, 
2017, p.2). The discursive representation of climate-smart agriculture reproduces “the prevailing 
food regime that operates globally at this historical conjuncture” (Newell and Taylor, 2017, p.1). 




discourse firmly embedded in the neoliberal agenda and “the prevailing modes of agrifood 
production and governance [where] business-as-usual” modes of farming are “rendered 
compatible with addressing the threat of climate change” (Newell & Taylor 2017, p.2). Newell 
and Taylor (2017) argued that the discursive consensus on climate-smart agriculture is achieved 
through “mutually reinforcing discursive, institutional and material sites of power whereby 
powerful actors seek to frame, govern and align CSA with the overriding imperatives of the 
dominant global system of food and agriculture” (p.2). A critique of the climate-smart agriculture 
discourse “helps to explain how responses to date are shaped by and further entrench- landscapes 
of power in the global system of food and agriculture” (Newell & Taylor 2017, p.2). 
7.3.1 The Paris Agreement (COP21): Celebration and disappointment 
Climate change negotiations at COP21 were constructed as deeply divided along geopolitical lines. 
It is important to note that a key finding from analysing the coverage of climate change 
negotiations by the South African news media shows that the developed global North countries 
are represented as insincere, irresponsible and not to be trusted. The global North is represented as 
villains who sought to derail climate action and blocking a globally and legally binding treaty. In 
contrast, the global South is represented as passive victims of climate change and were responsible 
actors as they demanded ‘climate action now’. Further, the principle of Common But 
Differentiated Responsibility is taken for granted in the media and the constructions produced by 
elite politicians are reproduced in the media unquestioned. South Africa, as a ‘responsible actor’ 
“took a tough stance … accusing developed nations of blocking negotiations around finance” 
(Yolandi Groenewald, “The issue of finance divides nations,” City Press, 06 December 2015).  
Developing countries say the principle of rich countries taking the lead- the cornerstone of 
the UN Climate Convention - is being eroded because the US and other developed 
countries are pushing for a deal where nations will act voluntarily according to their ability 
and without legal liability (Yolandi Groenewald, “The issue of finance divides nations,” 
City Press, 06 December 2015).  
 
South Africa’s Ambassador to the United Nations and Chair of the G77+China at COP21, Nozipho 
Mxakato-Diseko accused the developed countries of “undermining the agreement”. The global 
North was portrayed by Mxakato-Diseko as irresponsible: “New language is emerging that has 




this language is and where it is coming from.” The global North countries were represented as 
feeling “free to waste time … with no sense of responsibility”. 
 
The story “Exclusive: SA’s UN ambassador tells us about the climate talks,” (Yolandi 
Groenewald, City Press, 13 December 2015) brought out the fissures and disappointment at 
COP21 negotiations. South Africa’s United Nations Ambassador and G77 chair at COP21, 
Nozipho Mxakato-Diseko, was represented as angry towards the High Ambition Coalition group 
which she criticised for “using new side coalitions to undermine developing countries”. The 
developed countries were accused of using “donor-based” relationships to force developing and 
less developed countries into the High Ambition Coalition group. “There is nothing like a high-
ambition coalition in the official negotiations …. It does not exist. It has no status. It will not 
deliver anything”. “We understand that their tactic is to find a shield from where to hide, an 
umbrella so that they can hide beneath it”. The use of donor-relationships to gain support from 
developing countries was constructed as “absolutely immoral”. Developed countries are accused 
of “a conservative effort to break the unity of the G77”.  
 
Mxakato-Diseko alleged that some countries attempted to get her removed from chairing the G77 
because they saw her as “problematic” and “even offered money as sweetener” president Jacob 
Zuma. At stake, this study argues, is the exclusion of South Africa in the High Ambition Coalition 
group and how key members of the G77 chaired by South Africa had jumped ship. South Africa’s 
diplomatic prowess was at stake and at loss. While the High Ambition Coalition is constructed as 
having an agenda of breaking the G77 group, Mxakato-Diseko attempted to allay the fear of 
disunity in the group arguing that under her leadership “the G77-plus-China grouping has grown 
in stature” because of her South African heritage: “Us South Africans focus ourselves on the bigger 
picture”. Mxakato-Diseko labelled the Umbrella group a “difficult group of countries” that they 
were facing as G77. “We are creating an agreement around them …. We are literally squeezing 
ourselves to fit their needs”. Mxakato-Diseko is constructed by the story as a “hard worker”, “Her 
hard work at the talks has been inspired by her desire to make a difference for those South Africans 





Yolandi Groenewald’s story “SA powers on despite ‘exclusion’ from COP21’s high ambition 
coalition,” (City Press, 11 December 2015) further highlighted divisions and fissures that 
characterised the global climate change talks. The story portrayed the anger within the South 
African negotiating group when South Africa was left of the secretive High Ambition Coalition 
Group. Alf Wills (South Africa’s Chief Negotiator) accused the High Ambition Coalition of 
“negotiating through the press and not in the negotiating sessions”. The coalition was comprised 
of the United States, the EU, Mexico, Columbia, 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. 
These countries ditched the South Africa-led G77 + China negotiating platform. South Africa, 
India and China were not invited to join the group. The group was against any kind of minimalist 
deal and wanted a five-year INDCs review. 
 
The BASIC negotiating group (Brazil, India, China and South Africa) was represented as a group 
of countries most willing to see action on climate change. For example, the story “No ‘climate 
holiday’ before 2020,” (Yolandi Groenewald, City Press, 09 December 2015) portrayed the 
BASIC delegates at COP21 as people who wanted urgent climate action. This representation is 
first expressed in the headline: “No ‘climate holiday’ before 2020, say COP21 delegates who want 
action now”. Action before 2020 meant that countries should start work on climate action 
immediately even if the Paris Agreement was to enter into force in 2020. This followed the 
agreements made in Durban under the Durban Platform to have a second Kyoto commitment 
period to stand in between the first commitment (ending in 2012) and the operationalisation of the 
Paris agreement in 2020. Action on climate change was exported and shifted to developed 
countries. Through the discursive tool of othering, the global North were blackmailed into action: 
“The group [BASIC] has publicly maintained the need for developed countries to take the lead in 
emission reductions and also to fulfil the support needed for developing countries through finance 
and technology for undertaking actions”. 
 
Climate change mitigation responsibility was left in the hands of those ‘historically responsible’ 
and the global South countries are only to act upon the provision of finance and technology. The 
story reproduced these worldviews as rational and thus helped to legitimise them. Silent in such 




complicit and have become the highest carbon emitters. The BASIC group, loosely portrayed as 
just the global South developing countries, are represented as passive victims of climate change. 
Without climate finance, the BASIC group argued, it was impossible for them to act. India’s 
Environment Minister, Prakash Javadekar was cited in the story arguing that the global North was 
supposed to provide the finance: “Because they have, and we don’t have, the haves must provide.” 
Xie Zhenhua, China’s special climate representative is quoted in support of India’s position and 
blaming the developed countries for not providing the funding: “we are definitely not seeing the 
money that we reportedly got”. Javadekar was indirectly represented noting that “the action of the 
developing world depended on finance and technological support from the developed countries,” 
while Zhenhua attempted to pacify the need for BASIC countries to equally contribute towards 
climate finance because “China was already contributing through bilateral relationships with the 
countries most in need”. The story effectively reproduced, through disabling disagreement, the 
views of South Africa, India and China. By reproducing the passive victimhood discourse, the 
story failed to critique the responsibility and agency of BASIC countries in present emissions. The 
representation of BASIC on the equal plane with less developed countries helped to portray them 
as poor and qualify the argument that they are poor and in need of aid. 
 
At COP21, South Africa wanted an “ambitious, fair and effective deal” that had a “legal status” 
and “kept temperatures below two degrees Celsius” (Yolandi Groenewald, “Climate change: SA 
wants ambitious, fair and effective deal,” City Press, 07 December 2015). Disagreements during 
the negotiations were between the developed global North and the global South who fought over 
climate finance “which would help developing countries cope with the effects of locked-in climate 
change”. Developed global North countries were failing “to commit to a finance deal”. The story 
constructed the global South from a position of passive climate change victims, who were suffering 
from the effects of “global inaction on mitigation” and resulting in the increase of the “adaptation 
burden on developing countries”. Because of this burden, the global South wanted climate change 






From the discursive construction inherent in the story, the global South and South Africa in 
particular, are constructed from the planes of victimhood and have no responsibility and capacity 
to reduce their emissions. This representation naturalised the claims for non-action by the global 
South because they are not historically responsible for greenhouse gas emissions. Hidden within 
this sort of representation is the present emissions responsibility and agency of countries whose 
economies are responsible for emissions. This deletion of the present agency also obscures critique 
and questioning, allowing these countries to continue emissions through avoiding cutting their 
carbon footprint. The constructions further help entrench claims for a ‘developmental path’ and 
only sees climate action as the responsibility of the global North. The focus on adaptation finance 
is also meant to divert attention from the mitigation responsibility of the global South. 
 
The Paris Agreement was portrayed by government officials and some news media as progressive, 
except for few actors from academia and environmental non-governmental organisations who saw 
it as inadequate in addressing the climate change crises. The story “SA will have to start ridding 
itself of its coal addiction,” (Yolandi Groenewald, City Press, 13 December 2015) described the 
Paris Agreement as “a game-changer for humanity”. In line with the pledges made in Paris, South 
Africa was now expected “to start ridding itself of its coal addiction little by little”. As part of 
constructing the Paris talks as a success, Groenewald quoted Sam Barratt of Avaaz arguing that 
the treaty was “a turning point in history, paving way for the shift to 100% clean energy that the 
world wants and the planet needs”. Bill McKibben (founder of the NGO 350.org) was less 
optimistic of the deal: “But the power of the fossil fuel industry is still reflected in the text, which 
drags out the transition so far that endless climate change will be done”. South Africa and China 
“accused rich countries of trying to railroad them into a deal that would damage their economies”. 
Kumi Naidoo of Greenpeace argued that South Africa was not a good example: “We can’t say to 
the world that climate change is a problem, but back home we are building coal power stations and 
opening more coal mines”. To support the need to eliminate coal, Jackson Mthembu (ANC 
Parliamentary Chief Whip) is represented noting that “We have to legalise South Africa’s pledges 
at the conference into a strong legal framework back home. We will also engage industry to make 





Contrary to the NGOs constructions, the article “SA lauded for significant role in Paris climate 
change agreement,” (Edna Molewa, Sunday Independent, 07 February 2016) portrayed the 
agreement as good for the planet and at the same time reproduced multilateralism. The headline of 
the article indirectly praised and saw the Paris Accord as a significant global achievement and a 
win for multilateralism. Despite the Paris Accord being neoliberal and promoting Promethean 
responses to climate change through market instruments and its lack of a binding and regulatory 
framework through the vulgar of ‘name and shame’ principle, where countries voluntarily 
submitted their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), Edna Molewa endorsed 
and praised it.  
 
The Paris Agreement at COP21 was to be celebrated as “a turning point in global climate change 
governance and [that also] strengthens rules-based multilateralism”. Her view showed confidence 
and support for the Paris Accord. Evans and Musvipwa (2017) have argued that the Paris 
Agreement does little to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, criticising the agreement for 
being based on a weak principle proposed by Barack Obama, former US president, of ‘naming and 
shaming’ that shies away from a legally binding force to ensure Parties to the Agreement curb 
emissions. The accord, Molewa noted “establishes nationally determined contributions by all 
parties to the global mitigation effort,” albeit without setting any enforcement mechanism. 
Molewa’s article noted that the Paris arrangement was “a solid foundation from which all parties 
will launch enhanced action to address climate change in the post-2020 period, with renewed 
determination”. While the Accord has received criticism for its lack of a legally binding 
mechanism and its embeddedness within neoliberal responses, the South African government saw 
the Accord as a win for the developing global South. 
 
Elijah Maholola’s story, “Paris Pledges fall short of 2oC rise,” (Mail & Guardian, 22 July 2016), 
described the pledges to reduce emissions under the Paris Accord as inadequate. The headline 
captured this disappointment: “Paris pledges fall short of 2oC rise” and rather called for the 
strengthening of individual country pledges “to limit future climate change to well below the 2o C 




keep temperatures increases below 2oC, Joeri Rogelj (lead author International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis- Austria) was cited showing dissatisfaction:  
our analysis shows that these measures [carbon reduction pledges] need to be strengthened 
in order to have a good chance of keeping warming to well below 2o C, let alone 1.5o C 
…. Our study clearly shows that the current national [INDCs] plans are too incremental 
and thus inconsistent with the long-term ambition from the Paris Agreement. If we want to 
keep 2oC within reach, we’ll need much more rapid and fundamental changes. 
 
The story by Aldi Schoeman “Paris climate deal: Good for the environment, bad for jobs,” (City 
Press, 16 May 2016) argued that the Paris Climate deal was “Good for the environment” but “bad 
for jobs”. It was “bad news for the labour market and the economy” and this was being worsened 
by “long-standing talks about carbon tax” all of which made job losses ‘inevitable”. The story 
quoted Alan Mukoki, the Chief Executive of the South Africa Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
sponsoring these worldviews: “The impact will be significant. There will certainly be job losses. 
In addition, developing countries have a handicap because we do not have all the technology that 
is needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions”. Judy Beaumont (Deputy Director-General in the 
Department of Environmental Affairs) was represented in the story disputing the jobs-killing 
discourse: “we have entered into an agreement and we must honour it. It’s about balancing 
development and the environment”. 
 
7.3.2 Trumping the Paris Agreement 
Debates on the Paris Agreement moved past 2015 to include events prior and after the United 
States elections of 2016 that elected Donald Trump as president of the country. Donald Trump, as 
part of his election campaign made it clear that he was against climate treaties because they were 
bad for the United States and for the economy. Upon his election in 2016, Trump announced that 
he will pull-out the United States from the Paris Agreement, an agreement he perceived to be unfair 
to the United States. In 2017, Trump followed on his promise and announced the United States 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. All these events in the United States had a bearing on global 
climate governance, including South Africa.  
 
South Africa received the announcement by the United States President Donald Trump to pull out 
of the Paris Agreement with disappointment. The election of Donald Trump in November of 2016 




Ed “SA hopeful Trump’s fiery rhetoric won’t overheat the planet,” (Edna Molewa, Sunday Times, 
27 November 2016). South Africa remained optimistic that “Trump’s fiery rhetoric” would not 
“overheat the planet”. The threats by Trump to pull the United States out of the Paris Agreement 
were morally and environmentally irresponsible because “After China, the US is the second-largest 
contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions”. While the actions from Trump are constructed as 
irresponsible and immoral, the Obama administration is portrayed as progressive and rational. 
“During President Barack Obama’s term in office the international community made 
unprecedented progress in climate change negotiations, culminating in the early entry into force 
of the Paris Agreement”. The threat from Trump and the actual withdrawal were taking the world 
back and having the consequence of undoing the Paris Accord.  
 
The United States could renege on its obligation to reduce emissions by not adhering to “it’s 
nationally determined contribution and financial support to developing countries”. The withdrawal 
of the United States was represented as going against the multilateral spirit. Molewa averred that: 
“The reality is that there is no viable alternative to collective multilateral action. The Paris 
Agreement is our best hope to achieve climate safety globally”. Further to the moralisation of the 
Obama administration, Molewa noted that the United States had remained “committed to working 
with other parties to combat climate change in the spirit of cooperation and under the convention”. 
Molewa was clearly against Trump’s isolationist climate change foreign policy. 
Similarities between government discourses and newspaper discourses on Trump’s desire to 
withdraw from the Paris Agreement were observed. The article by Sipho Kings, “Trump’s hot 
words heat the world,” (Mail & Guardian, 11 November 2016) portrayed and constructed the 
United States president-elect Donald Trump as environmentally careless and insensitive: 
“President-elect Donald Trump’s stance on global warming spells trouble for the country’s carbon 
footprint”. The first paragraph of the story quoted Trump’s tweet: “The concept of global warming 
was created by and for the Chinese in order to make the US manufacturing noncompetitive”. 
Trump and the Republican party that he represents, were constructed as villains standing in the 
way of a moral call and duty to protect the environment and avert catastrophic climate change. “In 
the Republican worldview, industries that emit pollutants and warm the environment are good for 




Republican party were represented as the ‘other’ - in opposition to progressive and responsible 
Barack Obama and the Democratic party. Under Obama, Kings argued, “The United States has 
become a world leader in tackling global warming” because “President Obama has made this a 
cornerstone of his second term, with agreements signed with China and other big emitters”. Trump 
and the Republicans were, therefore, a threat to the progress made by the Obama administration. 
Kings argued that the Paris Agreement came out weak without legally binding clauses “because it 
could not get past a hostile Republican House”. Trump represents the bad while Obama stands for 
the good. The Democrats are constructed as having a good relationship with the environment: “the 
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol was intended to lower emissions. That was driven by a Clinton 
presidency [Democrat], but then George W Bush [Republican] pulled the US out of the protocol”.  
 
The editorial “Editorial: Trump’s need for vindication hurts the world,” (City Press, 04 June 2017) 
criticised the United States decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement by President Donald 
Trump. The headline saw the withdrawal as not based on substantive reasons but Trump’s “need 
for vindication” which “hurts the world”. Further, the lead paragraph also develops the same 
argument by describing the decision as shameful: “One of the shameful acts in US history”. It was 
shameful for the United States to withdraw from the Paris deal because of the country’s historical 
responsibility and that the “US is the second-biggest carbon dioxide polluter after China”. Having 
outlined the United States greenhouse gases culpability, the editorial constructs the United States 
as a calamity, immoral and irresponsible. The US’s actions were to be seen as villainy. The 
reference to the United States culpability is also an attempt to criminalise, demoralise and 
delegitimise the United States. The decision, the editorial argued, was based on “Trump’s Obama 
fixation” and the political connection of the Republicans to the oil industry “big oil and coal 
business is running his political party” which led to “this contempt for the world and the future”. 
 
Edna Molewa, Minister of Environmental Affairs, in an Op-Ed in the Mail & Guardian, “Trump 
won’t scupper Paris agreement on climate change,” (Mail & Guardian, 09 June 2017) saw the 
announcement as “regrettable” and blamed the United States for being ‘irresponsible’. The 
decision by Trump, Molewa argued, reflected “an abdication of global responsibility … the US 




multilateralism, the rule of law and trust between nations”. The Paris Agreement was constructed 
by Molewa as “the best flexible and dynamic approach to keeping global temperature increases 
well below 2oC and is a victory for multilateralism”. Molewa universalised the climate problem 
and limited action to address emissions to developed countries’ actions: “The success of the Paris 
Agreement hinges heavily on the extent to which developed countries, historically bear the 
responsibility for the majority of the world’s climate change-causing emissions, are able to meet 
their commitment to developing countries, which have historically been low emitters”. In her view, 
the decision by the United States was retrogressive considering the United States’ historical 
responsibility in causing climate change. Rather than ditching the Paris Agreement, it was 
necessary for the United States to remember that it had “a moral obligation not only to lead in 
reducing emissions but also to support poorer economies in contributing to the global effort”. She 
further endorsed multilateralism, arguing that climate change could “only be effectively addressed 
multilaterally, under the broad-based legitimacy of the UN framework convention”. 
 
7.3.3 Concealing responsibility and blame-shifting 
Yolandi Groenewald, in the story “Crunch time for Kyoto” (Mail & Guardian, 06 October 2011), 
portrayed the politics within the negotiations on emissions reduction where “the old question of 
which countries should take what responsibility for capping emissions to the possible detriment of 
their economy is still very much at the centre of the talks.'' South Africa’s international climate 
policy was underpinned by the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) 
adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. This principle gave responsibility for climate 
action to the global North industrialised countries in line with their historical responsibility. 
However, with developments in the fast-developing economies, countries that are members of 
BRICS had their emissions levels escalate, requiring that they also should start actions to limit 
emissions. Regardless of these new developments, economies in transition/fast-developing 
economies continued to use the CBDR principle under the pretext that their economies needed to 
catch-up. These discourses mostly found their way into the news media and were reproduced with 
little or no questioning. For example, the story “Seeking balanced, fair and credible outcomes,” 
(No author, Sunday Times, 27 November 2011) reproduced South Africa’s negotiating stance at 
COP17: the aspect of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities. There is an imagined 




The International Relations Minister and also incoming COP17 President, Maite Nkoana-
Mashabane was directly represented arguing that “All parties appear to be in agreement that the 
outcome in Durban should be balanced, fair and credible, that it should preserve and strengthen 
the multilateral rules-based response to climate change”.  
 
The rules-based multilateral system was to “be informed by the principles that form the basis of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations”. “These 
principles include multilateralism, environmental integrity, fairness based on the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, equity and honouring of all 
international commitments and understandings made in the climate change process”. Through the 
CBDR principle, South Africa remained represented as a passive victim of climate change. 
Allusions to fairness underpinned by the CBDR principle helped to delete South Africa’s complicit 
behaviour in present responsibility, of which it must act. A focus on adaptation also helped to 
passivise and nominalise a discussion on South Africa’s mitigation responsibility. The entire story 
was based on one actor and thus ideological disagreement was disabled. It is key to mention that 
the South African news media largely followed the dominant South African foreign policy 
discourses relating to the climate change negotiations. The media reproduced the South African 
worldviews and seldom questioned the vested interests behind. 
Global climate change negotiators, especially those from the global North were also constructed 
as self-interested in the story, “Diplomats win, but climate loses,” (Fiona Macleod, Mail & 
Guardian, 22 December 2011). Despite the International Relations Minister Maite Nkoana-
Mashabane’s portrayal of COP17 as a success because it secured the Durban Platform that drew a 
roadmap for a legally binding deal by 2015 and a second Kyoto commitment period ending in 
2018, the story saw the outcome of COP17 as “a political coup” that “failed to deal with the nitty-
gritty of how to keep global temperatures from rising”. The story used NGOs discourses to draw 
this conclusion. Tasneem Essop of WWF for Nature described COP17 as an “empty shell”. 
 
In “EU has hope for climate talks,” (Fiona Macleod, Mail & Guardian, 14 April 2011), the 
responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions reduction is constructed as belonging to the developed 




need for a ‘developmental space’. Excluded from the story are discussions on local (South Africa) 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Correspondingly, in “Basic puts science-based plan on 
table,” (Fiona Macleod, Mail & Guardian, 14 December 2011), the global North countries were 
represented as pursuing their own selfish interests at the expense of addressing climate change. 
Although the global North countries pursued selfish interests, the BASIC group was constructed 
as trying to bring in a “science-based” approach to the negotiations. The approach was to be 
premised on agreeing on the second Kyoto commitment period (where all Basic countries) will be 
exempt and on the aspect of fairness. The approach proposed by the BASIC countries was 
portrayed as progressive by the news story, regardless of the BASIC member countries only 
promising to legally reduce their emissions post-2020. The attempt to postpone action from the 
Basic group was left without scrutiny by the newspaper discourse. The United States, Canada, and 
Russia are represented as stumbling blocks to a second Kyoto commitment period. 
 
The South African government saw climate action (providing adaptation finance and mitigation) 
as a responsibility of the global North countries. The Minister of Environmental Affairs, Edna 
Molewa, in the Op-Ed “Climate change burden must be shared,” (Edna Molewa, Sunday 
Independent, 26 July 2015), constructed South Africa as a developing country and a passive victim 
of climate change impacts. By constructing South Africa as a passive victim, Molewa indirectly 
bundled South Africa into the group of ‘poor countries’, ignoring, by exclusion and 
nominalisation, the role of South Africa in global greenhouse gas emissions. Molewa’s article laid 
out the approach to be taken by South Africa at Paris COP21 regarding global climate change 
negotiations. South Africa pushed for a global deal that was “fair, rules-based, binding and 
applicable to all”. Regarding adaptation and mitigation financing in the global South, Molewa 
drew from the closet of historical responsibility, noting that “the adaptation burden should be a 
global responsibility- and should not be shouldered by developing countries”. This was a direct 
call for the global North to provide financing for adaptation in the global South in consideration 
of their historical responsibility: “Developed countries should at least indicate their intended levels 





Molewa’s article also shed light into the climate change negotiations and the geopolitical 
polarisation that characterised them: “Developed countries expect more commitments from 
developing countries, despite their poverty and developmental challenges” (Edna Molewa, Sunday 
Independent, 26 July 2015). Problematic in this discursive construction used by Molewa is how 
conveniently South Africa is bundled together with other ‘developing and poor countries’. 
Concealed in this construction are the emissions inequalities within South Africa and the Africa 
Group where South Africa is responsible for above 40 % of emissions emanating from Africa. 
This and South Africa’s emissions levels are concealed and consequently, the present 
responsibility of South Africa in reducing emissions in line with current responsibility is 
passivised. The agency of the global South nations comes to light when they are constructed from 
a position of climate impacts vulnerability, but their complicit in emissions, especially the BRICS 
countries, is passivised and thus left unquestioned. This discourse then allows Molewa to articulate 
a vulnerability discourse which even calls for more exploitation of fossils “because South Africa 
is a developing country …. We will therefore, over a reasonable time, continue to argue for our 
developmental space without being pressured into further emission reduction” (Edna Molewa, 
Sunday Independent, 26 July 2015). The narrative of ‘catching-up’ and the need for a 
developmental space is brought into the debate. South Africa’s emissions cuts are deferred “over 
a reasonable time” to allow the country to develop. While this discourse appears normal and 
common-sensical, it leaves out questions of internal inequality within South Africa and Africa 
unanswered. Essentially, it has been argued in Chapter 2 that the key beneficiaries of continued 
fossil fuel usage are the players in the minerals-energy complex. Patrick Bond argued that despite 
the claims for developmental space, there has been no improvement in the standard of living for 
ordinary South Africans but rather inequalities have widened. 
 
While Molewa appealed for a developmental space, she at the same time projected a transition into 
renewables by “creating alternative renewables through new technological innovation”. There is 
an element of techno-managerial optimism that underpins government thinking. The headline 
suggests that global climate change responsibility must be shared, however, the article itself 
showed that the belief is that in the meantime the global North be doing more to reduce carbon 




South countries adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. The global South is thus not 
responsible but should be given a developmental space. 
 
In the article, “SA lauded for significant role in Paris climate change agreement,” (Edna Molewa, 
Sunday Independent, 07 February 2016), the developed global North is constructed and 
represented as historically and morally responsible for leading action towards mitigation and 
adaptation. South Africa, as Molewa alluded, relied on the 1992 Earth summit principle of 
‘Common But Differentiated Responsibility’. Molewa argued that “It was important that we 
argued strongly, as we did, that the final text should give effect to the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and capabilities” which makes sure that “developed countries should 
take the lead in not only reducing greenhouse gas emissions but in supporting climate change 
activities in developing countries”. Countries in the global South are constructed as incapable of 
taking any further climate change action because they were victims in need of help: “The reality 
is that countries like South Africa are doing what they can with little resources they have.” The 
othering and distanciation of climate change responsibility passivised and nominalised South 
Africa’s agency in present emissions and left the current emission scenarios without scrutiny. This 
passivisation went along with the claim for South Africa to be given the right to pollute and a 
developmental space: “As a country, it’s our responsibility to do our part to fight climate change 
while simultaneously be cognisant of our status as a developing country.” 
 
Sipho Kings’ story “Big polluters backpedal at climate talks,” (Mail & Guardian, 28 November 
2013) was pessimistic at the possibility of a binding deal because of the villainy of “Big polluters” 
who were “backpedalling” through “scrapping their pledges to reduce emissions”. This 
backpedalling led the global South “vulnerable nations” to demand “that something happens now 
before it is too late”. The big polluters were seen as villains and “vulnerable nations” are 
constructed as passive victims of the historical and present actions of the big polluters.  
Political change in some of the world’s biggest greenhouse-gas polluters has resulted in 
them backpedalling from pledges to lower emissions. Australia, which is building a 
thriving economy on coal exports, has elected a government that does not believe climate 
change is driven by humans. Canada has pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol and other climate 
agreements. Japan has lowered its targets, and Europe is refusing to increase its targets. 




Congress (Sipho Kings, “Big polluters backpedal at climate talks,” Mail & Guardian, 28 
November 2013). 
In protest to the ‘backpedalling,’ “the Chinese delegation led a walkout with 131 other developing 
nations”. The aspect of climate finance, similar to 2011, was contentious and the global South 
nations were unhappy with “the lack of progress on funding for ‘loss and damage’... the developing 
world want the rich world to pay for it to use less carbon-intensive energy and for the damage 
caused by climate change because the majority of emissions were produced by the developed 
world”. For their part, the global North countries blamed “the recession for a lack of funds,” and 
also wanted the BRICS economies to step up and contribute towards the fund because they were 
“now on a par with the developed world, they should not benefit from any funding”. 
The story exposed the politics of climate change negotiations where Parties in the developed global 
North disagreed that only the rich should pay for emissions because economies in transition were 
responsible for present emissions. The story, however, put the blame on the developed countries 
and by so doing deleted the primacy and agency of BRICS countries in present emissions 
responsibility. This study argues that the countries in BRICS attempt to avoid emissions cuts 
claiming a developmental space and require funding for clean development forgetting their present 
emissions responsibility. By sticking to equality in emissions responsibility, the global North 
countries (Canada and Australia) are portrayed as backpedalling and thus stalling progress.  
The story deleted, by passivisation and nominalisation, the agency of BRICS countries as the key 
present big polluters, thereby lessening focus and scrutiny on their ambitions and actions to reduce 
their carbon footprint. This also shields these countries from scrutiny and promotes a worldview 
where they can easily claim passive victimhood to climate change. The discursive strategy of 
othering and labelling is used. The developed global North was labelled as “big polluters” and 
responsibility for climate actions shifted through exporting responsibility and blame. 
 
Notwithstanding that most of the stories in the newspapers constructed climate change mitigation 
as a responsibility of the global North, at least some articles managed to balance their stories by 
pinpointing the activities of global South fast-developing economies. The story “Valli Moosa 




fore the politics prevailing at the COP17 climate change talks in Durban, including a discussion 
of the political economy and geopolitics of climate change. The appointment of Valli Moosa 
(former South African Environment minister) was meant to “to try to prevent a stand-off between 
the world’s worst polluting nations that could scupper any chance of a global agreement being 
signed at the conference in Durban at the end of the month” and pacify India to agree to a binding 
climate change deal.  “India’s hard-line is causing a stumbling block. India and China are saying 
they won’t move, so the US is also saying it won’t move. The three countries are holding things 
up,” (Fiona Macleod, “Valli Moosa drafted to ease deadlock,” Mail & Guardian, 24 November 
2011). While the discussions on emissions have been about the global North, the story focused on 
the politics of emissions reduction within economies in transition in BRICS. India and China were 
constructed in the story as stumbling blocks and because of their actions, the United States got an 
opportunity to escape.   
Observers this week said India’s refusal to commit itself to legally binding carbon emission 
cuts was giving the United States an excuse to play hardball. India accounted for 6.2% of 
global carbon emissions last year, the US for 16.4% …. China, responsible for 24.6% of 
the world’s emissions, was also reluctant to take any binding cuts (Fiona Macleod, “Valli 
Moosa drafted to ease deadlock,” Mail & Guardian, 24 November 2011). 
India favoured voluntary actions, not a legally binding deal. India is constructed as a climate 
villain, for refusing to agree with other ‘progressive countries’. The United States, India and China 
were represented as the world’s “worst” polluters and yet they were not willing to act because of 
selfish interests. Whereas the story brought out emissions for these three countries, the emissions 
from South Africa are not mentioned, neither is the South African position regarding emissions 
reduction plans.  
 
Discourses from the global South critically attached climate action responsibility in the hands of 
the global North. However, the global North countries pushed back on this narrative and promoted 
a discourse of universal action. This pluri-versal action required everyone to work together 
multilaterally. Thus, it was inevitable for the global North to promote the multilateral process 
because it was universal. The endorsement of multilateralism came also from global North 
diplomats stationed in South Africa. The British High Commissioner to South Africa, Nicola 
Brewer, in the Op-Ed “We have the green light to curb emissions,” (City Press, 23 January 2011), 




Brewer, climate change could only be tackled through a “global deal”. “For the first time, there is 
an international commitment to ‘deep cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions’”. The Cancun 
COP16 was praised in the article for sending “a very clear and positive message - that the UN 
process is back and with renewed momentum”. The language used by Brewer suggests that the 
author was intertextually responding to competing discourses that had lost faith in multilateral 
responses and platforms. The author attempted to reproduce multilateralism as common sense and 
a consensual ideology worthy embracing: “Cancun was a triumph for the spirit of international 
cooperation in tackling an international threat.” The construction of climate change as an 
international threat is consistent with the United Kingdom policy that attempted to universalise the 
climate problem and by so doing diminishing the responsibility of Britain as a key contributor to 
the risk society produced by climate change (Carvalho 2004, see also chapter 4). 
 
By constructing climate change as a universal threat, the discourse attempted to bury the actors 
and economic systems behind this threat and rather universalise action in addressing a risk 
produced by the few. The multilateral language is crucial for Britain as it helped to create a climate 
change which is universal and therefore requiring universal action, diminishing the historical 
responsibility of the elite culprits. The language of universality is captured in the headline: “We 
have the green light to curb emissions”. Britain attempted to rationalise climate responses as the 
responsibility of ‘everyone’ by interpellating the global South to see themselves as part of the 
problem and the solution. More important also is that while South Africa and other countries in 
the global South attempted to export climate change responsibility, this article by Brewer could be 
interpreted as a rebuttal of the tribal politics depicted by the global South. Essentially, Brewer’s 
article became a response that sought to say, ‘we are all responsible, and therefore we should act 
together”. The multilateral spirit, therefore, was crucial for this universalisation project. 
 
7.3.4 Climate Finance and historical ‘debt payment’ 
Climate change financing is a key feature of the climate change negotiations theme. The subtheme 
of finance was constructed as common sense and reproduced along with the policy choices of the 
South African government and non-governmental organisations. In the Mail & Guardian, the 




centre stage. The Mail & Guardian devoted several stories towards the climate financing sub-
theme and constructed finance as a key issue for the success of climate talks, from COP17 to 
COP21. The news story “Green fund full of empty promises,” by Sipho McDermott (Mail & 
Guardian, 06 October 2011) is one example. Funding of the Green Climate Fund was viewed as a 
key sticking issue that needed to be resolved at COP17 in Durban: “one of the most contentious 
issues in the negotiations is where that money will come from and who will dispense it.” The story 
moralised the need for climate finance and the operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund 
because: “The fund will help poor countries to adapt to climate change and to develop low carbon 
economies” and in addition “pay for developing countries to change their development trajectories 
to more environmentally sustainable ones”. The developed global North countries were blamed 
for the lack of progress on the Green Climate Fund implementation mechanism. Trevor Manuel, 
South Africa’s Planning Minister and co-chair of the Green Climate Fund Committee, was directly 
represented saying “it was ‘easier to extract teeth from chickens that convince G20 finance 
ministers to part with money”. 
The underlying expectation was that developed countries were responsible for funding climate 
action based on their historical responsibility under the principle of Common But Differentiated 
Responsibilities. The need for the Green Climate Fund operationalisation was seen as a moral and 
natural way of helping “poor countries” respond to climate impacts and pursue a cleaner 
developmental path. Interesting is that the global South reporters, analogous to global North 
journalistic practices (see Evans, 2016), also refer to the global South as “poor countries” - 
labelling that achieves the goal of normalising their perceived victimhood. Because they are poor, 
they need financial assistance from the rich and developed countries. The global South thus is 
represented as dependent on aid from the global North to develop and respond to climate change. 
Furthermore, the construction of the global South as victims deletes the agency of present 
responsibilities from the economies in transition.  
The South African news media has constructed the neoliberalisation of climate change as common 
sense and having acquired imagined universal consensus. The aspects of climate finance, support 
of the Kyoto Protocol and the Green Climate Fund are constructed as given and natural. The media 




commodification, marketisation and fetishisation of nature have not been critiqued and questioned 
in the news media. By blindly reproducing the dominance of neoliberal climate change responses, 
the news media effectively entrenched and legitimised the self-mutative tendencies of capitalism 
as a tendential economic, cultural and material force. Responses that put nature at the profit altar 
have been uncritically reproduced and reinforced. Key to this production has been the news 
media’s dependency on a ‘club’ of experts and actors in climate policy, governance, whose 
interests are predominantly capitalistic. The media essentially reproduced elite ideologies because 
of the news structures and requirements for ‘expert sources’.  
Using synchronic discourse analysis, the study managed to find that within the Mail & Guardian, 
different reporters managed to build stories about climate finance that were in ideological 
agreement and reproduced the views of the dominant government actors. Synonymous to Sipho 
McDermott’s story above, Fiona Macleod “No cash will be a COP-out,” (Mail & Guardian, 17 
November 2011) constructed finance as a key to a global climate deal. The story discussed what 
it constructed as impediments to global climate talks. Non-governmental organisations had warned 
that “Durban will achieve little if no money was forthcoming for the climate fund”. Kumi Naidoo 
of Greenpeace International is directly represented arguing that “With no agreement on any long-
term sources of finance, the Green Fund is an empty shell”. The NGOs expected global North 
developed countries to make more pledges towards the Green Climate Fund to lure global South 
nations into a deal. Jeremy Hobbs of Oxfam International is represented directly echoing the same 
sentiments: “The fund currently stands empty, so governments must now decide where the money 
needed to fill it will come from.” The story reproduced the discourses from NGOs without 
including any ideological disagreement. Finance is constructed as the key to unlocking the 
potential of having a global climate deal. Nothing is written about the responsibility of present key 
emitters in the global South. 
Within the discussions at the COP meetings, one of the emergent themes was the issue of climate 
finance, embodied within the need to operationalise the Green Climate Fund. At COP17, the 
operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund was so important for South Africa’s diplomatic 
posture. International Relations Minister and incoming COP17 President Maite Nkoana-




conference,” Sunday Independent, 16 October 2011) benchmarking the success of the talks on the 
provision of climate finance. For Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, the Durban COP17 was supposed to 
operationalise agreements made at COP16 in Cancun, Mexico. She writes of “agreed consensus” 
on the need to operationalise the Green Climate Fund, the need to finalise a second Kyoto 
commitment period and agreeing on a legally binding climate deal. South Africa’s position in 
terms of climate change mitigation and adaptation are closely attached to neoliberal approaches. 
The Green Climate Fund is an example together with the need for a second Kyoto commitment 
period. This meant an indirect but strong endorsement of market-led responses to the climate 
problem. The Kyoto Protocol gave birth to carbon trading and the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), systems that essentially financialised and commodified climate change responses.  
 
The article by the International Relations Minister (and incoming COP17 president), Maite 
Nkoana-Mashabane, “Negotiations need mature approach to pertinent issues,” (City Press, 16 
November 2011) noted that there was a need for the operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund 
as agreed at COP16 in Cancun, Mexico: “Developing countries demand a prompt start for the fund 
through early capitalisation”. The minister further endorsed the market-led responses of Kyoto by 
making a second commitment deal common sense. Maite Nkoana-Mashabane constructs climate 
change as a matter of science, she achieves this by instrumentalising science through explicit 
confidence and references to the effects citing extreme weather events globally and Africa. The 
climate problems, thus, required a response mechanism that addressed the science challenges, i.e. 
reducing emissions by whatever scientific means possible. The source of the emissions is not 
discussed nor opportunities for rethinking the structural processes, capitalism, that have resulted 
in the ecological rift are thus not discussed. Effectively, the solutions to be sought are found in 
technological and managerial innovation leading to green capitalism. In this article, Nkoana-
Mashabane is clear that the future should be based on neoliberal principles of the Green Climate 
Fund and the Kyoto Protocol signatures of carbon trade and clean development mechanism. She 
successfully de-politicises climate change by constructing the problem in the scientific and the 
failure to refer to the political economy of the climate problem. The article takes for granted 
notions of neoliberal responses. It is hoped that neoliberal approaches would result in fair and 




should seek to address global inequalities, intra and extra-territorial inequalities. Climate change 
widens these. A system that critically restructures our conditions of existing with nature should 
question the political-economic foundations of neoliberalism and argue for a radical detour that 
puts people and the environment over profit. 
 
Similar to Nkoana-Mashabane, Eleanor Momberg, in the story “It’s all eyes on UN climate talks” 
(Sunday Independent, 27 November 2011), saw the talks in Durban as pivotal “to finalise details 
for implementation of the fund [Green Climate Fund],” a fund that “would assist poor nations 
adapt to and mitigate climate change”. The success of the Durban climate negotiations was to be 
evaluated against the operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund. Failure to operationalise the 
fund was constructed Edna Molewa as a failure for South Africa because: “We have a name to 
lose… the name South Africa is very expensive”. This quote in the article form Edna Molewa (also 
head of the South African delegation) sums up the overall agenda of South Africa. It was more of 
a geopolitical and diplomatic win than one for the environment. The country wanted to make a 
name for itself for hosting a successful meeting that operationalised the Green Climate Fund and 
secured a second Kyoto commitment period. The agenda of the talks, thus, was mired in this 
diplomatic race to pitch South Africa as a key player at the multilateral level for global climate 
governance. It was part of the South African policy, to emerge as a key leader in these talks and 
secure international victory. By securing the operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund, South 
Africa hoped to appease “poor countries”. The operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund is 
moralised because it would “assist poor nations to adapt to and mitigate climate change” and this 
type of discourse takes for granted the view that the fund automatically ‘helps’ poor nations. 
Therefore, South Africa, by pursuing this agenda, was a champion of poor nations that it spoke for 
and act on behalf of. The political economy of the green climate fund is missing from the story. 
 
The story “For Earth, against the odds,” (Maureen Isaacson, Sunday Independent, 13 November 
2011) mirrors government-sponsored activism. June Josephs-Langa (the Chief Executive Officer 
of the Environmental Affairs Department’s Indalo Yethu) contributed to constructing the South 
African position regarding the climate change negotiations in Durban. Josephs-Langa amplified 
the construction of the global North as unfaithful and failing to honour their promise of 




of climate change for developing countries”. The global South is constructed as a unity and as 
passive victims of climate change and in need of aid in order to adapt and mitigate. The unitisation 
of the global South helped in constructing all as having the same emissions dynamics and even the 
economies in transition in the global South, presently responsible for emissions (Brazil, India, 
China and South Africa) are lumped together and scrutiny on their emissions efforts and non-
efforts is erased from the discourse. The story portrayed the world as a duality between the global 
North and south with the former being responsible and the latter as passive victims. Effectively, 
the high emissions from the global South, especially the economies in transition were passivised 
and nominalised through the discourse.  
 
News stories in the Sunday Independent saw the operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund as 
part of the principles agreed in Cancun Mexico during COP16. Fiona Macleod’s story “Green 
Fund may be only positive to come from COP17,” (Sunday Independent, 04 December 2011) 
argued that the operationalisation of the green climate fund was one of the key target achievements 
of the South African government. The government had hoped to have the Green Climate Fund 
operationalised in Durban. This would have been a diplomatic score for the government. The story 
signals that there was no hope on other agenda items (Kyoto Protocol Second Commitment Period, 
a globally binding climate change deal etc.). Trevor Manuel, the Planning Minister expressed hope 
that COP17 would deliver a Green Climate Fund operationalisation mechanism, noting a deal on 
the fund “was not dead in the water”. Manuel argued that the “fund has not failed. We should not 
fret negotiation grandstanding”. The story constructed climate change negotiation as geopolitically 
divided between the developed global North and the developing global South. The talks were not 
producing results because of these geopolitical divides and the United States is especially 
represented as a villain at the talks for refusing to sign up. The story stated that “the US and Saudi 
Arabia had earlier withdrawn their support for the design and modalities of the climate change 
financial mechanism”. The United States and Saudi Arabia, together with some developed 
countries are portrayed as working against a deal on the Green Climate Fund. The global North is 
constructed as having the historical responsibility to provide climate change finance “to assist 
developing countries to kickstart mitigation and adaptation programmes, including reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation [REDD], adaptation, technology development 




Manuel is cited emphasising on this global North responsibility: “The biggest problems relate to 
firstly, persuading lawmakers in the rich world that they have a responsibility to the rest of the 
world.” The emphasis on global North responsibility should not be seen as a common and 
inevitable course but rather as a deliberate South African government policy to other and export 
responsibility on climate change. This is done under the auspices of the Common But 
Differentiated Responsibilities principle of 1992, without paying attention to the present growth 
of emissions in the BRICS, economies in transition and South Africa included. The continuous 
and consistent export of responsibility allows South Africa to propagate the discourse on the need 
to ‘catch-up’ and develop using fossil fuels under the logic of ‘the right to pollute’. It defers South 
Africa’s climate change responsibility. 
 
The entire story lacked ideological disagreement as it relied on a single actor, Trevor Manuel. The 
views of Manuel represent the policy discourses of South Africa as expressed in the Climate 
Change Response White Paper. These views of Manuel are reproduced and are pitched to the 
readers as consensus views and the only ones accessible and available. They become common 
sense. The granting of officials extensive discursive space allows them to set the parameters for 
issue-definition and their solutions towards climate change to achieve a discursive-hegemonic 
consensus because they are uncontested. The reproduction of these worldviews excludes other 
available discourses, other actors and other narratives. Crucially, the South African government 
has the capacity to set the climate agenda, define the issues and offer solutions that are put to the 
people as moral, natural and in the interest of the country. 
 
Eleanor Momberg’s “MDG goals at risk, UN report warns,” (Sunday Independent, 11 December 
2011), made it morally binding that climate change negotiations should have come up with a 
“legally binding agreement setting targets for the immediate reduction of carbon emissions” 
together with the operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund to avert the effects of climate 
change. The Green Climate Fund operationalisation is represented as an issue of morality and 
common sense because: 
Creating a Green Climate Fund and ensuring long-term funding for mitigation and 
adaptation in the developing world has been vital not only to ensure communities did not 




but also for development of technology and skills to come up with alternative ways of 
providing the services and development needed without increasing carbon emissions 
(Eleanor Momberg, “MDG goals at risk, UN report warns,” Sunday Independent, 11 
December 2011).  
 
The story expressed optimism in the Green Climate Fund as an adaptation and mitigation financing 
scheme. The fund was built as a moral intervention because it would avert food and water shortages 
in the global South and lead to emissions reductions. Techno-optimism is represented as a 
common-sense worldview, by so doing the neoliberal green capitalism agenda was legitimised and 
moralised. It is represented through the public idiom/translation into a common-sense everyday 
language, for example, statements such as “it is vital not only to ensure communities did not suffer 
food and water shortages or have their lives claimed by climatic changes … but also for the 
development of technology”. The story moralised neoliberal techno-optimistic responses.  
 
The high carbon emissions from South Africa are acknowledged but passivised: “Despite South 
Africa being the 13th highest carbon emitter in the world, particularly because of its reliance on the 
coal-based power supply, Africa is the lowest contributor to climate change. But it is the hardest 
hit.” Momberg diminished the agency of South African emissions, though acknowledged as high, 
were insignificant because, after all, Africa was the lowest contributor to global emissions. South 
Africa and Africa were produced as passive victims of climate change that needed urgent climate 
finance to help the continent cope with climate impacts. The emphasis on victimhood and 
vulnerability essentially prioritised discourses on aid and finance over mitigation action, of which 
South Africa, as the 13th emitter globally, ought to be contributing. The passive agency of the 
global South is emphasised regarding victimhood constructions and at the same agency regarding 
emissions is passivised. Molewa is represented arguing that “We are highly dependent on climate-
sensitive sectors such as rain-fed agriculture. Combined with severe development challenges the 
continent already faces, this makes Africa particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate 
change”. Molewa’s use of the discursive tool of oral models and public translation helped her 
assume the position of speaking on behalf of everyone in Africa: “We are highly dependent” 
becomes some sought of universalising language meant to interpellate and constitute subjects as 
well-represented in discourse. While this could be correct, the overemphasis on vulnerability 




emissions, thus, creating a new perspective where South Africa is not just a passive victim but an 
active agent in creating the ecological and climate crisis. 
 
The vulnerability is co-sponsored by the World Bank’s Andrew Steer who, through discourse, 
created unity and universality of ‘developing countries’ with equal and similar climate dynamics. 
This unity is produced as having to suffer “three-quarters of the negative impacts of changing 
weather patterns, water shortages, and rising sea levels, and they are the least equipped to deal 
with them”. This, therefore, justified and moralised calls for the developed global North countries 
to provide the ‘essential’ Green Climate finance to help the ‘poor victims of climate change cope’.  
 
The story “Tough talks ahead on climate change,” (Eleanor Momberg, Sunday Independent, 23 
October 2011) set out South Africa’s expectations at the global climate change talks in Durban 
2011 (COP17). Key for South Africa was a second Kyoto commitment period and the 
operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund. The Green Climate Fund was necessary “to help 
nations adapt to climate change”. The Environmental Affairs Minister, Edna Molewa, was cited 
arguing that it was the responsibility of rich nations to “assist particularly the least developed 
nations and low-lying Island states, to among others, adapt to climate change, mitigate its effects”. 
There is a bi-polar representation of countries along with the rich-poor binaries. South Africa is 
constructed as a representative and a voice of the developing poor countries fighting against 
climate villains such as the United States and Saudi Arabia that were against a Green Climate Fund 
operational mechanism: “a final deal could face yet another delay after the withdrawal of support 
from the United States and Saudi Arabia for the design and modalities of the fund.” The story also 
highlighted the deep-rooted divisions within the global climate change multilateral negotiating 
blocs. “Part of the debate in recent months had been fairness and whether fast-developing 
economies such as India, China, Brazil and South Africa should not also contribute to the Fund”. 
These views were represented indirectly and are not expanded on. The story did not mention who 
the sponsor(s) of these views are. The story builds the narrative around ‘fairness’ by implicitly 
invoking the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities. 
 
Climate change is constructed as an environmental problem that could be overcome through 




innovation. It is argued in this study that the plausible way to respond to climate change would be 
through addressing and transforming the very issues at the root of climate decay, consumption and 
capitalist accumulation. The story is silent on how the Green Climate Fund would radically alter 
and restructure the processes of production and accumulation that are the foundations of the 
capitalist risk society. Providing finance through the Green Climate Fund is not in any way related 
to key issues of aggressive emissions reduction to avoid warming beyond 1.5o Celsius by 2100. 
 
Edna Molewa, in the Op-Ed, “Need to clear air over climate finance,” (Sunday Independent, 14 
December 2014), argued that reaching a global climate deal depended on the financial package 
given to developing countries: “While there are many pillars in the negotiations [for a global 
climate deal], finance is considered the main element under the means of implementation”. A 
global climate deal was supposed to come up with a financial package to enable developing 
countries to adapt to the negative impacts of climate change and develop in a cleaner way. Molewa 
argued that climate finance “is directly linked to the level of action envisaged as needing to be 
taken by developing countries to deal with climate challenges in adaptation and mitigation”. 
Molewa moved the argued the argument that the global North needed to provide a sound financial 
mechanism to help the developing countries adapt and mitigate. The responsibility for climate 
action is put in the hands of the global North: “It is time for all those who bear the greatest 
responsibility for the effects of climate change to show leadership”. While Molewa conceded in 
the article that South Africa’s emissions would peak and begin to fall in 2035, she argued that 
South Africa was “managing the transition to an internationally-competitive low-carbon economy 
and society” alongside what she called “South Africa’s national priorities for sustainable 
development”. 
 
Yolandi Groenewald’s Op-Ed “COP21 - it’s about money,” (City Press, 13 December 2015) 
reproduced the claim that without finance, developing countries were unable to take climate action. 
Climate action, especially mitigation efforts, were expected to be led by the global North countries 
because of historical responsibility and because “they have” and “we don’t have”. South Africa 
and other economies in transition such as India and China were treated in the story as developing 
countries who are passive victims of climate change without the capacity to act in the absence of 




Groenewald arguing that “We are a developing nation, and we need the funds to switch …. We, 
as South Africa, are quite insistent that rich countries should come to the party with financing”. 
The global climate talks were constructed along the dichotomous lines with developing countries 
on the one-hand (passive victims) and developed countries (culprits) on the other. The divisions 
mirror the outward geopolitical character of the North-South relations that are marked by suspicion 
and mistrust. The global North is represented as countries attempting to evade responsibility 
because they “want major developing nations such as China and India to also contribute to the pot 
[climate finance]”. 
The construction of climate change in this way passivised and nominalised present climate change 
responsibility and promoted inaction from the developing global South. While climate finance is 
important, there is a need for discourses that seek to expose the complicit nature of economies in 
transition. The provision of finance to the developing countries was produced as fair and normal. 
The use of sources that had a consensus point of view withheld ideological disagreement and 
helped create a one-dimensional story. The story, therefore, legitimised the views of the NGOs, 
reproducing them as the most normal and without alternative. The developing global South 
countries are represented as victims who should be compensated. The agency of the global South 
in emissions is passivised and no attention is paid, in particular, the high emissions from BRICS. 
Interesting to note is also that, by way of articulation, it is possible to see how the discourses on 
finance from the NGO actors cohered well with the global South governments' discourses, 
especially South Africa. 
 
The Environmental Affairs Minister, Edna Molewa, contributed Op-Ed articles also to City Press 
and attempted to promote the official government position of doing nothing without the provision 
of climate finance. In an Op-Ed “COP21: SA needs help to reduce emissions,” (Edna Molewa, 
City Press, 13 December 2015), the country needed “help [finance]to reduce emissions”. Climate 
finance was a central issue at the Paris talks: “One of the central issues throughout COP21 
negotiations in Paris has been the provision of climate finance to enable developing countries to 
enhance their ambitions of reducing carbon emissions pre-2020.” Molewa discursively constructed 
South Africa as a developing country “particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change”. 




to diminish and silence debates around South Africa’s climate change responsibilities as a key 
greenhouse gas emitter globally. It helped to create a sense of sympathy and generalised South 
Africa into a bunch of poor countries who have no role to play and are just victims of risks created 
elsewhere.  
 
To further cover up the discussion of South African emissions, Molewa entrenched her narrative 
within the adaptation discourse to flag away links to the South African emissions. An entrenchment 
of adaptation stretched the representation of South Africa as a passive victim and thus passivised 
present emissions that must be reduced with or without climate finance. For Molewa, adaptation 
needed urgent attention: “adaptation should, of necessity, receive equal priority with mitigation”. 
For adaptation to be successful the Paris “agreement must affirm this obligation of developed 
countries to provide climate finance that is additional, predictable and sustainable”. South Africa, 
Molewa argued, was “a developmental state” with “a duty … to advance socio-economic 
development and transformation to better the lives of all our people” - thus “Our national efforts, 
notwithstanding, scaling up efforts by developing countries such as ours requires financial 
investment, the deployment of new and innovative technologies and enhanced capacity for 
effective implementation”. 
The Environmental Affairs Minister Edna Molewa, in the article “Implementing the Paris climate 
agreement calls for big money,” (Mail & Guardian, 21 October 2016)  praised the signing of the 
Paris Accord at COP21 in 2015 but warned that South Africa needed “big money” to implement 
it. In the article, Molewa, through nominalisation and passivisation, attempted to foreground the 
need for finance from developed global North countries and does not mention or discuss South 
Africa’s present culpability in emissions and the responses thereof. Molewa constructed South 
Africa as a passive victim of climate change in need of aid. South Africa and the developing 
countries in general, could only scale up their Paris agreement ambitions provided there was 
monetary assistance: “The reality is that developing countries can only scale up their climate action 
efforts with significant investment.” The global North countries, in Molewa’s view, were supposed 






In the Sunday Times Op-Ed “Let us keep the impetus on climate action,” (23 October 2016), 
Environmental Affairs Minister Edna Molewa celebrated the multilateral United Nations process 
celebrated for agreeing to the Paris Agreement. The Paris accord was constructed as a victory for 
the planet: “It is a victory for climate action”. However, notwithstanding the construction of the 
Paris agreement as a success, Molewa argued that without South Africa was unable to take climate 
action under the auspices of the Paris Agreement without assistance from the global North: “South 
Africa requires funding from international sources as well as a greater role by the private sector if 
it wants to attain its climate change objectives”. The referral to a “greater role by the private sector” 
set the tone for market-led response instruments, especially private finance capital. The 
entrenchment of climate responses within neoliberal discourses is achieved. The ‘greater role by 
the private sector’ moralised the neoliberal interventions. For Molewa, “the issue of climate 
finance is critical”. Molewa constructed South Africa, not as an economy in transition, but 
essentially as a developing country: “The reality is that developing countries such as South Africa 
can only scale up their climate action efforts with significant investments”. The Paris Accord could 
only be implemented upon the provision of finance. The finance was “to enable developing 
countries to meet the costs of adaptation to, and mitigation of the effects of climate change”. 
Molewa, in stressing the need for finance, saw adaptation as more crucial than anything else. To 
moralise the call for adaptation finance, Molewa drew upon the impacts of climate change on 
South Africa: “Like many other countries on the continent, South Africa is semi-arid, with less 
than 5% of annual rainfall available to recharge our groundwater aquifers”. She gave more 
examples of impacts such as extreme weather, impacts on health etc. “Scaling up the provision of 
climate financing is critical if we are to meet the long-term objectives of the Paris Agreement”. 
 
Interesting in Edna Molewa’s article is that she does not deal with the aspect of climate change 
mitigation. While there is a thin line that South Africa was investing heavily in mitigation efforts, 
the entire article went on to construct South Africa (equated with the rest of Africa and developing 
poor countries) as a passive victim of climate change. The attempt to universalise the aspect of 
poverty and ‘developing’ country achieves the discursive agenda of constructing South Africa as 




Africa’s high emission ratios globally and manages to delete a discussion on the need for South 
Africa to act in curbing emissions. 
Climate finance was so central during the climate change negotiations under the timeframe of this 
study. Between 2011 and 2018, the issue of climate finance remained an evasive yet central 
concern for the global South negotiators. The media construction of climate finance centrality was 
consistent. News stories reproduced the need for climate finance as a moral imperative. Yolandi 
Groenewald noted that: “Money is a major sticking point in international talks about addressing 
climate change” (Mail & Guardian, 14 December 2018) because the global South countries were 
not willing to “start planning their transformation into green economies until they knew how much 
money they will receive from rich countries”. The South African position on the need for climate 
finance is seen as a firm one: “South Africa has been firm that it can’t meet its promises made in 
Paris in 2015 to decarbonise its economy if it doesn’t receive financial aid”.  
7.3.5 Representing uncertainty 
Newspapers often constructed climate change negotiations with pessimism. Within this regulatory 
pessimistic discourse, political actors handling the negotiations were portrayed, most often, as self-
interested and uninterested in addressing the climate change problem. This portrayal was mostly 
applied to actors from the global North, whom most news stories saw as roadblocks to a globally 
and legally binding climate deal. For example, in the story “Success of summit remains uncertain,” 
by Peter Fabricius (Sunday Independent, 27 November 2011), the prospects of COP17 reaching a 
deal were gloomy. The headline of the story is pessimistic about the prospects about COP17 
becoming a success: “Success of summit remains uncertain.” For Fabricius, the pessimism also 
concerned the need for the operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund and securing a second 
Kyoto commitment period: “even the adoption of the Green Climate Fund, the minimum 
achievement expected, has now been cast in doubt”. The story made it simple and expected that 
the Green Climate Fund and the second Kyoto Protocol commitment period were to be 
operationalised and extended: “More ambitious expectations such as keeping alive the Kyoto or 
agreeing to a much broader legally binding treaty which commits all major emitters of carbon to 





Fundamental in the story is how the author assumed and concluded that these were the expectations 
of everyone. What the story is representing as ‘everyone’s’ expectations, are essentially the 
expectations of the South African political and climate elites. The success of these meant a 
diplomatic success for South Africa on the international scene. The South African foreign policy 
and pride were more important than any concern for nature. Maite Nkoana-Mashabane was quoted 
cementing the view that the Green Climate Fund was more of a political project than an 
environmental case: “The Green Climate Fund represents a centrepiece of a broader set of 
outcomes for Durban”. The Green Climate Fund was important for South Africa because “it will 
help finance the efforts of poor countries to mitigate and adapt to the effects of global warming”. 
This moral role of the fund made South Africa’s clamour for its adoption, a necessary moral duty. 
However, it should be argued that while the fund was thought to be the “centrepiece”, the 
involvement of private international capital is not questioned. The impact of the fund in extending 
the debt, inequalities and further making vulnerable the economies of the global South to debt 
from the global North is silent. The adoption of the fund and the preservation of the Kyoto process 
are constructed as views and aspirations of ‘everyone’ except those against nature. Left 
unquestioned are the consequences of the solutions on social and environmental inequality and 
justice. The story reproduced the Kyoto Protocol and the Green Climate Fund as necessary and 
progressive responses to climate change, hence failure to agree on these meant the summit would 
have been a failure. 
 
The theme of uncertainty is also found in the Sunday Independent story, “Climate deal a few years 
away,” (Eleanor Momberg, 11 December 2011). Governments at COP17 were constructed as self-
centred because they were failing to come up with “a legally binding global treaty that would save 
the world from an environmental catastrophe”. The failure was a failure of South Africa’s 
diplomatic efforts at a global multilateral level. The failure went against President Jacob Zuma’s 
call to “save tomorrow today” through “an accord that would force rich nations to cut carbon 
emissions while financially aiding poor nations mitigate and adapt to climate change or a second 
commitment to the Kyoto Protocol”. Zuma’s call for emissions reductions to be done in the global 
North is reproduced as common sense. Connotatively, such a call was made in the context of the 




nations are responsible) worked in diminishing the calls for economies in transition such as South 
Africa to take responsibility for present emissions. Further, the consistent call for a second Kyoto 
Protocol commitment period also helped in helping South Africa continue with business-as-usual 
industrial emissions since South Africa, a non-Annexure 1 country, is not obliged to reduce its 
emissions as it is categorised as a poor country. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which South Africa 
sought to extend, would have passivised and nominalised the need for economies in transition to 
curb their emissions.  
 
The article geo-politically saw the historically responsible global North as having the 
responsibility to reduce emissions and fund mitigation and adaptation in the global South. South 
Africa had hoped to persuade the global North to agree to an accord. However, part of the failure 
of the Durban negotiations arose out of the request by the developed countries for economies in 
transition to commit and do more to cut their present emissions. The global North is blamed in the 
story for stalling the talks. “Instead, the developed world, through the EU, appeared to have won 
the day with most countries supporting their idea of a carbon emission reduction agreement that 
would be designed and finalised by 2015”. The blame is apportioned on the global North and the 
global South is represented as having approached the negotiations innocently. Missing from the 
argument is what the global South economies in transition had offered to reduce their emissions 
that are presently responsible for global warming. The article highlights the discord and mistrust 
that characterised COP17 negotiations. Deep divisions emerged between the United States, India, 
China on one side with South Africa, Brazil and Small Island Nations on the other. 
 
The bickering among nations during COP17 climate change negotiations in Durban are exposed 
in the story, “COP17 threatened by delays,” (Peter Fabricius, Sunday Independent, 11 December 
2011). The European was represented as a progressive global actor because of “its conditional 
proposal to keep the Kyoto Protocol alive if other big greenhouse gas emitters such as the US, 
China, India, and Brazil, which are not bound by Kyoto, agree in Durban to start negotiating a new 
treaty that would bind them too”. However, these good gestures from the European Union were 
being met with reluctance from “the US, China and India ... to commit themselves to such legal 




China and the US to a legally binding second Kyoto commitment period that would limit their 
economic activity.  
 
Similar to other Op-Eds in the Sunday Independent, Liz Clarke’s article, “Gloom and doom hang 
in the air at climate talks,” (Sunday Independent, 04 December 2011) represented the uncertainty 
that characterised the climate change negotiations happening in Durban. The article was sceptical 
that the talks in Durban would produce anything tangible. For Liz Clarke, it was all “gloom and 
doom”. Clarke portrayed the politicians, “world’s polluters,” gathered in Durban as people 
pursuing their selfish national interests and “playing Russian roulette with human existence” 
despite the warnings from scientists that the “world teeters on point of no return”. The article used 
scientific instrumentalisation to call out the selfish interests of the politicians negotiating. The 
reliance on scientific instrumentalisation unintentionally depoliticised the climate story by 
constructing science as unquestionable and beyond criticism. The reliance on science excluded the 
cultural politics of climate change and attention to the political-economic logic underpinning the 
selfish interests of individual countries is diminished: “The bottom line, hammered home by every 
scientist on the planet, was that if humans don’t put the brakes on dirty fossil fuel emissions … 
life as we know it will come to an end”. The divisions and bickering characterising COP17 are 
exposed in the article: 
Main players in this planetary tug of war are the polluters doing everything in their power 
to defer any meaningful agreements on dirty business to the next COP and the next. Next 
door are green engineers pushing for alternative energy, from windmills, to water, nuclear 
to natural gas. 
 
Notwithstanding wide support for the United Nations multilateral climate governance systems, 
some news reports depicted pessimism towards multilateralism. For example, the story “A climate 
for change,” (Siphesihle Mthembu, City Press, 04 December 2011), relied on artistes gathered in 
Durban in December 2011 for discourse definition. The central theme in the story was the role of 
art and artistes in climate responses. The artistes “from across the globe are in Durban to make 
sure COP17 is more than a talkshop”. The statement implied that the official United Nations 
gathering was simply a “talkshop” with no results coming out to save the planet. The meeting of 
the artistes became a platform to delegitimise the United Nations multilateral system and an 




converging as part of “a civil society climate conference”. Angus Joseph from Durban Knights 
(organisers of the art exhibition) was quoted arguing: “It’s important for us to speak directly to 
people so that they can join the call for immediate action.” By way of opposition, Joseph 
constructed the United Nations COP17 as a gathering that did not involve or include people. He 
described it as a “conference of polluters”. 
 
Yolandi Groenewald’s story, “COP17 dithers as earth withers,” (City Press, 11 December 2011), 
expressed disappointment at the slow pace of negotiations and the likely on the deal outcome. The 
headline expressed this disappointment: “COP17 dithers as earth withers”. The failure to reach an 
agreement would be embarrassing for South Africa’s diplomatic status: “SA will have egg on its 
face if the event ends without a solid agreement”. The only hope expressed in the story was for 
COP17 to adopt the green climate fund operational mechanism. The text produced at the talks was 
described as “weak”. Sam Smith (World Wide Fund for Nature) is indirectly represented arguing 
that “the text available yesterday had not gone far enough to keep the global temperature rise under 
the necessary 2oC”. In the same story, Kumi Naidoo of Greenpeace saw the negotiations deadlock 
as a victory for “the carbon cartels [who] will once more be drinking champagne and dancing in 
the streets of Durban tonight - job done, business as usual”. 
 
The story’s “Can COP17 forge global consensus?” (Lucky Biyase, Sunday Times, 27 November 
2011) the headline was sceptical that a globally binding climate deal could be reached in Durban. 
This pessimism was because “climate change [was] low on agenda in face of the world’s economic 
woes”. A deal was impossible because of deviant and environmentally irresponsible actors such 
as the United States and China. Shaun Nel, from BDO Consulting, was directly represented 
labelling the United States and China as lacking the will “to commit to targets”. Richard 
Worthington from WWF for Nature is also quoted promoting the scepticism. The climate change 
negotiations are constructed as being held back by the United States, China and other vested 
interests domestically: “hurdles at the conference will stem from the reluctance of the US to 
embrace a multilateral approach, its opposition to any binding agreement and its apparent refusal 
to stop free-riding on the efforts of others to avert climate catastrophe”. The global North is 




represented in the story criticising the global North political leaders of being selfish and 
unconcerned about the environment: “Politicians in the developed, western world are hanging on 
to their jobs by their fingertips, and very few ruling parties of today will still be in power in five 
years’ time”. The global North is represented in the news media as the impediments to successful 
climate change negotiations. The global North, blamed for historical responsibility but unwilling 
to act, is dichotomously represented in opposition to the global South that was not historically 
responsible, likely to suffer more but willing to act. The global South is universalised, even 
countries with high emissions whose economies are fast developing are bundled together as poor 
and passive victims of global warming and climate change. 
 
Lucky Biyase’s construction of climate change negotiations along the pessimism and uncertainty 
planes continued throughout the duration of COP17. In the story “COP17 deal unlikely amid 
uncertainty,” (Sunday Times, 04 December 2011), the headline shows the Sunday Times was 
sceptical and uncertain about COP17 reaching any global climate agreement: “COP17 deal 
unlikely amid uncertainty”. The negotiators at COP17 were constructed as self-interested: 
“Fighting climate change is a sideshow in the minds of those at the Conference of Parties when 
their political survival is at stake.” Canada was labelled and delegitimised: “Canada has indicated 
that it will not commit itself to a second Kyoto period after 2012 unless the world’s biggest emitters 
such as China, the US agree to an internationally binding deal”. South Africa is constructed as a 
progressive and responsible country that sought a fair deal. Tasneem Essop was directly 
represented arguing that “Countries like South Africa that play a progressive and facilitative role 
in trying to find a common good to find solutions are also those that understand that climate effects 
will incur major costs”. Within this construction, the global North was represented as not 
progressive and irresponsible. The global North was oppositionally constructed against the global 
South that is responsible and caring.  
 
Rene Vollgraaff’s story “Scepticism about COP17 deal,” (Sunday Times, 31 July 2011) shed light 
on the pessimistic attitude that some people had towards COP17 producing a global climate deal. 
The headline is reinforced by the lead paragraph that noted that “there is much scepticism about 




Industry Strategic Business Unit at the Industrial Development Corporation, reinforcing the 
scepticism: “We have not really seen much happening subsequent to other such events”. Faith in 
the United Nations multilateral system was diminished and a call towards minilateral and unilateral 
action was made.  
Similar to the frustrations expressed in the Sunday Independent and Sunday Times in 2011, the 
Mail & Guardian in 2013 produced stories that showed disappointment and frustration with the 
international climate negotiations. This disappointment is manifest in stories such as “Bonn-fire 
of vanities,” (Michelle Nel, Mail & Guardian, 06 June 2013). In this story, the newspaper 
discourse showed disappointment with the lack of action and progress in the international global 
climate change negotiations, especially the failure to secure a binding global climate deal and a 
mechanism to operationalise a second Kyoto Protocol commitment period as envisaged under the 
Durban Platform. “International negotiations to build a successor to Kyoto continued in Bonn in 
May. But, is the process just a tedious, expensive talk shop to fiddle with documents while the 
planet burns?”. “Negotiations for a new protocol to reduce carbon emissions have been slow but 
temperatures continue to rise”. Despite the frustrations with the failure to find common ground, 
crucial to note however, is that the article saw and constructed the global multilateral system as 
the natural and best platform to address the climate change crisis: “One of the achievements of the 
COP17 climate change meeting in Durban in 2011 was an agreement by countries to establish a 
binding global treaty for emissions reductions by 2025”. The story directly represented the 
UNFCCC’s Christiana Figueres warning that the “recent record levels of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere should prompt governments to take climate change seriously”. The allusion to 
increased temperatures amid slow or non-productive negotiations was used to paint the political 
systems as pursuing selfish interests at the expense of the environment. Tasneem Essop of WWF 
for Nature is directly represented expressing the same disappointment in the negotiations: “The 
underlying political barriers - for example, north versus south will still exist and will probably re-
emerge as the real negotiations take place up to 2015”. Ferrial Adam of Greenpeace Africa was 
quoted also expressing disappointment: “The negotiations are moving extremely slowly”.  
In the story, South Africa is portrayed as a villain and a stumbling block to emissions reduction 




that “South Africa, as one of the biggest emitters of CO2, should play a leading role” and criticised 
the construction of “two of the biggest coal-fired power stations in the world and declaring coal a 
strategic resource bodes poorly for South Africa’s commitments, and is disappointing given that 
Africa will be on the frontline of climate change impacts”. Further, Bob Scholes from CSIR also 
expressed disappointment noting that: “The rate at which countries are agreeing to reduce their 
greenhouse emissions- and then actually doing it is currently far too slow to avoid a global 
temperature rise.” Similarly, the South African government’s continued investment in coal was 
demoralised and delegitimised as irresponsible:  
South Africa is building two massive coal-fired plants at Kusile and Medupi (the world’s 
third and fourth-largest), opening an anticipated 40 new coal mines in spite of scandalous 
local air and water pollution, and claiming that more ‘carbon space’ to pollute the air and 
thus threaten future generations is required for ‘development’ (Patrick Bond, “SA reps at 
climate talks ‘are letting us down’,” Sunday Independent, 06 February 2011). 
 
The sub-theme of representing COP negotiations pessimism and uncertainty found space also in 
the Sunday Times. Happy Khambule’s Op-Ed “COP has negotiated all my life. Now close the 
gap,” (Sunday Times, 21 November 2013) saw the negotiations as a site of geopolitical struggle 
between the global North and the south: “developed countries have insisted that the mitigation gap 
should be addressed based on what they call Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and 
Respective Capabilities, which includes the role of developing countries in addressing the present 
gap”. The author expressed a loss of hope in the COP process due to delays in reaching a globally 
binding climate deal: “You have negotiated all my life. How much more time do you need?”. 
 
The story “Climate is changing. So must we,” (Ufrieda Ho, Sunday Times, 18 November 2015) 
expressed pessimism on the COP processed which it described as dysfunctional. The headline 
“Climate is changing. So must we” called attention to the need for a global climate deal that took 
concern of the affected people. The negotiations and global politicians were represented as 
restrained by their selfish interests: “For global leaders the big push has come in the form of the 
UN Conference of the Parties processes, but they are already 21 years old and still the talking 
continues”. Collen Vogel (from the Wits University Global Change and Sustainability Institute) 




over the past 21 years has been COP Copenhagen in 2009, when we failed to get firm commitments 
to emissions reduction.” 
 
For Ufrieda Ho, COP meetings were only going to be successful if there were “hard and fast 
emission cuts and real penalties for transgressors”. Contrary to the dominant bi-polar distinctions 
that consistently blamed the global North for stalling climate action, Bobby Peek (an 
environmentalist) criticised fast-developing economies in the global South for consistent refusal 
to cut emissions using the “right to pollute” premise.  
Countries such as China, India and South Africa are hiding behind their poor and claiming 
they need more Medupis and Kusiles [coal-fired power stations] but they are actually not 
getting energy to the poor. The North has outsourced its carbon emissions to us and our 
spineless politicians have accepted this at the expense of the poor. The poor have become 
poorer and there is an increase in global poverty and inequality (Ufrieda Ho, “Climate is 
changing. So must we,” Sunday Times, 18 November 2015). 
Sipho Kings’ feature article, “Africa will burn after timid talks,” (Mail & Guardian, 11 December 
2015), represented the Paris COP21 negotiations as chaotic and with little chances of success. The 
headline of the article “Africa will burn after timid talks” showed disappointment and pessimism 
on the negotiations. Africa was thus constructed as a victim of “timid talks” whose results 
“guarantees that the Earth will be 3o C hotter this century”. Kings had faith in and endorsed the 
green economy ideology. “Spend some money now on greener economy which in itself will drive 
a whole new industry - or spend a whole lot more dealing with the damage a changing climate will 
do to the economy”. The neoliberal ideology in Kings’ article was also supported by the 
endorsement of multilateral neoliberal Kyoto Protocol. Kings argued that the UNFCCC’s “first 
success was the Kyoto Protocol in 1997”. Kyoto, as has been shown in this study, is one of the 
worst instruments in addressing climate change because it subjects nature to profit dictates through 
the commodification and financialisation of nature.   
 
The BASIC group are constructed as refusing to be environmentally responsible because “they 
sought to defend their high-coal development pathways. Led by China, it [BASIC] sank COP15 
in Copenhagen in 2009”. The structure of the Paris Agreement proposal, Kings argued, does 
“enough to keep global warming to just below 3oC this century” which in itself “is catastrophic”. 




countries such as Saudi Arabia” were vilified as seeking “the weakest agreement possible to secure 
their oil revenues” together with the BASIC group “which wants to avoid responsibility for their 
growing emissions, while still getting funding from developed countries to adapt to climate 
change”. Developing countries were represented as passive victims of climate change: “the poorest 
and most vulnerable countries, such as island states … are already suffering from climate change”.  
 
The European Union was portrayed as a responsible negotiator: “Europe and most developing 
countries want an agreement that keeps the world less than 1.5o C hotter”. The goodwill from 
Europe was being scuppered by the: 
Basic group [which] largely rejects this [review of INDCs every five years] - particularly 
India, which is going through a boom in coal-fired power generation. The group is instead 
focused on the Green Climate Fund, which developed countries set up the Copenhagen 
COP to disburse 4100-billion a year in climate funding (Sipho Kings’, “Africa will burn 
after timid talks,” Mail & Guardian, 11 December 2015). 
The theme of representing negotiations uncertainty is found across the study period 2011 to 2018. 
In the story, “COP24 ignores dire climate warnings,” (Yolandi Groenewald, Mail & Guardian, 18 
December 2018), COP24 was portrayed as a failure because it could not get “nations to commit 
themselves to cut their emissions even further to save the world”. The United States, Kuwait, 
Russia and Saudi Arabia are constructed as the villain Parties who “worked hard to bury the report 
(IPCC’s Climate Report) … countries such as the US, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Australia and Brazil 
had clearly shown that they were not prepared to do what they said they would”. The headline of 
the story “COP24 ignores dire climate warning” constructed politicians as selfish and not pursuing 
goals meant to save the planet. The story used South African negotiators and actors from the NGOs 
as discourse definers. The countries that were stumbling blocks were represented dichotomously 
with nations trying to do something about the environment. South Africa was represented as a key 
global climate player that was interested in saving the world: “the rulebook negotiations threatened 
to end in a stalemate, but some political manoeuvring, which the South African delegation helped 




7.3.6 South Africa and climate diplomacy 
The news media managed to portray South Africa as a key actor during global climate change 
negotiations, especially in 2011 (COP17 in Durban) and 2015 (COP21 in Paris). This kind of 
representation was entrenched by reproducing the views from the Ministers of Environmental 
Affairs and International Relations and ambassadors. The Ministers and government officials also 
often published Op-Eds in newspapers that constructed South Africa positively in global climate 
governance.  
 
In Sabelo Ndlangisa’s story “Norway hopeful before climate talks,” (City Press, 04 September 
2011), South Africa and Norway were represented as progressive countries who sought progress 
in climate talks. They were climate champions whose work was being disturbed by the 
irresponsible actions of “Major world economies such as Japan, India, the US and China” who 
were “reluctant to make far-reaching commitments”. The othering and labelling of these ‘other’ 
countries created a bi-polar reading of ‘us’ the good against ‘them’ environmentally immoral and 
irresponsible who are selfish and “reluctant” to act against climate change. The othering helped in 
nominalising and passivising the present role of South Africa in greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
In the article, “SA lauded for significant role in Paris climate change agreement,” (Edna Molewa, 
Sunday Independent, 07 February 2016) the Environmental Affairs Minister encouraged South 
Africa to “be proud of the role played by the entire [negotiations] delegation”. South Africa is 
constructed as a force to be reckoned with: “South Africa played an active and leading role as part 
of the Africa group” and its “solid reputation and negotiating capabilities in diplomatic circles” 
was proven at COP21. This deal was achieved, in Molewa’s construction, partly through the 
chairing of the G77+China and because of their role, the South African negotiating delegates were 
“lauded by the COP21 French presidency and other parties for our role in drawing together the 
diversity of positions of 136 countries towards a common goal”. South Africa was a good 
representative of the developing countries as it “played a pivotal role in ensuring that the 





7.3.7 Representing South Africa’s double standards 
While the South African government sought to portray an image of good environmental and global 
stewardship, discourse actors from environmental civil society groups and some academics called 
out the government for what they perceived to be double standards. These actors delegitimised 
South Africa’s international posture, arguing that actions at home were not in sync with 
environmental and climate change demands. Coal expansion was seen by these actors as 
retrogressive and worth abandoning. The Op-Ed, “SA reps at climate talks ‘are letting us down’,” 
by Patrick Bond (Sunday Independent, 06 February 2011) criticised South Africa’s proposals 
towards reducing emissions through “nuclear” and “carbon trading”. Bond criticised the neoliberal 
approaches that the South African government pursued arguing that they lacked credible 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. He described the South African Green Paper on climate 
change as ‘embarrassing’ because it promoted “two dangerous strategies - nuclear energy and 
carbon trading”. The negotiating teams from South Africa were accused in the article of “joining 
a contradictory movement of emerging economic powers that both want to retain Kyoto’s North-
South differentiation of responsibility to cut emissions and to either gut Kyoto’s binding targets or 
establish complicated, fraud-ridden offsets and carbon trades that would have the same effect”. 
Bond’s article also delegitimised the United Nations multilateral system that he described as a 
“Conference of Polluters”. Carbon trading, a neoliberal instrument under the Kyoto Protocol, was 
seen as a way of making profits at the expense of the climate. The economic modernisation and 
geoengineering approaches and the introduction of GMOs are seen as having the same effect, that 
of propelling capitalism and the ecological risks and health risks as well. 
 
Synonymous with criticisms on coal projects by Greenpeace and WWF for Nature, Patrick Bond 
“Eskom’s supply of the cheapest electricity in the world to two of the biggest mining/metals 
companies in the world (BHP Billiton and Anglo American Corporation)” as part of South Africa’s 
emissions problem. The policy to continue with the extraction of coal through the ‘development 
card’, thus, served “major corporations instead” of ordinary people. Bond attempted to demystify 
the lies in the government’s claims that local use was for development purposes because only the 
minerals-energy complex benefited and not the ordinary people. The interests of the minerals-
energy complex were being served by the government. Patrick Bond re-articulated the climate 




that they needed more coal usage for development purposes, rather, he began to link the desire for 
coal exploitation to the profit interests of the minerals-energy complex.  
 
In the Op-Ed, “COP17’s dirty secret: another failure will please certain South Africans,” (Sunday 
Independent, 27 November 2011,) Patrick Bond argued that South Africa’s interests in COP17 
were “grounded in the crony-capitalist minerals-energy complex”.  
Although Pretoria claims a desire for the Kyoto Protocol’s extension after 2012, this 
appears a rhetorical gambit to bait-and switch on the other African delegates, now holed 
up at the Hilton, because satisfying both Washington and Beijing also ensures our elites’ 
prosperity (Patrick Bond, “COP17’s dirty secret: another failure will please certain South 
Africans,” Sunday Independent, 27 November 2011) .  
 
For Bond, the neoliberal climate change responses favoured by South Africa would benefit South 
Africa’s elite. “A good measure of our economic elites’ addiction to fossil fuels is carbon intensity 
per capita unit of output, and we have among the world's highest, far worse than even that great 
climate Satan, the US”. Bond built a biographical picture of all the things that showed South 
Africa’s insecurity when it comes to emissions reduction: (a) R250- billion-plus worth of coal-
fired electricity generators being built by Eskom at Medupi and Kusile (b) The continued operation 
and expansion of Sasol’s gasification plant at Secunda in Mpumalanga (c) Approval of 40 (forty) 
new coal mines in Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo and (d) The one-trillion rand 
nuclear project. 
 
7.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter built a historical representational overview on how the South African news media 
represented climate change negotiations between 2011 and 2018. The negotiations were a major 
feature in the news media coverage and representation of climate change. The negotiations were 
represented and constructed as a site of geopolitical contestation and struggle between the 
developed global North and the developing global South. The global North was predominantly 
constructed as a blockade and stalling the achievement of a globally binding climate change deal. 
The North was constructed as selfish, unwilling to honour their historical responsibility and truant. 
The developing global South was represented as a passive victim of climate change. The global 
North was ‘othered’ and was to bear the cost of emissions reduction and adaptation because they 




‘historical responsibility’ is emphasised, there is silence on ‘present responsibility’ which is more 
crucial and where South Africa is a key culprit. Geopolitics in the news was achieved by othering 
the global North as ‘villains’ while the global South is constructed as ‘victims’ whose agency in 

























Chapter Eight: Contradictory National Discourses: The Political Economy of 
Climate Change and Energy in South African 
8.1 Introduction 
This study observes that any understanding of climate change mitigation discourses in South 
Africa should involve a deeper appreciation of the political economy of energy in the country. The 
social formations/blocs with vested interests in energy hold much influence on climate change 
decision-making and policy direction. The South African energy ‘futures’ (energy mix) terrain is 
a key feature of the news media representations of climate change and global warming. Future 
energy choices have a bearing on whether the country will be able to meet its obligations on 
emissions reductions and decarbonise its industry. Climate change discourses in South Africa are 
intertwined with energy discourses. Fundamentally, any climate mitigation action is linked to the 
country’s energy complex. The climate and energy discourses intersect, at some moments, as allies 
and at some as adversaries. Climate mitigation requires a reduction in emissions, mostly from the 
energy industry and thus, discursive and policy conflicts are inevitable. This chapter presents the 
analyses and interpretation of climate change mitigation debates as they permeated the South 
African news media, identifying the critical discourses on mitigation and energy and linking 
discourses to the vested interests of the actors that promoted them. Discourses on coal 
indispensability, nuclear optimism and shale gas optimism are a preserve of the minerals-energy 
complex, the Department of Energy (DoE) and that of Mineral Resources, the beneficiaries of any 
developments in those sectors. The actors from these sectors and institutions used the discursive 
strategies of moralisation and economisation to moralise the ‘need’ for South Africa to use coal 
because the country was still ‘developing’ and thus coal was necessary for economic growth and 
international trade competitiveness. These actors also promoted the oxymoron of ‘clean coal’.  
 
Oppositional discourses (coal, nuclear and shale gas diffidence) competed for discursive 
signification in the news media representations of the South African energy futures. Actors from 
environmental non-governmental organisations and academics mainly sponsored the oppositional 
discourses. In expressing opposition to coal, shale gas and nuclear, these actors promoted the 
Promethean techno-renewable energy optimism. At some moments, their discourses converged 




that sought to steer South Africa towards ‘renewable-energy’ green growth. The Promethean 
discourses re/constructed climate change as a problem that could be fixed through technology, 
techno-managerial strategies and market-led initiatives.  
 
These discourses naturalised geoengineering and green capitalism. They conceptualised (to draw 
from Pepermans & Maeseele 2018, p.642) “nature (including the climate) as a resource that can 
be mastered through unlimited scientific and technological progress and economic growth” (see 
also Foster 2010). Economic growth (wealth) and mitigating the climate change risks were seen 
as complementary and compatible through technological innovation and market activities (the 
carbon market system).  
 
In discussing the energy and climate change mitigation discourses, it is essential to point out that 
discourses and knowledge are constitutive. The discourses that get salience can shape knowledge 
and resultantly also human cognition and the conceptualisation and framing of climate change by 
the discourse consumers. Knowledge, this study argues, is a result of discourse and discursive 
hegemony of some knowledge(s) over others. The knowledge(s)/ideologies in discourse are 
socially constructed by the journalists and the knowledge/social actors who define issues and 
subjects from their tribal ontologies. This argument is reinforced by the example given by Tor 
Halvorsen (2017, p.7) when discussing the relationship between knowledge production and 
creation of social systems that do not favour the majority. Halvorsen observed that during the 
apartheid era in South Africa “lawyers, social scientists and biblical scholars, in particular, formed 
an alliance [articulation] with the ruling party. Together they reinforced the foundations of 
colonialism and created the ideology of apartheid, which legalised and justified racial repression 
and exploitation” (Halvorsen 2017, p.17).  
 
Similar to Halvorsen’s (2017) argument, the representatives of the minerals-energy complex, the 
government, the financial industry representatives formed an alliance that culminated in the 
ideologies of ‘self-preservation’ through pursuing coal for ‘developmental purposes’ and that of 




through neoliberalism would reduce social-internal inequalities and lead to a cleaner and liveable 
environment (Halvorsen 2017, p.17).  
 
Tor Halvorsen (2017) argued that the  
ethical challenge is to find a way out of the contemporary growth paradigm [neoliberalism], 
which creates wealth for a few at the great cost to nature and the poor while insisting that 
wealth will eventually trickle down to everyone if we all seek economic growth. Despite 
much evidence that shows this to be false, a blind faith in the relationship between free 
trade and widespread prosperity continues to be proclaimed (p.15). 
 
While concern has been placed on discourse, Halvorsen’s argument indirectly but more 
importantly saw knowledge as indispensable in social evolution trajectories. What at times, has 
been missed, are the consequences of knowledge and the contributions of those who created those 
knowledge(s). Halvorsen argued that the producers of knowledge have had tremendous power in 
shaping the world, and he drew references from those who wrote and supported white racism in 
the United States and the culmination of Donald Trump as a result of actions of knowledge 
producers of almost a century ago. Inferences are also drawn from Germany. Drawing from 
Halvorsen’s conceptualisation of knowledge and the power of knowledge producers, this study 
brings in his important views into the study of discourse. Influenced by Halvorsen’s ideas, this 
study argues that discourse is identical to knowledge and ideology. As Halvorsen (2017, p.17) 
noted: “the real challenge facing the world is a global economy that promises prosperity for all, 
while, in fact, destabilising the earth’s heat balance, causing mass extinctions and leaving more 
and more people vulnerable to poverty”. Capitalism through the exploitation of finite resources 
leads to the widening of the metabolic and ecological rifts. While it has been taken to be 
commonsensical to argue that capitalism and democracy all promote prosperity, a sharp warning 
from Angela Merkel (2014, 109 cited by Halvorsen 2017, p.20) is instructional and provides a 
basis for questioning how through the veil of democracy, neoliberal policies that favour the few in 
the minerals-energy complex and government have been possible:  
Capitalism and democracy follow different logics: unequally distributed property rights on 
the one hand, equal civic and political rights on the other, profit-oriented trade within 
capitalism in contrast to the search for the common good within democracy; debate, 
compromise and majority decision-making within democratic politics versus hierarchical 





The logic of coal, nuclear and renewable energy, all aspire to satisfy the interests of the few 
business and economic elites at the expense of the poor. The news media stories analysed show 
that the aspects of coal, nuclear and renewable energy were constructed and packaged through 
interpellating the discourse subjects into believing that these discourses spoke about and on behalf 
of their interests. Hidden underneath the walls of ‘economic development,’ and the vulgar of 
‘sustainable development’ were the real beneficiaries of such neoliberal policies, all of which 
negatively bear on the human-nature relationships and are characterised by intensified exploitation 
of people and the environment. 
8.2 ‘Coal is indispensable in the South African Economy’: Dominant Discursive Voices 
The discourse on coal indispensability relied on strategies of rationalism, economisation, common 
sense and moralism. Coal was portrayed as ‘cheap’, ‘quick’, and the ‘best’, way to provide energy 
for development. The continued use of coal (whether ‘dirty’ or ‘clean’) served the political, 
economic, social and moral imperative of development and growth. The key actors (Eskom, coal-
mining companies, mining companies who benefit from cheap electricity, Sasol, and the 
government) propelled this discourse in the news media. While coal indispensability discourses 
found their way into the Sunday Independent, the Sunday Times and City Press, the entire sample 
frame from the Mail & Guardian did not have any story that promoted such a discourse. Coal 
indispensability was more prevalent and powerful in the Sunday Times, attached to renewable 





To try and intertextually respond to coal criticism, often the sponsors of the coal use discourse 
applied the oxymoron of ‘clean coal’9 as an appeasement strategy. The story “‘Clean’ coal for 
small carbon footprint,” (Christelle Terreblanche, Sunday Independent, 20 February 2011) is an 
example. The discourse actors, two ministers - Ebrahim Patel (Minister of Economic 
Development) and Enoch Godongwana (Deputy Minister, Economic Development) contended in 
the story that South Africa’s energy needs were enormous and while the government 
acknowledged the need for a transition towards renewables, the present energy needs called for 
continued coal use. Thus, a discourse benchmarked on the oxymoron of ‘clean coal’ is promoted. 
Ebrahim Patel defined the discourse arguing that South Africa would pursue a cleaner coal 
pathway as part of addressing the huge greenhouse gas emissions. The clean coal discourse was 
embedded within a worldview that sought to continue with coal exploitation if the technology for 
reducing emissions (at least a cover-up) was available. The continued coal exploitation was 
moralised by alluding to the need to vigorously pursue ‘economic development’. Enoch 
Godongwana, in a presentation to parliamentarians, was indirectly represented arguing that “the 
government was still not persuaded that renewable energy could be adequate for the base-load 
power supply needed to grow South Africa’s gross domestic product by 4.4 percent a year”.  
 
The government position thus promoted a pessimistic reading of the renewable energy discourses 
and constructed them as ‘unreliable in the meantime’. The views of the government ministers were 
reproduced and translated by the structure and language of the news story. The story took as fact, 
the claims made by Patel and Godongwana. Through the newspaper discourse, it was argued that 




9 Clean coal involves the use of technologies that seek to reduce the pollution caused by the burning of coal 
and its processes. The technology is based on carbon capture, flue-gas desulphurisation, fluid-bed 
combustion, integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC), low nitrogen burners and electrostatic 






the movement towards ‘clean coal’ was a solution to South Africa meeting its “commitment to 
drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions from its coal-dependent economy by 2025”.  
 
It is interesting that the newspaper’s own discourse constructed and imagined the possibility of 
‘clean coal’ as rational and posing as an alternative energy source. The newspaper discourse did 
not find it oxymoronic to write about the rhetoric of clean coal. This study maintains that coal is 
not clean - the clean coal discourse is a culmination of attempts by countries and fossil fuel 
companies to moralise and legitimise continued coal exploitation under the guise of the planetary 
scatology of ‘clean’.  The story used the discursive strategy of discourse translation by translating 
elite worldviews into common sense language. For example, in the lead paragraph, the story noted 
that “A move to an alternative ‘cleaner’ coal is on the cards as the government considers how to 
meet South Africa’s commitment to drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions from its coal-
dependent economy by 2025”. The need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions was made subservient 
to the need to grow the economy. Patel argued that “We have a major developmental challenge, as 
a country faced with enormous poverty and unemployment”. The continued use of coal, therefore, 
was a moral issue for the eradication of poverty and providing employment. Patel used language 
to bring everyone into his discourse. The use of personal pronouns such as “we” was meant to 
universalise the moral call for continued coal use because ‘all of us’ needed to develop the 
economy and create jobs. The use of clean coal was seen as an opportunity by Patel to “link our 
climate-change commitments and the fact of the economy’s coal base and the potential of the green 
economy”. Instead of abandoning coal completely, Patel argued that “the cheap coal method would 
have to be used as an incentive for South Africa’s entry into the renewables market” and “In the 
meantime, ‘gasification’ would help clean coal-driven power generation and reduce the country’s 
carbon footprint”.  
 
From the news story under analysis, it clear that South Africa sought to address climate change by 
putting any climate change actions under the subservience of the economic growth imperative. 
Solutions to climate change needed to be compatible with South Africa’s goal of attaining 
economic growth at all costs. Economic modernisation/Promethean solutions were given 




energy technology. Solutions to environmental concerns were to be sought in capitalist tendencies 
and geoengineering. Attempts were not made in the story to politicise the issue of emissions as an 
issue of capitalist risk culture. Economic development, loosely translated as endless accumulation 
and exploitation, was not questioned but solutions were sought from the very economic system at 
the heart of the ecological biospheric crises. The beneficiaries of continued coal exploitation, the 
minerals-energy complex, would continue to enjoy low electricity tariffs and pollute the earth. 
While the provision of electricity is constructed as a moral duty in the story, what is left 
unanswered is who benefits from coal in South Africa. The reliance on government sources 
rendered their worldviews common-sense and gained hegemonic discursive power.  
Similar to the Sunday Independent’s construction of coal as indispensable, the Sunday Times by 
far had more stories devoted towards coal centrality in the South African energy mix. René 
Vollgraaff’s story “Coal is best, cheapest options says Eskom boss,” (Sunday Times, 08 May 2011) 
is one of the stories that overtly and explicitly promoted the coal indispensability discourse. The 
headline “Coal is best, cheapest option says Eskom boss” was an endorsement/legitimation of the 
official dominant view. While it is agreed that efforts towards reducing emissions should be 
pursued, the Minister of Energy, Dipuo Peters, supported further coal use basing her views on the 
Integrated Resource Plan “which sets out power-generating plans for the next 20 years, [and] still 
includes a large percentage of coal-generated power”. The continued exploitation of coal was also 
promoted by the Eskom Chief Executive Officer, Brian Dames because there was “a massive 
energy issue on the continent” and to provide ‘light’ to the “dark continent”. 
By not questioning or providing alternative voices to those of Eskom and the government, the story 
essentially reproduced and naturalised the dominant views and ways of life, i.e., the 
indispensability of coal in South Africa’s development. By presenting coal use as viable and moral, 
it made sense to use coal “because it is still the cheapest and quickest option”. The discursive 
strategy of common sensing is also manifest in the story. Coal and nuclear make sense and are 
readily available. While the story does not discuss available alternatives, by affording Eskom and 
the government the primary definitional power of the energy futures of South Africa, their 
positions are accepted. The argument of the sources is juxtaposed against the ‘invisible calls’ for 




This study goes beyond the texts and establishes the context within which these discourses on coal 
indispensability and nuclear optimism gain discursive salience. The debates took place within the 
context of the World Economic Forum on Africa in Cape (micro context) and were umbrellaed by 
the evolving discussions on climate change, the need to reduce South Africa’s greenhouse gas 
emissions and the imminent COP17 in November to December of 2011. The government was at 
the time facing stiff criticism from environmental Non-governmental Organisations and academics 
on its continued coal projects in Mpumalanga and Limpopo (Kusile and Medupi) – projects which 
themselves stood as proof that the government had no plans to de-escalate coal-powered electricity 
generation. The views expressed by Eskom and the Minister of energy intertextually rebut such 
criticisms and by talking about envisaged clean energy projects, the dominant voices responded 
prospectively to any future criticisms against their actions. 
Common-sensing: We will use coal “because this is still the cheapest and quickest”. There are no 
better alternatives ‘now’ and coal “was the easiest and most efficient way to deal with energy 
scarcity” of the moment. The introduction of the aspect of “energy scarcity” plays a key role in the 
production of a moral code and duty-care to provide electricity (regardless of the source). What is 
absent from the story is the energy complex matrix in South Africa. While Eskom and the Minister 
construct coal as a way of providing energy to the people, concealed is the fact that energy and 
resources benefit the mining-energy complex more than ordinary people (Fine & Rustomjee 1996, 
McDonald 2009, Bond 2012, Weston 2012). The economic interests in coal are powerful. Key 
companies such as Exxaro are involved in the extraction of coal that they sell to Eskom. The 
argument is purely in the interests of the mining-energy complex camouflaged as a public good. 
By reproducing the state/official position, the Sunday Times story worked to reproduce dominant 
views on energy in South Africa. The interests and practices of the actors in the fossil energy 
industries and related organisations whose desire for the maintenance of the status quo are 
reproduced. However, their interests are concealed by the public idiom where the discursive 
strategy attempted to make a case for energy as a benefit for the people of South Africa and Africa. 
The consensus in the story is sought at a macro-continental level where Eskom extends its coal-
use morality claim to “we” – alluding to what Brian Dames called the “massive energy issue on 




trying to make a case for the need for further coal exploitation. Who is “we”? Dames begins to 
interpellate the entire continent: the need to exploit coal was not just a South African issue, but an 
issue facing ‘everyone’ in Africa. There is an implied and imagined ideological consensus within 
and outside of South Africa. The absence of alternative sources/views helped in presenting the 
views of Eskom and the government as the only available views closing out, by exclusion, any 
contrary worldviews that would likely politicise the discussion. 
The alliance between the government and the minerals-energy complex was reproduced through 
primary definitional power, common-sensing and the translation of official views into the public 
idiom. The continued use of coal was constructed as a public necessity because “only 30% of 
Africa’s one billion people had access to electricity” which accordingly was necessary because it 
“is impossible to improve education and health systems without power”. The entire story 
diminished the role of coal in the climate change debate and the primary definers saw coal (not as 
a source of emissions) but as a tool for ‘growth’, and ‘development’, in Africa. The attempt was 
to legitimise coal use and while conceding that there is a need for action, the present demands 
outweighed any climate change concerns. By so doing, the minerals-energy complex, its views 
and interests and practices are sustained and entrenched. 
Similar constructions of coal indispensability were prevalent in the Sunday Times. For example, 
the Op-Ed “Voetsek, Greenpeace - poor need jobs, food,” (Peter Delmar, Sunday Times, 07 
December 2011) argued that coal was indispensable in the South African economy. The headline 
expressed annoyance and despise towards environmental groups such as Greenpeace that opposed 
further coal use: “Voetsek, Greenpeace”. Coal was constructed positively because the “poor need 
jobs, food” and could not simply be done away with. “We’re burning coal and we damn well intend 
to keep burning the stuff until it runs out in 100 years’ time because we need energy and because 
we’re poor where a lot of people have no jobs and no food”. Environmental NGOs such as 
Greenpeace were ridiculed for opposing coal. For Delmar, these organisations opposed coal simply 
because they wanted to continue receiving donations: “Greenpeace doesn’t particularly care about 
facts - not nearly as much as it cares about relentlessly driving the agenda that keeps it in grants 
and donations”. Because South Africa is a poor and developing country, there was a need for 




for food and jobs. Drawing from Bond (2012), this study also argues that there is no guarantee that 
coal use leads to the betterment of ordinary people’s standards of living in South Africa. 
Inequalities have widened alongside increased coal use. Constructing coal exploitation in the 
language of the poor is meant to interpellate them and thus appear to be speaking for and from and 
on their behalf. The interests of the elite are translated into oral models, made to become part of 
the everyday general language of common people and thus achieve universal consent and 
consensus.  
The story “Emissions target impossible,” by Lucky Biyase (Sunday Times, 27 November 2011), 
used multiple sources to reproduce the discourse of coal indispensability and described President 
Jacob Zuma’s target of cutting emissions by 34% in 2020 and 45% by 2025 as “impossible”. 
Robbie Louw, from a carbon trading consultancy firm, Promethean, claimed: “The probability that 
this can be achieved is highly unlikely to almost impossible”. Dawie Roodt, an economist with the 
Efficient Group argued that coal was indispensable in the South African economy: “The reality is 
that we need cheap energy and coal is the only real alternative for now”. The rationale behind this 
construction is that South Africa needed cheap energy which could only be realised through coal 
in opposition to the ‘expensive’ other alternatives. Makwe Masilela from BP Bernstein also 
supported the coal indispensability discourse, noting that: “Not only does coal provide electricity, 
but it is also an essential fuel for steel and cement production, and other industrial activities”. This 
construction of coal made it appear as a necessity and any discussions to get rid of coal were 
therefore not rational and defied common sense. The basis of this discourse was cheap energy and 
other industrial uses of coal. As part of ideological disagreement, the story quoted World Wide 
Fund (WWF) for Nature’s Richard Worthington in support of Zuma’s pledges because they were 
“a reduction against business-as-usual baseline, not an absolute emissions reduction”. 
 
Loni Prinsloo’s story “Third coal-fired power station looms,” (Sunday Times, 20 November 2011) 
was in support of a third coal-fired power station, notwithstanding, as the story conceded, 
“government’s recent commitments to a less carbon-intensive economy”. The new coal-fired 
power station, the newspaper discourse averred, could “be the only feasible option to ensure short-
term power supply for South Africa”. Coal was, therefore, an ‘a necessary evil’ providing short-




was directly quoted arguing that “an honest assessment of the targets to reduce carbon emissions 
indicate that building a third-coal fired power station is probably the best way to meet the country’s 
short-term energy needs”. For Robinson, coal-fired power stations were not only cheaper, but 
reliable because “coal-powered technology has been proven, while nuclear is still uncertain and 
both nuclear and renewables are deemed expensive”.  
 
Ideological disagreement was enabled in the story by including Greenpeace’s climate change 
campaigner Melita Steele. Steele criticised coal as expensive and dirty: “Coal-based electricity is 
unsustainable, polluting and socially devastating. What we need is investment in clean and 
sustainable power infrastructure”. However, the structure of the story helped to reproduce the 
views of Ken Robinson whom the story afforded the primary definitional power and agenda-
setting. The placement of Melita Steele’s views at the end of the story may well have worked to 
passivise and diminish the worldviews expressed. The representation of coal indispensability at 
the beginning gave the discourse the discursive power and entrenchment. It became a superior 
discourse and the ideology it carried was given legitimacy and supremacy. 
 
Consistent with its 2011 representation of coal, in 2012 the Sunday Times reproduced and 
legitimated the oxymoron of clean coal. In the story “Wind of change blows for big miners,” (Loni 
Prinsloo, Sunday Times, 24 April 2012), Anglo American’s nuclear engineer, Samantha Hoe-
Richardson claimed that Anglo American was concerned about climate change and “accepted the 
responsibility to address both the causes of climate change and the effects it could have on the 
business and its assets and on communities”. As a way of addressing the climate problem, Hoe-
Richardson supported techno-optimism that included “clean coal technologies” and “technologies 
such as carbon capture and storage into commercial production”. Constructed alongside the ‘clean-
coal optimism’ was a denial of climate science. The Sunday Times managed to offer considerable 
coverage to voices of climate change denialism. Philip Lloyd from the Cape Peninsula University 
of Technology, in the same story, denied the existence of climate change. He argued that climate 
change science was a “questionable hypothesis … [and] that some people had doctored statistics 
to ‘terrify people’” because there was no “evidence that the world has gotten any warmer over the 




necessarily a bad thing … as plants would be able to ‘mop up’ the excess carbon dioxide and 
developing countries would be able to grow their economies”. 
  
Within South African discourses on climate change mitigation, energy discourses are key in 
determining policy. The Op-Ed “Renewables no panacea, it’s about coal or nuclear,” by Ron Derby 
(Business Times editor) (Sunday Times, 24 July 2016) was pessimistic about solar and wind and 
argued that South Africa was simply enriching the United States and China by buying their 
renewable energy products. Solar and wind, Derby argued, could not be relied on for baseload: 
“The most pertinent question with the power situation on the continent and in South Africa is base-
load power. There is no solution without a base-load one”. The headline opened the pessimism: 
“Renewables no panacea, it’s about coal or nuclear”. Coal and nuclear were legitimised because 
they are able to provide base-load power compared with renewables. The article further justified 
nuclear by drawing examples from Europe “when there isn’t enough solar power, Europe’s biggest 
economy [Germany] simply taps into the supply from neighbour France’s nuclear power stations”. 
 
In another Op-Ed “Renewable power has a role, and limitations,” Ron Derby (Sunday Times, 31 
July 2016) argued that though the fight against climate change was noble, the attempt to use solar 
and wind as a panacea to South Africa’s energy needs was “irrational”. Derby discredited 
renewables because they had no capacity to provide base-load electricity: 
The extra 2100 MW of renewable energy - of which only 30% is available at any given 
time - that has been added to the grid over the past eight years would not cover South 
Africa’s energy shortfall if - suddenly and rather miraculously - global growth returned to 
the pre-2007 levels. Our lights would go out again.  
 
While South Africa was trying to bring renewables online, not even Europe, a developed continent, 
had phased out coal and nuclear. “Europe, with a population of more than 740 million people living 
on a landmass of over 10 million square kilometres, has 185 nuclear power plants”. For Derby: 
Coal is still a feature of their lives, even in Germany, where it makes up about a quarter of 
the country’s energy profile …. In Africa, with more than a billion inhabitants on a 
landmass triple the size of Europe, there’s one nuclear plant with two reactors in the form 
of Koeberg in the Western Cape (Ron Derby, “Renewable power has a role, and 





Similar to the coal indispensability discourses represented in the Sunday Times and Sunday 
Independent, the City Press also gave the theme and its sponsors considerable representation. In 
the story “The value of coal,” (Yolandi Groenewald, City Press, 30 October 2016) the transition 
from coal is constructed by Eskom and other discourse sponsors on the side of coal indispensability 
as an issue of the economy: “An Eskom spokesperson said that any policy-driven transition to a 
low-carbon society must take into account the overriding priority to address poverty and 
inequality”. In terms of the coal indispensability construction, coal use was not just about energy, 
but a moral call to end poverty and inequality. The construction of this indispensability discourse 
in the poverty and inequality planes universalised coal benefits in South Africa through portraying 
coal as part of the ingredients for eliminating poverty and inequality.  
 
This construction attempted to draw support from those that aspire to end poverty and inequality. 
The unnamed Eskom spokesperson further argued that “Zero growth in CO2 emissions from 2025 
means no new coal coming online after 2025 …. This will have an impact on job security in the 
coal mining sector, which is the largest employer of semi-skilled and unskilled labour”.  In the 
same story, Joanne Isaacs from Nedbank defended the bank’s financing of coal projects in South 
Africa. Funding coal projects was good because banks were “lending into a sector that is critical 
to economic growth and energy security, playing a vital role in South Africa’s development”. 
Obakeng Moloabi (executive director at Pele Natural Energy) advised against ignoring “South 
Africa’s context,” characterised by the need “to create jobs” and only coal could offer “more job 
opportunities than renewables”. The story showed the convergence of Eskom, coal mining 
companies and the finance capital discourses. All these forces articulate at this juncture because 
of their interests in profit. Eskom for selling electricity, Nedbank from giving finance to both coal 
mines and Eskom. All these profit motives are covered as needs for South Africa.  The coal 
industry attempted to bring ‘everyone’ onboard into their discourse by portraying coal as good for 







Sizwe Sama Yende’s story “Molewa fights green groups,” (City Press, 18 February 2018) 
highlighted the contestations between the government and environmental groups. The ‘green 
groups’ were unhappy with the granting of environmental authorisations to new coal mines by the 
Environmental Affairs Minister, Edna Molewa, whom they accused of “using outdated 
information about the country’s energy needs”. The South African government had argued that the 
IRP 2010-2030 permitted the development of new coal power of up to 6.3GW. The country’s 
energy needs outweighed any climate considerations. For example, Edna Molewa was directly 
represented backing new coal mines because “the harm that would result from the establishment 
of new coal-fired facilities to generate an additional 6.3 GW was outweighed by the benefit to the 
country of having old-energy generation capacity”. As noted earlier in this chapter, aspects of 
emissions reduction in South Africa were to be subservient to the ‘needs’ for energy. The new coal 
and the coal indispensability discourse that Molewa sought to promote are constructed as 
benefitting the nation - nuances of a developmental path and economic development are manifest. 
While Molewa constructed coal as indispensable, the development of coal energy also directly 
benefitted the capitalist system, i.e. the minerals-energy complex. The environmental groups, on 
the one hand, sought to discredit the coal common sense discourse that the government promoted.  
 
Leon Louw (Free Market Foundation) saw the reduction of coal power in the 2018 IRP as bad for 
South Africa. In the Op-Ed “SA’s daft electricity policy: 7 myths debunked, including ‘green 
power’,” (City Press, 09 November 2018) Louw pushed a narrative that saw coal energy as central 
to South Africa’s economic development and future. While the IRP moved towards Independent 
Power Producers (IPPs) on renewables, Louw argued that it was a bad policy. Louw described the 
2018 IRP as a “daft electricity policy” which contained a lot of “myths” about “green power”. 
According to Louw, the IRP “will perpetuate stagnation, unemployment and retarded 
transformation”. There was a need to get rid of this policy and action required “brave, patriotic 
and wise politicians and officials to prevail over subversive interests”. Renewable energy policy 
was constructed as a bad choice because it forced South Africa to “import what we do not have, 
render worthless what we have, destroy the environment, fleece the poor, suffer blackout and 
maximise corruption”.  Renewable energy was not ideal for South Africa because it was expensive 




concealing the real cost of getting power procured from independent power producers (IPPs) to 
consumers, and of thousands of square kilometres of land diverted to solar and wind farms”. 
Further renewables were constructed as not renewable at all:  
People concerned about ‘climate change’ and ‘resource depletion’ have been conned. 
Electricity from windmills, for instance, are like temporary skyscrapers built with toxic 
materials from resource-depleting mines, processed in coal-burning factories running on 
non-renewable power.  
 
Louw sought to discredit renewable energy, especially solar and wind farms which “occupy vast 
expanses of previously natural or agricultural land”.  
8.3 ... actually, not true: Underling Coal Diffidence Voices  
This sub-theme examines how alternative viewpoints (politicisation discourses) attempted to 
discredit the taken-for-granted coal indispensability discourses(s). The Mail & Guardian, the City 
Press and the Sunday Independent had more stories devoted to rebutting the official government 
and minerals-energy complex discourses on coal indispensability. The Sunday Times, though to a 
lesser extent, also included coal diffidence discourses. Lucky Biyase’s story “Coal mines add to 
acid threat,” (Sunday Times, 27 November 2011) to some extent attempted to demoralise and 
denaturalise coal use. The story did not just construct coal as bad for the climate but also a threat 
to water resources. The headline noted that “Coal mines add to acid threat” and the lead paragraph 
expanded by noting that “Acid mine drainage from coal mining also affects water resources: 
acidifying rivers and streams, raising metals levels and killing fish”. The story saw coal, not just 
as a resource for local electricity generation but as a key export resource, an explanation maybe, 
that could explain the increased insatiable appetite for its exploitation. “South Africa was the 
fourth-largest exporter of thermal coal .... During that year [2009], coal sales amounted to R65-
billion, the highest-value commodity for the year when compared with platinum’s R58-billion and 
gold’s R49-billion”. The World Wide Fund’s (WWF) Christine Colvin explained in the story that 
“our already stressed water resources are under threat from coal mining operations located in 






A similar focus on coal diffidence and its effects on water resources was in the story, “Coal is bad 
for our water: Greenpeace,” by Eleanor Momberg (Sunday Independent, 22 April 2012). The story 
produced coal and nuclear as bad energy choices for South Africa. The story was written within 
the context of Earth Day and World Water Day. Mike Baillie (Greenpeace Africa representative) 
noted in the story that “sticking with coal-powered electricity will intensify the effects of climate 
change and make a bad water situation even worse”. Coal-fired power stations were seen as using 
more water compared to renewable energy sources:  
coal-power was an extremely bad choice …. Even if we were to completely ignore the 
effect that coal power will have on the climate, its impacts on our water situation are serious 
enough to warrant a complete overhaul of our energy system …. In a country blessed with 
sufficient Sun and wind to power, these alternative energy supply means, nuclear energy 
was also not the way to go for South Africa. 
 
The story was an antithesis to the mainstream South African government narrative that supported 
coal because it was good, cheap, quick and useful in the development of the economy. Greenpeace 
saw a move towards renewable energy as the only way to address climate change and reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. The slant towards renewables resonates with the green growth crusade 
and does promote the naturalisation of economic modernisation perspectives and Prometheanism. 
The Greenpeace discourse only challenged government policies but essentially did not construct 
climate change as a product of capitalist systems and relations of production. This study argues 
that the interest in renewables leaves capitalists with the power to define and continue to exploit 
resources. 
 
Trusha Reddy (Earthlife Africa), in the Op-Ed “Coal3 will be another Eskom catastrophe,” (Mail 
& Guardian, 03 October 2013) expressed disappointment with South Africa’s plans to build 
“another climate-killing coal plant, dubbed Coal3”. The article described such plans by the 
government as environmentally irresponsible, noting that the planned power station was not 
consistent with “SA’s pledge to a 34% decrease in emissions by 2020”. South Africa did not need 
any further emissions increases because the country was “the 12th-largest carbon emitter in the 
world because of its dependence on coal for 95% of electricity”. Reddy attempted to expose the 




by 34% by 2020 but back home had “already committed to building a 10.1 GW coal plant and will 
build 6.25 GW more coal-firing capacity between 2014 and 2030”.  
 
The story “SA faces funding crisis as lenders go for green,” by Yolandi Groenewald (City Press, 
15 June 2014) noted that international lenders such as the World Bank were no longer interested 
in funding coal projects to reduce emissions. While lenders were divesting their funds from coal, 
South Africa sought to expand its electricity generation by building 4 600MW power plant at 
Waterberg (also known as Coal3). The World Bank vice-president, Rachel Kyte, was quoted in 
the story noting that financial institutions took cognisance of the climate change threats and that 
meant “thinking twice about financing projects such as coal power stations that ramp up 
greenhouse gases”.  
 
As of 2019, the name Coal3 seems to have been replaced by the Musina-Makhado power station 
where 4600MW will be produced against the latest IRP (2018) proposal of 1000 - 1500 MW. The 
Musina-Makhado power station is also known as the Power China International Energy Project. 
The South African government signed a memorandum of understanding with the Chinese 
government in September 2018 where the Bank of China will invest $1.1 billion in special 
economic zones and industrial parks. The Musina-Makhado power station is part of the deal and 
was estimated to be worth over $10 billion. This shows that South Africa’s appetite for coal is not 
over and the talk of leaving coal behind is just rhetoric and symbolic. There are divisions in the 
South African energy policy and politics with groups that are aligned to the minerals-energy 
complex having more power. The funding of coal by China also shows how globally China keeps 
an environmentally friendly face and at the same time fund dirty coal in Africa. 
 
The Op-Ed article by Adi Mistry-Frost (climate campaigner at 350Africa.org) and Ferrial Adam 
(350Africa.org team leader), “Don’t bank on ‘Eugreen’ future” (Sunday Independent, 21 
December 2014) attempted to deconstruct the complicity of banks in the financing of coal. While 
banks in South Africa claim to be ‘green’ and funding renewable energy projects, Mistry-Frost 
and Adam argued that this was just another public relations stunt as the same banks had huge 
investments in coal. There was “serious hypocrisy” because “Nedbank, Standard Bank and Absa 




in turn contributed to combined annual profits of over R32 billion in the 2013 financial year”. The 
authors argued that: 
The face of the South African banking industry may be greenwashed but its heart is as dark 
as coal … banks are happy to highlight their investments in renewable energy but hide the 
full extent of their financing of fossil fuel projects .... there is a great deal of money to be 
made and for the fossil-fuel industry it’s a good thing if South Africa falls deeper into its 
current addiction to coal.  
 
In this article, the authors, through language, were able to call out the agency of South Africa in 
causing global warming as the country remained the biggest emitter of greenhouse gases in Africa. 
Further, this was worsened by the government’s “backing future coal power stations and hundreds 
of new coal mining licences that are also under consideration”. The article demoralised the claims 
by the government and the minerals-energy complex that continued to argue that the use of coal 
was meant to boost the economy. The authors attempted to debunk this narrative and pointed out 
that the increased appetite for coal could worsen global warming. The banks were complicit in this 
because they funded coal projects in pursuit of profit.  
 
Nicole King, Divestment Campaign Advisor at 350Africa.org, in the Op-Ed “SA must divest from 
coal and oil,” (Sunday Independent, 15 February 2015) was against the continued exploitation of 
coal and oil and was critical of the institutions that funded it. For King, funding coal was against 
scientific evidence and common sense that showed that “The scientific health check of the Earth 
is dire”. The first section of the article outlined the effects of climate change based on science, 
which is constructed as a moral and unquestionable yardstick. King challenged the dominant 
paradigm players in the minerals-energy complex and the financial institutions to stop their 
activities. People could help force banks to divest from coal through “using their collective power 
as bank account holders, students, and academics, religious leaders and members of faith-based 
communities to get banks to divest from coal and oil”. The fight for divestment was thus set 
between the people ‘us’ against ‘them’ (banks and the minerals-energy complex). Due to the 
continued extreme weather events, the call for divestment was even stronger because “the human 
cost of rising temperatures is proving too high”. References to recent extreme weather in Malawi 
and Mozambique were used to pull the problem closer and localise it. The flooding in these two 




shortages”. These references acted as ‘factors in aggravation’ and helped the readers to visualise 
the human cost of climate change. This could be an attempt to bring in the human aspect and thus 
politicise the issue to gain public discursive salience. 
 
King’s article also expressed lack of trust and confidence in coal and oil as these were responsible 
for the current problems: “There is scepticism about the promises of jobs and fear about the health 
risks associated with polluted water and air”. Due to these risks, the call for coal and oil divestment 
was a moral and responsible appeal. It became a moral duty for all “people of conscience” to “use 
their collective power” to stop investments in coal and oil. Those who are for coal and oil were 
portrayed as ‘others’ and without ‘a conscience’. Further, the author was opposed to hydraulic 
fracking, especially “the government’s plan to fast-track economic development through oil and 
gas exploration off the coast, including a potential 3.5km-deep oil well off KwaZulu-Natal’s coast” 
under Operation Phakisa10. 
 
Oppositional discourses in the news stories often portrayed South Africa as hypocritical by 
comparing the government claims of emissions reduction against the government’s increased coal 
appetite. The discord in government policy and action was constructed as showing signs that South 
Africa was not willing to take climate action. The story, “SA talks green as it burns coal,” (Yolandi 
Groenewald, City Press, 19 July 2015) described South Africa’s coal appetite as unending: 
“Recent development plans show that South Africa has no intention of scaling down on its coal 
dependency to provide the country with energy”. The lead paragraph delegitimised South Africa’s 
international posture as a climate champion by arguing that the posture did not match action at 
home. Ferrial Adam of 350.org cited directly in the story, cemented this description of South 




10 According to the Operation Phakisa website (https://www.operationphakisa.gov.za/Pages/Home.aspx), 
Operation Phakisa (Hurry Up), launched by President Jacob Zuma in July 2014, is a government 
mechanism “to implement the National Development Plan” through “a fast results delivery programme … 





Africa: “South Africa says one thing on the international arena but has a whole other domestic 
policy”. Adam argued that while the international posture is promoted by the departments of 
Environmental Affairs and International Relations, “the department of energy was responsible for 
determining what kind of energy South Africa would use” and this policy discord in government 
was because “the departments don’t talk to each other”. The development of Medupi and Kusile 
coal-fired power plants was demoralised and constructed as irresponsible. The power stations “will 
be two of the largest five coal-fired power stations in the world. And more are coming. Another 
sibling is planned for Medupi in the Waterberg. Eskom’s Coal Three has President Jacob Zuma’s 
backing”. Dominique Doyle of Earthlife Africa opposed coal expansion because there was no 
“more room in South Africa’s carbon budget for more coal-fired power stations” as increased coal 
would “make South Africa the laughing stock of the international negotiations because it will show 
that South Africa cannot keep its promises” (Yolandi Groenewald, “SA talks green as it burns 
coal,” City Press, 19 July 2015). 
 
David King (the United Kingdom climate advisor) saw the South African government’s 
investment in the Medupi and Kusile power stations as misplaced and irresponsible, both 
environmentally and economically. King, in the story “‘SA is building white elephants’,” (Yolandi 
Groenewald, City Press, 08 November 2015) questioned why “any country [would] invest billions 
in infrastructure that will be obsolete in less than 50 years?” because the “stranded assets will not 
yield electricity in 50 years because you would have mothballed them in favour of clean, renewable 
energy”. The story delegitimised and denaturalised the discourse of coal indispensability that is 
promoted by the South African government and the minerals-energy complex. The South African 
government believed that coal would be useful soon to power the country’s development. King’s 
assertions rebut these claims in favour of investments in renewables.  
 
The expansion of coal projects was constructed as wasteful because the assets will be “obsolete in 
less than 50 years”. The newspaper discourse further delegitimised South Africa’s coal energy 
expansion by contrasting the coal indispensability narrative to South African contributions towards 
global warming: “South Africa’s emissions are listed as the 12th highest in the world per person, 




meant to show that the expansion of coal energy through Medupi and Kusile by the government 
was irresponsible and contrary to good environmental stewardship. It was a bad decision because 
already the country’s per capita emissions were already too high, and any increase would worsen 
the South African carbon footprint. The story disabled ideological disagreement by using actors 
that promoted a one-dimensional worldview of clean energy. Ferrial Adam from 350.org was 
quoted in the story blaming “vested interests in coal mining in South Africa, and political buy-in 
for coal as a resource” which blocked the plans for coal divestments.  
 
The debate and discussions on South Africa’s carbon emissions are to be found in South Africa’s 
energy futures discourses. The Energy Futures discourse is predominantly defined by those with 
interests in coal and nuclear energy. The two were primarily defined as indispensable in relation 
to South Africa’s energy needs and security. Sizwe Sama Yende’s story “The green fight to stop 
coal power,” (City Press, 18 September 2016) revealed these deep discussions and policy choices 
being contested. Environmental activists were against coal expansion and their discourses 
denaturalised claims that linked coal use to economic growth. The battle was constructed in the 
headline “The green fight to stop coal” as between the green/environmental groups and coal 
interests. “Environmentalists are hellbent on putting the brakes on the construction of 10 proposed 
coal-fired power stations by independent producers”. 
 
While the government had given environmental authorisations to new coal plants, environmental 
groups saw this as irresponsible and immoral. Earthlife Africa challenged the issuing of the 
authorisations for Thabametsi and Khanyisa power stations at the Pretoria High Court. The 
contestations reveal the articulations that are between the government, coal mining companies and 
Eskom in support of further coal exploitation against the discourse disarticulations that are pushed 
by environmental groups. Mxolisi Mgojo (Exxaro Resources CEO) was quoted in the story “Coal 
fight off to court,” (Yolandi Groenewald, City Press, 16 October 2016) in support of the 
Thabametsi power station because it would create “opportunities to supply coal to other coal 
independent power producers in the Waterberg that could bid in the second window, as well as the 
mining of high-value coal seams for the export market”. Exxaro as a mining giant saw coal as a 




complex in South Africa’s energy debates and climate change mitigation is also revealed. The 
minerals-energy complex attempted to construct coal as a way to develop the economy and create 
job opportunities. This strategy was meant to moralise and justify further coal appetite. Earthlife 
and the Centre for Environmental Rights, in opposition, criticised any further coal development as 
counter the interests of the environment. 
 
Earthlife Africa (an environmental organisation) had approached the High Court in Pretoria to 
reverse these authorisations, especially Thabametsi. Earthlife attorney, Nicole Loser, on behalf of 
the Centre for Environmental Rights argued that “More and more countries are moving away from 
both coal and nuclear, and transitioning to renewable energy”. “Considering the high costs of coal 
and its impact on the health and wellbeing of South Africans, there is no justifiable basis for 
authorising new coal-fired power projects in our country”. Accordingly, rather than seeking coal 
expansion, South Africa should have sought renewables because the country is “renowned for its 
optimal renewable energy potential, for both solar and wind energy” which were “cheaper and 
cleaner, unlike the Medupi and Kusile coal-fired power stations”. 
 
The story “Environmental Affairs in Catch-22,” (Sipho Kings, Mail & Guardian, 03 March 2017), 
revealed contradictions in South Africa’s climate change policy arena. The contradictions were 
between the ‘word of mouth’ aspirations to reduce emissions and the ‘actual’ actions. More 
importantly, the story went on to show the power players and policy disunity between the 
departments of Environmental Affairs and that of Energy respectively. Having signed the Paris 
Agreement in 2015 and offered to reduce emissions by 42% by 2025, South Africa still intended 
to grant licences for coal-fired power stations in Thabametsi. The Thabametsi coal-fired powered 
station would be “fuelled for 30 years by Exxaro (through its Grootegeluk mine and the planned 
Thabametsi mine)”. In terms of shareholding, “Japan’s Marubeni has a 24.5% share of Thabametsi 
power station and is leading its development. Other partners include the Public Investment 
Corporation (government), South Korea’s Kepco (24.5%), Royal Bafokeng Holdings, KDI and 
Tirasano”. This study notes that although Exxaro sponsors the Climate Change Governance Chair 
at UNISA, the company seems to be doing actions completely against the climate. The Department 




Africa which argued that “South Africa should not be building power plants that warm the planet, 
and that it will have a disproportionate impact on the country, which is already feeling the shift in 
rainfall patterns and increased temperatures”. 
  
In its response in court, the Department of Environmental Affairs’ affidavit argued that “The 
department acknowledges that coal-fired power stations are heavy greenhouse gas emitters but 
accepts that some measure of coal-generated energy is necessary to meet South Africa’s current 
and medium-term energy needs” contending further that “there is no legal requirement for climate 
change impact assessment to be done for a plant to get environmental authorisation” because the 
country’s “obligations have not been [under the Paris Agreement] enacted in national legislation 
… [and] they do not bind parties within the republic”.  
 
The arguments by the Department of Environmental Affairs reveal South Africa’s real climate 
policy: to pursue internal economic development first and deal with environmental and climate 
change consequences later. The granting of licenses to new coal-fired plants showed that South 
Africa’s appetite for coal, despite the public rhetoric on massive emissions reduction, was still 
very high. One should also allude to the political economy of coal energy as an imperative to fully 
grasp the politics of climate policy in South Africa. Big national and multinational conglomerates 
and mining houses are heavily interested and invested. These companies have policy power 
through their discourse coalitions in the Departments of Energy, Mineral Resources and to a lesser 
extent the Department of Environmental Affairs. The interests of these big minerals-energy 
companies are then translated into public national language by the government that argued that 
increasing coal-energy supply satisfied the present and future national interests. Behind the veil of 
national energy needs, lies big corporate power involving government investment companies, 
Eskom, banks, and giant multinational companies such as Exxaro, ArcelorMittal, BHP Billiton, 
and Anglo American who are heavy energy consumers and not interested in seeing their profits 
nose-dive because of stringent climate regulations. Further to note is how the loose nature of the 
Paris Agreement allows member states to put their national interest first before climate because 




to be dependent on national circumstances. Anonymous sources within the Department of 
Environmental Affairs were quoted revealing deep disappointment: 
We’re in this absurd position of defending something that we do not believe in 
defending.… We hate this case. But whatelse can we do but apply the law and use the tools 
available to us? … This is huge. It’s the kind of precedent-setting case that we should be 
fighting on the right side of history.  
The Thabametsi power plant manager argued in the affidavit that “It would be unfair and 
oppressive to refuse Thabametsi an environmental authorisation for the failure to submit a climate 
change assessment which was not a legal requirement”.  
The diffidence to the continued coal exploration and exploitation in South Africa was also echoed 
in the City Press. Yolandi Groenewald’s “The value of coal,” (City Press, 30 October 2016) 
compared the views for and against coal in South Africa’s energy futures discourse. The views 
against the continued investments in coal were aligned to the need to reduce carbon emissions 
from coal energy. While there are evidence and calls for emissions reduction, South Africa is first 
constructed as a country still in pursuit of coal energy and whose appetite was insatiable. “Alarm 
bells are going off as new investment in fossil fuel projects may exceed the carbon budget that 
South Africa is allowed, which means investors could end up with billions of rands of stranded 
assets”. The discourse, mainly from the government and industry on coal indispensability, was 
denaturalised and delegitimised. The IRP that the government relied on for its energy policies was 
described as “outdated”. Jesse Burton, academic from the University of Cape Town’s Energy 
Research Centre, saw “a mismatch between the IRP and the least cost mitigation plan” because it 
was “extremely risky to plan new plants that you won’t reap profits from”. South African banks 
such as Nedbank who continued to invest in coal were delegitimised and represented as going 
against global common sense where “Big banks such as JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, 
Citigroup and Morgan Stanley are backing away from coal”.  
The story “State’s court loss is also its gain,” (Sipho Kings, Mail & Guardian, 10 March 2017) 
discussed the Pretoria High Court’s decision to order the Department of Environmental Affairs to 
revisit and “reconsider its decision to grant authorisation for the construction of a new coal-fired 
power station” because the “South Africa’s legal and policy framework ‘overwhelmingly’ 




and mitigation measures’”. The article celebrated this judgment as progressive and the 
Environmental Department could “now stop initiatives that contribute to climate change”.  
The ruling by the Pretoria High Court Judge John Murphy for the reconsideration of the 
Thabametsi power plant authorisation certificate is celebrated in the Mail & Guardian editorial 
“Green ruling a win for all,” (Mail & Guardian, 10 March 2017) as a victory “for all”. The editorial 
saw no need for additional coal mines because it “is at odds with the imperative for all countries 
to lower their carbon emissions”. The decision by the Department of Environmental Affairs to 
allow “a coal-fired power station permission to be built” was therefore immoral because “South 
Africans are already, per capita, the 12th highest emitters of carbon in the world” and the 
Thabametsi plant would account “for 4% of the country’s total emissions by the 2050s”. The 
granting of the environmental authorisation was irresponsible considering that “the effects of 
climate change will be disproportionately felt here and across Africa. Rainfall patterns are already 
changing, with farmers unable to plant in time to avoid winter frost, and extreme heat is drying out 
entire provinces”. Despite all these climate impacts, the Environmental Affairs Department still 
wanted more emissions generating power plants to be built. “Big business - with its long history 
of externalising its pollution and making the poorest pay through diseases such as asthma - and 
other government departments have consistently blocked climate change legislation and a carbon 
tax”. “In this particular case, it meant the environment department signed off on a coal-fired plant 
because the energy department - vested with more political power - had advocated for its 
construction”. 
 
In the story “Earthlife wins first case against coal power,” (Sizwe Sama Yende, City Press, 12 
March 2017), the Pretoria High Court Judge John Murphy’s judgment ordering the Minister of 
Environmental Affairs, Edna Molewa, to consider a climate change impact assessment for the 
Thabametsi coal-fired power plant was victory for Earthlife Africa and the environment. The story 
brought to light the ideological contestations that permeate energy and climate debates in South 
Africa. - setting the environmental NGOs on the one hand and coal mining companies and 
government on the other. Nicole Loser from the Centre for Environmental Rights was given 
enough access to define what the court victory meant: For Loser, the judgment was “a major blow 




sources such as solar and wind do not suffer from this legal constraint”. Loser, by alluding to the 
environmental impacts of coal mines and power plants, attempted to draw a discussion around 
common sense.  
 
The government and coal mining companies were acting irresponsibly because: “Given that these 
are coal plants, which will have unavoidably significant greenhouse gas  (GHG) emissions - GHGs 
radiate heat, making the earth warmer - and given that South Africa is extremely vulnerable to the 
effects of climate change”. The coal plants were going to use “significant amounts of limited water 
and posing a risk to the quality of that water … they will be exposing South Africa to further 
vulnerability to climate change effects” (Sizwe Sama Yende, “Earthlife wins first case against coal 
power,” City Press, 12 March 2017). Retrospectively, it can be argued, the government and the 
coal mining companies and Eskom, were acting immorally ignoring the attendant coal impacts on 
the environment and the climate system. The newspaper discourse further criticised the 
government for the continued coal projects which had been “proven to be a source of respiratory 
illness” and leading to “2 200 deaths” in South Africa. 
 
While the issue of the Thabametsi power station received wide coverage in City Press and the Mail 
& Guardian, the issue only found itself inside a completely different story in the Sunday Times. 
The story “Living under a sulphurous coal-fire cloud in Marapong,” (Siphe Macanda and Matthew 
Savides, 13 March 2017) in the Sunday Times was on pollution caused by the Marapong power 
station in Lephalale, Limpopo - close to Thabametsi. The story alluded to high pollution that was 
causing illnesses to residents nearby: “The towering power station releases pollutants, including 
toxic sulphur dioxide (SO2)”. The story delegitimised the Marapong coal-power station as an 
environmental hazard that negatively affected people’s health. While the story did not discredit 
the power station from a climate change view, it did show the negative effects of coal power plants 
on communities. This could be seen as delegitimising and demoralising government efforts to 
expand coal-fired power stations in South Africa. The story quoted a health victim of the power 
station, Rabelani Mulovhedzi, who was “worried about my health so I can’t continue staying here 
anymore”.  One important observation from the data analysis has been that the South African news 
media relied on government officials, business leaders, academics and NGOs for their climate 




they appear as victims. This story included the voices of two residents who were victims of 
pollution from the Marapong power station. Ordinary people, it is argued, are not worthy sources 
of news, their involvement is limited to passive victimhood and not debate and agenda-setting. 
 
Dewald Van Rensburg’s story “Ramaphosa’s bizarre power plan,” (City Press, 09 September 
2018) criticised, through demoralisation, the logic of coal expansion and indispensability. The 
planned 4600MW power station (Coal3) to be constructed within the Musina-Makhado Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ) was a “bizarre power plan” that was even contradictory to the revised 
Integrated Resource Plan published in 2018. “This came only a week after Energy Minister Jeff 
Radebe revealed the long-awaited new Integrated Resource Plan (IRP), charting the future of 
energy investments in South Africa - a future conspicuously lacking in major new coal”. The story 
constructed this planned coal expansion as a policy discord and contradiction.  
 
The Musina-Makhado power station was part of the Memorandum of Understanding for an SEZ 
signed between the South African president, Cyril Ramaphosa, and Chinese President, Xi Jinping, 
which included “a hugely improbable plan to build another new 4600-megawatt coal power station 
in Limpopo”. While this was contradicting the 2018 IRP, the news story quoted the Department 
of Trade and Industry suggesting an adjustment: “The aim is to invest in the construction and 
operation of a 4600 MW coal-fired plant”. As part of the delegitimisation of coal expansion, the 
story directly represented Chris Yelland (an energy analyst) arguing that the “announcement was 
completely ‘whacko’ and joking that ‘some people live in alternative logic and regulations”. The 
signing of the deal was even more ironic because “Ramaphosa and his Chinese counterpart, 
President Xi Jinping, signed an agreement to cooperate on climate change alongside the 
memorandum of understanding to build a major new coal power station”.  
 
8.4 Nuclear Energy Optimism 
Nuclear energy has been central to energy debates in South Africa, especially after President Jacob 
Zuma’s COP15 announcement that South Africa would reduce emissions by 34% in 2020 and 42% 
by 2025. This announcement was followed by the inclusion of nuclear into South Africa’s energy 




Megawatt/hour of electricity in the new South African energy mix. Nuclear was seen offering two 
key advantages to South Africa. Firstly, the government and some private sector players with 
interests in nuclear energy value chains promoted nuclear as a way of securing the country’s energy 
needs and secondly as a way of securing the country’s energy needs through a resource that 
reduced the country’s emissions (signalling the move away from coal). On these two premises, 
nuclear energy became common-sense that was legitimised through discursive strategies such as 
moralisation and economisation. Nuclear energy powered-South Africa would lead to economic 
growth, reduce unemployment and make the country economically competitive. Nuclear energy, 
therefore, was rationalised and automatised as inevitable and moral.  
Missing from the nuclear optimism discourses is the political economy of nuclear energy and the 
newspapers did not question this. As a way of complementing the news analysis, this section also 
draws insight from authors that have written about the political economy of nuclear energy, more 
importantly the ownership patterns of uranium mines and the proposed beneficiaries of nuclear 
energy reactors, France’s Areva and Russia’s Rosatom, the links between nuclear support and 
Duduzane Zuma (son to former President Jacob Zuma) and the Gupta-linked and partly owned 
Uranium One. This is done to show that the nuclear optimism discourse, regardless of the veil of 
public interest and energy security claims by the actors, was meant to benefit a few economic elites 
and this was achieved by constructing the benefits of nuclear as in ‘everyone’s interest’ and for 
the country and the economy. On the other hand, the newspapers managed to also represent nuclear 
diffidence and these oppositional discourses came from some academics and environmental non-
governmental organisations who sought to denaturalise the nuclear morality claims by constructing 
nuclear ambitions as environmentally risky and economically too expensive. These actors, on the 
contrary, supported emissions reduction and energy security along the planes of techno-renewable 
energy optimism. 
 
The story “SA’s nuclear projects go ahead despite Japan,” (Lucky Biyase, Sunday Times, 20 March 
2011) reproduced the Eskom and government worldviews on nuclear indispensability in South 
Africa’s future energy mix. Nuclear energy, the story argued, would provide South Africa with the 
energy security it required. Brian Dames, the Eskom CEO, was used as the only source in the story. 




energy futures. The story took note of the March 11, 2011, nuclear disaster in Fukushima Japan 
but went on to portray South Africa as having the capacity to prevent such from happening. Dames 
allayed fears by arguing that: “Eskom has operated Koeberg, safely for more than 26 years”. 
Nuclear energy was good because it would help South Africa “meet the challenges of affordability 
[electricity] and the security of supply and the climate change issues”. The dominant views on 
nuclear were left unchallenged through the disabling of ideological disagreement. The construction 
of the entire story through Brian Dames helped in excluding alternative worldviews. Consent was 
manufactured through this one-dimensional discursive representation. Nuclear energy was 
moralised as safe and helping in fighting climate change and as an energy source that provides 
energy “security”. The political economy of nuclear energy is not discussed in the story and the 
vested interests behind nuclear were shielded from scrutiny. 
Through news media representations, the dominant government and energy views on nuclear 
optimism were discursively constructed. René Vollgraaff’s story “Coal is best, cheapest options 
says Eskom boss,” (Sunday Times, 08 May 2011), despite environmental concerns, constructed 
nuclear energy as a clean and viable form of energy to replace the usage of coal in the long run. 
Eskom and the South African government were the sponsors of the nuclear optimism discourse. 
Eskom CEO Brian Dames was cited arguing that the government through the Integrated Resource 
Plan was clear about future energy policies. These included huge investments in nuclear. “Hence 
nuclear power then needs to play a role in meeting our energy needs”. While concerns were noted 
regarding “the safety of nuclear power after the disaster at the Fukushima plant in Japan”, the 
Minister of Energy Dipuo Peters, maintained that “the government had taken a decision to consider 
nuclear power as part of its energy architecture”. 
The Mail & Guardian, though few, did give space to stories that promoted the nuclear optimism 
discourse. The story “‘Bright future’ for nuclear power,” (Lisa Steyn, Mail & Guardian, 02 June 
2011) celebrated nuclear as providing a bright future for South Africa’s energy mix: “South Africa 
has the raw material to produce cleaner nuclear energy with fewer risks”. The structure of the news 
story and the placement of source attributions helped in allowing pro-nuclear actors to get the 
primary definitional power. Three pro-nuclear actors were used against one alternative nuclear 




The story did not make a direct reference to climate change but is important as a contribution to 
the South African energy futures debates which go along with mitigation action through reducing 
emissions from energy production. The story constructed a view of addressing global emissions 
through optimism in nuclear, especially thorium which is not easily adapted to weapons 
manufacturing. The story moralised the use of thorium for energy generation in South Africa 
because it has “fewer risks”. This optimism feeds into the mainstream dominant framing of nuclear 
energy as ‘safe’ and ‘clean’ and therefore suitable for South Africa’s energy needs. Though 
rendered less significant, the story allowed for nuclear diffidence at the end. WWF for Nature 
described nuclear as undesirable “nevertheless it is a major liability issue and the toxic waste is 
long-lived”. 
Energy Minister, Dipuo Peters, in an Op-Ed “Nuclear power, is a key part of SA’s future,” (Mail 
& Guardian, 14 December 2011) constructed nuclear energy as a key ingredient of South Africa’s 
future energy mix. Nuclear did not just represent the future of energy in South Africa but the 
existence of South Africa as a country. The headline made this claim clearer: “Nuclear power is a 
key part of SA’s future” because it offered “not only a secure electricity supply but also benefits 
in terms of climate change, job creation and development”. Nuclear was key because it was a 
“reliable source of affordable electricity” which guaranteed “a strong and successful economy for 
any modern country competing in global markets”. Peters used language that shows her 
discussions of nuclear energy were intertextually responding to preceding texts and discourses that 
were pessimistic about nuclear energy. The use of words such as “secure” was meant to pacify 
those who advocated for other ‘insecure’ sources of energy (such as wind and solar). The country 
could not rely on insecure forms of energy. The use of nuclear was thus moralised through 
economisation: the benefits were too far great to be ignored in favour of less reliable and less 
affordable forms of energy. Nuclear energy would provide “job creation and economic 
development”. This construction of nuclear’s potential was meant to respond prospectively to 
discourses that opposed its adoption.  
 
Furthermore, the inclusion of nuclear was meant to satisfy future energy needs as projected in the 
IRP. This automatically therefore justified and moralised the government’s decision to adopt 




nuclear energy as compatible with South Africa’s energy futures, Peters shamed and condemned 
renewable energy sources: 
South Africa is a water-stressed country and does not have large rivers that would help to 
increase indigenous hydropower capacity …. Wind and solar power are developing rapidly 
and are expected to make a substantial contribution to South Africa’s energy mix. The fact 
that both are limited in the number of electricity hours that they can generate means that 
other suitable base-load technologies are required.  
These “suitable base-load technologies” were to be found in nuclear. Because of the limitations 
presented by other forms of renewable energy, South Africa had a duty to pursue nuclear to create 
jobs, address climate change and to develop the economy. Further, the limits presented by other 
forms of energy justify and legitimise the use of ‘other suitable’ energy sources because: “Nuclear 
power is a suitable base-load source. It is well established, having provided up to 17% of world 
electricity for more than 25 years.” As a way of reducing South Africa’s dependence on coal, 
Peters noted that there was a need to increase “the amount of low-carbon nuclear” in the energy 
mix.  
In prospective response to criticism of nuclear energy based on accidents elsewhere (for example 
Fukushima), Peters noted that South Africa had experience from the two nuclear units it operates 
from Koeberg. This experience was backed by “Technological improvements and lessons learned 
from the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl have been taken into account”. Referring 
to the Fukushima disaster in Japan of 2011, Peters argued that only three deaths were related to 
the nuclear accident and there were no deaths due to the radioactive materials that were released. 
To back her claims, she cited the conclusion of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
that “to date, no confirmed long-term health effects to any person have been reported as a result of 
radiation exposure from the nuclear accident”. Peters seemed to be suggesting that even if South 
Africa was to have any nuclear accident, chances of its effects on health and lives were not there. 
For her, the deaths in Japan were a result of the tsunami and not the nuclear accident: “A massive 
9.0 magnitude earthquake and ensuing tsunami hit Japan on March 11, 2011, causing widespread 
destruction and leaving thousands dead and missing”. While no deaths were directly attributed to 





Caiphus Kgosana’s story “SA ready to roll out R300bn nuclear stations,” (Sunday Times, 26 
February 2012) represented nuclear energy as a cornerstone of South Africa’s energy mix. Nuclear 
energy was necessary to “ensure a supply of an extra 9600 megawatts of electricity”. The drive 
towards nuclear was due to the “rising demand for electricity and climate change requirements that 
force coal-reliant South Africa to diversify its energy sources”.  
 
Peet du Plooy from the Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies, in the Op-Ed “Seductive nuclear 
power of Thor,” (Mail & Guardian, 08 March 2012) expressed optimism in nuclear energy as a 
key component of South Africa’s energy futures. The article intertextually agreed with the 
Integrated Resource Plan that sought to build 9.6GHW of electricity capacity by 2030. Peet du 
Plooy promoted Thorium as a better nuclear energy substitute compared to uranium: “Just 4000 
tonnes of thorium could satisfy South Africa’s electricity needs for 100 years”. On top of it being 
safer, Thorium also made sense because it was “four times more abundant in the Earth’s crust than 
uranium”. To legitimise and entrench the use of Thor, du Plooy argued that thorium was safer and 
produced  
less radioactive waste with lower levels of radioactivity than uranium-based reactors and 
contain none of the waste products that can be used for making nuclear weapons. On top 
of this, when something goes wrong, thorium-based reactors shut themselves down, 
protecting them from the kind of overheating that resulted in the meltdown at the 
Fukushima Daiichi plant after the tsunami that hit Japan last year. 
 
In support of nuclear energy powered South Africa was Ayanda Myoli (Chief Executive of the 
Nuclear Industry Association of South Africa), who the article “Nuclear WAR,” (Ayanda Myoli 
and Ferrial Adam, City Press, 11 March 2012), presented nuclear as a safe energy source which 
will contribute towards South Africa’s greenhouse emissions reduction. Myoli also used 
economisation to legitimise nuclear energy by arguing that the adoption of nuclear would provide 
“adequate electrical energy for the future prosperity of South Africa” and contribute towards the 
“upliftment of impoverished populations”. Thus, the adoption of nuclear fulfilled a moral cause. 
The language of nuclear optimism is translated into the interests of ‘everyone’ ‘everywhere’ and 
therefore appears to appeal to common sense and rationality. The underlying interests of nuclear 
clubs, the corruption, the power plays and the neoliberal nature of the nuclear energy discourse are 




economic interests behind it are hidden, their agency was deleted, and a front is put where nuclear 
energy is for the benefit of the people. The discourse interpellated subjects by articulate the 
interests and positionalities of the poor and impoverished so that they can also identify themselves 
as being represented in the discourse. In an intertextual response to the nuclear pessimists, Myoli 
argued that “Nuclear power is well proven in 31 countries, including South Africa, and can play a 
major contribution towards climate change mitigation since nuclear power plants emit no CO2”. 
This construction of nuclear energy represents it as a consensual issue, and that everyone agreed 
that it was the best.  
 
In the story “Time running out to meet nuclear target,” (Tina Weavind, Sunday Times, 03 June 
2012), Tina Weavind bemoaned the delays in bringing nuclear energy capacity because “Time 
[was] running out to meet nuclear target …. [and] The date has already been pushed back by five 
years - it was originally expected to be on stream by 2018 - and several years’ work still needs to 
be done before the first sod is turned”. The adoption of nuclear needed “tough decisions … to be 
made soon if nuclear power is to be added to the South African grid by 2023”. The story pretended 
that there was no debate or disagreement about nuclear energy in South Africa. The only source 
used was the Energy Minister, Dipuo Peters, hence reproducing dominant discourses and 
worldviews and presenting them as the only ones available.  
 
Similar to the articles in the Mail & Guardian, the Sunday Independent also gave discourse access 
to nuclear optimism. The Op-Ed “Government’s brave and bold nuclear move,” (Jovial Rantao, 
Sunday Independent, 22 June 2014) reproduced elite dominance, interests and views by promoting 
the government-sponsored nuclear discourses. Rantao achieved this by constructing South 
Africa’s energy needs as “desperate”. Nuclear energy was desperately needed to prevent the 
“intermittent power cuts” and to improve the “lives of those they lead [government]”. The author 
noted the problems with coal and nuclear in the context of the Fukushima disaster but went on to 
argue that “Our government deserves credit for acting, when a nation is faced with a crisis” but 
also “We [South Africans] will now become the subject of hate from environmental activists 
backed by some powerful, yet faceless powers”. Rantao saw campaigns against nuclear energy as 




against government nuclear plans were demonised and constructed as enemies who worked in the 
interests of ‘powerful’ and ‘faceless’ organisations. By so doing, the article deleted people’s 
agency in resisting government policies. The article intertextually began to prospectively 
anticipate backlash and thus labelled any future opposition to its discourse as “hate” and 
‘sponsored’ by the country’s enemies. Those who disagreed with the government became 
unpatriotic enemies of the state and the people. The government position was legitimised and 
reproduced because it was a response to a national energy crisis which could be averted by nuclear 
energy. The nuclear optimism discourse is thus attached to morality and rationality claims without 
question. Further, the article made no attempt to construct the present and future energy needs as 
existing within a way of life that favours unrestrained consumption. This study argues that the 
issue of increased energy generation serves one particular interest, that is, unlimited consumption- 
and all the related aspects of its production, mining, and business which feed into the exploitation 
of subordinate groups and further widens the social, economic and political inequalities in South 
Africa.  
 
Jovial Rantao’s, a senior editor and journalist at Independent Media (IOL), views on nuclear 
energy articulate and collude with those of the minerals-energy complex and the South African 
government. This is important to note because it shows how at a political-economic and ideological 
level, the mentality within the Sunday Independent and the publisher were highly pro-nuclear and 
thus a consistent reproduction of the dominant views of nuclear optimism and a key bias towards 
the energy industry. Rantao argued that South Africa would face criticism even relating to the 
decision to allow fracking in the Karoo. Zuma’s decision to adopt nuclear energy, in Rantao’s 
thesis was “unpopular” but “will provide solutions to problems faced by the people he leads …. 
Solutions that will, in this case, provide energy security and help grow the economy. The president 
of a country always has to do what is in the interest of the country, no matter how unpopular”.  
 
Rantao’s article brought out the idea that South Africa’s adoption of nuclear energy has never been 
an issue of addressing greenhouse gas emissions or climate change but a selfish national agenda 
that sought to achieve “energy security” at all costs. The article constructed the energy problems 




be brave enough to go to Mofolo or any part of Johannesburg and explain to them why they must 
stay in the dark and cold, in the middle of the fiercest winters”. By drawing upon the problems 
affecting the ordinary high-density person, the article sought to personalise its discourse by way 
of pretending to articulate the group interests of the ordinary people, bear with them and speak on 
their behalf. The everyday language, especially of power problems, the darkness, the fiercest 
winter etc. was good enough to appellate people and railroad the elite nuclear energy discourse 
into the language and interests of an ordinary South African. An elite discourse is translated, 
moralised and automatised through making an appeal to the lowest common denominator interests 
of the majority. This discursive strategy helps in gaining consent from the discourse subjects. 
Nuclear adoption is constructed as a way of responding to “our” (shared) problems. Concealed in 
this construction are the ideological and capital investments of powerful actors in the government 
and the nuclear industry. The government was constructed as fighting a war with ‘haters’ who are 
‘faceless’ and hence the government has a moral duty to fight for its people’s interests. 
 
Dawid Serfontein also promoted nuclear optimism in the Op-Ed “Nuclear can pay its own way,” 
(Mail & Guardian, 14 August 2015). Serfontein moralised nuclear because it had “small health 
hazards” “compared with the very high number of deaths yearly caused by pollutants from coal-
fired power plants”. Intertextually, the author was responding to both retrospective and prospective 
texts that demoralised nuclear because it was expensive for South Africa and had health hazards 
from the released radioactive material. 
 
In some instances, the Sunday Times constructed nuclear as renewable energy that had the potential 
to reduce South Africa’s emissions. For example, the story “France and SA to work together on 
nuclear power,” (Jan-Jan Joubert, Sunday Times, 03 December 2015) argued that the use of nuclear 
was meant to replace coal as a base-load source of energy. The story reproduced the optimism of 
the French Nuclear Society and the Nuclear Industry Association of South Africa. “French and 
South African nuclear scientists have come out in support of nuclear as a clean energy option after 
meeting in Cape Town”. Valerie Faudon, the French Nuclear Society’s executive officer, promoted 





Lynne Brown, South Africa’s Public Enterprises Minister, was indirectly represented in the story 
“Lynne Brown backs nuclear,” (Yolandi Groenewald, City Press, 24 July 2016) in support of 
nuclear energy because it provided “base load power - as opposed to peaking power used at the 
peak times of the day -South Africa had just two options: coal and nuclear”. Brown contended that 
the need for nuclear was a consensus ideology: “There is growing consensus that future cost 
comparisons will swing in favour of nuclear … [it] offers one of the cheapest sources of electricity 
that comes with zero greenhouse emissions”. The story lacked ideological disagreement. The 
dominant nuclear optimistic paradigm is reproduced throughout the story using actors from 
government and Eskom. 
8.5 Nuclear Diffidence 
The nuclear energy discourse in South Africa is a contested terrain. The key opposition to the 
government’s nuclear optimism comes from NGOs, churches and academics while the government 
and the nuclear industry, banks and the energy-intensive industry seem optimistic about nuclear 
energy. The key discursive divisions are to be found in how the country should move forward in 
terms of the energy mix. The government policies, especially the guiding IRP, favour the interests 
of business and largely ignored calls for a rethink of nuclear plans and the continued exploitation 
of coal. The government policies, through the policy and media discourses, have largely mirrored 
the interests of the minerals-energy complex, capital and profit-oriented companies. In adopting 
nuclear energy and further exploiting coal, the government often used the moral standard of energy 
supply and economic development. This is against the unavailability of evidence that increased 
electricity generation has improved the standard of living of the poor or reduced class inequalities. 
Rather the increased electricity generation has been seen to benefit the intensive energy consumers 
in mining and industry. 
 
Several environmental groups criticised the government’s IRP which envisaged an energy path 
with 9600MW of nuclear energy. Michelle Pietersen’s story “Activists urge nuclear rethink: It’s 
biggest mistake ever,” (Sunday Independent, 20 March 2011) portrayed the South African 
government as irresponsible for adopting nuclear energy. In the context of the Fukushima disaster 
of March 2011, the South African government pressed ahead with its nuclear path contrary to what 




As a result of Japan’s horrific accident, we understand that governments are reviewing their 
commitment to nuclear energy. South Africa cannot ignore the implications of what is now 
looking like the worst nuclear accident in the history of the industry. 
 
Representatives from the environmental groups argued that nuclear energy was a “false solution” 
that was expensive and “unsafe and high risk”. Tristen Taylor of Earthlife Africa saw South 
Africa’s adoption of nuclear energy as “the biggest mistake ever” and described the decision as 
“reckless”.  
 
The NGOs, in their letter to cabinet ministers, Dipuo Peters (Energy) and Edna Molewa 
(Environmental Affairs), assigned themselves the role of speaking on behalf of everyone who was 
‘responsible’ and not ‘reckless’. This strong language represents the bi-polar distinctions that the 
NGOs constructed between ‘us’ the people (against nuclear energy) and ‘them’ the villains 
(government, banks, nuclear industry etc. who were for nuclear). The letter argued that “We can’t 
help but think they (government) have a deal and that’s why they are pushing it through”. Dipuo 
Peters, the South African minister of Energy denied the claim that the government was pushing 
the nuclear path because it had a deal with foreign nuclear multinationals. The story further quoted 
the Deputy-Director-General in the Energy Department, Ompi Aphane, who was adamant that the 
nuclear plans were continuing: “This (plan) looks 20 years into the future. When you look at the 
plan, you’ll see that most urgent was the renewables”. Asked what the government would do next, 
Aphane was quoted saying, “Implementation. We launched it on Thursday and within the month, 
the bidding process for the renewables will open”. 
 
The views of the NGOs are presented first and are given the primary definitional power. The 
NGOs, labelled activists in the story, are constructed as building a case for the non-adoption of 
nuclear energy. The NGOs constructed nuclear energy as unsafe and expensive for the country, 
especially in the context of the Fukushima disaster in Japan. However, there is no single name of 
the people representing the NGOs in the first twelve paragraphs. Only Earthlife Africa’s Tristen 
Taylor got quoted in the 13th paragraph. In contrast, two government officials are given the right 
to reply and are afforded almost the same discursive space to rebut the claims made by the 




basis of the story, the extensive coverage given to the Department of Energy almost renders the 
claims from the nameless NGOs irrelevant and unsubstantiated.  
 
The Department of Energy Minister, Dipuo Peters made a serious morality claim for the adoption 
of nuclear energy. Peters saw the adoption of nuclear energy benefitting “all of us”. There is 
implied and imagined consensus and benefit through the translation of elite views into everyday 
public idiom: “everywhere you go when you want to determine what particular challenges you 
have, especially in consideration of the X-ray environment, we apply nuclear”. It followed, 
therefore, that nuclear energy benefits outweighed the fears raised by the NGOs. The nuclear 
energy optimism discourse translated itself into a rational and morality discourse. Missing from 
the arguments put forward by Peters and Aphane is the politics and political economy of nuclear 
energy in South Africa. The story is not inclusive of the contradictions within the South African 
society when it comes to energy access and use, the interested parties, the powerful multinational 
investors such as France’s Areva, Russia’s Rosatom, etc. The political economy of nuclear energy 
and procurement is concealed in the story. At best, the story is a surface description of deeper 
economic and political interests in the energy sector.  
 
The government, banks, and the private sector had vast interests in nuclear because of the huge 
amounts involved. The goal was always profit and not development and energy supply, these were 
the fringe outcomes of the profit drive. The views expressed by the government are essentially the 
interests of the minerals-energy complex, the nuclear industry, and multinational nuclear 
companies. The nuclear energy discourse in South Africa becomes an articulation of the energy, 
policy, finance and mining coalitions and their interests. By providing extensive rebuttal space to 
the government, the views of the government were reproduced along the rationality plane and 
common sense. The government, contrary to criticism was “very responsible, caring and extremely 
cautious (Peters)”.  
The story “‘Avoid disaster on our shores’,” (Fiona Macleod, Mail & Guardian, 24 March 2011) 
constructed nuclear energy as unsafe and undesirable for South Africa. The story began by 
delegitimising the South African government for making nuclear energy a key component of the 




mix was viewed as a sign of an irresponsible and insensitive government. Six actors are used to 
demoralise nuclear energy optimism. “Environmentalists call on the government to reconsider 
SA’s nuclear plans … from its climate change strategy following the earthquake and threatened 
meltdown of Japanese reactors”. The disaster in Fukushima (March 11, 2011) was used as a 
discursive basis to ridicule the government’s plans to use nuclear energy as part of the energy mix. 
The disaster in Japan was ‘proof enough’ for the government to see the dangers of nuclear. The 
story directly represented Tristen Taylor from Earthlife Africa emphasising: “This crisis [in Japan], 
considered the second-worst nuclear accident in history, has proved that nuclear power generation 
is not safe”. Alongside these calls by activists, the story also referred to Germany closing its 
nuclear reactors after the Japanese disaster. In terms of the story construction, this could be seen 
as a way of moralising the calls for the abandonment of nuclear and demoralisation of the 
government’s nuclear plans.  
South African Minister of Energy, Dipuo Peters, was indirectly represented defending South 
Africa’s nuclear plans and making the claim that “the Japanese crisis had not affected government 
plans to expand the nuclear energy supply from 6.5% to 14% of the country’s energy mix by 2030”. 
Peters defended the government plan because it was meant “to ensure energy security as well as 
meet climate change mitigation undertakings”. The claims by Dipuo Peters were preceded and 
proceeded by views and actors who actively demoralised the government claims. Nuclear 
pessimists saw nuclear energy as too costly, and “depended on fossil fuels for the mining, 
processing and enrichment of uranium”. Diffidence on nuclear was also shared by the trade union, 
National Union of Mineworkers. The trade union’s Mziwakhe Nhlope was directly represented in 
the story noting that as a union they opposed nuclear because it “raises issues of safety, cost, 
sustainability and the impact on jobs”.  
As an alternative to nuclear, the actors who were against nuclear energy expressed optimism in 
solar and wind. The story displayed ideological disagreement between the government on the one 
side and civil society representatives on the other. Through the headline and structure of the story 
together with the placement of actors’ views, the story built the idea that nuclear energy was bad 
for South Africa. Regardless of views from Dipuo Peters and Eskom, the overarching idea was 




While the South African government adopted the Integrated Resource Plan that proposed 9600 
MW of electricity to be produced from nuclear, Adam saw such actions as counterproductive 
(Ferrial Adam, “SA must remove nuclear blinkers,” City Press, 17 June 2011). Intertextually, the 
article was responding to the nuclear provision in the IRP and the dominant government discourses 
that attempted to promote nuclear energy as part of ensuring energy security and reducing carbon 
emissions. The plans by the government to introduce and promote nuclear energy were constructed 
as going against common sense because even “Governments around the world are rethinking 
nuclear energy. The Germany government has decided to phase out nuclear energy and 95% of 
Italians voted against the use of nuclear in a recent referendum”. It followed, therefore, that the 
proposal by South Africa as envisaged in the IRP was not rational and moral. The South African 
government was demoralised and delegitimised as irresponsible for adopting nuclear proposals 
“Merely six days after the Japanese were reeling from a nuclear meltdown”. Adam argued that: 
“The claim that nuclear power could be a solution to climate change is false” because it can “only 
reduce CO2 emissions by 6%” and is also “dependent on a non-renewable resource, creates 
dangerous radioactive waste and is very costly”.  
Rianne Teule, from Greenpeace Africa, in the Op-Ed “Nuclear power will cost the country dearly,” 
(Mail & Guardian, 20 October 2011), argued that the move towards nuclear energy was not good 
for South Africa because of the costs. By way of discursive de-economisation and demoralisation, 
the article attempted to delegitimise the mainstream government discourse of nuclear optimism. 
Using examples from Japan, the article constructed a pessimistic tone against nuclear energy which 
was described as providing “too little, too late and at too high a price”. The article ideologically 
disagrees with the government position on nuclear and by way of intertextuality responded to the 
government premise by delegitimising the dominant frames of nuclear energy. The South African 
government’s nuclear project was delegitimised and demoralised because other countries “around 
the world are rethinking nuclear energy after the Japan nuclear disaster”. More importantly, the 
nuclear project would require a lot of funding: “The high price of nuclear is already being paid by 
Japanese citizens after the Fukushima disaster in March this year”. The author laid the background 
in a bid to delegitimise the government worldview. The article drew into the politics of nuclear 
energy: It was not just about energy, but key multinational energy conglomerates had vested 




governments, are desperately clinging to South Africa’s nuclear expansion plans … The French 
companies Areva and EDF need to sell reactors abroad to survive”. For Teule, it was incorrect to 
link nuclear energy to emissions reduction because “nuclear energy will not combat climate 
change” because it had “a small contribution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions”. 
 
Ferrial Adam in “Nuclear WAR,” (Ayanda Myoli and Ferrial Adam, City Press, 11 March 2012) 
attempted to delegitimise and demoralise nuclear energy as unsafe and unclean. Adam criticised 
the South African government for failing to learn “from the tragic lessons of Fukushima” by 
“pushing ahead with its nuclear plans to build six nuclear reactors”. While Myoli argued that 
nuclear energy was “well-proven in 31 countries,” Adam argued that “Governments across the 
world were rethinking nuclear energy after the Japanese nuclear disaster”. In this way, the South 
African government was represented as going against global common sense. “It is hugely 
irresponsible for the government to believe that they can spend billions of taxpayers’ rands on such 
dangerous and expansive technology”. While Myoli argued that nuclear energy would help in 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, Adam rebutted that construction by arguing that the 
contributions of nuclear power towards emissions are “too little, too late and at high a price”. 
Instead of nuclear, Adam was optimistic about renewable energy that provides “a sustainable, 
long-term increase in green jobs”. 
Bishop Geoff Davies, executive director of the Southern African Faith Communities’ Environment 
Institute, in the Op-Ed “Nuclear power will worsen the wealth gap,” (Mail & Guardian, 25 April 
2012) attempted to politicise the nuclear energy debate. Intertextually, the article was a direct 
response to the South African government’s Integrated Resource Plan that envisaged an increased 
role of nuclear energy in South Africa’s energy futures supplying 9.6GWH of electricity from six 
reactors by 2030. While the government-sponsored the discourse on nuclear energy optimism, 
Davies delegitimised nuclear. The government claimed that nuclear was cheap and safe, but Davies 
believed that the use of nuclear energy could have “devastating consequences” as evidenced in 
Fukushima, Japan. Davies further drew from environmental sociology critique and agreed with the 
metabolic theory that sees humans and nature as having relations of interdependence. Davies 




humans, are but part of the web, entirely dependent on a healthy planet. We threaten all life through 
our carbon-intensive way of life [capitalism], our habitat destruction and pollution”.  
 
The optimism in nuclear was portrayed as based on myths promoted by the government and its 
agents: “Eskom continues to propagate the myth that coal and nuclear power are the only sources 
of energy that can provide base-load electricity”. On the contrary, Davies expressed optimism in 
green energy techno-fixes wherein “[with] thermal batteries and a mix of wind, sun and ocean 
currents, we can produce clean base-load electricity that is cheaper than nuclear power and new 
coal and has no fuel or decommissioning costs”. Davies also delegitimised the view that nuclear 
energy is clean by arguing: “Taking into account the mining of uranium, its transport and the 
construction of power plants, nuclear energy is certainly neither carbon-neutral nor ‘clean’”. The 
article discredited nuclear, shaming the drive towards nuclear energy by asking why  
most industrialised countries, such as Germany and Japan, are turning their backs on it? 
The only conclusion is that there is an immense amount of money in the nuclear industry 
for those involved and in power. They will reap the financial benefits, not the majority of 
South Africans. This will exacerbate the poverty-wealth gap. 
 
In the story, “Coal is bad for our water: Greenpeace,” (Eleanor Momberg, Sunday Independent, 22 
April 2012) Greenpeace expressed diffidence towards the government’s decision to continue with 
its nuclear energy plans: “Our government is barrelling ahead with its nuclear plans without 
consultation of public stakeholders or transparency to its plans”. Greenpeace’s Ferrial Adam was 
quoted contending that “The government’s rushed decision to build six additional nuclear reactors 
is a clear indication that the South African government is not learning from the systematic failures 
around the world’s nuclear industry, as became apparent recently in Fukushima, Japan”. Adam 
reasoned further that “Nuclear energy is a dirty energy source that offers too little, too late, at too 
high a price”.  
Dirk de Vos (consultant in renewable energy) delegitimised the South African government’s 
support of nuclear energy. He achieved this in the Op-Ed “Put nuclear dreams aside for now,” 
(Dirk de Vos, Mail & Guardian, 18 April 2013) by alluding to the March 11, 2011, Fukushima 
nuclear disaster in Japan. “Fukushima showed that nuclear safety requires not only good 
engineering but also high-level, vigilant and independent regulation that constantly and critically 




Pieter-Louis Myburgh, in the Op-Ed “Nuclear family,” (City Press, 23 April 2017) drew attention 
to the political economy of the South African energy futures debate as it relates to nuclear energy. 
The article, based on the extract of the book “The Republic of Gupta: A Story of State Capture” by 
Pieter-Louis Myburgh, attempted to join links between the Zuma administration’s clamour for 
nuclear energy and the Gupta uranium interests: “the Gupta family’s and Duduzane Zuma’s 
investment in uranium mining … coincides with the involvement of the Russian state-owned 
nuclear energy corporation Rosatom”. In 2009 at COP15 in Copenhagen, Zuma announced South 
Africa’s ambitions to reduce emissions and surprised many: “According to the Rand Daily Mail 
‘his announcement … revealed Zuma’s nuclear ambitions”. 
 
In the story “Nuclear deal ‘comes with price for SA’,” (Bulelwa Payi, Sunday Independent, 11 
February 2018), NJ Ayuk (oil and gas lawyer) was the sole discourse sponsor against nuclear 
energy optimism because “there was no reason for South Africa to consider nuclear energy as part 
of its energy mix”. Nuclear energy was detested because the “proposed deal might come with 
political pressure which could lead to political capture”. The story and the main discourse actor 
concurred that South Africa needed “to look at other energy sources to meet its climate change 
commitments”.  
 
Ayuk opposed nuclear energy, not because of any concern for the environment, but because it 
would lead to “political capture” by global North countries whose countries were interested in 
developing nuclear energy capacity in South Africa. Ayuk could have been intertextually 
responding to, though not mentioned in the story, French, Russian and Chinese companies that 
were interested in building nuclear reactors in South Africa. “Do you want a member of the 
Security Council that’s dependent on another country for its energy security and needs? Africa 
needs a representative that will articulate its views and not one that will be perceived to be captured 
by another strong power”. 
 
By default, Ayuk saw South Africa’s energy solutions as coming from renewable energy. Ayuk 
economised the renewable optimism discourse by arguing that they were clean and were able “to 




Africa’s energy mix because they had “the potential to alleviate poverty … will create jobs and 
allow small businesses to participate in the sector”. The newspaper discourse aligned with the 
techno-optimistic constructions of renewable energy as economically making sense and moral. His 
views are reproduced through direct and indirect discourse representation. The views Ayuk 
expressed are represented as very important and unquestionable because he is “a leading oil and 
gas lawyer [who is] widely recognised as one of the top influential businessmen in the oil and gas 
sector globally”. His Promethean beliefs are reproduced and he himself constructed renewable 
energy and technological innovation as common sense and the most rational and logical sources 
of energy: “Renewable energy must be the core part of the energy mix [because] it has the potential 
to alleviate poverty … [and] create jobs”. Renewable energy, therefore, is moralised by way of 
economisation and alluding to the perceived benefits. Through the newspaper’s own discourse and 
indirectly representing Ayuk’s views, it is argued that renewable energy would be a catalyst 
towards meeting South Africa’s “commitments signed on climate change”. 
8.6 Techno-renewable energy optimism 
News media discourses on climate change in South Africa are closely tied to the energy discourses. 
Energy discourses are important because the future energy choices made by South Africa have a 
direct impact on climate change mitigation. Four key energy discourses emerged from the news 
analysis. Firstly the coal discourse (argued for the continued use of coal for economic development 
and energy security), the nuclear energy discourse (argued for the expansion of nuclear capacity 
for economic development coupled with ‘clean’ energy), the shale gas discourse (argued for the 
extensive exploration of coal gas to replace coal because gas ‘cleaner’ than coal) and last the 
renewable energy discourse (argued for the transition towards wind and solar energy). The 
renewable energy discourse was primarily sponsored by actors from environmental non-
governmental organisations, the Department of Environmental Affairs and partly the Department 
of Energy. The South African Climate Change Response White Paper of 2011 articulated a future 
that was based on techno-renewable energy optimism that led to a ‘green economy’.  
 
Renewable energy was constructed as a clean and moral way of developing the country. The 
sponsors of the techno-renewable energy optimism used environmental moralisation and 




provided jobs and could develop the economy in a clean way. This study argues that the techno-
renewable optimistic discourse was intensely embedded within, at least ideologically, within the 
capitalist logic of ‘Sustainable Capitalism’ grounded within the economic modernisation 
paradigm. Such discourses, rather than seeking a transformation of the capitalist risk society, 
sought climate change solutions within the same mode of life that promotes consumption and 
exploitation. However, actors who opposed the techno-renewable optimism, mostly from the 
Department of Energy, the Department of Mineral Resources and the Minerals-Energy complex 
argued that renewable energy was too expensive and unreliable because it could not provide base-
load. News stories, especially in the Mail & Guardian, the City Press and the Sunday Independent 
demonstrated a close affinity to Promethean discourses where climate change presented 
opportunities for South Africa to transition to a ‘neoliberal green economy’ through renewable 
energy and technological advancements. 
  
Wilson Manganyi (a researcher at Mistra - Mapungubwe Institute), in the Op-Ed “Is South Africa 
ready to embrace the hydrogen economy?” (Sunday Independent, 06 November 2011), argued 
against coal because South Africa’s emissions were seen to be a result of power generation by 
Eskom. “Ninety percent of Eskom’s electricity comes from this fossil fuel [coal] which explains 
our excessive carbon footprint”. In the third paragraph, the article problematised the coal problem 
by making direct links between coal and the political economy of the South African energy system, 
especially the benefits going to the minerals-energy complex: “Our aluminium, zinc and steel 
industries have been buttressed by a steady supply of cheap electricity from coal … coal is also 
used to produce liquid fuels [Sasol].” Manganyi argued that the energy problem was historical and 
cited the government’s 1998 energy white paper that envisaged the centrality of coal in South 
Africa’s energy mix. The article argued that South Africa needed to move away from fossil fuel 
towards a “hydrogen economy” anchored on the use of platinum group of metals (PGMs) such as 







The article used the discursive strategy of economisation to moralise the move towards the 
hydrogen economy. This transition had the advantage of reducing emissions while meeting the 
country’s energy needs and most importantly “South Africa can become a major supplier of fuel 
cells across the globe - with major implications for manufacturing and services”. Crucially, the 
culture of unending exploitation is left unquestioned, rather new ways of exploiting both nature 
and humans are sought. Because South Africa is endowed with the platinum group of metals, the 
country was supposed to fully exploit this potential. The article constructed nature as given freely 
and open to unlimited human exploitation and conquer through technological interventions. This 
study maintains that technological interventions only benefit the capitalist class and worsens 
ecological risks as new technologies bring in new risks. The call to explore the PGMs was made 
without questioning the need to expand mining and the use of chemicals in the process thus 
furthering the metabolic rifts between humans and nature. By completely ignoring the social and 
cultural embeddedness of the capitalist system, the article concealed the agentive responsibility of 
capitalism towards the ecological catastrophe. Approaches that favour economic modernisation 
and Promethean discourses were rendered rational, moral and common sense. Approaches 
(technological interventions) that seek to reinvent capitalism through shifting risk sources and 
economic modernisation but not addressing the foundational political-economic structures of the 
climate ecological problems were promoted. While the article saw coal divestment as a crucial 
step, it did not question the structural inequalities in energy access and use in South Africa.  
News stories in the Mail & Guardian saw renewable energy as the panacea to South Africa’s 
energy future. Renewable energy was economised and thus acquired a moral campus. In “Blowing 
up a storm,” Fiona Macleod (Mail & Guardian, 12 May 2011) used the discursive strategies of 
scientisation and economisation to legitimise and moralise wind energy optimism where 
“electricity from wind turbines will soon be cheaper than power from the Eskom grid” and “cost 
95 cents a unit against the more than R1 a unit that will be charged by Eskom in four years’ time”. 
Because of this economic common sense, it was imperative that the economy moved towards this 
new energy resource that was both clean and cheaper. This economisation and moralisation helped 
in constructing legitimacy and a consensus ideology. While this appears noble on the surface, it is 
the ideological role of such texts that should be probed. The texts build narratives in the common-




The story automatised renewable energy as the best energy for the future. While aspects of the 
renewable energy discourse appear as common sense, they only become so because of how 
journalists and other actors have constructed and naturalised them. Renewable energy (Promethean 
discourse) was constructed as a panacea to sustainable and clean development. Central questions 
of the cultural politics of climate change were not addressed. Climate change, and the responses 
to it, therefore, this study argues, must be discussed from an understanding of climate change as a 
product of capitalist risk culture that sees exploitation in its operations. 
The same principles of Capital and expansion and efficiency that produced the risk society are 
naturalised and automatised that no alternatives seem possible. Capitalism and the market-led 
responses ingrained in technological optimism were not debated. This study contends that any 
attempt to solve the climate crisis should begin by disintegrating and disentangling the risk 
tendencies of capitalism. Responding to climate change through renewables is made to appear 
commonsensical. The news story constructed an image of consensus discourse that everyone 
agrees that renewables and technology interventions are the answer. Climate change is a cultural 
problem, whose answers should be constructed from changing the cultural structures of 
exploitation, massification and inequality. Excluded from the Promethean discourses expressed in 
the story are alternative (environmental sociology) views that speak to and about transforming 
society from exploitation to equality, views that see the need for a restoration of truly metabolic 
relations between nature and society: where nature is viewed as a finite resource and hence the 
need for dialectical human-nature relationships. Moving towards renewable energy under the 
capitalist praxis simply relocates the centres of expansion, exploitation and the consumerist 
culture. The doxa of renewable energy and sustainable clean energy cannot be viewed as innocent. 
The Promethean discourses that find comfort in techno-optimism have been legitimised, 
automatised and commonsensed by their representation and construction as the only ones 
available. 
 
The story “SA will have to transform its transport and energy sectors,” (No author, Sunday Times, 
27 November 2011) contended that South Africa needed “to transition its transport and energy 
sectors” in order to reduce emissions. The key actor in the story was the United Nations 




change, we cannot get away from the greenhouse gas emissions produced by the transport and 
energy sectors”. The techno-optimism discourse was moralised by Zacharias through the strategy 
of economisation: “By investing in renewable energy, valuable jobs can be created, particularly in 
rural areas where they are desperately in short supply”. Overall, the story reproduced the ideology 
of Promethean capitalism: What was needed was just a shift from coal to renewables without 
fundamentally altering the capitalist political economy. 
 
Yolandi Groenewald, in “Our green is good as gold” (City Press, 15 December 2012) praised the 
government for its efforts in ‘green electricity’ production and supply. The lead paragraph noted 
that “South Africa’s renewable energy expansion programme is viewed as one of the biggest in 
the world”. There was a scramble and rush for renewable energy investment: “Solar and wind 
farms are rising between the koppies on farms from the Soutpansberg in Limpopo to Boshoff in 
the Free State and De Aar in the Northern Cape”. The article reads like a public relations release 
from a government department. 
 
Key details in the story are important in this study. The story noted that renewable energy funding 
in South Africa “originates from private or overseas investors” and “South African banks like 
Nedbank [who had] also invested considerable resources in the programme”. The neoliberal nature 
highlighted was presented as a milestone and good for South Africa. Under the pretext of fighting 
climate change, neoliberalism sees climate change and global warming as opportunities for making 
more money. It is about profit and accumulation and not reducing emissions and upholding a 
strategy that seeks to alter the current global capitalist system. Renewable energy investments 
become the new alternatives where capital moves from coal to renewables but maintaining the 
same structures and systems of accumulation. These much-celebrated Promethean approaches do 
not have the capacity to usher climate justice, social justice and economic justice. Rather these are 
stratagems that are meant to ensure the morphosis and self-mutation character of capital. 
Sustainable capitalism only shifts the forms of exploitation, but continuously seeks to exploit 
natural resources for the benefit of a few. The solar and wind farms cause displacements and noise 
but the benefits are shared by a minority who own the means of production. Key is that addressing 




move towards de-consumption and de-exploitation of nature, a real attempt to restore the metabolic 
human-nature relations. 
The story “Sustainable energy savings,” (Alf James, Sunday Independent, 28 April 2013) 
represents optimism in renewable energy and argued that “sustainable power boosts opportunity” 
and could lead to poverty alleviation and better living conditions. As part of attempts to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, there was a need for “doubling the share of renewable energy in the 
global energy mix … sustainable energy - energy that is accessible, cleaner and more efficient” 
with the potential to ‘power’ sustainable development. As part of moralising renewable energy, 
the article delegitimised what it termed “inefficient energy” that harmed “economic productivity 
and energy-related emissions contribute significantly to the dangerous warming of our planet”. 
The article portrayed renewable energy initiatives as automatically leading to sustainable 
development. The power of renewable energy in this regard was to be understood as a matter of 
common sense. 
 
Dipuo Peters, the Minister of Energy, was represented in the story constructing renewable as 
contributing “immensely towards reducing poverty, mitigating climate change”. The story was 
premised on two major events. Firstly, the launch of the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban 
Ki-moon’s Sustainable Energy for All programme and secondly the presentation by Dipuo Peters 
at the Africa Energy Indaba. Peters addressed the topic from an ideology of consensus and used 
public idioms such as “we have” and “we believe that” and thus brought ‘everyone’ to the support 
of renewable energy optimism. While her views were essentially the views of the South African 
Department of Energy, her address universalised the views to represent the entirety of Africa. 
Climate change and poverty were depoliticised and constructed as problems that could be solved 
by changing the source of energy. The answers to poverty and climate change lay in technological 
innovation. The answers were to be found, not necessarily in the change/reduction of emissions, 
but in creating new energy sources, this perpetuates the dominant capitalist system. Sustainable 
development, if seen from this Promethean, neoliberal discourse and ideology, becomes essentially 
rhetoric that has no real effects in making better the environment and the social status of people. 
By using official sources, the news article legitimised the official views of the UN elite and the 




obvious lack of alternatives. The absence of other views makes the available views automatic, and 
natural.  
 
In contrast to coal that was consistently constructed as dirty and bad, Sipho Kings, in “SA set to 
profit from wind power,” (Mail & Guardian, 06 June 2013) endorsed renewable as safe and 
attractive. In terms of ideology, the story helped in naturalising and legitimising techno-optimistic 
and neoliberal discourses that see climate change solutions through the lenses of renewable 
capitalism. These ideas/solutions feed into the global mainstream rhetoric of sustainable capitalism 
masked as development. The legitimation and naturalisation of wind energy help in entrenching 
the neoliberal agenda of innovation and does not seek to proffer discourses that pursue the 
transformation of capitalism as an environmentally corrosive system. Within the renewable energy 
discourse, wind and solar (all public goods) are appropriated gratis for the maximisation of profit 
for a few capitalists whose investments in renewable energy are profit-oriented. Aspects of 
equality and climate justice are not part of the renewables crusade. Any benefits to the environment 
are purely incidental and coincidental if not accidental.  
There was no ideological disagreement because alternative discourses were excluded thereby 
leading to the story being one-dimensional and the manufacture of imagined ideological consent 
and consensus. The worldviews of the actors were translated into everyday common-sense 
language and spoke on behalf of logic and rationality. The story used intertextuality to respond to 
both retrospective and prospective discourses that opposed wind energy as not good for the 
environment. “Darling has benefitted the wind industry in various ways. By giving the public and 
other stakeholders an up-close view of the turbines in operation, it has alleviated many of the 
insecurities and concerns that lobby groups have wrongfully advertised”. This way of constructing 
wind energy was done to legitimise and portray wind energy (turbines) as friendly to people and 
biodiversity. This helps in buying consent. 
 
Another example of techno-renewable energy optimism is found in an article by Rashmi Mistry, 
an Oxfam senior campaigner, “Actions at home need to match SA’s posture on climate,” (Sunday 
Independent, 21 December 2014). The article was techno-optimistic as it saw climate responses 




power is coming down and could provide affordable energy, generated nearby, to communities 
battling with the rising costs of our coal-fed electricity lines”. For Mistry, South Africa needed to 
move away from its heavy reliance on coal power and saw the development of Kusile and Medupi 
power stations and the proposed Coal 3 as putting “doubt whether the country can reach the 
emission reduction targets it has promoted on the world stage”. Essentially, the article, starting 
with the headline saw contradictions between what South Africa was saying on the world stage 
and the domestic action especially in the energy sector with the continued coal appetite. 
 
Patrick Bond, Professor at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, in the Op-Ed “Patrick Bond favours 
sunshine and wind for energy generation and warns of the high risks and costs of nuclear and coal 
power, fracking and offshore drilling,” (Sunday Independent, 15 February 2015) attempted to 
problematise and politicise the debate about South Africa’s energy mix. He began by criticising 
the government’s approach towards coal and later the nuclear drive. In his pursuit to reproduce 
and legitimise the techno-renewable energy discourse, Bond depended on the demoralisation and 
delegitimisation of coal and nuclear energy. Bond’s article can be read as intertextually defying 
the mainstream government discourses of coal indispensability and nuclear expansion.  
 
Two key issues are salient in Bond’s diatribe. Coal diffidence: “Water, land and air are being 
poisoned by coal. Climate change will be worsened by the 30m tons a year of carbon dioxide 
emitted by each of the coal burners”. While the primary concern for Bond regarding coal was 
related to carbon emissions, he also paid attention to the political economy of the energy mix in 
South Africa, criticising the corrupt nature of the awarding of tenders to Hitachi Corporation for 
the Medupi and Kusile coal-fired power stations. Worrying was that Eskom’s Chairperson - Popo 
Molefe, also sat in the ANC Finance committee and knew that Chancellor House, an ANC 
investment arm, had a 25 percent stake in Hitachi, the company that was given the R40 billion 
tender for the Medupi and Kusile power stations. Nuclear Diffidence: Bond noted that President 
Jacob Zuma had put in place an energy policy that “Other than building three huge coal-fired 
power plants, the long-term supply strategy option is nuclear”. Bond expressed concern that there 
was a possibility of nuclear accidents, drawing parallels from the Japan March 11, 2011, 




the politics of nuclear energy in South Africa, arguing that the nuclear energy program was a 
potential corruption breeding place. The other concern was with the cost of nuclear energy to the 
South African economy. Furthermore, while the South African government also pinned its hopes 
for energy supply on hydraulic fracturing, Bond saw this move as counterproductive. The 
dominant ideology of nuclear common sense, of coal indispensability and fracking, were 
questioned and delegitimised. Instead of a reliance on coal, nuclear and natural gas, Bond 
promoted a techno-optimistic ideology. 
 
Comparable Bond’s renewables thesis, Yolandi Groenewald, in “Retailers try to go green,” (City 
Press, 07 June 2015), reproduced the idea of a green economy founded on techno-renewable 
energy. The retailers were represented as making efforts to ‘green’ their operations because they 
realised “that renewable energy makes sense”. Woolworths’s Justin Smith was represented in the 
story noting that “Global climate change negotiations have highlighted the ongoing need for the 
retail industry in South Africa to manage energy”.  
 
Mike Brown (CEO at Nedbank) constructed climate change as a living reality and it was about 
“Either we change or the climate does” (Mike Brown, “Either we change or the climate does,” 
Sunday Times, 14 June 2015). The impacts of climate change were represented as dire and thus 
there was a need for ‘everyone’ to agree and act. Through universalising language “As business, 
we need to deliver a firm mandate to our negotiators in Paris to enhance the likelihood of a 
successful deal that will create new opportunities as we move to a low-carbon economy”. While 
admitting that climate change risk society was human-induced, Brown argued that the causes were 
to be explained from a genuine moral imperative. 
 
“What makes it particularly difficult for people and business - to grasp is that climate change isn’t 
actually caused by evil intentions or deliberate selfishness. Rather, it has its roots in our well-
meaning efforts to provide affordable energy, food, and higher living standards”. These statements 
attempted to moralise the exploitation of humans and the environment as something that happened 
for everyone’s benefit. The breakdown of the human-nature metabolism was explained as an 
unintended consequence from a development path that sought to benefit everyone. The article 




Climate change responses, therefore, were to be thought of within a Promethean neoliberal 
discourse that prioritised technology and market instruments of a carbon market and carbon 
budgets. 
 
Craig Dodds in “For energy win, wary investors must be wooed,” (Sunday Independent, 11 
October 2015), promoted renewable energy optimism by constructing it through the discursive 
strategies of economisation and moralisation. The story used the International Renewable Energy 
Agency’s (IRENA) Adnan Amin as the sole discourse sponsor. Amin saw the financing of 
renewable energy projects as problematic regardless “of the need and escalation of energy 
demand”. Therefore, the funding of renewables was to be sought through the private sector: “the 
question on financing becomes, how do you mobilise private capital at sufficiently low cost”. The 
paradox is that traditionally, renewable technologies have always been imported from the global 
North, now also India and China, the importation of technology has two attributes: dependence on 
the manufacturers for the technology hardware, software and training and the importation of the 
ideologies that underpin those technologies. The question is not about technology transfer, but 
essentially, transfer of what and under what conditions.  
 
The absence of financing locally also meant the dependence on global private capital from the 
same suppliers of the technology. This dependence creates a syndrome of reliance and control in 
a top-bottom centre-periphery structure. Key to note in this study is that the discourse on 
technological optimism has found a central discursive salience across the global South. The 
techno-optimism expressed through the government and other players shows how the idea of 
technology transfer and innovation has been taken for granted and how the political economy of 
those technologies has been depoliticised. It is necessary to question the political economy of the 
technology transfer discourse which for now has enjoyed extensive support. This study argues that 
while technology transfer has been criticised from the frameworks of cultural and technological 
imperialism paradigms, the discourse has found consent from even the victims of the transfer in 
the global South. Governments and key discourse sponsors have appropriated, without any 
difference, the rhetoric of sustainability and the underlying ideas of technology transfer and 




between the global North and the global South - it has become a planetary vulgate, scatology. The 
rhetoric of technology optimism has been rendered a consensus ideology that has not been 
challenged, especially by the governments in the global South.  
 
This could be explained by noting that the discourse itself has found multilateral salience, 
achieving the status of common sense and thus enjoying ideological hegemony. Technology 
transfer and innovation discourses are closely tied to the rhetoric of sustainability and the 
technology itself is seen as the centrepiece of Promethean capitalist responses. The discourse, this 
study argues is inherently neoliberal and has become automatised. Renewables is another 
mechanistic and material name for new capital frontiers that come under the banner of sustainable 
development: whose technology? Whose finance? And under what conditions?  
 
Africa and its vulnerability and desire to develop are the vistas of opportunity for capitalists in the 
global North. Adnan Amin noted: “We’re seeing renewables developers from Europe and the US 
looking at the African market as a major opportunity because if electricity demand is going to 
triple by 2015”. The energy needs and climate problems faced by the global South are a window 
of opportunity for the global North private capital. The contradiction is how there is convergence 
between the capitalist interests of global finance capital and the policies of global South 
governments. Articulation as an analytical tool becomes essential. The convergence of interests, 
even if they are not the same - all lead to the same outcome of a technology-led green economy 
which carries with it ideals of a sustainable society. The unquestioning appropriation and 
proliferation of the sustainability discourse in the news media rendered Promethean responses to 
climate change dominant ideologies and thus continue to entrench neoliberal market-led solutions. 
The sustainability discourse, therefore, opens by default, global South economies to technologies 
and finance from the global North thereby maintaining the same logic of capital based on centre-
periphery exploitation, inequality and dependence. 
 
Renewable energy optimism ran through the story “Huge solar power projects take a shine to the 
Northern Cape,” (Claire Keeton, Sunday Times, 13 December 2015). Projects such as the Bokpoort 




Solar-thermal power plants were promoted in the story because they had an “added bonus of 
promoting industrialisation and creating jobs”. Valli Moosa, former Environmental Affairs 
minister and investor in solar-thermal projects noted “Concentrated solar power is the renewable 
technology of choice. It has the real potential to supply electricity on an industrial scale, and with 
storage, it can supply electricity during peak demand”. 
 
The article “Searching for GREEN POWER,” by Yolandi Groenewald (City Press, 14 February 
2016) reproduced neoliberal techno-optimism in renewable energy. The renewables were 
constructed as the energy that could power South Africa into the ‘future’. Coal, on the other hand, 
was seen as “the pariah fuel of the world”. South Africa was “looking for solutions to power our 
economy into the future, and renewable energy could be the answer”. The story praised the Energy 
department for committing “South Africa to increase renewable energy generation to 13 225 MW 
by 2025 in terms of South Africa’s Integrated Resource Plan”. Groenewald used economisation to 
legitimise the drive towards renewable energy: “Official figures show that so far the programme 
has attracted R192.6 billion in committed investment”. The article directly entrenched and 
endorsed the green-sustainable market-led solutions to South Africa’s energy futures and climate 
responses. 
 
The government planned to have “renewable energy development zones … where wind and solar 
photovoltaic technologies can be incentivised and where deep grid expansion can be directed” 
(Jan-Jan Joubert, “Renewable Energy Development Zones mooted,” Sunday Times, 18 February 
2016). The optimism in renewable energy follows a ‘sustainable development’ path informed by 
the expansion of renewable energy. The growth trajectory is neoliberal and continues along with 
the capitalist lenses of profit, exploitation and accumulation.  
The story “Sun and wind for Africa, yet we go for coal,” (Sipho Kings, Mail & Guardian, 14 
October 2016) argued that while the availability of renewable sources of energy in South Africa 
was guaranteed, the government still pursued coal, showing signs of insatiable coal appetite and 
environmental immorality. The headline is crucial for this depiction: “Sun and wind for Africa, 
yet we go for coal”. The headline demonstrated disappointment with the decision to continue coal 




generation is possible, thanks to the country’s wealth of wind and sunlight. But the energy 
department this week gave preferred bidder status to two new coal-fired power stations”. The 
government was accused of providing the funding of the coal power stations, Khanyisa and 
Thabametsi in Mpumalanga and Limpopo provinces: “The R40-billion it will cost to build the new 
coal plants has been raised, with a quarter of the money coming from the government through the 
Industrial Development Corporation, the Public Investment Corporation and the Development 
Bank of Southern Africa”. The story quoted Life after Coal warning that “The long-term 
environmental liabilities created by coal mining and power make any further investment in coal 
infrastructure a high-risk proposition”. The newspaper discourse added that “The plants are being 
built in areas where air quality is already poor”.  
 
The Op-Ed “Tapping sun and wind’s energy is only natural,” (Sunday Times, 07 May 2017) by 
Thorsten Herdan, director-general for energy policy at the Germany Ministry for Economic Affairs 
and Energy, favoured South Africa to transition to renewable energy sources which he constructed 
as “natural” and were “important economically, employing around 330 000 people in 2015”. 
Herdan argued that “Energy systems centred on renewable energy and energy efficiency have 
started to provide the most economical way to generate and use electricity, heat and mobility”. 
Renewables were good because “They will also serve as a basis for achieving the climate goals 
that the world agreed on,” at the same time providing “cheap and reliable electricity”.  
 
Siseko Njobeni’s story “Energy group blows up over stalled PPAs,” (Sunday Independent, 18 
March 2018) exposed the key fights between those who wanted to have coal as a dominant energy 
source in South Africa and those that wanted to see renewable energy sources becoming the 
dominant sources. Actors that were referred to are the National Union of Metalworkers of South 
Africa (NUMSA) and Transform SA. NUMSA and Transform SA were represented as being 
against the Independent Power Producers because, as reported in the story, they had argued in the 
High Court that “Eskom was producing excess power and did not need additional capacity from 
IPPs”. However, the South African Wind Energy Association (SAWEA) believed that NUMSA 
and Transform SA’s “arguments were based on questionable data”. SAWEA was given the 




villains. Through the newspaper discourse, the author agreed with the arguments put through by 
the wind energy association. The story used the discursive strategy of economisation to moralise 
the call for renewable energy dominance, for example, the story argued that the “wind and solar 
projects are expected to unlock investments worth R56 billion over the next two to three years”. 
In further support of the renewable energy optimism discourse, the story quoted SAWEA Chief 
Executive, Brenda Martin, who justified the IPPs because they would lead to a reduction of fossil 
fuel reliance and give South Africa a new energy balance. Beyond economisation, the article thus 
constructed renewable energy sources as environmentally moral and therefore whoever was 
against them was an environmental villain. Martin is quoted in the story arguing: “In addition to 
growing economic effects, South Africa cannot continue to ignore these large negative impacts on 
human health and the environment when much cheaper and cleaner job-creating options are readily 
available”.  
 
The newspaper discourse, in support of the arguments put forward by Martins, averred that the 
“growth of low cost, clean, renewable energy technologies provided a critical opportunity to 
reduce the economy’s exposure to the risks of job losses, of long-term tariff increases and of human 
and environmental health effects”. Therefore, SAWEA and the newspaper constructed the 
transition to renewable energy sources as a natural common-sense option, because the advantages 
were many. The South African government also initially acted in alliance with the renewable 
energy side and used economisation to automatise and moralise renewable energy. A government 
statement is cited in the story noting that: 
The renewable energy independent power producer procurement programme will ensure 
that consumers in our country have access to cost-efficient and clean energy and will bring 
much-needed investment in South Africa…. These projects will provide 61 600 full-time 
jobs, 95 percent of which are for South African citizens, specifically youth.  
 
The use of SAWEA as discourse definers quoted directly and the indirect quotation of NUMSA 
and Transform SA helped in legitimising the renewable techno-optimistic discourse and vilified 
the positions taken by environmentally ‘uncaring and irresponsible’ NUMSA and Transform SA. 
Transform SA and NUMSA, because of their background in mining, felt threatened by the issuance 
of Power Purchase Agreements to the IPPs as this would result in job losses at the coal mines and 




complex and actors attempt to discuss the energy mix and climate change from their own value-
interest vantage points. For trade unions such as NUMSA, the war was about job security while 
for mining companies, it was about continuity and profitability. Consequently, through accidental 
convergence, the anti-renewables discourse brings together mining companies and trade unions, 
generally foes, into one discursive corner. The energy discourse, therefore, must be re-articulated 
from an understanding of deep political-economic factors that underpin energy production, 
distribution and maintenance of the hegemonic power of the minerals-energy complex. The South 
African government, through the Department of Energy, “cancelled the conclusion of PPAs with 
27 independent power producers”. However, it is interesting that while the government seems to 
have fallen to the pressure from the mining interests and trade unions, it still claimed to be pursuing 
renewable energy, something that, in the context of the cancellation of the PPAs, remained mere 
rhetoric and helps to show the power and bullying of the minerals-energy complex was in force. 
 
In “Dirty business as coalition of the sidelined distorts the clean energy debates,” (Sunday Times, 
28 October 2018), Anton Eberhard, Professor Emeritus at the University of Cape Town Graduate 
School of Business, described the people who opposed renewable energy as “frustrated and angry 
that they will no longer have access to special deals with Eskom or the coal and nuclear industries”. 
The opposition to the IPPs and renewable energy was a matter of self-aggrandisement and political 
survival: “others may feel marginalised and alienated from President Cyril Ramaphosa’s new 
political dispensation”. While critics of solar and wind were wary of the costs, the author argued 
that “innovation and expanding global markets have led to dramatic cost reductions.'' 
8.7 Wind Energy Diffidence 
As part of discourse analysis and the metabolic/ecological rift analyses, this study examined the 
actual locations of the proposed renewable energy sites and how these were being accepted or 
rejected by local communities. For the government, it was about being seen to be doing something, 
while for the multinational companies, it was about profit. This is done through the moralisation 
of renewables as the answer to reducing global greenhouse gas emissions. This study maintains 
that capitalism cannot cure itself, the diagnosis should reveal the embeddedness of the Promethean 




story below shows, renewable energy projects are being imposed on communities, are not good 
for the environment and lead to forced displacement of humans and other living species to give 
room to the ‘clean and safe’ technology. The beneficiaries are the capitalist elites who go on to 
benefit from investment-friendly deals that are tied to renewables as incentives. Capitalism 
remains exploitative and sees nature as given gratis. The solutions to climate change are to be 
found in transforming the consumption patterns towards a ‘living well’ basis and not ‘good life’. 
There is need to de-escalate the capitalist risk culture. 
The story “An ill wind blows in Paternoster,” (Fiona Macleod, Mail & Guardian, 28 April 2011) 
dealt with local communities’ resistance to the proposed wind farms in Paternoster on the Cape 
West Coast. The actors in the story offer ideological disagreement, the communities are not happy 
with the projects because “There are better locations for wind turbines than tourist towns”. 
However, the story quoted a government position paper that disregards these concerns, because it 
must be done at all costs. “Urban dwellers will have to become accustomed to the idea of new 
technologies influencing the urban landscape”. The residents of Paternoster were “in high dudgeon 
over plans to erect hundreds of wind turbines as part of a scramble to meet the government’s 
renewable energy targets”. The Paternoster project (West Coast One) “is the first of numerous 
commercial wind farms planned along the coastline from Darling to Namaqualand. It is being 
implemented by Moyeng Energy, jointly owned by Investec Bank and French multinational energy 
company GDF Suez”. Keri Harvey, a resident of Paternoster was directly represented arguing 
against the wind farms because of the noise they produce: “why place the turbines in the oldest 
and most beautiful, traditional fishing village on the West Coast? The wind farms should be moved 
away from civilisation and tourist attractions”. Residents noted that “companies are buying land 
close to the coastal towns for wind farms with an eye to capitalising on renewable-energy 
reimbursements from the natural energy regulator as well as internationally funded carbon offset 
programmes” 
Andre` Kleynhans noted the residents were “bullied into this. There’s lots of wind further inland.'' 
The residents were opposed “to the thudding vibration of the turbines” which they linked “to health 
problems such as headaches, anxiety and nausea”. The story denaturalised Promethean optimism 




with endangered bird species found in the area [Britannia Bay]”. In Britannia Bay, residents were 
against the wind project by Terra Power Solutions because “The planned site is designated a 
critical biodiversity area, with limestone strandveld and two other endangered endemic vegetation 
types”. The logic of capital remains at the centre of energy initiatives. Wind and sun, public goods, 
were being commodified through international carbon financial systems. Aspects of use-value 
were overridden by the need for exchange value. 
 
The story “Man-made weather could make it worse,” (Yolandi Groenewald, City Press, 08 April 
2012) demoralised the attempts to address reduce emissions through geoengineering nature. The 
headline warned that “Man-made weather could make it [climate change] worse”. The scientists 
involved in geoengineering were constructed as having “big and dangerous dreams” because 
geoengineering was a “mysterious and controversial art”. The United States, the United Kingdom 
and greater Europe were viewed as reckless entertainers of geoengineering because for them “a 
quick fix would be welcome”. These countries were giving “a sympathetic ear” because their 
economies “will have to dramatically cut their fossil fuel diet to curb the effects of climate change”. 
The actors used in the story co-sponsored the pessimism. For example, Dr Paul Johnston of 
Greenpeace Lab was quoted against geoengineering which he described as “very dangerous, 
because the effect of tampering with the climate is so unpredictable”. Johnston argued that while 
the dangerous geoengineering scientists were entertained in the global North, “Africa with its 
fragile ecosystems is in a good position to catch the downstream effects of whatever climate 
scheme Europe or the US has initiated”. Furthermore, Johnston noted that the scientists were 
working together with the private sector: “Equally unsurprising is that once the smog clears, the 
major private sector players in geoengineering will likely be the same folks who geo-engineered 
us into this mess in the first place” -Johnston. The story discusses geoengineering as a viable 
response to emissions reduction and climate change because it tampered with the climate system 





8.8 Shale Gas Optimism 
In 2012, the South African energy discourses began to take a turn towards what the government 
called ‘energy diversification’ and as part of this drive, the government began to entertain ideas 
about shale gas exploration in the Karoo. Shale gas, if found and exploited would then replace coal 
as fossil energy of choice. In 2014, the then President, Jacob Zuma, launched Operation Phakisa 
(Hurry up) as a way of speeding the implementation of the National Development Plan. Within 
the parameters set for Operation Phakisa, the government envisaged an expedient exploration of 
shale gas reserves. Key energy multinational companies such as the Royal Dutch Shell (operating 
through Shell South Africa) applied for exploration licences in the Karoo and were optimistic of 
hydraulic fracking providing new energy potential for the country. However, this study notes that 
the shale gas optimism in government, especially the Departments of Energy and Mineral 
Resources, working together with fossil fuel energy companies, received a fair share of opposition 
from individuals and groups who still believed that shale gas was a dirty form of energy and thus 
wanted South Africa to fully incorporate renewable energy sources. The Mail & Guardian11 in 
2014 and 2015 published key information that is highlighted here. From reading the stories in the 
Mail & Guardian, the shale gas optimism from the government and the fossil fuel industry must 
be understood within a framework of the beneficiaries of shale gas exploration, i.e. the government 
through increased revenue base, corrupt civil servants through kickbacks, the oil companies and 
also the ruling African National Congress, which, through its investment arm, Chancellor House, 
has shares in Shell South Africa’s Karoo operations. 
The news media largely reproduced the shale gas optimism that was promoted by the government 
and industrial elites without many critiques. Sipho Kings’ story “Shale gas energises government,” 












(Mail & Guardian, 20 September 2012) represents optimistic discourses on shale gas in providing 
energy security. Oxymoronically, shale gas was represented “as a greener way to secure South 
Africa’s future electricity supply”. The story saw a dirty fossil fuel as a “greener’ source of 
electricity. The allusion to the fiction of ‘greener shale gas’ helps in building consent - if the energy 
source is greener, therefore it is good for the country. The story celebrated the lifting of a fracking 
moratorium by the government: “For now, shale gas has the government excited and not just 
because it could add R1 - trillion to the economy. It is being seen as the next big power source, 
something that could give a big cleaner backbone to the economy than coal and that is more reliable 
than green energy”. The news reporter uncritically accepted the view that shale gas was clean 
energy - and celebrated its possible addition to the energy mix. The contradictions are key. In the 
sub-headline, the story alluded to shale gas “as a greener” energy source but in paragraph three, it 
mentioned that it could be cheaper and “reliable than green energy”.  
In support of shale gas, Mineral Resources Minister, Susan Shabangu opined that shale gas had 
“the potential to energise this country and this energy will be built into the integrated resource plan 
and it will form part of the country’s energy mix”. Important to observe is that South Africa 
planned to shift the environmental risks from one form of dirty energy to another, i.e. from coal to 
shale gas. The desire for expansion and accumulation was bigger and louder: “gas is used to make 
the transition from carbon-intense economy with high emissions to a more sustainable one driven 
by green energy. Gas has much lower carbon emissions and the power stations that run on it are 
friendlier to the environment and much cheaper than coal power station”. 
For Shabangu, “shale gas would help South Africa to meet its commitments under the Copenhagen 
Process to reduce its carbon emissions by 42% by 2025”. Unfortunate to note is that deliberate 
misinformation was used by the minister and passed on to the readers through the unquestioning 
newspaper discourse. The story did not probe how and when the fracking exploration was to begin, 
could shale gas be usable by 2025 and how it could contribute to the reduction of South Africa’s 
emissions as early as 2025. Shabangu was quoted arguing, of course without any basis that “Shale 
gas will contribute to clean energy and will come as part of our programme to mitigate our carbon 
emissions”. By allowing the Minister of Mineral Resources to be the primary definer of the subject, 




government elites. The viewpoints of the Department of Mineral Resources were supported by 
Shell, a multinational energy company with which the governing African National Congress party 
had shares in Shell’s Karoo operations through its investment arm, Chancellor House. The actors’ 
discourse and that of the news reporter were all optimistic that shale gas was ‘the future’. The 
dominant views were mainstreamed and legitimised through discursive devices such as creating 
shale gas as clean, green and leading to sustainable development and bringing R1-trillion to the 
South African economy. At the end of the story, the newspaper discourse brought in alternative 
actors and worldviews who attempted to delegitimise the dominant representations of shale gas. 
The placement of shale gas diffidence views at the end of the story rendered them inferior to the 
primary definitional voices. These alternative actors and their viewpoints were constructed from 
within the predefined parameters set at the beginning. Key to note is that some of the alternative 
actors were only in opposition to the price and logistics and not shale gas exploration and 
production. These actors did not demoralise the official government views but were sceptical of 
the costs and logistics without providing a counter-narrative. For example, Dirk de Vos fits into 
this bracket. De Vos was concerned with “the costs of getting the shale gas and moving it around 
[...] just because there are proven resources does not mean they are commercially viable.'' 
However, some actors attempted to discredit the cleanliness of shale gas. Ferrial Adam of 
Greenpeace Africa noted that “Shale gas is dirty and the process to extract it is associated with 
dangers to water and the environment”.  
 
Bonang Mohale, Chairman and Country Manager of Shell South Africa, in the Op-Ed “Resource 
stresses require action,” (Sunday Independent, 17 March 2013) argued in favour of exploitation of 
natural gas to address energy security and global warming. Mohale built the narrative based on a 
Shell study on The New Lens Scenarios. Important to note in Mohale’s argument is that the world’s 
demand for energy was increasing, mostly because the “global population is growing by more than 
200 000 people everyday” and also “One projection involves the equivalent of one new city of 
almost 1.5 million people every week for the next forty years”. These developments, argued 
Mohale, made it morally good and necessary for increased energy production, and this included 
shale gas exploration and production. This argument should be read together with Shell South 




therefore not be isolated from an attempt to acquire government and society’s acceptance of 
fracking activities in the Karoo. 
 
Mohale universalised and moralised the energy futures based on shale gas through using common 
sense language: “We need to work together to starve off an energy and resource crisis”. By alluding 
to “we” Mohale constructed the need to address the “world’s resource and environmental stresses” 
as the responsibility of everyone. Mohale homogenised these claims by using discourse translation 
by raising issues that resonated with the ‘imagined’ everyone and thus implying a point of 
ideological consensus. The energy stresses, in Mohale’s construction, presented a moral obligation 
to act together because the “study of future scenarios shows time running out; [and therefore the 
need to act in a] united effort” to “avert a global crisis”. The claim by Mohale that “Hundreds of 
millions of people are emerging from poverty as wealth levels rise” served to legitimise the call 
for increased energy exploitation. Mohale saw answers to the global energy crisis in “opening up 
of vast new shale gas and oil resources in North America” to “ease some of the pressure, especially 
if China and other countries like South Africa develop their own resources”. This legitimation of 
shale gas emanated from Shell’s key interest in the Karoo. Conveniently, Mohale did not discuss 
the environmental concerns caused hydraulic fracturing and intertextually responded to criticisms 
from the Karoo communities and environmentalists who wanted the moratorium on Karoo 
fracking to be indefinitely put on hold. Implicit in Mohale’s views was that such an approach 
would worsen the global energy crisis.  
 
The author argued “Meanwhile, greenhouse gas emissions are rising fast. On existing trends, the 
world will far exceed the average temperature rise of 2o regarded as the limit for avoiding the most 
effects of climate change,” thus, intensifying “pressure on water, energy and food resources”. 
Mohale noted that water, energy and food resources were “tightly woven” and required “that we 
will need to address them intelligently and in unison”. Some of the solutions were to be found in 
“intelligent urban planning in the world’s rapidly growing cities” and “cleaner fossil fuels will also 
be critical in meeting the world’s energy needs. But the sheer scale of energy demand means fossil 
fuel consumption will continue to grow”. Bonang Mohale began dangerous rhetoric of ‘clean fossil 




climate change problems. While it could be correct that energy needs will rise, Mohale only saw 
the increase as a result of population growth and not increased capitalist-motivated consumption. 
Mohale did not seek a discourse that was based on transforming the capitalist economic system 
but continues to encourage ways of salvaging the way of life-based on never-ending consumption 
and exploitation. While the article conceded that coal use will continue for the foreseeable future, 
the solutions were to be found in making the coal ‘clean’ and also replacing it with other ‘clean 
fossils’ such as shale gas: “So displacing coal-fired power with natural gas, the cleanest burning 
fossil fuel, could make the most substantial contribution to reducing CO2 emissions over the next 
forty years. When used to generate power, gas produces around half the emissions of coal”. This, 
therefore, morally justified hydraulic fracturing.  
Natural gas was constructed as key in supporting the “growth in renewable energy”. Despite the 
foreseeable growth of wind and solar energy, Mohale argued that they still “need back-up because 
they cannot operate all the time. With energy storage technologies in their infancy, gas-fired power 
is well placed to do this because it can be switched on and off quickly”. Bonang Mohale spoke on 
behalf of one of the major environmental culprits, Royal Dutch Shell, but the article moralised and 
universalised the arguments. While the central issue was about Shell’s interest in the Karoo shale 
gas, Mohale built a picture of a global energy crisis that needed heroes (Shell) to provide solutions 
through ‘clean natural gas’. Key to note is that the ANC, through Chancellor House, has shares in 
Shell’s Karoo exploration agenda and this made the discursive and policy power of actors such as 
Mohale more serious. The article was a solicitation of moral support and consensus for hydraulic 
fracturing in the Karoo amid resistance from the local communities. 
The story “Fracking report inflames gas feud,” (Sarah Wild, Mail & Guardian, 04 July 2013) 
promoted the view that natural gas was clean energy. This was done by quoting Barack Obama: 
“The bottom line is natural gas is creating jobs …. And it’s the transition fuel that can power our 
economy with less carbon pollution even as our businesses work to develop and then deploy more 
of the technology required for even cleaner energy economy of the future”. In South Africa, the 
newspaper discourse noted, shale gas offered “the opportunity for South Africa to move away from 
dirty coal-based electricity and its high greenhouse gas emissions”. The story allowed ideological 
disagreement where residents of the Karoo attempt to show their pessimism towards fracking in 




in drinking water “indicates the potential for the emigration of gases from far below the surface 
area where the gases are expected”. Saliem Fakir (WWF) was concerned about the regulatory 
framework. “It depends on the regulatory regime that is able to set standards of the wells should 
be capped or sealed”. 
 
In the story “Coal’s future looks dark as gas lift energy hopes,” (No author, Sunday Times, 12 
April 2015), natural gas, a fossil fuel, was represented as a response instrument in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. Quoting Jonathan Stern from the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, 
the story praised big oil companies that were diversifying into natural gas exploration and 
production because shale gas was “likely overtake coal as the world’s second fuel by the 2020s”. 
The story argued that shale gas was “a preferred fuel around the world because it is cleaner to burn 
than coal and oil”. Helge Lund, the Chief Executive of Statoil ASA supported natural gas because 
it would replace “in electricity production”. The gas optimism was legitimised and naturalised by 
Shell’s Chief Executive Officer, Ben van Beurden who claimed that “When burnt for power, gas 
produces half the CO2 coal does”. 
 
The Op-Ed “Mix it up to gain energy security,” (Sunday Independent, 28 June 2015) by Busani 
Ngcaweni, Deputy Director-General in the Presidency, supported nuclear energy and hydraulic 
fracturing as possible new vistas for South Africa’s energy security. This feeds into the debate on 
South Africa’s energy mix. The article buttressed the government's policies and actions regarding 
Operation Phakisa and nuclear projects. This was “based on the realisation that the country needed 
a diversified energy mix to meet current and future needs …. South Africa can confidently claim 
the capability to safely and cost-effectively manage the installation, operation and maintenance of 
new nuclear power stations”. Shale gas and nuclear energy were contrasted with unreliable and 
insecure wind and solar energy sources which were only useful “towards satisfying household and 
industrial energy needs”.  
 
Nuclear and shale gas were seen as giving South Africa opportunities in terms of economic growth 
and job creation. Ngcaweni maintained that “activists should appreciate the political economy and 




made today”. Though claiming to be writing in his own capacity, coincidentally, Ngcaweni’s 
views align with official government ideas on the energy mix and climate change. The need to 
provide enough energy, grow the economy and create jobs is used as a justification for optimism 
in both nuclear and shale gas. The article was more concerned with energy sufficiency and 
relegated environmental impacts. Ngcaweni legitimised, through economisation and moralisation, 
the views on nuclear and shale gas optimism. By referring to jobs and the economy, the article 
painted the IRP as a progressive policy. Absent from the article was a discussion on the 
beneficiaries of nuclear and shale gas optimistic policies. Overall, the present energy needs 
trumped the calls for emissions reduction and environmental integrity. 
 
The concerns about nuclear problems and fracking raised by activists were not as important as the 
perceived benefits in terms of improved energy supply scenarios. Further, South Africa could 
improve nuclear safety through research and innovation at universities. The benefits of nuclear 
and shale gas were immense: “Nuclear power has the advantage of providing electricity in 
conjunction with technological development in other applications, including health, agriculture, 
mining, poverty alleviation and security of water supply”. 
8.9 Shale Gas Diffidence 
Eleanor Momberg’s story “Strong opposition to fracking,” (Sunday Independent, 22 April 2012) 
expressed hydraulic fracturing diffidence. The story was sponsored by the Diamond Route, a 
company owned by De Beers and Debeswa (De Beers is a member of Anglo American Plc as of 
2019). The political economy of the Karoo and Shale gas fracturing was alluded to. The story 
pointed out the conflicts of interests that faced many interested parties. For example, the ANC 
owns shares in Shell South Africa, and Shell was doing the feasibility in the Karoo. The ANC 
shares were held its investment arm, Chancellor House. Key people at Chancellor House were 
Popo Molefe (Chairman) and Manatho Netsianda (CEO). Chancellor House has interests in 
Hitachi Power Africa (a company given the tender for the Kusile and Medupi coal power stations) 
where it held 25%. Eskom awarded Hitachi R20 billion tender for the supply of six steam 
generators for the Medupi and Kusile power stations while its Chairman, Popo Molefe also set in 





The story laid out the complex nature of the Karoo and energy clubs in South Africa, the interest 
of big companies versus environmental concerns. The story problematised fracking by alluding to 
the political economy of shale gas exploration. The story raises concerns about the ANC as both 
judge ad player and the existence of an ANC member in the Karoo Community Action Forum 
“which supports fracking, and the ownership of another exploration applicant, Sungu Petroleum, 
by a former senior Minerals Department official”. Simi Sobukwe was represented further 
delegitimising fracking: “But very few people will benefit from fracking and this approach of 
tearing everything down is not going to help. We need a partnership to fix things”. Dougie Stern 
believed that “the introduction of fracking would affect the country’s meat and wool production”. 
The fracking resistance discourse is legitimised and moralised because the Karoo “produced 30 
percent of South Africa’s meat, and sheep farmers contributed extensively to the international wool 
industry”. 
 
David Fig sought to rebut the South African government claims that shale gas is clean energy 
(David Fig, “Fracking issues require new laws,” Mail & Guardian, 16 August 2012). David Fig, 
an honorary research associate at the environmental evaluation institute at the University of Cape 
Town, politicised fracking as a system harmful to both people and the environment:  
Up to 8% of the shale gas will escape in the process and enter the atmosphere, creating a 
problem for climate change. Methane is a greenhouse gas 28 times more lethal than carbon 
dioxide …. People who make their livelihoods in the Karoo rely entirely on underground 
water for their survival. The risk of contamination is high …. Trucking in freshwater, sand  
and chemicals to each well will cause immense dust pollution from the gravel roads of the 
Karoo …. Farmers in the Karoo have said they believe fracking and agriculture are 
incompatible. Water contamination and dust pollution could cost the Karoo its reputation 
for purity, ruining the reputation of products such as Karoo lamb …. Fracking will 
compromise our supply of freshwater. It may contaminate the Karoo’s fragile resources 
and do away with livelihoods …. It will extend South Africa’s dependence on fossil energy 
rather than encouraging the use of renewables.  
By making several allusions to the impacts of fracking in the Karoo, the article began to show that 
while the government and multinational companies seeking to maximise their profits through shale 
gas, the impacts on the environment and people were massive. This study contends that the need 
for shale gas (with less carbon dioxide emissions compared to coal and oil) is simply a matter of 
rift shifting without addressing the challenge. The leakages of about 8% of methane and shale gas 




real reduction of greenhouse gases. Shale gas optimism is dominant because of the discourse 
coalitions (government, ANC and private multinational companies and the news media) that 
support it at the expense of concerns raised by the people. The Op-Ed is an attempt to offer 
ideological disagreement. However, regardless of the ills outlined in the article, the author does 
not wholly disagree with the idea of hydraulic fracturing but attempts to make the government 
draft new laws to accommodate the impacts and thus minimise harm: “it is imperative to write a 
new Act to cover the specifics of the shale gas industry to ensure it does minimal harm to the 
fragile Karoo environment”. 
 
8.10 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the analyses and interpretation of climate change mitigation debates as they 
permeated the South African news media, identifying the key discourses on mitigation and energy 
and linking discourses to the vested interests of the actors that promoted them. These discourses 
included coal indispensability, nuclear optimism and shale gas optimism that were promoted by 
the minerals-energy complex and the Department of Energy and that of Mineral Resources. These 
actors used the discursive strategies of moralisation and economisation to moralise the ‘need’ for 
South Africa to use coal because the country was still ‘developing’ and thus coal was necessary 
for economic growth and international trade competitiveness. The oxymoron of ‘clean coal’ was 
also promoted by these actors. In opposition, there are actors who strongly opposed coal, shale gas 
and nuclear energy. These contrarian discourses were sponsored by actors from environmental 
non-governmental organisations and academics. In expressing opposition to coal and nuclear, 
these actors from non-government organisations and academics promoted the Promethean techno-
renewable energy optimism leading to the green economy. At some moments, their discourses 
converged with the discourses from the government, especially the Department of Environmental 
Affairs, that sought to steer South Africa towards ‘renewable-energy’ green growth. The 
Promethean discourses construct climate change as a problem that can be fixed through 








Chapter Nine: Contested Landscapes and the Barriers to Action: Corporate South Africa 
and the Rhetoric of Industrial Growth 
9.1 Introduction 
Climate change discourses in the news media were characterised by ideological and discourse 
contestations between the need to reduce internal carbon emissions and those actors who preferred 
a ‘do nothing’ approach. The government, through the Environmental Affairs Department and the 
Treasury Department, had policies in place to reduce the country’s emissions, mostly coming from 
the energy sector. These plans included setting up carbon budgets and implementing a carbon tax 
as instruments to encourage companies to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions through opting 
for renewable energy. The actors in the minerals-energy complex heavily resisted the introduction 
of a carbon budget and a carbon tax. This tax, they argued, would kill the industry and thus lead 
to massive unemployment. These actors used ‘bullying,’ ‘lobbying,’ and economic blackmail to 
try and discourage the government from implementing these instruments. This chapter 
rearticulates these discourses as they played out in the newspapers, examines whether the media 
took ideological positions that promoted and reproduced the interests of particular actors, 
especially those in the minerals-energy complex or reproduced the government discourse. Overall, 
this chapter provides a general critique of market instruments of carbon tax and the included 
elements of carbon trade in the mitigation approaches pursued by South Africa. 
9.2 Carbon Tax Diffidence: ‘It’s an industry and job-killing policy’ 
Opposition to the proposed carbon tax came mostly from the minerals-energy complex. In the 
story “Carbon budget ‘bad for business’,” (Lynley Donnelly and Fiona Macleod, Mail & 
Guardian, 17 November 2011) brought out the opposition to a government White Paper on climate 
change that proposed carbon budgets and a carbon tax. Mining and energy companies were 
opposed to any idea of a carbon budget and tax. While the White Paper found support amongst 
environmental groups and civil society who saw it as a step towards mandatory mitigation 
measures per sector, the Chamber of Mines opposed the proposed policy arguing that: “We find 
the department of environmental affairs has gone back on its word and has included numbers that 
are still in discussion, including whether the baseline that informed those numbers was correct”. 




carbon tax, for example, is a blunt instrument that will not produce the desired results to reduce 
emissions and change behaviour …. It may, in fact, result in pervasive behaviour [such as 
exporting emissions] and have a negative impact on emissions as well as greater economic impacts 
such as job losses”.  
Although the story gave the primary definitional power to the Environmental Affairs Minister, 
Edna Molewa, the use of direct representation, the headline and the abundant use of minerals-
energy discourse actors reproduced their views as the most dominant ones and that any attempts 
on carbon budgets and tax were bad for the economy because they could result in “job losses”. 
Actors from the minerals-energy complex, assisted by the news structure and discourse, 
represented carbon budgets and taxes as enemies of business. It was against common sense to 
pursue policies that could harm the economy. The story showed the power of the minerals-energy 
complex in determining and influencing climate change policies in South Africa which are 
achieved through bullying and blackmailing civil society and government. The story reproduced 
interests of the minerals-energy complex as interests of everyone because their fears were 
generalised and normalised and thus, ‘we should all care not to disrupt business and the economy’.  
 
Carbon tax diffidence discourses were also given room in the Sunday Independent. For example, 
the story “Mining industry lays golden egg for SA,” (Eleanor Momberg, Sunday Independent, 27 
November 2011) used Xolani Mkhwanazi (President, South Africa Chamber of Mines and the 
Chairperson of BHP Billiton South Africa Operations) and Bheki Sibiya (Chief Executive of the 
South Africa Chamber of Mines) as the discourse sponsors against the carbon tax. The two 
constructed the proposed carbon tax as an affront to business and therefore an undesirable irritant. 
For them, mining was the mainstay of the South African economy, putting unnecessary taxes 
would strangle business and the economy. The carbon tax was seen by Mkhwanazi as “imposition 
of non-essential additional taxes” which needed to be avoided because they added, “to an already 
onerous cost profile for the South African mining industry”. The newspaper discourse 
inadvertently expressed support of the discourse put forward by the Chamber of Mines: “In a 
climate affected world, the industry remained committed to acting immediately to ensure that 
South Africa remained competitive as a resource-efficient country in a future carbon-constrained 




that could be used to reduce South Africa’s emissions. Mkhwanazi was represented stating that 
“The Chamber’s intention is to help find a climate policy that is not harmful to business and which 
fosters job creation and advances capacity for the mining sector to increase its contribution to 
national economic growth and development”.  
 
The emphasis from the mining sector was on growth and profit. While it is common knowledge 
that the minerals-energy complex in South Africa is key in both emissions and in mitigation 
because of the extensive use of coal energy and also the cheap electricity paid by the mining sector, 
the industry was against a carbon tax because they saw it as just “a blunt instrument to raise revenue 
for the national Treasury without necessarily achieving a lower carbon intensity objective”. The 
story economised the contributions of the mining industry to the South African economy, for 
example, “about 19 percent of GDP,” over “50 percent of merchandise exports,” “1 million jobs,” 
“30 percent of capital inflows into the economy,” over “40 percent, or close to R2 trillion of the 
market capitalisation of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange,” and “more than 90 percent of SA 
electricity generation capacity … about 13 percent of direct corporate tax receipts”. The provision 
of the statistics relating to the economic contributions of the mining industry helped to propel the 
industry’s claim that they did not need any more taxes. The centrality of the mining industry, hence 
its role in the political economy of climate change responses was made clear by the sheer 
contributions of the industry to the economy. The South African economy is dependent on mining, 
hence the power of the minerals-energy complex in the climate change mitigation discourses. 
 
The dominance of the minerals-energy complex was legitimised by the news article discourse 
which effectively, through translation, agreed with the viewpoints of the mining companies. 
Further, the story quoted Bheki Sibiya, Chamber of Mines Chief Executive, emphasising the 
importance of the mining industry to the South African economy when appearing before the 
parliamentary portfolio committee on minerals. Sibiya’s arguments were paraphrased throughout 
the story. The exclusive use of actors from the South African Chamber of Mines helped to 
naturalise the views of the minerals-energy complex. The provision of economic contributions of 
the mining industry moralised their rejection of the carbon tax. Implied in this discourse is that any 




everyone. From the ideologies promoted in the story, the mining industry in South Africa served 
everyone and therefore should not be burdened by “non-essential taxes”.  
 
Central to note is that the claims of the minerals-energy complex were reproduced by way of direct 
and indirect representation. Rather than the story focusing on the emissions from mining and how 
the tax could help South Africa in reducing its emissions, the story diverted to account for the 
benefits of the industry to the entire economy. Interestingly, the story used the mining industry as 
discourse sponsors in a debate that they themselves are the villains. Their views were not 
challenged but reproduced and legitimised. The emissions from the mining sector, according to 
the worldviews expressed in the story, were to be understood as inescapable evils. This study 
contends that the unquestioning reproduction of the elite ideologies only helps to maintain the 
status quo characterised by high emissions coming from the minerals-energy complex. Key also 
is the omission of the political economy of mining and energy in the country and the attendant 
inequalities that are created by the conglomerate mining houses. The minerals-energy complex 
only benefited a few elite and had no direct benefit to the people. Essential to argue is that the level 
of emissions from mining and the overall per capita emissions did not correspond with the wealth 
of ordinary people. 
 
In another story related to the one by Eleanor Momberg, Peter Delenno produced the story “Carbon 
tax could sink mining, SA Chamber chief warns,” (Sunday Independent, 27 November 2011) that 
also described the proposed carbon tax as harmful to the South African economy. Xolani 
Mkhwanazi, South Africa Chamber of Mines Chair and the chairperson of BHP Billiton South 
African Operations, was the sole actor used in the story. Amid the calls for a carbon tax to help 
South Africa reduce greenhouse gas emissions, Mkhwanazi was indirectly represented opposing 
the tax because “The already declining South African mining sector would be further damaged if 
the government did not grant high energy users, such as smelters, exemptions to the proposed 
carbon tax”. Mkhwanazi, while overall speaking on behalf of the Chamber of Mines, it should be 
noted, represents the interests of BHP Billiton, a big beneficiary of cheap electricity from Eskom 
and a key part of the minerals-energy complex. While acknowledging that climate change was a 




could not afford to put a carbon tax regime, noting further that that should be left to the more 
advanced economies: “Developed countries have moved closer to becoming service economies so 
they have better opportunities to develop a carbon free economy”. The developing countries such 
as South Africa, Mkhwanazi argued, needed assistance, “If the developed world does not help the 
developing countries, we just might not implement these measures. South Africa is just a 1 percent 
emitter … compared with countries such as China it is tiny”. The discourse strategy used by 
Mkhwanazi was to attempt to picture South Africa within a generalised bracket of ‘developing and 
poor’ countries. He did not allude to the huge volumes of emissions coming from South Africa. 
By arguing that South Africa was just “1 percent” of global emissions, he attempted to reduce the 
scale of responsibility for present emissions on the South African shoulders. This strategy actively 
passivised and nominalised the role of South Africa in the global greenhouse gas emissions. The 
drawing of parallels between the developed countries and China was meant to diminish local 
greenhouse gas emissions and thus argue that they were too tiny to warrant a carbon tax. South 
Africa’s emissions were therefore globally insignificant and ignorable and at the same time 
allowing the country ‘a developmental space’. 
 
Within the climate change discourses in South Africa, some actors believed that climate change-
induced regulations such as carbon budgets and taxes were bad for economic growth. In the Op-
Ed “Carbon limits bad for growth,” Johan Muller (Mail & Guardian, 14 December 2011), (an 
energy and power systems industry analyst at Frost & Sullivan) argued that South Africa was a 
country with higher inequalities and not ready for any changes meant to reduce carbon-based 
economic activity. Muller was worried that South Africa, a country he characterised as having its 
own unique inequality challenges, was busy with problems that were ‘western’: “Against the 
backdrop of a country struggling to adapt to the lingering effects of apartheid and a relatively slow-
growing economy, we find the often ‘first-world’ issues related to climate change (and its 
accompanying effects) a real concern” In Muller’s view, climate change was a western first-world 
perspective and problem. Because of the higher inequalities in South Africa, the country needed a 
developmental space free from environmental regulations to catch-up. “In terms of the Gini Index 
South Africa is consistently ranked in the bottom five in the world, holding that the distance 




noted that “various policies” meant to develop the economy “have to be balanced against climate-
change issues that have the potential to slow down economic growth rather than stimulate it”. 
Inequalities were used to moralise the thesis of dirty development. Patrick Bond (2012) has argued 
that there was no evidence linking the continued use of fossils and the massive GDP growth to 
better standards of living for the poor people of South Africa.  
Muller warned against “eco-protectionism” because it hurts “the major energy consumers such as 
Eskom, Sasol, BHP Billiton and ArcelorMittal” with the “knock-on effect … [being] felt all the 
way down to single household consumers”. The discourse against emissions reduction that was 
peddled in this article speaks on behalf of the minerals-energy complex discourse coalition. The 
coalition stands to benefit from non-restrictive environmental measures. Their profits and interests 
will continue to grow at the expense of the environment. The article pushed forward the interests 
of actors in energy and mining disguised as a concern for the ordinary people. The reference to the 
“knock-on effect” being felt at the household level was meant to interpellate the readers and 
‘everyone’ into the discourse. Using oral models and discourse translation, Muller began to speak 
on behalf of all those who ‘care’ about the economy and inequality. 
The reference to inequalities and poverty was meant to build a moral benchmark to launch the 
argument. The fictive concern for inequality ignored to mention that despite the continuous 
exploitation of fossils, these inequalities have not shrunk but widened, a clear position to attest 
that there is no co-relationship between fossils use and better living conditions for the poor. To the 
contrary, inequalities have hugely widened alongside the growth in profits for big companies that 
enjoy very low electricity tariffs. While inequalities have increased together with environmental 
degradation, the profits of a few have soared. Big minerals-energy coalitions have not benefited 
the people but a few industrial capitalists. The author attempted to promote an elite minerals-
energy discourse coalition position under the false pretence of ‘development’ and reducing 
inequality and poverty. The language consistently used in the article was that of the public idiom 
and oral models. It appeals to the lowest common denominator of meaning production and makes 
a common-sense appeal (see Hall and O’Shea 2013). Hall and O’Shea (2013) noted that common 
sense is the opposite of right sense. The language common senses the discourse through allusions 




ordinary people. Key to note, however, is that the commonsensical nature of the article was an 
attempt to win the consent of the subordinated by using language that speaks to their daily 
struggles. It allows people to identify themselves with the story, the author and the interests 
represented by both. In so doing, the interests of the minerals-energy complex discourse coalition 
are preserved and gain consent from the people. The public is interpellated and assimilated by way 
of language into the interests of the elite, which on face value, seem to represent ‘everyone’s’ 
views. 
Some news stories sought balance in their representation and coverage of the carbon tax debates. 
One example is the story by Johann Barnard “Carbon pricing under the microscope,” (Mail & 
Guardian, 23 August 2012). The story was based on the Mail & Guardian’s Critical Thinking 
Forum (sponsored by one of the biggest beneficiaries of cheap electricity - BHP Billiton). The 
story is a summary of the viewpoints from industry, civil society and government about carbon 
pricing and budgets. The story portrayed big businesses as opposed to the introduction of the 
‘harmful’ carbon pricing and carbon budgets and preferred that the pricing be deferred to later 
years. Michael Rossouw from Xstrata argued: “Surely, we should first determine what we can 
practically do without causing detrimental harm to our economy and growth and jobs”. This view 
was also supported by Brandon Fraser from the Consumer Goods Council who noted that “If we 
continue to look at these indirect taxes, it becomes a system of an elastic band”. Rob Jeffrey from 
Econometrix also supported this view: “The current trend toward certain green energy would more 
than double the costs of electricity production …. Sadly, our competitive advantage is going to be 
dependent on using coal and gas, and we need to maintain the competitive advantage if we are to 
promote our economic growth”. Jeffrey added that research had shown that “that by 2021 the 
carbon tax alone could reduce the country’s GDP by 2% contributing a loss of an additional 700 
000 jobs”. These discourses from the industry show that the industry was not in support of carbon 
pricing. They used the discursive strategy of de-economising the carbon pricing regime by alluding 
to its impacts on global economic competitiveness and the loss of jobs. While the arguments put 
forward are about reduced competitiveness and growth, the interests represented here were not of 
‘all’ South Africans but a few industrial elites in the minerals-energy complex. The attempt to 
define carbon pricing as a threat to the economy and “our competitive advantage,” and the use of 




commonsensical and logical. Policies that destroyed the economy and killed jobs, were seen as not 
good for the country. This discourse strategy tries to speak on behalf of the interests of the ‘people’, 
make them ‘its interests’ and thus interpellate people into talking from the sourcebook of capitalist 
industrial elites. By using the public idiom and oral models through discourse translation, the 
discourse makes carbon pricing evil and cannot be commonsensical.  
However, on the other hand, the ideological disagreement was provided by Richard Worthington 
(WWF) and Cecil Morden (Chief Director of Economic Tax at the Treasury Department) who 
argued in support of carbon pricing and urgent climate action. Worthington argued that “There is 
a cost associated with greenhouse gas emissions …. The cost is currently being deferred into the 
future, but we know we can’t continue doing that indefinitely. In support, Cecil Morden promoted 
the use of market instruments in reducing emissions: “The use of prices as an instrument is 
important, and it is in that context that there is no free lunch”. The preponderance of carbon tax 
diffident voices in the story made the views of the minerals-energy complex more prominent and 
acquire discursive legitimacy. 
Lynley Donnelly’s story “Carbon or resource rent tax?” (Mail & Guardian, 07 March 2012) 
attempted to dissect the contested carbon tax policy terrain. The story relied on a document 
produced by the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party on the Resource Rent Tax. The 
ANC was sceptical of a carbon tax preferring rather a resource rent tax. The newspaper discourse 
described the ANC as “ambivalent about introducing a carbon tax”. The ANC document showed 
carbon tax diffidence by arguing that the tax “could be extremely damaging to our economy and 
should be put on hold [and would] potentially render many energy-intensive beneficiation 
operations unviable”. These views were supported in the story by Peet du Plooy from the Trade 
and Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS) who argued that “Unless a way is found to reduce the 
impact on the poor, such as free basic electricity, a carbon tax would disproportionately affect 
them. At high levels, it can also put some competitive strain on energy-intensive and export-
exposed sectors”. The agenda of the ANC as a governing party was to dissuade the nation from 
following a path of polluter pays. The scepticism towards carbon tax served the interests of the 
industrial and business elites. The carbon tax could also affect companies that some ANC members 




For the ANC to push forward a debate against the carbon tax, its discourse articulates well with 
concerns of the industrial-energy complex that also opposed the tax. The two, not necessarily 
always converging, begin to cohere together as a social and discursive bloc. The ANC’s allusion 
to a carbon tax as “extremely damaging to our economy” translates the language of government 
and industry elites into a doxa, it is not just about the tax but “our economy” which becomes a 
social collective and shared. Anything that could harm “our economy” was to be opposed. The use 
of the translation of elite discourses and the public idiom/oral models was meant to present carbon 
taxes as evil against ‘all of us’ and therefore must be resisted. By so doing, the interests of industry 
and government were constructed as points of national ideological consensus and people should 
not accept carbon taxes. Hidden behind these oral models were the ideological interests of the 
industrial capitalists, bankers and the minerals-energy complex who are to directly be affected 
through reduced profits. It was not about the people but the capitalist system. The newspaper 
discourse argued that “the private sector has grave reservations over the implementation of such a 
tax and particularly over the threat it would pose to the competitiveness of South Africa’s carbon-
intensive mining and manufacturing industries”. 
The dominant views of the ANC and industrial capitalists were built into a common-sense 
language, legitimised and moralised through the delegitimisation and demoralisation of the 
proposed carbon tax. The ANC and Peet du Plooy effectively discredited carbon taxes as harmful 
to the economy, to jobs etc. More importantly, du Plooy extended his narrative and began to speak 
on behalf of the poor and energy-intensive and export-exposed industries. This helped to 
demoralise the carbon tax discourse by portraying it as against national interest. Richard 
Worthington (WWF South Africa) was quoted at the end of the article providing an alternative 
view. The placement of the counter-discourse at the periphery of the story helped in portraying the 
views as negligible and inferior. The structure of the story played a crucial role in building 
ideological closure, rendering some views more important (ANC and du Plooy) and the alternative 
ones as less important. The structure of the story also helped in the meaning formulation that 
helped people to read and produce meanings that are consistent with the worldviews of those given 
the primary definitional power. Worthington’s views, it should be noted, already were limited in 
scope by the discursive parameters already set by the news writer and social actors enjoying the 




While the Mail and Guardian, City Press and the Sunday Independent hardly had stories that 
promote climate change denialism and scepticism, the Sunday Times devoted several stories and 
actors that constructed climate science as a lie. Op-Eds by Stephen Mulholland denied climate 
science. For example, the article, “Global warming is mythical nonsense” (Sunday Times, 12 May 
2013), described those who supported the climate science consensus discourse “crazies”. The 
introduction of the carbon tax by the government was described as “This cult has decided that man 
is changing the earth’s climate in ways that destroy us … it now appears our ravenous revenue 
service has converted to the climate change religion”. The author sought to moralise the denialist 
discourse by quoting a scientist, Professor Philip Lloyd from the Cape Peninsula University of 
Technology: “SARS is riding the climate change frenzy to extort even more in hidden imposts 
from our tiny base of taxpayers”. The carbon tax “will not be ring-fenced and used for 
environmental purposes. It will disappear, as does the fuel duty, into the fiscal pot to be squandered 
by incompetent and corrupt civil servants and their political bosses”. 
 
The story “ArcelorMittal may be forced to pay carbon tax,” (Dewald van Rensburg, City Press, 23 
June 2013) noted that the carbon tax proposed by the Treasury Department could force 
ArcelorMittal South Africa to pay the environmental sin tax. The story brought about the 
disagreements between the government and the minerals-energy complex (ArcelorMittal is part of 
it). The government argued that carbon tax was a way of encouraging energy efficiency and 
emissions cuts. ArcelorMittal saw the carbon tax as “no more than a revenue-raising initiative” 
which was bad for the country because “The reality is that South Africa is de-industrialising”. The 
tax will cost the country “R600 million per year while it actually has no feasible way of reducing 
its emissions except by reducing its production”. 
 
In the story “Carbon tax regime faces hurdles,” (Jana Marais, Sunday Times, 23 June 2013), the 
proposed carbon tax regime was demoralised as having negative impacts on the economy and with 
little environmental impact. South Africa, ‘a developing country’ first to introduce such a tax, “will 
have a limited effect on global emissions and will render the economy uncompetitive, costing jobs 
and investment”. While the news story quoted the Treasury’s research findings that noted that the 




economy into a more sustainable and low-carbon growth path”, the story went on to question this 
claim. The tax was portrayed as not making any economic sense. The aspects of the environment 
and climate change were to be subjected to economic logic first. The cost of carbon would be 
transferred to consumers by Eskom. “Concerns were also raised as to whether imported products 
from countries without carbon taxes will face an additional import tax in South Africa to ensure a 
level playing field … relocation of companies to countries without carbon taxes - as this would 
leave total global carbon emissions unchanged and would defeat the purpose of the tax”. The 
sponsors of the anti-carbon tax regime were “big companies, including ArcelorMittal South Africa 
(Amsa), Sasol, Anglo Gold Ashanti and Exxaro”. Amsa’s group environmental manager, Siegfried 
Spänig, described the tax as  
a revenue-gathering exercise that would have dire economic consequences …. Even if you 
tax us to death, we cannot change our behaviour. We should ask if we - as a developing 
country facing a number of challenges including unemployment, air pollution and water 
scarcity and with a focus on beneficiation to grow the economy - should be at the forefront 
of implementing carbon tax. 
 
The opposite to the carbon tax by the minerals-energy complex is being normalised and legitimised 
through the de-economisation of a carbon tax in a “developing country”. The notion of a 
developing path and the right to pollute was manifest in such discourses. The aspect of a carbon 
tax was not projected as a problem for the profit margins of the minerals-energy complex, but 
rather through discourse translation - where it became an issue of the “entire economy” affecting 
jobs, investments, growth etc. By drawing their legitimation for the economic growth/development 
discourses, the minerals-energy complex attempted to make their concerns nationwide concerns. 
The carbon tax would harm the economy and therefore, it was immoral and irresponsible for the 
government to impose such a tax in a country faced with “many challenges”. 
 
The introduction of a carbon tax as part of South Africa’s plans to cut emissions was met with 
resistance from the business sector which argued that the tax was not necessary since because “SA 
contributes less than 1% of the world’s greenhouse gas” and that “There is no reason for South 
Africa to ‘take a lead’ with climate change mitigation” (Dewald van Rensburg, “Business lobby 
lashes carbon tax,” City Press, 08 September 2013). The Business Unity SA group (Busa), as 




introduce a carbon tax”. The discourse of development was used to normalise and rationalise the 
need for South Africa to avoid a carbon tax because “much of the South African economy literally 
cannot reduce its emissions and should be exempted from the tax”. 
 
The Busa argued further that it was nonsensical “to tax unavoidable emissions” and that “the tax 
will achieve next to nothing except a steep increase in electricity prices”. The ideas of the Business 
Unity SA and ArcelorMittal were reproduced without questioning. The argument against a carbon 
tax was made as an argument in the interest of ‘everyone’, the ‘economy’ and the people who will 
be affected by the “steep increase in electricity prices”. While the major beneficiaries of a new tax 
are the actors in the minerals-energy complex, the story represented the tax as bad for everyone. 
The minerals-energy complex (see also chapter 2) is a beneficiary of cheap and subsidised 
electricity. A carbon tax would force Eskom to increase tariffs that had a knock-on effect on the 
profits of big mining and industry corporations that consume over 70% of the South African 
energy. The beneficiaries of the dirty coal were against instruments that potentially reduced their 
profits. Therefore, to gain public sympathy, the discourse on carbon tax diffidence was constructed 
in the public idiom using oral models so as to interpellate readers and recruit them to become 
members of discourse that at face value champions their interests. Hidden underneath such a 
discursive construction were the interests of the elite blocs that enjoyed energy subsidies from 
Eskom and make huge profits. 
 
Stephen Mulholland was given quite wide access to the climate change discourse in the Sunday 
Times. As part of attempts to reject the proposed carbon tax, Mulholland began by questioning the 
science of climate change itself. An example is a story “Climate change band plays on,” (Stephen 
Mulholland, Sunday Times, 29 September 2013) where he constructed climate change as a hoax 
that was being promoted by “crazies” who had “been fooled by ambitious scientists who had 
doctored the evidence”. Mulholland described those interested in climate change as “groupies, 
including our own [South African] climate crazies”. The article used the 2015 emails leak scandal 
during COP15 in Copenhagen to moralise the climate change denialism claims: “leaked documents 
from the climate research unit at the University of East Anglia showed conclusively that a hoax 




and civil servants [who] see global warming alarm - despite overwhelming evidence that it is 
largely a scientific fraud - as a means to extract yet more revenue from the private sector”. 
Mulholland was against carbon taxes because they represented a “punishment” instead of focusing 
on ‘incentives’ for reducing carbon emissions. For Mulholland, carbon emissions reduction were 
necessary, not for climate change reasons, but because “they are not healthy.'' 
 
Carbon tax diffidence was more prevalent and pronounced in the Sunday Times. Brendan Peacock, 
in his story “The hidden calamity of carbon tax,” (Sunday Times, 06 October 2013), delegitimised 
carbon tax as bad policy for South Africa. In the headline, “The hidden calamity of carbon tax”, 
the story portrayed a climate of pessimism and opposition. South Africa was seen as being over-
ambitious by championing a carbon tax: “South Africa - a relatively small polluter by world 
standards and first developing country anywhere with such a tax and business is railing against yet 
another blow to our global competitiveness if such costs come to pass”. It was immoral and 
irresponsible for South Africa to tax carbon because the country was just “a small GHGs emitter 
globally” and was still developing. The introduction of a carbon tax was a “blow to our 
competitiveness” globally and therefore bad for everyone. By de-economising the carbon tax 
discourse, the story attempted to paint such policies and initiatives as against logic and common 
sense. The economy was paramount and the environmental concerns were secondary. Within this 
story, notions of ‘the right to develop’ or the right to ‘pollute’ are connotatively present. While 
“the leading polluters by some distance are China and the US, and other developed nations have 
balked at the idea of committing to such a tax”, South Africa, a low key emitter, wanted to crucify 
its industry by introducing such a tax regime. The story directly represented Philip Lloyd (an anti-
climate Professor from CPUT) arguing that “internationally carbon taxes had not reduced 
emissions” and that “In every jurisdiction I have identified where there has been a carbon tax in 
place for a reasonable period … carbon emissions at best have been almost static, and in a number 
of cases they have soared in spite of the tax”. Pieter Roos, a consultant at the South African 
Chamber of Commerce supported Lloyd’s argument: “some economic sectors in South Africa - 
like heavy industry - would be hit hard by this tax and job losses would need to be reabsorbed into 
other, less energy-intensive sectors” and thus forcing companies to “shed employment and make 




News stories by Brendan Peacock promoted carbon tax diffidence. In the story “SA’s share of 
global emissions falling, say experts,” (Sunday Times, 06 October 2013), greenhouse gas 
emissions from South Africa were represented as ‘already’ falling and thus there was no need for 
the government to put carbon caps on the economy. The story relied on discourse constructions by 
Philip Lloyd, an ardent opposition scholar to climate change and a carbon tax dissident. The 
consistent choice of Lloyd and his stance against climate activities is questionable. According to 
Lloyd, carbon tax and emission caps “would be fatal because energy consumption and wealth 
creation are so intimately linked”. Lloyd attempted to demoralise the attempts to reduce emissions 
by de-economisation such as attempts as going against economic logic. 
 
For the carbon tax diffidence discourse, caps on energy consumption had negative effects on 
economic growth and thus undesirable. To moralise the claim, Lloyd further brought statistics 
from Econometrix to dispute government claims of minimal economic effects. “Where Treasury 
talks of a small impact on job creation, Econometrix talks of hundreds of thousands of job losses. 
The truth must lie somewhere in between”. The South African Chamber of Commerce’s Pietman 
Roos argued that the carbon tax “would hurt a prestige local agricultural commodity [sugar]”. 
Instead of a carbon tax, the story used direct discourse representation to summarise the views of 
Gisela Pieterse of Tax Advisory who argued for incentives where the government provided 
incentives for greenhouse gas cuts: “in the form of grants and tax breaks for companies to reduce 
their carbon emissions”. 
 
An Op-Ed from Peter Delmar “SA needs carbon copy of Aussie wheeze,” (Sunday Times, 04 
November 2014) opposed the plan of introducing a carbon tax. While the government was pushing 
through with plans to implement a carbon tax, Peter Delmar attempted to promote opposition to 
the carbon tax by using Australia as an example. South Africa was supposed to ditch the tax the 
same way Australia had done it: “SA needs carbon copy of Aussie wheeze” “if they 
[Australia]could get away with it, why can’t we”. South Africa was just “a little country … one 
that is not nearly as rich as Australia, we have a government that is hell-bent on inflicting on hard-
working industrialists a carbon tax so that it can buy more Mercedes-Benzes for its cadres deployed 




The Chemical and Allied Industries Association (CAIA) responded to David Hallowes’ article 
with an Op-Ed article headlined: “Climate policy may harm industrial growth” (Mail & Guardian, 
24 June 2015). From the Op-Ed, it is clear that CAIA believed and pushed through an agenda of 
regulatory scepticism. There was a belief that any climate action, especially the carbon tax would 
“harm industrial growth”. Growth, a buzzword of capitalism, was put forward as more important 
than any environmental concerns. Regulatory scepticism was emphasised in the article: 
“Significant investments have been made by industry players to mitigating GHG emissions, 
without regulatory or economic instruments being imposed by government”. The underlying 
theme in the carbon tax and carbon budgets debates was that of polarised discourses between 
regulatory optimism against regulatory diffidence from the industry. Regulation, industry 
discourses argued, stifled economic development and this discourse unit blackmailed and bullied 
the government into inaction. When industry translated their profit interests into a common 
language of growth - the discourse began to talk on behalf of national interest and veered off the 
actual agentive interests of Capital. “Though it can be agreed that the carbon intensity of the South 
African economy should be reduced in a phased manner, there is no urgency for this to take place”. 
From the viewpoint of the CAIA, South Africa could wait to implement climate action to facilitate 
growth and development: “Along with the electricity supply catastrophe, climate policy in South 
Africa runs the real risk of causing increased deindustrialisation. Its negative effects must be seen 
in the light of future growth and stability and the economic freedom of its citizens”. 
9.3 Reducing Emissions through Carbon Tax and Carbon Budget Optimism 
The Mail & Guardian largely reproduced the carbon tax optimism, also seeing the tax as a 
progressive instrument that would make companies more responsible and leading South Africa 
towards a ‘green economy’. Political indexing of officials in the Treasury and Environmental 
Affairs departments was common in all the newspapers. However, the Mail & Guardian did not 
critique this Promethean instrument, rather co-discourse sponsors from the environmental non-
governmental organisation were sought to buttress the importance of the carbon tax. The story “No 
carbon tax, but power levy up,” by Fiona Macleod (Mail & Guardian, 03 March 2011) showed in 
indifference that carbon tax would not be implemented due to the shelving of the tax. The story 
reproduced elite views by only using Pravin Gordhan (Minister of Finance) as the key actor and 




Africa’s unwillingness to punish polluters in the context of a warming planet. The carbon tax is 
constructed as a simple issue of policy and the story does not seek to problematise it and expose 
the government’s lukewarm responses: the shelving of carbon tax meant that pollution remained 
unchecked. This worked in the interests of the high polluters in the minerals-energy complex. 
Sipho Kings McDermott’s stories in the Mail & Guardian portrayed the carbon tax policy as 
progressive. In “Climate change fight gets tax nod,” (Sipho Kings McDermott, Mail & Guardian, 
01 March 2012), the reporter discussed carbon tax as a progressive tool in efforts to reduce 
emissions: “The proposed tax, R120 per tonne of emissions, will penalise companies that do not 
start lowering their emissions. It will also reward efficiency. '' The move towards the tax was 
supported by all the actors in the story. Edna Molewa was quoted in support “market-based 
instruments such as an escalating carbon tax” were to be used to reduce emissions. 
Similar to Sipho Kings’ acceptance and reproduction of the carbon tax optimism, Lisa Steyn, in 
the story “We’ll all pay the price for dirty power,” (Mail & Guardian, 07 March 2013) constructed 
the proposed carbon tax as the best way to force companies to reduce carbon emissions. Carbon 
tax legitimation in the story was also achieved because of the actors who were chosen. Peet du 
Plooy (Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies), Pravin Gordhan (Finance Minister) and Cecil 
Morden (Chief Director of Economic Tax at National Treasury) all supported the carbon tax. The 
story “Carbon tax will power SA’s drive to clean up its act,” (Sipho Kings, Mail & Guardian, 14 
March 2013) built endorsements for the carbon tax regime as an instrument to cut greenhouse gas 
emissions. The article delegitimised, by way of intertextual representation, the views that saw 
carbon taxes as harmful to the economy: “Robbie Louw, a director at Promethean Carbon, said the 
effect on business will be significantly less than most people think”.  
To delegitimise the ‘big business’ for promoting carbon myths, Hallowes noted that already the 
effects of climate change were affecting many people and leading to loss of life: “Already, the 
deaths of half a million people a year are directly attributable to climate change”. This was 
happening in the midst of corporate refusal to cut the ‘death-causing’ emissions: “They [big 
business] argue first that South Africa’s emissions are globally insignificant, second, on Sasol’s 




that these discourses from the minerals-energy complex were meant to shield these corporations 
from taking climate action. 
Sipho Kings’ story “Is carbon tax the key?” (Mail & Guardian, 06 June 2013) supported the 
attempt to promulgate the carbon tax “as a way of forcing industry to become more energy efficient 
and emit less harmful greenhouse gases”. Alex McNamara from Camco Clean Energy was directly 
cited in the story noting that “the tax would help change the current unsustainable mix of South 
Africa’s carbon-intensive economy with considerable health and water-related benefits”. The 
newspaper story was optimistic that carbon taxes had the potential to help South Africa reduce its 
emissions and force companies to be energy efficient. The carbon tax was moralised because it 
came with health and water-related benefits as pollution levels went down. A move towards carbon 
was also going to usher in the ‘green economy’ powered by renewable energy: “With renewable 
energy sources becoming increasingly attractive, more money would be spent on research and 
development in technology”. Key to the carbon tax proposal was a market-led approach of carbon 
trade where companies that needed to emit more could buy credits: “All sectors will start with an 
immediate 60% discount on the tax. Companies that need to compete on the international markets, 
such as those in iron and steel sectors, get a further 10% reduction. They can then trade carbon 
credits from initiatives that lower carbon emissions to lower it [tax] by another 5% to 10%”.  
The story alluded to South Africa’s carbon footprint as one of the largest, accounting for about 1% 
of total global emissions and having higher per capita emissions. “Each South African emits 10 
tonnes of carbon per year. The world average is 4.7”. While the per-capita calculation is world 
standard, this study argues that this has been one of the many ways inequality in the South African 
social system has been enveloped. The per capita calculations effectively delete the agency of key 
multinationals and the minerals-energy complex that accounts for more usage and gets its energy 
cheaper than the ordinary South African. By using the per capita accounting standards, it is clear 
that emissions in South Africa become universalised and focus is taken away from the major 
polluters. The same companies responsible for emissions are the ones getting 70% discounts on 
emissions and Eskom getting also 70% and offsetting the other 30% by charging consumers an 
extra. The solution could have tariff increases on those industries that consumed more and polluted 




bloc benefits more than the ordinary people. The story did not enable ideological disagreement. 
Carbon taxes were accepted as the best way. Critical to note however is the lack of quantification 
in the story. How effective is a carbon tax in reducing emissions given that 70% discounts for five 
years are given to companies with higher emissions?  The tax remains, from the face of it, an 
international public relations scam where South Africa was to be seen to be doing something about 
emissions. The story carried praises of such strides  “South Africa is leading the developing world 
in implementing a carbon tax” and “KPMG has named South Africa as the 13th most active 
country, out of 21 major global economies, in using tax as a tool to drive sustainable corporate 
behaviour and achieve green goal”. 
David Hallowes, in the Op-Ed “Corporate SA promotes carbon myths,” (Mail & Guardian, 17 
July 2015) problematised and politicised climate change politics in South Africa. The responses 
to climate change, especially the need to reduce emissions, were portrayed as areas of deep 
corporate contestation. Bipolar depictions between the government and civil society on the one 
side and business on the hand are clear. The article demoralised and delegitimised the discourses 
of non-action from businesses that bully and lobby against climate action and emissions reduction. 
Business, especially the Chemical and Allied Industries Association (CAIA) and the Intensive 
Energy Users Group (minerals-energy complex) were constructed as barriers to carbon tax 
implementation and emissions reduction. Hallowes accused them of seeking selfish corporate 
profits over the environment. They were portrayed as ‘immoral’ and ‘irresponsible’ actors: “Big 
industry has decided that South Africa should not do anything about climate change …. CAIA 
does not support South Africa’s continued development of climate change policy, including that 
of carbon tax”.  
Sipho Kings, in most of the stories on the carbon tax, managed to portray the big business within 
the minerals-energy complex as villains who refused to accept ‘a progressive’ carbon tax. In the 
story “Big business stalls crucial carbon tax,” (Sipho Kings, Mail & Guardian, 18 June 2015), 
Kings alluded to the debate around carbon tax as a mitigation instrument in South Africa. The 
carbon tax was constructed as a site of struggle between environmentalists and the government on 
one side and the minerals-energy complex on the other. Kings moralised and legitimised the carbon 




construction, the reduction of emissions in South Africa through a carbon tax was being hampered 
by “Bullying and lobbying by industry”. The industry was thus seen as ‘immoral’ and 
‘irresponsible’ for lobbying against the only “policy instrument that can reduce carbon emissions 
straight away”. Sasol, one of the biggest polluters in South Africa was quoted arguing against the 
tax because it was “not in the best interests of South Africa”. Similarly, the South African Chamber 
of Mines was against the tax because “would undermine the competitiveness of the industry and 
would have negative economic and social effects”. These two quotations served to legitimise and 
demoralise the claims by ‘immoral’ and ‘irresponsible players’ who were selfish and only 
concerned about their interests and profit. These industry players, thus, were enemies of the 
environment and their views and “bullying” tactics were ‘irresponsible’. The power of the 
minerals-energy complex is illustrated: “The tax is being undone by bullying …. Business has the 
resources and power to be belligerent, while the government does not even have a united position”. 
Big business used bullying and financial muscle to muzzle progress towards a green carbon tax 
that “was intended to change consumer and producer behaviour by making dirtier forms of 
production more expensive”. The industry was further demoralised through using WWF for 
Nature’s Saliem Fakir to define the industry as powerful and abusive: “The capability of 
corporations whose job is to remove anything that lowers the rate of return is serious”. The story 
quoted an unnamed investment expert arguing that: “Government maybe trying to do the right 
thing with the tax, but it is faced with companies desperately trying to defend their profits”.  
The big businesses, the story reported, bullied the government “threatening to cut jobs or divest”. 
The Intensive Energy Users Group spokesperson, Shaun Nel, denied bullying allegations: “Capital 
moves where it makes sense. That’s not a threat, it’s a fact …. Business in no way thinks we should 
not have a price on carbon. But a tax in this form makes no sense when emissions are dominated 
by Eskom, Sasol and ArcelorMittal”. The story allowed for ideological disagreement, even though 
it has a strongly preferred reading. Shaun Nel was quoted arguing that companies will move out 
of South Africa to places without the tax and cheaper electricity: “They will still emit and we will 
suffer the local impacts from those emissions while not getting any of the economic development”. 
The statement shows that for the Intensive Energy Users Group, profit came first over the 
environmental concerns. The South African government was given a choice between economic 




characterise climate change debates in South Africa, the contours of a struggle between the 
government, civil society and the minerals-energy complex. The headline of the story helped in 
building the dichotomies of climate politics in South Africa. Big business was constructed as the 
‘other’ - the villain that was stopping a ‘crucial’ tax meant to save the planet. The government, 
through the tax, was represented as taking the right steps. 
The story used, as its primary definer, an unnamed carbon trade consultant to deauthorize and 
demoralise industry. This study makes an important finding in terms of the articulations of 
different social groups. The news reporter, government and the carbon trade consultant all agreed 
that climate change mitigation could be achieved through a carbon tax. Articulation informs us 
that the unity of social formations is not necessarily out of correspondence and agreement but 
social formations often cohere out of their contradictions but converge by accident and 
coincidence. It is normal for carbon traders to support carbon tax systems because South Africa 
promised 5-10% tax exemptions to companies if they traded or bought carbon credits. A carbon 
tax is a good business for carbon consultants. For the government, a carbon tax meant another 
revenue stream. This is important as Treasury did not ring-fence revenues from carbon tax towards 
any environmental programmes and projects. It makes sense for the government to come up with 
an instrument that would bring more revenue. For the newspaper, it could be a matter of supporting 
environmental concerns and the legitimate need for lowering emissions. However, at an 
ideological level, the legitimation and endorsement of the carbon tax in the story helped to 
legitimise the market-led Promethean ideology behind it. By making carbon tax common sense, 
the story effectively endorsed market-led responses. In doing so, the language of the elite and the 
financialisation and commodification of public commons were made natural and a sense of 
imagined universal consent was built. Green capitalism becomes a winning force. Important to 
note is that all these discourses are profit-oriented and still exploit nature. 
 
In the City Press, carbon tax optimism was promoted from news stories written by Yokandi 
Groenewald. In one example is the “Polluters will have to pay up,” (City Press, 05 July 2016). The 
story noted that South Africa’s overall response to climate change was pinned on market-led 
responses, with carbon taxes forming part of the response instruments. The carbon tax, which came 




90-95%, plus also brought in the aspect of cap and trade (carbon trade). The story, written in 2016, 
praised the government for taking “a step closer to taxing big polluters last week when it published 
its latest carbon tax regulations”. The tax was also praised because it was meant “to put a price on 
pollution and encourage heavy emitters to change their ways, while also aligning South Africa 
with its international commitments to reduce its carbon footprint”. The environmental non-
governmental organisation, however, were constructed in the story pessimistic that the carbon tax 
regime would work because of the offset projects: “Earthlife Africa called it a false solution for 
climate change”. For David Hallowes of groundWork, it was “a disastrous policy, largely driven 
by Treasury’s faith in markets”. The story revealed that different and contesting viewpoints on the 
aspect of a carbon tax in South Africa. The government, on one hand, supported the aspect of 
carbon tax and trade as an income, CSO was supportive of the idea but pessimistic because of the 
inclusion of huge exemptions while heavy emitters did not see a carbon tax as a solution. For 
example, Alex Anderson of Sasol argued that a “carbon tax would not change behaviour” and 
Thava Govender, Eskom’s group executive for Transmission and Sustainability “welcomed the 
inclusion of the offsets in the draft, but warned that the long lead times required to deliver these 
projects could limit their effectiveness”. 
On top of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the Mail & Guardian saw the carbon tax “could 
save 20 000 lives a year”. The tax was good because “South Africa can cut its emissions by a third 
and dent the progress of global warming. All it has to do is sign off on a local carbon tax. This will 
make business pay for its pollution and encourage it to lower emissions” (Sipho Kings, “Tax could 
save 20 000 lives a year,” Mail & Guardian, 18 November 2016). 
 
The story “Carbon bill drops the ball on actual taxes,” by Dewald Van Rensburg (City Press, 07 
November 2018), while in support of the carbon tax, lamented the weak nature of the final carbon 
tax bill. noted that the new carbon tax bill “pushed out the actual imposition of the new tax and 
significantly reduced the tax burden in real terms”. The story saw the carbon tax as part of South 
Africa’s progress towards emissions reduction. The adoption and implementation of the carbon 





9.4 Chapter summary 
Climate change discourses in the news media were characterised by ideological and discourse 
contestations between the need to reduce internal carbon emissions and those actors who preferred 
a ‘do nothing’ approach. The government, through the Environmental Affairs Department and the 
Treasury Department, had policies in place to reduce the country’s emissions, mostly coming from 
the energy sector. These plans included setting up carbon budgets and implementing a carbon tax 
as instruments to encourage companies to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions through opting 
for renewable energy. The actors in the minerals-energy complex heavily resisted the introduction 
of a carbon budget and a carbon tax. This tax, they argued, would kill the industry and thus lead 
to massive unemployment. These actors used ‘bullying,’ ‘lobbying,’ and economic blackmail to 
try and discourage the government from implementing these instruments. This chapter 
rearticulated these discourses as they played out in the newspapers, examines whether the media 
took ideological positions that promoted and reproduced the interests of particular actors, 
especially those in the minerals-energy complex or reproduced the government discourse. Overall, 
this chapter provided a general critique of market instruments of carbon tax and the included 















Chapter Ten: Media re/production of the neoliberal green economy: Towards 
Environmental Financialisation and Commodification 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter has two sections. The first section articulates the green economy optimistic discourses 
as they traversed the South African weekly newspapers. The news media representations of climate 
change in South Africa, as part of the solutions narrative, often reproduced the ideas of techno-
optimism where buzzwords such as ‘green economy’, ‘sustainable development’ and ‘green 
growth’ were used and reproduced as common-sense ideologies. In this section, the media 
constructions and representations of these discourses, that are Promethean in nature, are analysed 
and critiqued. All the newspapers reproduced this optimism, leading to the manufacture of consent 
and a one-dimensional discourse that saw solutions to address climate change through the 
neoliberal market-led lenses. The green economy/Promethean discourses acquired a tendential 
force status by way of economisation: they were constructed as ‘bringing jobs’, they were ‘clean’ 
and ‘safe’ etc. These discourse strategies enabled the neoliberal language to be exerted as a 
commonsense language. Techno-responses combined with market principles were seen as rational, 
normal and innovative because they balance economic growth with clean air. The agency of 
capitalism in the climate change crisis was concealed but it was greatly revealed in offering 
‘rational’ solutions. Capitalism is indirectly referenced as the best ideological and material force 
to address the climate change problem (self-mutation and entrenchment). The Promethean 
discourses construct climate change as a problem that can be fixed through technology, techno-
managerial strategies and market-led initiatives. They conceptualise (to draw from Pepermans and 
Maeseele 2018: 642) “nature (including the climate) as a resource that can be mastered through 
unlimited scientific and technological progress and economic growth” (see also Foster 2010). 
Economic growth (wealth) and mitigating the climate change risks were treated as complementary 
and compatible through technological innovation and market activities.  
 
The second section provides a re-articulation of these discourses by bringing out the ‘small’ but 
important green economy disarticulating discourses. Most of the articles in the second section were 
in the form of Op-Eds from academics, environmental activists and the faith communities. This 




change. The solutions that were reproduced in the news media followed the economic 
modernisation ideological paradigm and failed to account for theories and solutions that are found 
within environmental sociology paradigms which argue against environmental commodification, 
fetishism and financialisation. These paradigms seek to re-articulate the human-nature relations 
and see capitalism as opposition to true metabolic relationships. Tor Halvorsen (2017) drew 
attention to the false hopes preached under the neoliberal climate responses crusade. The 
neoliberalist economic agenda sees solutions to climate change as a way for “the state to create 
secure markets in the environmental sector” (p.21). “Instead of supporting an economic system 
capable of reproducing democracy, neoliberalism reproduces power relations that … undermine 
democracy at all levels, particularly when democracy asks for alternatives to the knowledge that 
the market allows to develop” (Halvorsen, 2017, p.21). This argument was also buttressed by 
Henri-Count Evans and Rosemary Musvipwa (2017) who argued that “Carbon markets are part of 
a broader set of ‘green economy’ discourses and practices, which facilitate profit accumulation 
through the capture and monetisation of ecosystems and environmental ‘resources’ (p.39). 
10.2 Contested landscapes: the global political economy of climate-smart agriculture 
Of all the newspapers analysed, only the Sunday Independent had climate-smart agriculture 
optimism. The climate-smart agriculture discourse was uncontested and reproduced as common 
sense. The Op-Ed article “Climate-smart agriculture for Africa: In search of the Triple Win,” 
(Sunday Independent, 27 November 2011) by South Africa’s Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries, Tina Joemat-Patterson and Andrew Steer (World Bank special envoy for climate 
change), expressed confidence in climate-smart agriculture, being optimistic that climate-smart 
agriculture could be a solution to climate change-induced food insecurity. Adopting climate-smart 
agriculture was represented as a moral call to feed the growing world population and COP17 was 
“an opportunity to make decisions that will improve the prospects of feeding this already vast 
population and the additional two to three billion that will join their number in 2050”. The authors 
made the problems of population growth, climate change and food security universal challenges. 
These problems were ‘everyone’s’ problems. They attempted to write using language that was 
translated into the language of everyday universal conversation: “The challenges we face” require 





Scientific instrumentalisation was used to legitimise the claims for the adoption of climate-smart 
agriculture. For example, the authors argued that “leading scientists” agreed that climate-smart 
agriculture was a necessity and called for “the negotiators in Durban to recognise and support the 
potential that climate-smart agriculture offers”. The reference to “leading scientists” helped in 
legitimising the claims made in the article and to construct the claims as a moral imperative. The 
article argued further that climate-smart agriculture could “provide a triple win for farmers by 
creating higher yields and increasing climate resilience, while reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
and storing carbon in plants and soil”. All this was done as a way of building consent and 
reproducing the elite and neoliberal ideology that underpins climate-smart agriculture as a 
legitimate pathway. The path of climate-smart agriculture was constructed as ideologically 
unquestionable because even the “leading scientists from 38 countries” agreed that it is the best. 
In this instance science is seen as unquestionable and unequivocal. 
 
The examples of climate-smart agriculture successes were shared: “Kenya is supporting a pilot 
programme on triple-win agriculture”. The language of discourse scientisation was used across the 
article. Food security and climate change were reduced to science where climate-smart agriculture 
was envisaged to play a critical role “at a time when scientists estimate that unless there are strong 
adaptation measures, yields are likely to fall by 10 to 20 percent”. The challenges were worse for 
Africa because “Demand for food will rise by 200 percent by 2050” and because of this “Africa 
needs nothing less than a transformation in agriculture”. Climate-smart agriculture was the ‘hero’ 
and the best available way to combat climate change through adaptation and mitigation. Climate-
smart agriculture entailed the ability of farmers to “use proven conservation agriculture techniques, 
together with innovative technologies such as drought and flood-tolerant crops, improved early 
warning systems and risk insurance”. The authors argued that there was “need for climate-smart 
agriculture which can provide a triple win”. Notwithstanding the entrenchment of current global 
food systems inequalities in agricultural trade, the article did not see solutions in changing the 
global agri-food processing and trade systems, systems based on competition. Rather, solutions 
lay in increased production (unending exploitation of nature because humans could conquer 
nature) even if it meant the spread and proliferation of genetically modified food (GMOs) that 




the best tool at the disposal of humanity. Climate-smart agriculture was normalised and 
automatised. The calls for climate-smart agriculture ignored the most important calls for 
restructuring and transforming the global agri-food production, processing and distributional 
imbalances. The responses proposed and promoted all indirectly reproduce neoliberalism and thus 
making the neoliberal ideology a common sense. 
 
Climate-smart agriculture was again represented as having a contribution to climate change 
adaptation and mitigation. Agriculture was seen as a piece of the climate change puzzle: “NO 
STRATEGY for mitigating climate change can be complete or successful without reducing 
emissions from agriculture, forestry and other land uses” (Eleanor Momberg, “Agricultural 
communities have a role in fighting climate change,” Sunday Independent, 27 November 2011). 
As agricultural activities were partly responsible for global warming, solutions were to be found 
in agricultural innovation. The news story was based on a scientific report released by the 
Worldwatch Institute. Solutions to climate change were to be found through “land-based or 
‘terrestrial’ carbon sequestration” which “offers the possibility today of large-scale removal of 
greenhouse gases from the atmosphere through plant photosynthesis”. The story limited solutions 
to climate change to scientific interventions and neglected the social nature of climate change 
which led to the breakdown of the metabolic human-nature relations. The discourse was 
depoliticised through the non-reference to the social and material forces that gave rise to the risk 
society and climate change. The social and economic systems responsible for global warming and 
climate change are constructed as possible solutions. 
10.3 Green economy optimism 
Since their inception, the United Nations-led climate change talks were benchmarked on the need 
to reduce carbon emissions and help countries adapt to the negative effects of climate change. The 
solutions sought became universalised as encompassing an agenda for technological interventions 
including the aspects of renewable energy, constructed as the springboard for a ‘green economy’. 
The language of the green economy was promoted and made commonsensical by the United 
Nations, politicians and business leaders, acquired a level of ‘imagined consensus’ where it 
became desirable and only rational to aspire to transition towards the ‘green future’. Based on the 




economy became a discursive tendential force and thus had planetary hegemony. The news media 
in South Africa, it is argued here, were part of the reproduction and legitimisation of this green 
economy discourse and helped it to acquire the common-sense status and thus providing it with 
ideological and discursive superiority. As part of its entrenchment, the green economy discourse 
(part of economic modernisation) was to be understood as a way of achieving sustainable 
development. Discursive devices such as moralisation and economisation were instrumental in 
how the news media reproduced and legitimised ‘the green economy’ which, in this study, is 
treated as ‘sustainable Promethean capitalism’. 
Discourse analysis allows researchers to do synchronic and diachronic-comparative analyses of 
representations. In this study, the synchronic analysis examined the prevalence of themes in stories 
written by the same reporters within the same newspaper while the diachronic-comparative 
analysis enabled the researcher to compare representations across all the newspapers. These 
analyses naturally playout through the structures of all the chapters and sections.  
Victoria John, in the story “Greener pastures for Durban,” (Mail & Guardian, 01 September 2011), 
expressed optimism in the green economy. The story relied on a report released by the Academy 
of Sciences of South Africa (Assaf) which recommended reducing Durban’s carbon footprint 
“through biomass suited to a subtropical climate and increased local production to reduce the 
burning of fossil fuels”. The newspaper discourse noted that “the transition in Africa to ‘low-
carbon’ cities could be seen as an economic opportunity, not a burden.'' All the social actors used 
in the story came from the Academy of Sciences of South Africa, making the story one-
dimensional. The story moralised the green economy because it offered “significant co-benefits, 
including improved public health as a result of reduced air pollution, greater agricultural 
productivity and greater water and energy security”. 
The transition to a ‘greener economy’ was perceived as inevitable and natural. There was an 
assumption that ‘everyone’ agrees to this transition, it is common sense to go the direction of a 
green economy. The exclusion of alternatives effectively meant that the ideology of green 
sustainable capitalism was given a universal imagined consensus. The green economy rhetoric was 
anchored on the actors’ optimism in technology and innovation: “The eThekwini municipality 




indirectly represented arguing that “a green economy could create employment opportunities” 
(economisation). The story’s discursive strategies of scientisation and economisation effectively 
depoliticised the climate change problem. The story did not question the consumerist behaviour 
that underpins emissions. Instead of a discourse that sought to disarticulate capital and its tenets, 
the story propelled capitalist exploitation and self-mutilation.  
In the South African news media, key discourse actors such as government ministers and civil 
servants together with civil society (environmental) groups and the renewables industry embraced 
and promoted the green economy discourse. The green economy optimism is a theme that cuts 
across all the four newspapers analysed. In a story by Peter Fabricius, “Meeting in SA this week 
to clear major obstacles to successful COP17,” (Sunday Independent, 04 September 2011), the 
green economy optimism discourse was sponsored by Norway’s International Development and 
Environment Minister, Erik Solheim, who was cited proposing to assist South Africa in its 
transition to a green economy through supporting “the South African Renewable Energy Initiative 
(Sari)”. Dominant worldviews on addressing climate change, especially the neoliberal solutions, 
were reproduced and made natural.  
The news story “A green SA economy: ‘The train is shifting direction’,” by Lynley Donnelly (Mail 
& Guardian, 24 November 2011) celebrated the introduction of what it called a ‘green economy’ 
based on the agreement between business, government and labour which committed South Africa 
“to the creation of 300 000 jobs by building a green industrial base”. The agreement  
comprises 12 overarching commitments, including increasing investment in the green 
economy, enhancing renewable energy procurement, the development of biofuels, clean 
coal initiatives, promoting energy efficiency across the economy …. Renewable energy, 
including wind power generation, is targeted for the creation of 50, 000 jobs by 2020.  
In the story, Cosatu’s Zwelinzima Vavi supported the agreement because it would “make a huge 
contribution in turning the structure of the economy around so that we rely more in future on 
manufacturing capacity of the country”. The story lacked ideological disagreement. The actors in 
the entire story agreed on the necessity and the need for a green economy. The vulgates of a green 
economy and clean coal were not questioned but reproduced and endorsed by the news story.  
The one-dimensionality of the story helped in manufacturing imagined consent and consensus that 




and elsewhere that the Promethean discourses seek to perpetuate consumption, seek solutions in 
science and technology but do not provide measures for addressing the foundational and structural 
issues such as capitalism that are responsible for the climate chaos. These discourses bank their 
hope on capital’s self-mutative capabilities. Of interest is how the labour movement articulate so 
well ideas of capitalist accumulation. The views from Vavi concur conjuncturally with those of 
government and business and together they form a dangerous social formation that propagates and 
entrenches capitalism as a tendential force. 
It is interesting to note that business, labour and the government agreed on the green economy 
crusade. Implied by this story is that ‘everyone’ agrees that the green economy is the way to go. 
The green economy rhetoric was taken-for-granted, constructed as common sense and automatised 
through implied ideological consensus. Everyone had to support green economy initiatives without 
questioning. By so doing, the story promoted and reproduced the dominant environmental 
ideology and discourse of green capitalism over alternatives. By excluding alternative discourses, 
the story helped to reproduce dominance and the hegemonic prowess of sustainable green 
capitalism ushering society towards a one-dimensional capitalist logic. The discursive strategy of 
economisation was used to legitimise and moralise the green economy logic. The green economy 
was good because it led to “the creation of 300 000 jobs”.  
 
At the COP17, Environmental Affairs Minister Edna Molewa, hoped for the world to move closer 
to a greener economy by pursuing “a whole chain of green economy initiatives” leading to “a more 
environmentally sustainable South Africa” (Eleanor Momberg, “All eyes on UN climate talks,” 
Sunday Independent, 27 November 2011). Momberg paraphrased Molewa’s optimism to include 
“the introduction of renewables into the energy mix”. In another story, Eleanor Momberg used 
indirect representation to represent the green economy optimism views of the United Nations 
Environment Program’s (UNDP) Executive Director, Achim Steiner, who argued that: 
there was rapidly growing evidence that accelerating a transition to a low carbon, resource-
efficient, employment-generating Green Economy may not only be the key to meeting 
sustainability challenges of the 21st century, but also provide a considerable contribution 
to meeting other MDGs (Eleanor Momberg, “MDG goals at risk, UN report warns,” 




Steiner argued that the green economy “put a fresh lens on the challenges and spotlight on the 
multiple cost-effective economic and social opportunities from investing and reinvesting in 
modern clean-tech systems”. The story wholly reproduced Steiner’s worldviews on Promethean 
capitalism. Outside of the Promethean green economy frontage, the story did not include 
alternative viewpoints to addressing climate change. The optimism in the green economy was 
overarching. Edna Molewa also built on the green economy narrative by arguing that “Africa needs 
to embark on a path of sustainable development with new, clean, appropriate technologies”. The 
story reproduced and legitimised the elite views of the South African government, the UNDP and 
the World Bank. Missing from this discourse is the inability of capitalism to address the ecological 
and climate crises that it produced. Capitalism enjoys another lifeline as a credible ideology to 
addressing climate change. 
The Sunday Times also promoted the green economy optimism discourse in its coverage of climate 
change debates in South Africa. The story “Greener pastures for jobs,” by Mamello Masote and 
Tshepo Mashego (Sunday Times, 27 November 2011) directly reproduced the discourse of green 
economy optimism. The introduction, through the discourse strategy of economisation, noted: 
“More than 460 000 direct job opportunities could be created by 2025 in the green economy”. The 
lead paragraph constructed the green economy as natural, thereby legitimising it. At ideology level, 
this discourse construction naturalised and automatised the neoliberal green economy sustainable 
capitalism narrative. The Minister of Economic Development, Ebrahim Patel, was quoted arguing: 
“The competitiveness of our exports in global markets can be sustained and improved through the 
greening of our economy”.  
 
In the story “SA’s green economy linked to job creation,” (Staff Writer, Sunday Independent, 27 
November 2011) Ebrahim Patel (the Minister of Economic Development), David Jarvis (head of 
strategic operations at the Development Bank) and Jorge Maia (economist from the Industrial 
Development Corporation) sponsored the green economy optimism discourse. The discourse 
strategy of economisation was used throughout the story to naturalise, moralise and legitimise the 
neoliberal Promethean approach to address climate change. The story did not have ideological 





The newspaper constructed the green economy discourse and ideology with optimism, 
representing it as “one of South Africa’s most undeveloped sectors, yet it has the potential to create 
employment opportunities”. Patel, the newspaper noted, launched a “bullish report outlining the 
potential of the green economy and job creation prospects”. Here, there is a conflation of 
newspaper discourses and actor discourses. By way of language translation, the story portrayed 
the report by Patel as “bullish” and by so doing presented the views of the government as serious 
and correct. The climate change discourses and specifically the rhetoric of the green economy, 
were constructed by the government and made widespread and believable by the media. The 
newspaper, in its own discursive construction, unequivocally declared that “South Africa’s green 
economy can create considerable employment opportunities”.  
 
Both the newspaper and the actors further constructed this optimism. The agreement between the 
actors and the newspaper was clear. Important to observe is how the news media constantly rely 
on indexing official sources for their stories. The South African government has an upper 
discursive hand in the construction of climate change worldviews in South Africa. The turn 
towards green jobs indicates a point where government sees opportunities in the market-driven 
technological innovation and the green economy rhetoric. By constructing climate change 
responses in the neoliberal language, the news media discourses mainstream, legitimise and 
rationalise these dominant views and privilege them over alternatives that are excluded. The 
imagined leap from coal to renewables was constructed as rational and environmentally moral, 
however, lacking is the politicisation of the climate change problem, essentially the need to 
question the taken-for-granted rhetoric of sustainable development and green economy. Ebrahim 
Patel argued that: 
There are extraordinary growth opportunities as our economy gravitates towards a job-rich 
new growth path. A growing green economy should translate into opportunities for 
entrepreneurs in energy generation … from sustainable, renewable and alternative sources 
with low or no carbon emissions. Our colleagues in Germany, the US and Brazil have made 
greater strides in the adoption of the green economy. 
 
In support, David Jarvis noted that the “economic merit of many of these technologies may only 
be fully established in years to come but placing a requirement on local industries to invest now is 




is important is that those that have made the early mover advantage do realise that growing green 
economy does translate into opportunities for localisation, either through increased utilisation of 
existing production capabilities, or the establishment of new capacity”. The rhetoric on green 
economy/growth and techno-optimism is constructed as the only available discourse in addressing 
climate change and ensure a move away from fossils. Climate change should be seen as an 
opportunity for business to make profits. The exclusion of politicised alternative viewpoints helped 
in reproducing the hegemonic status of mainstream market-led neoliberal ideas. Responding to 
climate change is reduced to imagined and implied neoliberal consensual discourses. The green 
economy and technological innovation are reproduced as capable of solving the climate problem. 
Economic modernisation/Promethean discourses, by their access to the media gain discursive 
dominance and appear to be the only available discourses.  
The story “Long walk to greendom,” (No author, Sunday Times, 27 November 2011) focused on 
the events at COP17 and the views of some business delegates participating at the conference. The 
story, from the headline, embraced and automatised the green economy ideology. The headline: 
“Long walk to greendom” revealed the disappointment with the “long walk” which, this study 
argues, was seen as a walk towards a necessary epoch of a green economy, named a ‘greendom’. 
The story quoted Irvan Damon, ambassador for the Sustainable Energy Society of Southern Africa, 
contending that “his organisation had embraced opportunities provided by COP17 to add impetus 
to creating competitive green industries, local green-collar jobs and embracing a low-carbon 
culture”. The market-led Kyoto Protocol instruments such as carbon trading were embraced and 
celebrated: “New opportunities are emerging for low-carbon investment in developing countries 
such as SA. There is a signal of renewed confidence to investors in carbon markets”.  
Suthentira Govender and Subashni Naidoo, in the story “Jobs promise gives SA green fever,” 
(Sunday Times, 04 December 2011) represented the green economy as a boom for jobs and the 
economy. The story celebrated the green economy as good for ‘all’. It was constructed as the 
natural way to go. The headline expressed this optimism: “Jobs promise gives SA green fever”. 
The green economy, a neoliberal construction/language, was naturalised and celebrated through 
the translation of elite neoliberal interests into public and common interests of the poor. The green 




aligning the neoliberal profit interests of the elite with the aspirations of the interpellated poor. The 
market-led climate transition into the green economy was covered as if it was about ordinary 
people, the underlying vested interests of capital, the elite and multinationals were covered up. The 
green economy “could boost the economy and generate hundreds of thousands of jobs within 
years”. The green economy optimism was closely tied to the techno-renewable optimism: 
“Renewable sources of energy and materials form the basis of a green economy”. The discursive 
strategy of economisation was used, the green economy was moralised and legitimised because it 
would “boost the economy and generate hundreds of thousands of jobs”. The economisation of 
climate change responses fits well into the economic modernisation paradigm that sees solutions 
through neoliberal initiatives. This economisation depoliticises the climate problem and deletes 
the views that seek to address the political economy of green economics and the interests that it 
represents at ideology level and the attendant inequalities and risks that it produces along. In the 
story, Ebrahim Patel called for a quick transition. Edna Molewa was directly represented arguing 
that “We have stressed that there will be creation of jobs. This is not just an effort that is jobless, 
we will be getting into sustainable development, that talks to our people, our economy and takes 
care of our environment”.  
Ravi Naidoo (Group Executive, Development Bank of South Africa) and David Jarvis (Divisional 
Head on green programmes - DBSA), in an Op-Ed, encouraged South Africa to pursue a growth 
plan anchored on “green infrastructure,” and argued that “The development of green infrastructure 
is vital to creating a sustainable growth path for Africa” (Ravi Naidoo and David Jarvis, Mail & 
Guardian, 14 December 2011). They saw climate change as offering threats and opportunities, 
with an emphasis on the need to tap into the opportunities. The authors utilised the discursive 
strategies of scientisation and economisation. “Every 1.5o C temperature change globally translates 
into a 3o C increase in Southern Africa and the region is little prepared for the hardship and social 
disruption that may results”. This, therefore, the authors argued, moralised the need to maintain 
Africa’s growth path because climate change offered “an ideal opportunity for the region and the 
continent to build a greener development path for itself”. The authors argued that “sustainable 




The authors advocated for sustainable capitalism/Promethean approaches to development. “Green 
infrastructure” was constructed as moral and “resilient”. The article supported green capitalism 
because it made sense and even good for the environment because it takes “into account the effects 
of climate change and variability and will thus facilitate more enduring infrastructure and avoid 
additional retrofitting costs for poorly conceived investments”. Beneath these common-sense 
discourses, lie the ideological framework of capital, especially when bankers promote investments 
in green business. Critical to this ideology is profit which, however, discursively is fronted by the 
naturalised and legitimised need to ‘go green’’. Denotatively, the article outlined a developmental 
framework that had sustainability as its nucleus. Important, however, is to underscore the 
connotative ideological investments of the text in the ideology of profit, techno-managerial climate 
responses and heavily neoliberal principles of consumption, expansion and profit. The article 
reproduced capitalism, offered no politicisation of the climate problem, but rather crafted climate 
solutions through the same logic of risk manufacturing. The language of the text spoke to an 
imagined consensus on the need to adopt ‘green capitalism’. The article saw no need for debate 
but took for granted the environmental imperative to go green without transforming or eliminating 
the risk capitalist culture that is responsible for the climate crises. 
 
Alf James, in the story “Opportunity to power job creation,” (Sunday Times, 11 March 2012) 
moralised the green economy discourse through economisation. The green economy would create 
jobs and green the South African economy. The headline automatised the green economy rhetoric: 
“Opportunity to power job creation”. The green economy was represented as an opportunity. This 
discourse emanated from the government policy discourses on climate change. Government views 
were reproduced and legitimised in the story. Minister of Energy, Dipuo Peters, was represented 
directly emphasising the benefits of the green economy, as envisaged in the 2011 IRP. The green 
economy “provides us with a unique opportunity to create jobs, and tackle the concerns of climate 
change at the same time”. “Realising the opportunity to create jobs, the Green Economy Accord 
that was recently signed by the government and its social partners sets ambitious targets for local 
procurement in the manufacturing and assembly”. The discursive strategy of economisation was 
used to legitimise and automatise the green economy discourse. “Peters said the Green Economy 




ensure 75% local context, ensure business commits to funding and supports the government target 
of a million solar water heaters by 2014”.  
In an Op-Ed “The second transition will be green,” (Edna Molewa, Mail & Guardian, 22 March 
2012), the Environmental Affairs Minister conceptualised the green economy and sustainable 
development to mean same: “We have witnessed progress towards putting South Africa on the 
path of sustainable development, encompassing economic growth, social development and the 
conservation of natural resources”. The article by Molewa showed her optimism and allegiance to 
the green economy narrative. “The move to a more sustainable development path will create new 
green jobs … open up new investment opportunities and export markets”. Correspondingly, Rene 
Vollgraaff’s story “Growth can be green,” (Sunday Times, 10 June 2012) legitimised the green 
economy as a good transition for South Africa. The headline stressed that “Growth can be green” 
and the story noted that the transition to renewables could also bring economic development. At 
discourse and ideology levels, the story reproduced neoliberal Promethean ideas. Neil Morris from 
KPMG was represented directly noting arguing that “Businesses operating in Africa should 
decouple growth from environmental and resource depletion.” 
 
The green economy was good because it could “create thousands of jobs” (Matthew Savides, 
“‘Green economy’ to create thousands of jobs,” Sunday Independent, 04 December 2012). In this 
story, the discourse actors (Ebrahim Patel, Minister of Economic Development; Pravin Gordhan, 
Minister of Finance; David Jarvis, researcher at the Industrial Development Corporation; and Ana 
Sanchez from the International Labour Organisation) argued that there was an economic and moral 
imperative for South Africa to move towards a green economy because it would create “close to 
500 000 jobs”. The newspaper discourse began by a comment lead, which revealed the 
newspaper’s optimism in the green economy and at the same time aligned with the discourses of 
the actors in the story. By using a comment lead and having the first three paragraphs of the story 
in support of the green economy rhetoric, the newspaper endorsed the neoliberal ideological 
positions that are promoted by the discourse actors and also the values of capital that inform such 
ideologies and discourses. The translation of elite neoliberal views into common language of jobs 
rendered these ideologies attractive, commonsensical and natural. If the green economy could 




Absent from such a discourse are key arguments about the true character of capitalism. As a way 
of life and as a risk culture, capitalism cannot bring true sustainability that speaks to social, 
economic and environmental justice and equity. Neoliberalism, as both ideology and discourse is 
dominantly produced as the available solution to responding to climate change. The story 
ideologically reproduced inequality and exploitation.  
 
While the constructions were translated into public language/idiom, they were essentially elite 
views and through translation, they became cultural resources for the everyday man. By closing 
out alternatives, the green growth and sustainable capitalism discourse was reproduced as the only 
one available, as natural and rational. This one-dimensionality reproduction gave social power to 
the discourses that were given access to platforms of public communication and engagement. The 
voices that get to be heard, also get the power to define issues for the people, set the agenda and 
parameters for discussion with the effect of shielding the dominant discourses from scrutiny. 
Absent from the Promethean discourses promoted in the story is the need to rethink capitalism and 
to restructure the way of way of life.  
 
Evidence from environmental sociology has consistently pointed towards the widespread 
dominance of neoliberal ideas in addressing climate change and argued that capitalism itself was 
the problem and not a viable solution. The story is clear about South Africa’s preference of market-
led economic modernisation-based policies and approaches to achieving green growth. Patel was 
represented arguing that  
we also need the community to buy into this whole thing. We need to have a market for 
these products [solar panels, geysers etc.] for it to be successful. Every year about 200 000 
electric geysers burst and are replaced with other electric geysers. We are busy working on 
a partnership that will get these replaced with solar geysers. That creates a market - but we 
need people to be involved with us.  
 
The perception of the green economy as an opportunity signals the extent to which capitalism is 
willing to sacrifice nature at the altar of profit. A green growth trajectory included carbon trading, 
displacement of communities, the nuclear age, the commodification of nature, which is supposed 




The movement towards a green economy was always praised in the South African news media. 
The discourse on the transition to a green economy often used political indexing and reproduced 
the views of elite politicians legitimising the ‘green economy’ crusade. Yazeed Kamaldien, in the 
story “SA on its way to a greener economy” (Mail & Guardian, 06 June 2013) praised 
achievements made by South Africa in pursuing renewable energy. The story relied on official 
sources, especially the Minister of Energy, Dipuo Peters and President Jacob Zuma. The green 
economy crusade was celebrated through economisation. President Jacob was quoted noting that: 
“The positive outcome of our focus in the past year on clean energy initiatives has been more than 
R70-billion in investments in new generation capacity”. The government had also “signed 
contracts to the value of R47-billion in the renewable energy programme”. The story made the 
transition to renewable energy common sense discourse. ‘Everyone agreed’ because it brought 
jobs, investments and lowers emissions. Economisation was used to moralise, economise and 
legitimise the Promethean market-led techno-optimistic discourses. 
Renewable energy was constructed as benefiting ‘local’ poor people. Therefore, it was good. The 
newspaper discourse noted that “At least 315 000 solar water geysers had been rolled out by 
January this year, most of them for poor households that did not have them before”. There was a 
view that the transition to the green economy was natural and consensual. Ideological 
disagreement was disabled in the story, resulting in the reproduction of views of the Department 
of Energy and the Presidency. This helped in building ideological consent and closure. The 
newspaper discourse, combined with the politicians’ discourses, effectively promoted a one-
dimensional reading and manufactured a veil of imagined consensus. The views of the government 
elites were translated into everyday language to appeal to ‘everyone’ thereby decentralising and 
normalising elite discourses. 
 
Yolandi Groenewald’s feature story, “SA economy waits for the green light” (City Press, 15 
December 2013) was optimistic about the ‘green economy’ as a replacement of the old industrial 
economy. The green economy was moralised and reproduced as a legitimate idea through the 
discursive strategy of economisation. The green economy would create “more than 460 000 jobs”. 
The transition to a greener economy was thus automatised because it “is a growing trend as 




change by creating more sustainable-energy industries”. By referring to the green economy as a 
global trend, Groenewald effectively constructed the Promethean neoliberal discourse of green 
economy as common sense and within the parameters of ideological consent. There is a notion of 
‘everyone’ agrees that the green economy is the way to go. The rhetoric of green economy was 
constructed by way of presenting it as the only available discourse - it worked by way of exclusion: 
no other alternatives existed outside of the ‘green economy’. Effectively, debate and disagreement 
are disabled, the green economy is given a superior and universal appeal and any other alternative 
are rendered unavailable and thus deleted from the discourse. The green economy crusade was 
one-dimensional and built towards the manufacture of consent in green capitalism: “A UN 
Environment Programme (UNEP) study, South African Green Economy Modelling, shows that 
investing in a low-carbon, resource-efficient green economy is fundamental for South Africa’s 
sustained economic growth and wellbeing”. 
 
Christina Kennedy’s “Turning waste into green profit,” (City Press, 16 October 2016) saw waste 
as an opportunity to make money. The headline signalled the logic of capital: “Turning waste into 
profit”. The profit motive was attached to the need to eliminate emissions. The story reproduced 
the neoliberal market responses by promoting the commodification of waste. Thato Maleeq 
Keetse, an entrepreneur, argued that “People shouldn’t look at waste as waste - waste is a resource. 
Waste is money. At the moment, there’s more money in waste than, I think, in conventional 
methods”. “Capture the waste emissions and convert them into useful microscopic nanomaterials”. 
By constructing and championing the ideals of ‘sustainable capitalism’ - the carbon dioxide is 
commodified, and a new monetary resource is envisaged. This is in contrast with the need to curb 
and ultimately reduce emissions.  
 
The green economy optimism was not only an ANC-government embodiment, but a national 
optimism that acquired cross-party currency. The Democratic Alliance party, which is neoliberal 
in nature, embraced the green economy as the economy of the future. In this Op-Ed “Mayors, 
businesses tackle global warming,” (Sunday Independent, 22 January 2017) article by Helen Zille, 
the leader of the Democratic Alliance party and Western Cape province premier, argued that cities 




and the multilateral system. In the context of the election of Donald Trump and Brexit, Zille argued 
that “it is now cities and businesses delivering the boldest ideas and ambitious plans for a 
sustainable low carbon future”. Zille saw the future as based on ‘green economy principles’ and 
noted that “the urgency of the climate crisis and the economic potential for businesses and cities 
in shifting towards a greener future are too-well established to be rolled back by forces of 
isolationism”. Private capitalist businesses were constructed as “acting swiftly and seriously with 
massive investment in the next generation of low-carbon technology and shifting to renewables”. 
To moralise the green economy discourse, Zille sought a common-sense narrative that privileged 
the transition to the ‘green future’. The green future was necessary and legitimate because it would 
“clean the air we breathe and build low-carbon infrastructure [which had the potential to] also 
improve public health, encourage social inclusion and create jobs”. 
 
The article by Helen Zille showed optimism in the green economy and techno-managerialism. 
These ideas were legitimised by drawing upon the perceived benefits (economisation and 
moralisation) of a green economy on health, social inclusion and jobs. These perceived benefits 
were then used to underpin and legitimise green capitalism as a solution to the climate crisis. Zille 
saw climate change responses embedded in Promethean solutions as presenting opportunities. 
Technology and good management practices could solve the climate and ecological crises. Private 
sector-led technological innovation was an important contributor to a ‘greener and cleaner future’. 
The article resonated with the neoliberal ideology of the Democratic Alliance party. However, 
interesting is how, regardless of different political ideologies, the DA and the ANC converge on 
the aspect of the green economy and sustainable capitalism. This convergence cannot be explained 
from the planes of political ideology but by examining the overall political-economic ecologies of 
climate change in South Africa. The article, by seeing private sector investments as the answer to 
the climate change crisis, legitimised neoliberalism.  
10.3.1 Carbon sequestration optimism 
The green economy discourse had its springboard being technology. Technology was seen as 
providing a way out of the environmental crisis. Part of the technological optimism included 




reduce their exploitation of fossils but rather use fossils and then apply technology to capture the 
carbon dioxide. In the story “Blows traded over carbon capture,” (Fiona Macleod, Mail & 
Guardian, 10 November 2011), carbon capture technologies were considered as a way of reducing 
carbon emissions. While there is a need for the reduction of emissions, the carbon capture 
technology seeks to allow the current emissions levels because the excess could be captured 
(sequestrated). This is part of the techno-responses that are market-led and seek not to restructure 
the present forms of production but perpetuate them. The technologies allow business as usual; the 
soil can keep it so we can continue exploiting fossils. Mark Boneham was directly represented 
arguing that the “technology could help reduce these emissions by capturing flue gases produced 
by power plants using fossil fuels …. Instead of allowing these gases to escape into the atmosphere, 
we divert them and put them through a chemical process that separates the carbon dioxide from 
the flue gases”.  
However, those who disagreed with the idea only objected to the delay and not the use of the 
technology itself. Greenpeace Africa’s climate campaigner, Melita Steele, said the technology 
“could not deliver in time to avoid dangerous climate change. The very earliest that carbon capture 
might become feasible is 2030, which means it will deliver too little, too late, and at far too high a 
price. Climate action requires urgent action”. Other points of disagreement included whether the 
clean development mechanism should include carbon capture projects. Richard Worthington of 
WWF for Nature South Africa noted that they would oppose its inclusion but was generally not 
against the technology.  
10.3.2 Carbon Trade and Green Bonds Optimism 
Some of the neoliberal solutions to climate change included optimism in carbon trade principles.  
Geoff Sinclair (head of carbon trade at Standard Bank South Africa), in the Op-Ed “Climate funds 
give our continent an opportunity to lead the world,” (Sunday Independent, 13 November 2011) 
promoted market-led mitigation measures, especially carbon trade. The central argument in Geoff 
Sinclair’s article was that market-led responses to climate change were rational and could lead to 
sustainable development. Climate finance in Sinclair’s terms, was necessary “to enable 
implementation of energy efficiency, renewable energy sources” and an opportunity “to produce 




financial instruments (CDM) as the best way to streamline development in Africa. His article 
moralised this neoliberal approach because it “triggers sustainable growth in emerging 
economies”. For Sinclair, the CDM was to be expanded and adopted because “A lot has already 
been achieved” through it.  
That’s because CDM is good business. Companies that need to offset their carbon 
emissions get a business benefit from funding low carbon development in emerging 
economies. Communities in emerging economies who sell their carbon credits gain 
revenue that enables them to develop …. If Africa uses the CDM to create green industries, 
green markets and green products, it will gain an economic advantage that centuries of 
conventional development could never give it.  
 
The Op-Ed built a narrative of green capitalism as the panacea to African development. The 
language used in the article was that of imagined ideological consensus. Africa was constructed as 
a single unitary entity with similar problems and interests. The fundamental climate inequalities 
intra-states and between states in Africa were neglected. By using the language of consensus such 
as “our continent”, the article acquired for itself the identity of speaking on behalf of everyone in 
Africa. The participation of “us” in the green economy benefited all of “us”. The article 
interpellated Africa at continental level and generalised African climate problems and access to 
CDM funds. The overarching idea in the article was profit. For Sinclair, profit was the only reason 
why Africa should embrace a green society. Concealed in the article are the inequalities involved 
in the global allocation of carbon finance and the cascading of those inequalities at local and 
national levels. The financialisation and commodification of nature are superimposed as ideal and 
good for Africa. The absence of consensus regarding the negative consequences of the CDM 
projects in Bissar, Durban, for example, is important. Carbon finance and its commodification and 
fetishisation of nature was presented as a moral response to leveraging development in emerging 
economies and reducing emissions in the developed world. 
 
The article passivised and nominalised the fact that carbon trading actually does little at all in 
reducing emissions but only awards more licences to polluters to continue polluting. Carbon 
trading enables great polluting countries and industries to offset their emissions elsewhere and 
continue emissions (see Evans and Musvipa, 2017; Kumi et al, 2014). The article, therefore, 




climate change. The narrative resonated with the South African policy on the need for a second 
Kyoto commitment period. Carbon trading was an essential component of South Africa’s climate 
response strategies. It helped its heavy emitting industries to continue emitting greenhouse gases 
and offsetting their emissions elsewhere. This well feeds into South Africa’s claim to prioritise 
economic development. However, important to note is the conflation between the discourse-
policy-finance networks. Their interests, though divergent and cross-cutting, help feed into the 
culture of unending accumulation and exploitation. Capitalism is preserved at all costs. It becomes 
a dangerous tendential force that attempts to construct and reproduce itself as a climate saviour 
without any structural transformation that addresses social justice, environmental justice and 
economic justice. 
 
Climate change problems become constructed as ‘unrealised opportunities’. Missing in the climate 
finance argument is how funding is structured in relations of dominance that propel global intra- 
and international inequalities. Climate finance through private capital opens avenues for global 
financial flows that are unrestrained. The flows come with higher interest rates that perpetually 
subordinate the developing global South countries to international debt with a new glamourous 
name - ‘green finance’. As green projects are sought in developing countries, possibilities of 
displacements of indigenous communities are widespread. Carbon markets become perfect 
examples of 21th-century financial markets where the public goods (nature) are commodified and 
sold to the best bidders at the expense of the environment. 21st-century environmental heist/fraud. 
 
Carbon trade was also represented as a common sense in the Sunday Times. Thekiso Anthony 
Lefifi, in the story “Banks wait for the ‘green’ light,” (Sunday Times, 27 November 2011) 
promoted and saw as common sense market-led climate responses. Banks were constructed as key 
actors in the reduction of emissions due to their participation in the carbon trade scheme. The story 
represented carbon trading schemes as natural, a common and good business. This representation 
legitimises carbon trade and hence in common sensing the commodification and financialisation 
of nature. Banks were eager to participate but were simply waiting “for the ‘green’ light” from the 
COP17 negotiations. The story used bankers as the only discourse sponsors. The discourse on 




mitigation. Standard Bank’s Geoff Sinclair was indirectly represented hoping that “COP17 comes 
up with a design for the Copenhagen climate finance fund that ‘crowds in’ private investment, 
rather than crowding it out”. The bankers were worried about the low prices of carbon due to 
uncertainty about the carbon market post-2012. ‘With low-priced carbon, there is less incentive to 
generate carbon credits and conduct business in a lower carbon manner”. The story, firstly by using 
sources from the banking industry only, excluded alternative viewpoints. The actors used in the 
story constructed carbon trading as a given and natural. It is not open to contestation. By exclusion, 
alternative worldviews were passivised and nominalised leaving the dominant Promethean 
discourses unchallenged. The neoliberal ideology of private finance (market instruments) is 
legitimised and reproduced, being rendered a doxa. Consent is thought to be there, this is achieved 
by the story’s unquestioning stance and how it reproduced views that come from actors that do not 
disagree ideologically”. 
 
Fiona Macleod, in the story “South Africa may lose out on carbon-trading,” (Mail & Guardian, 
25 April 2012), took for granted the need for South Africa to participate in the global carbon 
trading market. The headline “South Africa may lose out on carbon-trading” signalled that the 
country needed to participate in the carbon trade system. Emissions reduction through carbon trade 
was not questioned but accepted and constructed as a rational way of responding to climate change. 
By disabling ideological disagreement, the story deleted the neoliberal character of carbon trade 
and how it is not a solution but a financialisation and further commodification of nature. The story 
portrayed a picture of a growing interest in the carbon market. UNFCCC’s Chief Executive, 
Christiana Figueres, was quoted endorsing carbon trade: “The CDM continues to evolve and 
improve and deliver on a scale well beyond initial expectations”. The story promotes and 
legitimises Promethean approaches to addressing the climate crises”. 
 
The feature article “Green bond market set to change Africa’s development,” by Jocelyn Sambira 
(Sunday Independent, 05 July 2015) was optimistic about the potential of green bond financing to 
help the growth of African economies. The article used the City of Johannesburg’s green bond 
launch as an example. The City of Johannesburg had successfully listed a green bond of $145 




confidence in the City of Johannesburg and commitment to environmental stewardship and climate 
change”. Without elaborating on what type of climate-friendly project the money will be used for, 
the article was only interested in the financing mechanism and not the climate and social impacts 
generated by the funds. The entire article, i.e., its global structure, promoted the adoption and 
proliferation of market-led responses to the climate change problem. By seeing green bonds as a 
panacea, the article legitimised and moralised the neoliberal market instruments. Key to note is 
that the neoliberal agenda of creating a financial market to trade environmental commodities was 
extended and not questioned. By excluding contrarian views to the green financing facade, the 
article presented a one-dimensional side of climate finance. Market-led responses were made to 
appear commonsensical and natural. This is key because the article even cited the World Bank in 
support of green bonds. Silent from the discourse are aspects of loan arrangement/terms and 
conditions and the interest rates. Green bonds are an extension and, in a sense,, a re-incarnation of 
finance capital with a fancy name ‘green capital’. The commodification and marketisation of 
nature were normalised and automatised through creating a consensus ideology and 
commonsensing. “With the market raking in billions of dollars a year, it seems the appetite for 
these new debts is growing as well as the emergence of new types of issuers”. 
10.3.4 Optimism in electric cars 
Part of the optimism in the green economy included an optimism in electric cars. Electric cars were 
promoted as a way of reducing emissions from the transport industry. The invention and 
proliferation of electric cars would reduce fuel emissions and lead towards a cleaner future. The 
electric cars optimism discourse was promoted by actors in the motor industry and the Department 
of Environmental Affairs. While the transport sector is one of the biggest greenhouse gas emitting 
sectors, the introduction of green cars is celebrated as a driver to emissions reduction. The story 
“Green cars in first gear,” by Schalk Mouton (Sunday Times, 27 February 2013) promoted the 
introduction of green cars as a way to deal with climate change. Edna Molewa, the Environmental 
Affairs Minister, was cited in support: “We are in big trouble. This [climate change] is a crisis. 
This world will run out of food. This world will run out of natural resources and all other resources 
that we have”. The green cars were “part of the government’s commitment to reducing carbon 
emissions by 34% by 2020 and 42% by 2025”. “Greenhouse-gas emissions are seen as the biggest 




The coming in of green cars is thus represented as progress towards addressing climate change. 
The optimism in green cars is high: “authorities want to have as many as half the cars on the road 
electricity powered in 10 years”. 
 
The feature “A Leaf out of the green book,” by Yolandi Groenewald (City Press, 01 September 
2013) was techno-optimistic about electric cars as part of emissions reduction. Mbulaheni Maseda, 
Chief Director of Facilities in the Department of Environmental Affairs was directly represented 
saying: “You don’t have to be a rocket scientist to see that an electric car makes more sense, 
economically and environmentally.'' The Department of Environmental Affairs was pushing 
forward with the promotion of electric cars in South Africa and the Nissan Leaf was the car used 
as part of the government’s ‘green fleet’. For example, the story “SA to see more electric vehicles,” 
(Justin Brown, City Press, 11 December 2016) celebrated the move towards electric cars which it 
constructed as commonsensical and natural. The headline reproduced the neoliberal Promethean 
discourses of techno-optimism: “SA to see more electric cars”.  
 
In Roxanne Henderson’s story “Electric cars could help power Eskom out of trouble if tax 
roadblocks removed,” (Sunday Times, 14 January 2018), electric cars were portrayed as a potential 
business for power utility Eskom: “Electric cars could help power Eskom out of trouble”. “Energy 
and e-mobility experts believe a boom in the local electric car market could see Eskom sell the 
30GW power surplus that is currently costing it millions”. The adoption of electric cars was also 
useful to help the government reduce emissions: “would help the government reach the carbon-
reduction targets set in the national development plan”. The discursive strategy of economisation 
is used to moralise the need for electric cars because they were “cheaper to maintain and charge 
less than the costs associated with petrol and diesel fuelled cars”. 
10.4 The drowned voices: Climate justice and Climate Justice 
While most news stories promoted capitalist-oriented discourses, the news media to a lesser extent 
paid attention to the ‘small-dissident’ voices that clamoured for climate justice. These voices were 
against the coal indispensability narrative, demoralised nuclear energy and firmly believed that 
climate change was real. However, at micro-ideological level, these discourses fragmented with 




for the structural transformation of the capitalist base. Discourses within this strand attempted to 
politicise the climate problem by rejecting the market-driven neoliberal solutions which are taken 
for granted. These discourses advocated an ideological shift from capitalism by altering the way 
of life towards true sustainability. Climate change was constructed as a site of struggle between 
civil society on the one hand and governments, corporations etc. on the other hand. The need for 
ideological directions that put climate, economic and social justice at the heart of policy was 
emphasised. Climate change is discussed from the position of social asymmetries and inequalities. 
 
David le Page, in an Op-Ed “Stop these crimes against humanity,” (Sunday Times, 20 March 2011) 
described the expansion in the use of fossil fuels as a crime against humanity: “When government 
licences continued fossil-fuel production - in the absence of an absolute commitment to a low or 
zero-carbon economy - it, too, is committing a crime against humanity”. David le Page argued that 
South Africa’s approach to climate action was immoral and irresponsible: “South Africa is the 
world’s 13th - biggest emitter. But we insist we will only cut emissions if paid to do so”. The 
article demoralised the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities that was used by 
the developing countries to claim a developmental space and a right to pollute: “So long as we 
developing countries claim to have an equal right to pollute, we take a morally bankrupt position 
where the rich are all too happy to have us .... the notion of a ‘right to pollute’ is a surreal absurdity, 
equivalent to a right to commit suicide”. le Page advocated for climate responses that were 
minimalistic: “many economies must be scaled down, not up, and made more equal”.  
 
le Page also directly demoralised private capital companies that were responsible for global 
warming and refusing to take action: “South Africa hosts companies that claim to be concerned 
about climate change - yet their international colleagues fund climate change deniers in the US 
Congress. Such behaviour, by ArcelorMittal, PP, Bayer and others, is dangerous and disgraceful”. 
Energy companies and heavy energy consumers were directly mentioned as the real source of 
climate in-action. The central theme, at the heart of the article, was climate action that pioneers 
climate justice: “Greater shared prosperity is still possible, indeed essential, and in many instances, 
action on climate change will greatly help true development”. While climate change was 




The Sunday Independent also echoed the ‘small voices’ that called for climate change justice. In 
the Op-Ed “COP17 isn’t about money, it’s about saving the world,” (13 November 2011) by Geoff 
Davies (Executive Director of the Southern African Faith Communities’ Environment Institute) 
politicised the climate problem and called for climate justice. For Davies, profit motives were “the 
very cause of the climate change crisis”. To address climate change, Davies argued for “putting 
the well-being of the planet and people at the centre of our negotiations” while at the same time 
criticising “Our present pursuit of wealth - motivated primarily by our addiction to fossil fuel” 
which was “is leading to increased poverty, economic injustice and environmental destruction”. 
Geoff Davies singled out the structures of capitalism and the logic of profit as the key drivers of 
the ecological rift leading to climate change. Any solution to climate change needed to take root 
in the need to alter our way of life, i.e. abandoning capitalism and all its attendant principles of 
consumption and profit, unending exploitation of labour and nature.  
 
Jeff Rudin (a board member of the Alternative Information and Development Centre), in the Op-
Ed “Put a cap on capitalism” (Mail & Guardian, 17 November 2011) politicised climate problem 
and offered a fundamental difference to the green economy crusade. Rudin argued that there was 
a need to break the links between the climate change catastrophe “and our heavily commercialised 
and commodified economies”. For Rudin, a radical rupture of the capitalist system was needed to 
address climate change: “Protecting Mother Earth and its life forms from further damage require 
something altogether different. One possible beginning is to question the social need of each 
particular product and its priority amongst competing products”. This was necessary because 
capitalism was “no longer compatible with the challenges of climate change,” hence the need to 
cap capitalism. 
the imperatives of profit maximisation that drive all business results in hugely wasteful 
competition that, in turn, accelerates climate change …. Capping capitalism does not mean 
reverting to a pre-industrial society. What it does mean is an entirely more rational use of 
finite resources to meet basic human needs, rather than the artificial manufacture of 
constantly changing wants designed to feed mindless consumerism as the source of profit 






Patrick Bond, Professor at the University of KwaZulu-Natal and Michael Dorsey, a professor at 
Dartmouth College, in their Op-Ed “Climate cash deals are killing us,” (Sunday Independent, 20 
November 2011) criticised the use of market-led solutions to address climate change. They 
specifically criticised carbon markets as a way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Carbon 
markets were seen as benefiting “speculators, financiers, consultants … and energy lucksters who 
made billions of dollars in profits on the sale of notional emissions reduction credits”. They argued 
that “As the air itself becomes privatised and commodified, poor communities across the world 
suffer, and resources and energy are diverted from real solutions”. For Bond and Dorsey “The 
CDM is neither reducing emissions nor securing its promised sustainable development”. Patrick 
Bond and Michael Dorsey essentially problematised and politicised the climate problem, 
delegitimised market instruments such as carbon trading and the Clean Development Mechanism. 
They argued that the CDM was a “dangerous vehicle for delivering money to Africa”. The CDM  
is part of the Kyoto Protocol where the “aim is to facilitate innovative carbon-mitigation and 
alternative development projects by drawing in funds from northern greenhouse gas emitters in 
exchange for their continued pollution. It is the use of market solutions to market problems”. The 
CDM was riddled with corruption, bureaucracy and conflict of interest: “The CDM gives primacy 
to its ties to large corporations, while often overlooking and even ignoring its foundational 
institutional mandate to sustainable development on behalf of Africa”. Bond and Dorsey argued 
that those historically responsible for climate change “should compensate the victims”. The 
construction of developing countries as victims were being too general. Absent from Bond and 
Dorsey’s argument was that while they are correct to criticise the market-led solutions, 
constructing the entire global South from a position of passive victimhood helped to legitimise 
claims by countries with higher emissions but in the global South such as South Africa that the 
global North was responsible for providing climate finance to ‘us’ the victims of global North 
emissions.  
 
Maureen Isaacson, in the story “COP17’s African slant: reshaping values, lifestyles,” (Sunday 
Independent, 27 November 2011) used Cormac Cullinan (environmental lawyer) is the key 
discourse sponsor and argued that climate change could be addressed by reshaping values and 




not the neoliberal values of consumption could save the planet. Humans and nature had a 
dialectical relationship that was being disturbed by the values and lifestyles of neoliberalism. The 
article by Isaacson sought to politicise climate change discourses by laying the blame for the 
climatic changes on the capitalist logic of exploitation and consumption. The newspaper discourse 
noted that “a conversation that is not confined to carbon trading but calls for the reshaping of our 
values and lifestyles” was important in addressing the excesses of capitalism and the resultant 
climate change”. Cormac Cullinan, an environmental lawyer, had drafted a climate People’s 
Charter for Africa with the aim of “uniting and mobilising many different sectors of civil society 
around a common agenda” towards a “conversation about how to achieve an ecologically 
sustainable and socially just and fulfilling society … what the world would like if we decided to 
live in harmony with nature and to contribute to the health and integrity of natural systems instead 
of exploiting them”. 
 
The article noted that the mainstream discourse on ‘good life’ (consumption) was wrong, 
preferring rather approaches of “living well” and where the focus shifted to “to the values that 
promote well-being-safety and communication, friendship and a sense of identity”. Central to note 
is that the article called for a shift from capitalism and all neoliberal responses to the climate crisis 
because they promote a good life for others while worsening inequalities. The focus towards living 
well with less is a concession that capitalism is not able to solve environmental problems. The 
values of capitalism were to be abandoned in favour of values that respected nature-human 
metabolism that remained dialectical and constitutive. 
 
Yolandi Groenewald’s story “What’s God gotta do with it,” (City Press, 04 December 2011) 
described politicians as self-interested and environmentally irresponsible because they did not seek 
climate justice. The key discourse sponsor in the story was the Anglican Archbishop of Cape 
Town, Geoff Davies, who argued that the aspect of climate justice involved a metabolic 
relationship with nature. Davies was directly cited contending that the genesis of the human-nature 
relationship is to be found in the Bible where God “entrusted us with his creation and we must 
look after it”. For Davies, we (humans) had failed to look after God’s creation because of 




the talks in Durban were not moving correctly was because of selfish political interests held by 
nation-states. The selfishness was also the reason for the metabolic rupture between humans and 
nature. Key to note for Davies’ argument is that as a religious/Christian leader, he saw it as his 
responsibility to speak for justice because it is ‘morally right’. He assumed the position of a solitary 
voice of reason ‘crying in the wilderness’ against climate, social and economic injustice. The 
Interfaith Declaration supported Davies’ argument by noting that humans were “endangering life 
on Earth with unacceptably high and rising levels of greenhouse gas emissions”. The story also 
quoted Cardinal Wilfrid Napier (Roman Catholic Archbishop of Durban) arguing that the climate 
talks were being stalled by “greed and materialism”. Cardinal Oscar Rodriguez Maradiaga 
(president of Caritas Internationalis) argued that “Our economic system and its search for money 
above all have dehumanised human beings. Religious groups have a duty to humanise them again”. 
The actors in the story actively politicised climate change as a product of the exploitative capitalist 
system which puts profit above everything else. 
 
In this section, the study included a discourse analysis of the Interfaith Declaration on Climate 
change. The declaration delegitimised the capitalist system for “endangering life on Earth with 
dangerous levels of greenhouse gases”. Religious leaders appropriated upon themselves the need 
to revitalise the metabolic relationship between humans and nature. “Today our faiths stand united 
in their call to care for the Earth, and to protect the poor and the suffering.'' The call for climate 
change justice was coupled with the call for social and economic justice. The declaration 
constructed climate change as “a moral, spiritual and cultural” problem and that humanity should 
be taught “to live together within the shared limits of our planet”. The declaration correctly saw 
the environment as finite as opposed to the dominant belief that sees natural resources as infinite 
and open to endless exploitation.  
 
The planet, the declaration argued, is “shared” and expressed hope and optimism in “great 
opportunities” brought by climate change, i.e. “Mitigating climate change can stimulate economies 
sustainably, protect our planet, lift up the poor, and unite us to a common cause”. While the calls 
for climate justice in the declaration are laudable, the declaration sees hope in neoliberal green 




same economic system that the declaration demoralised. Implied is that carbon capitalism is bad 
but could be replaced by ‘green capitalism’. While calls for transforming the economic system are 
made, what becomes clear is that the declaration only hopes to replace one form of capitalism with 
another. The political economy of green capitalism is not debated but rather legitimised and 
naturalised. Green capitalism becomes a carbon copy of carbon capitalism. I argue here that 
capitalism that is symbiotic is unthinkable.  
 
In another Op-Ed in 2013 “Humanity’s long, slow suicide,” (Mail & Guardian, 06 June 2013) Jeff 
Rudin rejected Promethean responses to the global climate crisis. Rudin attempted to politicise 
climate change and demonstrate the agency of capitalism as the primary driver of climate change: 
“We know that our economic activity is the cause of the global warming fuelling climate change”. 
The green economy was constructed as a “fantasy … which is at best a wishful illusion and at 
worst a deceptive myth”. Capitalism was criticised for its agency in causing climate change “while 
at the same time creating the idea of a different, ‘green’ economy to provide the illusion that 
something is being done”. This article delegitimised the Promethean ideology of a green economy 
as ‘fiction’. This is important in shaping a discourse whose basis is the transformation of the 
political-economic system at the root of the climate crisis. Rudin’s views denaturalised and 
demoralised the dominant green economy rhetoric as deceptive and promoting the same system 
responsible for climate change. It rejected the fallacy of capitalism that is able to cure its ills and 
sees the green economy claims as another sign of capitalism’s self-mutative behaviour. “The green 
economy, whether by design or otherwise, serves to deflect attention from the main economy 
[capitalism]. In doing so the green economy becomes an integral part of the problem rather than a 
proposed solution ... we have electric cars and hybrid cars, but what is not said is that these ‘green’ 
cars reproduce all the far-from-green absurdities of the car industry”. 
 
Patrick Bond in 2014 argued that there was a systematic cutting of funding towards climate change 
projects at the Department of Environmental Affairs. These funding cuts, for Bond, were a signal 
of political capture of the Environmental Affairs Minister, Edna Molewa by interests in the 
minerals-energy complex: “She regularly bows to the durable power of the so-called minerals-




planned to feed Eskom’s Medupi and Kusile plants”. Bond chronicled the coal projects that were 
penciled across the country: 
Even more damage is likely 12km away if Ibutho Coal opens a similar mine on the historic 
park’s direct border - a hare-brained plan that government has already approved. Ibutho 
refuses to disclose its corporate sponsors but, of the six principals named in its application, 
half are tied to Glencore and BHP Billiton, the world’s largest commodity trader and 
mining house respectively. The crony capitalism dates to apartheid, when it boosted the 
salaries of finance minister Derek Keys and Eskom treasurer Mick Davies. This helps to 
explain why the Australian-British firm gets electricity at a fraction of the price paid by 
ordinary people. It consumes 6% to 10% of our national power load, and exports the profits 
while employing fewer than 1500 at the main Richards Bay smelters. The NDP [National 
Development Plan] supports carbon-intensive fracking in the Karoo and deepwater 
offshore oil exploration near Durban: ExxonMobil hankers for prospecting permission at 
depths of more than 3.5km, in spite of sharpening community opposition. Sasol and a 
Burmese company are also trying their luck nearby; Zuma endorsed this through his 
Operation Phakisa, announced in Durban early this year (Patrick Bond, “Climate change: 
The secrets of our collusion,” Mail & Guardian, 29 August 2014) 
Bond’s article was a response to a budget presentation by Molewa but more importantly a 
revelation or critique of South Africa’s contradictory talk right and act left climate change policy. 
 
Thabo Makgoba, Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, saw addressing climate change as 
everyone’s responsibility, “All of us have to take considered action,” especially upon the 
realisation that the multilateral system was not bringing solutions. There was a need for “dialogues 
and bring about local solutions to address our challenges” (Thabo Makgoba, “Let us all take care 
of our earth for future generations,” Sunday Independent, 08 June 2014). Makgoba argued that the 
relationship between humans and nature was that of interdependence: “It is essential that we care 
for the environment if we are to have a habitable planet in the future [and ….] To do this we must 
live in harmony with the planet”.  
 
Similar to Bond and Makgoba, Vishwas Satgar, an academic at the University of the 
Witwatersrand, politicised climate change and examined climate change as a result of not only 
human effects but the capitalist political economy. Satgar criticised capitalism for being behind 
the ecological rift crisis:  
capital … is the real geological force destroying planetary life …. Driven by the need to 
make short-term profits, capital, through its organisation of production, distribution, 




now threatens human beings with extinction by means of climate change …. Capital, in 
this context, has become a geological force capable of ending human and nonhuman life. 
It is wired into a systemic logic of ecocode and is incapable of solving the climate crisis... 
Capitalist modernity, with its mastery of science and technology, has convinced capital that 
it is the conqueror of nature as well as its master. As a master, it seeks to reduce nature to 
being a commodity, while ending an alternative conception of nature: nature as a commons. 
This commodifying illusion informs the market-based techno-fixes of capital, such as 
carbon trading, which operates with the idea of no limits to capital (Vishwas Satgar, “The 
climate is ripe for change,” Mail & Guardian, 17 December 2014). 
 
Thabo Makgoba, Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, in his Op-Ed “Don’t just sit back and watch 
our planet deteriorate,” (Sunday Independent, 28 June 2015) politicised climate change by noting 
that the consumption habits of capitalism were responsible for the ecological rift and that climate 
change impacts were felt more by the poor. Makgoba used the public idiom as a strategy of address. 
By using this strategy, he appealed to ‘everyone’ and his views are constructed so as to represent 
‘everyone’s interests’. Those outside of “every South African and citizen of the world” were 
effectively constructed as outsiders and villains. June 26, a climate change day, was a day for 
climate justice and a day where everyone took “action to change their consumption patterns and 
throwaway approach to life”. Makgoba, through indirect representation, brought in Pope Francis 
into the debate to moralise the climate justice ideology. It is possible that, though Makgoba is an 
Anglican Archbishop, the invocation of Pope Francis becomes an attempt to reach out, not only 
the Anglicans but Roman Catholics and all Christians. It was also an attempt to show that there 
was ideological unity regarding climate justice within the Christian faith communities. Makgoba’s 
message, therefore, was a call to action for all who are Christians and society at large because he 
addressed “every South African and citizen of the world”. His method of address attempted to 
speak from within, it was conversational and appealed to ‘all people’ who cared about climate 
change as he did. Makgoba constructed responsibility for action within the planes of people. 
Climate change was constructed as a problem of consumption, hence the call for “action to change 
their [people] consumption patterns”. The reference to consumption directly implicated the way 
of life (culture) behind consumption, i.e. capitalism. Critically, for Makgoba, climate justice was 
to be sought in the transformation of the culture behind consumption, the materialist capitalist 
mode of living. Thus, Makgoba’s article politicised climate change by blaming the very social 




appropriated in the story spoke of clergy who is making a moral call: “We all have a part to play 
as responsible and caring citizens if we are to find the solutions to this new environmental reality”. 
The language here suggested that two camps are imagined. Those taking action to address climate 
change for justice were “caring” and “responsible” and stand in contrast to those whose actions 
worsened the planetary plight. Makgoba constructed the relationship between humans and nature 
through emotional appeals. People should “care” for “our planet to survive”. This construction 
blends with Marx, Clarke, Foster and York’s metabolic theories. The relationship between nature 
and humans was to be that of symbiosis and dialectic, where nature was the ‘mother’ to humanity. 
The call for action was thus about restoring the metabolic and symbiotic relationship between 
nature and humans and at the same time choosing life over death. 
The bottom line is that climate change affects everyone, particularly the poorest and most 
vulnerable in our society. People’s food security, at the very heart of basic human needs, 
is influenced by our world’s changing climate. 
 
Therefore, saving the planet was also about saving people. This quote introduced the aspect of 
social justice into the climate change discourse, intimately tied to climate justice. Climate justice 
also brought social justice and the opposite is also true. To further build the discursive moral 
ground, Makgoba brought in the aspects of extreme weather that he argued “affect people’s ability 
to harvest and access food” noting that “climate-related disasters have the potential to destroy 
crops, tools, equipment and homes, exacerbating poverty and hunger”. These references helped to 
build a discourse that is based on human emotion, compassion and the duty to protect and save the 
planet. Interesting to note is that Thabo Makgoba extended his discourse on justice by making 
reference to internal South African social inequalities that worsened climate change effects for the 
poor: “South Africa’s most vulnerable people, living in informal settlements, are increasingly 
experiencing the devastating consequences of flooding and drought each time one these new and 
extreme weather conditions hits home”. Makgoba saw climate change as having unequal effects, 
noting that the impacts were unequally distributed according to social class and the ability to adapt. 
As a solution, Makgoba called for reduced and careful consumption, including “paying greater 
attention to our consumption of goods and services …. Eating less meat, and by choosing poultry 
over beef, for example, would reduce the amount of carbon dioxide created by the production of 




system of production. Less consumption meant less production and this had a direct knock-on 
effect on the profits made by capitalists. These radical changes were calls for even greater social 
transformation - addressing the root problems of industrial risk society. 
Satgar delegitimised the techno-optimistic discourses of the green economy promoted the ideology 
that sees climate change as a result of a risk culture based on accumulation and the treatment of 
nature as a commodity. The underlying theme is climate justice based on true sustainability that 
represents the metabolic symbiosis between nature and humans. Satgar offered a politicised 
discourse that defied and railed against the often-taken-for granted notions of the green economy 
and other market strategies that only help to perpetuate the expansionist and accumulative 
behaviour of capitalism. 
Sipho Kings, in this comment article (“Government silent about geoengineering the climate,” Mail 
& Guardian, 06 January 2017), saw geoengineering as creating more environmental risks: 
“Unwilling to do much to halt catastrophic global warming, governments have turned to 
geoengineering. This covers anything that changes weather patterns, helps to store carbon 
emissions, and stops the sun’s rays from coming through the atmosphere”. Governments, 
especially Canada was singled out and blamed for geoengineering activities that “tinker with the 
climate for their own gain.'' The article was pessimistic about the goodness of techno-interventions 
that involve geoengineering. Instead of reducing their emissions, governments were “unwilling to 
halt catastrophic global warming”. 
The feature story “Will Maputo weather the storm,” by Sipho Kings (Mail & Guardian, 24 
February 2017) critiqued the development of a port in Maputo, Mozambique. Kings saw the 
contradiction between Mozambique’s port expansion and the increase in coal export volumes and 
handling capacity and the climate change impacts already affecting the country. The expansion 
included the coal port which had “also grown and aims to export 20-million tonnes of coal a year 
by 2020”. The Mozambican government was represented as pursuing a self-interested and 
irresponsible project. “But the coal the port exports is both a short-term blessing and a curse” 
because the exports from “Maputo therefore help warm the planet”. The Mozambican government 
was constructed as uncaring and irresponsible. Pursuing development through expanding the coal 




negative effects of climate change were already severe: “Warming is already affecting 
Mozambique and threatens the port’s future …. Last week tropical cyclone Dineo killed seven 
people. Floods in 2009 covered Maputo’s low-lying business and port districts. Tropical cyclone 
Eline in 2001 destroyed the homes of 20 000 people in Maputo and killed about 1000 people and 
40 000 cattle across the country”. 
Despite all these casualties, the government of Mozambique still wanted to pursue a dirty and 
irresponsible developmental path. The calamities were highlighted to build and portray an image 
of the Mozambican government that is careless. The expansion of the port was demoralised as 
irresponsible. Instead of worrying about the environment, the government was interested in profit: 
“But development policy has hardly catered for the warnings of what will come with global 
warming”. To strengthen this discourse, the story directly represented Luis Artur from Eduardo 
Mondlane University arguing: “Authorities and churches avoid creating consciousness that climate 
change is human-induced and hence may be effectively countered by mitigation measures”. The 
newspaper discourse added that “This means a development path that favours elites through 
extractive industries and short-term economic gains”. Booby Peek from groundWork was cited 
strengthening the critique of the government. Peek argued that the developmental path chosen by 
Mozambique did not take note of climate change: “It’s madness and short-term thinking at its best. 
Especially when communities along the entire [Maputo] corridor will be so heavily affected by 
climate change. Rising seas and cyclones will batter the port that ships coal to nations cutting this 
form of energy”. 
Vishwas Satgar, in a 2018 Op-Ed published in the Mail & Guardian (Light a fire under SA’s 
climate policy,” 13 April 2018) saw South Africa as too self-interested and not willing to do what 
was right for the climate. The article discredited the claims on jobs and economic growth as 
hindrances to emissions reduction action: “We also cannot hide behind false dichotomies of jobs 
and development versus the environment”. For Vishwas, the government’s “inaction over global 
warming is increasing inequality in the country”. The article argued that global climate change 
affects the poor more. An example of Cape Town’s water crisis was used: “The poor and working-
class citizens of Cape Town have endured … climate injustice and, if this repeats itself, climate 




exceptional and includes President Donald Trump’s United States, Russia, China, India and other 
petro-states”. The drive coal and green economy discourses were criticised because they saved the 
interests of the few: “Essentially, ruling elites have chosen more carbon emissions and hence a 
climate-driven world with devastating consequences for the poor, working-class and 
marginalised”. Satgar dismissed the Paris Agreement as part of “symbolic gestures” that provide 
“too little, too late”. 
Irvin Jim, general secretary of the National Union of Metal Workers (Numsa) in South Africa 
wrote an article “IPPs fail test for ‘just transition’ from fossil fuel- NUMSA,” (City Press, 29 July 
2018) criticising the government’s plan to move to Independent Power Producers. The transition 
to IPPs, especially those in renewables, was constructed by Jim Irvin as an “unjust transition” and 
“signals the dangerous continued neoliberalisation of the productive sector, the increasing 
privatisation of public resources - resulting in mass unemployment - and the consolidation of elite 
rule over productive economic forces”. Jim’s article disagreed with the transition to IPPs because 
it continued along with the capitalist logic of profit and did not result in a ‘just transition’. By so 
doing, Jum took his article to the core of climate responses, noting that responses should not be 
rooted in the same economic system responsible for the current crisis. As such, any transition was 
to meet aspects of social justice, environmental justice and economic justice. Jim argued that the 
renewable energy sector was supposed to be  
socially owned where the community and workers are direct beneficiaries - they own and 
control it …. For NUMSA, a just transition means recognising the fundamental 
contradictions that face workers today. On the one hand, workers depend on the jobs 
created by the existence of the coal mine, but on the other hand, workers are also victims 
of the pollution produced by the mine. This is an expression of capitalist accumulation at 
its worst and it is at the heart of the climate change crisis. The IPPs are not confronting the 
very system that produces the need for renewable clean energy.  
 
There was a need for a transition that would transform and overturn the capitalist system and 
“completely change the basis of economic production, away from that which infinitely exploits 
humankind and the natural environment on the basis of infinite profit accumulation”. The 
ecological rift crises, for Jim, was because “natural resources” were  
decimated because capitalist dependence on greed and rampant profiteering, therefore any 
solution to climate change cannot be resolved separately from the resolution of the 




has been sold to the highest bidder ... it is naive to believe that corporations can solve the 
climate change crisis, which is why tackling climate change must involve the destruction 
of the capitalist system as the basis for any solution. 
 
10.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter had two sections. The first section articulated the green economy optimistic 
discourses as they traversed the South African weekly newspapers. The news media 
representations of climate change in South Africa, as part of the solutions narrative, often 
reproduced the ideas of techno-optimism where buzzwords such as ‘green economy’, ‘sustainable 
development’ and ‘green growth’ were used and reproduced as common-sense ideologies. In this 
section, the media constructions and representations of these discourses, that are Promethean in 
nature, are analysed and critiqued. The second section provided a dis(-)articulation of these 
discourses by bringing out the ‘small’ but important green economy disarticulating discourses. 
Most of the articles in the second section were in the form of Op-Eds from academics, 
environmental activists and the faith communities. These paradigms sought to re-articulate the 


















Chapter Eleven: Summary and Conclusions 
11.1 Introduction 
Considering the serious impacts exerted by climate change globally and in South Africa, the news 
media play a central role in climate change knowledge generation, contribute to climate change 
policy frameworks and help the public build perception and opinion on the subject. Throughout 
the thesis, the study argued that climate change has become one of the key threats to planetary and 
human existence. This thesis set out to (re-)articulate news media representations of climate 
change in South Africa (loosely translated across the thesis to also mean the global South). The 
selection of newspapers provided a sample made up of four weekly titles, each of which is owned 
by a different press conglomerate (the Mail & Guardian, the City Press, the Sunday Independent, 
and the Sunday Times). Furthermore, the four selected newspapers are distributed nationally and 
regionally. This study noted that mainstream newspapers in South Africa are the dominant 
providers of climate change information and hence sought to examine the way climate change 
issues in developing countries (Global South) are reported on and framed. The assumption was 
that the news content produced by the newspapers in question inform and will inform and influence 
the decisions of policy makers and opinion leaders both in South Africa and Southern Africa since 
these news outlets are distributed beyond South African borders into the wider region.  
 
The thesis examined how these mainstream news media in South Africa represent issues of climate 
change. This study focused on the representation of the global South in relation to climate change 
in South African mainstream newspapers. While a lot of climate change communication research 
has focused on the global North, few studies have focused on the representation of climate change 
by the South African media, regardless of their reach and power to influence public opinion in the 
global South. The South African media, because of its wider coverage in Southern Africa, has 
more influence on climate change perceptions and attitudes not only within South Africa itself, but 
throughout the Southern African region.  
 
The study argued that with the development of climate change coverage in the mainstream media, 
the debates and contestations on the subject have also increased and the mass media have become 




public” as what the media writes “influences public perceptions and thence policy” (Doulton and 
Brown, 2009, p.191). Pertinent to this study was how the news media in South Africa have 
accomplished these envisaged roles. This thesis has shown that climate change discourses, rather 
than being diverse and plural, are often and mostly a reserve for a few chosen discourse elites in 
government, industry, environmental non-governmental organisations and some academics. These 
clubs have steered the climate change discourse from 2011 to 2018 (period under analysis).  
 
The study was crucial to conduct because of a number of reasons. Firstly, scholars such Tanja 
Bosch (2012) and Mike Shanahan (2009) had observed that little research on media coverage of 
climate change was available in South Africa. There was a dearth in research on news media 
representations of climate change about the global South and from the global South. In that vein, 
this thesis becomes an important contribution to the body of knowledge on news media 
representations of climate change in the global South and from the global South. Secondly, while 
scholars had observed little research on the climate change profile in the news media in South 
Africa, they also observed that the few available studies were ‘coverage’ studies that focused on 
aspects of frequency of coverage and patterns. Critical studies embedded within critical 
interpretivist and constructivist paradigms were lacking. This study, therefore, became an 
intervention in this regard. The study, at ontological and epistemological levels, adopted 
interpretivist/constructivist approaches, with two key aims. The first aim was to provide a 
theoretical and methodological direction that located media representations of climate change 
within critical approaches that have, as their goals, to politicise the arena of climate change and 
the media and question the attendant political economy of climate change, a methodological goal 
often impossible to achieve within strictly systematic and procedural research paradigms. The 
second aim was to enable a more pronounced methodological approach that allowed for the 
explication and emergence of results from the data without the constraints imposed by systematic 
research paradigms. Within this second aim, the study managed to adapt environmental sociology 






The thesis noted that a (re-)articulation of media representations of climate change in South Africa 
demanded a full grasp of the problems that have been brought by the warming climate, the politics 
that are at play in terms of governance, attempts to address the problem, and the political economy 
of climate change globally and in South Africa. In line with this idea, the thesis examined and 
discussed the politicisation of the climate problem and the resultant political ideologies that have 
attempted to shape climate governance locally and internationally. The thesis focused further on 
the political economics and ecologies of climate change globally and in South Africa. The 
contradictions in climate governance in South Africa were discussed. Allusions were made to the 
need to simultaneously curb emissions and achieve economic development, the latter requiring (as 
per the government of South Africa policy narratives) a reliance on fossil fuels. The formal and 
informal networks that shape climate policy in South Africa were examined. 
 
In addition, this thesis has argued that the discourse on climate change is never value-neutral and 
is always characterised by ideological viewpoints of different discourse actors. While the global 
South countries pursued the path to development based on exploiting natural resources, it was vital 
to understand how the mainstream newspapers selected for this study strengthened such a 
developmental discourse built by the government and the corporate sector. This study concurred 
with Cohen (1963) that the media tend to follow the foreign policy positions of their countries and 
often consciously or subconsciously participate in legitimising ideological and policy positions of 
their countries. This study examined how the South African quality mainstream newspapers 
represented climate change discourses as they evolved and how they covered the policy positions 
taken by the South African government.  
The media is important in these debates because of their power to control discursive structures. 
The media selected for this study were also instrumental and had sheer capacity to define and 
determine the frames and representations within which climate change is to be articulated and 
understood in South Africa and outside. By legitimising the views of the South African 
government, the media at the same time contributed significantly to how climate change 
governance was shaped and implemented at an national and international levels. This is because 
of the country’s strong influence on the climate change international scene as it belongs to 




became prominent at the international stage. By so doing the media were instruments in 
naturalising particular viewpoints and make them appear natural. As noted above, international 
climate change arenas were always characterised by geopolitical divisions. The legitimation of 
South African and global South viewpoints on climate change mitigation, especially on emissions 
reduction served a political purpose of positioning the country as a key actor within the 
international community.  
At theory and methodology level, the thesis incorporated the metabolic rift/ecological rift theories 
as grand paradigms for theorising about climate change. The thesis alluded to the idea that the 
problems of climate change that the world is facing were not isolated from the social relations of 
our existence and argued that these problems were are intrinsically tied to the political economic 
system of capitalism. This study argued that global climate change and its attendant sub-problems 
were products of capitalist accumulation and material reproduction. These theoretical 
underpinnings were necessary in unpacking capitalism as an exploitative regime that has huge 
negative impacts not only on the exploited labour but on nature which it views as given gratis 
(freely) and thus valueless. It was the object of this study to situate the discursive analysis of 
climate change representation in the news media within these broad theoretical foundations to 
broaden the analytical field and account for whether the media representations themselves pay 
attention to these structural and existential issues of capitalist political economy and its attendant 
consequences on nature. As a way of argument, the study contended that the solutions put on the 
table to deal with climate change have been hugely neoliberal and shy away from the real questions 
of political economy and therefore prescribe solutions that extend and entrench the culture of self-
mutation that characterises capitalism.  
The thesis made two key observations regarding South Africa’s climate change policy and 
discourse arenas. Firstly, the climate change discourses in South Africa were seen to be intimately 
linked to energy discourses because the country was an energy-intensive economy, where coal 
represents the lifeblood of the entire economy. Climate change mitigation required that countries 
divest from coal and reduce emissions by all possible means. To imagine this in the South African 
context also forced one to imagine the complex energy scenarios and vested interests. Radical coal 
divestments meant that the country would have to sacrifice its coal mines and coal-fired power 




meant reduced profits for the mines and heavy energy consumers and it also meant changed power 
relations. Essentially, the future energy plans (energy futures) determined how South Africa would 
manage to reduce its emissions. This observation was important as it illuminated the difficult 
terrain that characterised the South African economy and how the country would manage to truly 
reduce its emissions without breaking particular relationships. All it meant was that coal interests 
remained powerful in determining the climate change policy arenas. The second observation was 
that as the country sought to move away from coal, at least ideally, there had been optimism in 
technological and renewable energy interventions. The techno-renewable energy optimism had 
become so naturalised, at least at discourse and not implementation level, with hopes that this 
would lead to a more ‘successful’ green economy.  
 
All these two observations also shaped out in how the news media in South Africa represented the 
climate change response policy frameworks. The representations were divided between coal 
indispensability and techno-renewable optimism leading to a green economy. All these divisions 
(discourse tribes) were firmly reproduced through the discursive strategies of economisation, coal 
for example, being represented as providing reliable electricity to power economic growth on the 
one side and renewable energy being constructed as energy of the 21st century providing clean 
energy solutions for economic growth under the green economy. All these discursive tribes, this 
study argued, promoted the capitalist interests of elite groups. Coal for the minerals-energy 
complex, and renewable energy for multinational renewable energy companies and their local 
proxies. None of the discourses proposed a shift away from capitalism. At this realisation, the 
study then invoked the metabolic and ecological rift theories, as a way of unpacking the 
embeddedness of capitalism in the climate change risk and ecological rift society. These 
frameworks moved away from neoliberal theories of economic modernisation, towards truly 
political projects of transformation informed by environmental sociology theories. 
 
The theoretical and methodological choices that were made in this study are very subjective and 
moved the study towards being a political project, one that was interested in capitalistic rupture 
and the ushering in of social, economic and climate justice. An argument was made for climate 




metabolism. Through the examination of media representations of climate change issues and more 
specifically the energy debates, it was observed that news media in South Africa promoted climate 
solutions that put the market ahead in the form of coal-based capitalism or techno-renewable 
energy-based capitalism. This thesis discussed the twin concepts of articulation and discourse 
analysis and their application in examining how the news media articulate, re-articulate and dis-
articulate climate change discourses in South Africa. The study laid a methodological foundation 
for the study of climate change representation in the news through articulation and discourse 
analysis. The theoretical and methodological frameworks advanced in this study showed the 
possibilities of these concepts and the advantages of such methodological and theoretical hybridity. 
Used together, the concepts were useful in analysing the neoliberal climate change discourses in 
the news. Hence, this study, with its focus on articulation and discourse analysis, detailed how the 
neoliberal climate change and environmental discourses were naturalised and legitimated through 
the news. Articulation and discourse analysis were useful tools and methods in deconstructing 
ideologies in the news, the role of language, the sponsors of such discourses and the power they 
hold in society.  
11.2 Results 
The thesis, through discourse analysis, together with articulation, the metabolic rift theories and 
ecological rift theories examined 290 stories selected from the four newspapers for emergent 
themes that came from the news stories examined. The key themes related to a) news media 
constructions of climate change impacts, b) news media representations of climate change politics, 
internationalisation and multilateral processes, c) news media representations of South African 
energy futures, d) news media representations of South African responses, especially carbon tax 
policies, e) news media reproduction of the green economy Promethean discourse and f) news 
media representations of climate justice. 
Climate impacts 
The news media constructed climate change as a key global challenge characterised by rising sea 
levels, rising temperatures and incessant extreme weather events (including droughts, flooding) 
etc. This thesis traced how the newspapers in South Africa  represented the climate change problem 




how the knowledges and discourses of the key actors resulted in a particular slant in coverage in 
the four newspapers analysed. While climate change was constructed as a reality, with real present 
and future ‘dangerous’ impacts and a consensus issue in the Mail & Guardian, the City Press and 
the Sunday Times gave space to sceptical actors and views that questioned climate change science. 
From the final sample that was analysed, there was no story from the Sunday Independent that had 
climate change impacts as a key theme. The Mail & Guardian, followed by the City Press gave 
extensive coverage to the climate change impacts theme, where the newspapers attempted to 
localise the climate problem and projecting it as both a present and future problem. Overall, climate 
change was represented through discursive devices of scientisation and depoliticisation. Science 
reports and experts gained discursive power in defining the climate change problem, science was 
represented as ‘unequivocal’ and ‘unquestionable’ and resultantly the solutions proposed by the 
scientists were to be followed. Further, through depoliticisation, climate change was portrayed in 
the media as an issue of the environment. The political economy and cultural politics of climate 
change were therefore not addressed, leading to solutions that sought to reproduce capitalism as a 
magic bullet for action through technological-managerial innovation.  
 
Climate change internationalisation and politics 
This study built a historical representational overview on how the South African news media 
represented climate change negotiations between 2011 and 2018. The negotiations were a major 
news feature in the news media coverage and representation of climate change. The negotiations 
were represented and constructed as a site of geopolitical contestation and struggle between the 
developed global North and the developing global South. The global North was predominantly 
constructed as a blockade and stalling the achievement of a globally binding climate change deal 
while developing global South was represented as a passive victim and this category even 
economies in transitions such as Brazil, China, India and South Africa are lumped into ‘poor’ 
countries in the south. The global North was ‘othered’ and given the responsibility to bear the cost 
of emissions reduction and adaptation because it was ‘historically responsible’. Interesting to note 
was that while ‘historical responsibility’ was emphasised, there was silence on ‘present 
responsibility’ which is more crucial and where South Africa is a key culprit. Geopolitics in the 




constructed as ‘victims’ whose agency in the climate problem was immaterial. The appeal towards 
the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) by the South African 
discourse actors, a move necessarily meant to moralise South Africa and hence its pursuit of coal 
and other fossils was reproduced by the press as legitimate if not moral. By this discursive effort, 
the discourse achieved delegitimisation of the calls towards another equally bad principle of ‘equal 
responsibilities’ touted by neoliberalists in the global North. South Africa’s high per capita global 
emissions thus were saved from scrutiny and exposure. The global South was represented as 
unequally related to the North in terms of emissions. This contradicted the fact that the BRICS 
countries were significantly contributing towards global warming through massive 
industrialisation, for example, South Africa, China, India and Russia. The agency of the North 
(which is represented as the ‘other’) was emphasised when it came to greenhouse gases emissions 
while at the same the activities of the South were passivised and nominalised through discourse. 
 
South African Energy Futures and Climate Change Mitigation 
This study observed that any understanding of climate change mitigation discourses in South 
Africa should involve a deeper appreciation of the minerals-energy complex. These interests hold 
a lot of influence on climate change decision-making and implementation and they determine the 
‘best’ practices in line with their vested interests. The South African energy futures terrain is a key 
feature of the news media representations of climate change and global warming. Future energy 
choices have a bearing on whether the country will be able to meet its obligations on emissions 
reductions and decarbonise its industry. Climate change discourses in South Africa are intertwined 
with energy discourses. Essentially, any climate mitigation action is linked to the country’s energy 
complex. The climate and energy discourses intersect, at some moments as allies and mostly as 
adversaries. Climate mitigation required a reduction in emissions, mostly from the energy industry 
and thus discursive and policy conflicts were inevitable. This study analysed the climate change 
mitigation debates as they permeated the South African news media, identifying the key discourses 
on mitigation and energy and linking discourses to the vested interests of the actors that promoted 
them. Discourses on coal indispensability, nuclear optimism and shale gas optimism were a 
preserve of the minerals-energy complex and the Department of Energy and that of Mineral 




strategies of moralisation and economisation to moralise the ‘need’ for South Africa to use coal 
because the country was still ‘developing’ and thus coal was necessary for economic growth and 
international trade competitiveness. The oxymoron of ‘clean coal’ was also promoted by these 
actors.  
 
The coal, nuclear and shale gas diffidence discourses were sponsored by actors from 
environmental non-governmental organisations and academics. In expressing opposition to coal 
and nuclear, these actors from non-government organisations and academics promoted the 
Promethean techno-renewable energy optimism leading to the green economy. At some moments, 
their discourses converged with the discourses from the government, especially the Department of 
Environmental Affairs, that sought to steer South Africa towards ‘renewable-energy’ green 
growth. The Promethean discourses construct climate change as a problem that can be fixed 
through technology, techno-managerial strategies and market-led initiatives.  
 
Mitigation Through Carbon Tax 
Climate change discourses in the news media were characterised by ideological and discourse 
contestations between the need to reduce internal carbon emissions and those actors who preferred 
a ‘do nothing’ approach. The government, through the Environmental Affairs Department and the 
Treasury Department, had policies in place to reduce the country’s emissions, mostly coming from 
the energy sector. These plans included setting up carbon budgets and implementing a carbon tax 
as instruments to encourage companies to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions through opting 
for renewable energy. The actors in the minerals-energy complex heavily resisted the introduction 
of a carbon budget and a carbon tax. This tax, they argued, would kill the industry and thus lead 
to massive unemployment. These actors used ‘bullying,’ ‘lobbying,’ and economic blackmail to 
try and discourage the government from implementing these instruments. This thesis rearticulated 
these discourses as they played out in the newspapers, examined whether the media took 
ideological positions that promoted and reproduced the interests of particular actors, especially 
those in the minerals-energy complex or reproduced the government discourse. Overall, this thesis 
provided a general critique of market instruments of carbon tax and the included elements of 




Green economy optimism versus climate justice 
The news media representations of climate change in South Africa, as part of the solutions 
narrative, often reproduced the ideas of techno-optimism where buzzwords such as ‘green 
economy’, ‘sustainable development’ and ‘green growth’ were used and reproduced as common-
sense ideologies. The media constructions and representations of these discourses, that are 
Promethean in nature, were analysed and critiqued. All the newspapers reproduced this optimism, 
leading to the manufacture of consent and a one-dimensional discourse that saw solutions to 
address climate change through the neoliberal market-led lenses. The green economy/Promethean 
discourses acquired a tendential force status by way of economisation: they were constructed as 
‘bringing jobs’, they were ‘clean’ and ‘safe’ etc. These discourse strategies enabled the neoliberal 
language to be exerted as a commonsense language. Techno-responses combined with market 
principles were seen as rational, normal and innovative because they balance economic growth 
with clean air. The agency of capitalism in the climate change crisis was concealed but it was 
greatly revealed in offering ‘rational’ solutions. Capitalism was indirectly referenced as the best 
ideological and material force to address the climate change problem. The Promethean discourses 
constructed climate change as a problem that could be fixed through technology, techno-
managerial strategies and market-led initiatives.  In addition, the study provided a re-articulation 
of climate justice discourses. Most of the articles on climate justice were in the form of Op-Eds 
from academics, environmental activists and the faith communities. This study argued that the 
news media largely failed to offer alternative ways of addressing climate change. The solutions 
that were reproduced in the news media followed the economic modernisation ideological 
paradigm and failed to account for theories and solutions that are found within environmental 













Amin, S. (1997). Samir Amin's 1997 Babu Memorial Lecture. [Accessed 10 October 2016] 
https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/first-babu-memorial-lecture-22-september-1997 
 
Anderson, A. (2009). Media, politics and climate change: Towards a new research 
agenda. Sociology Compass, 3(2), 166-182. 
 
Ashman, S., Fine, B., & Newman, S. (2010). The developmental state and post-liberation South 
Africa. In N. Misra-Dexter & J. February (Eds.), Testing democracy: Which way is South 
Africa going (pp.23-45). Cape Town: Idasa 
Aykut, S. C., Comby, J. B., & Guillemot, H. (2012). Climate change controversies in French 
mass media 1990–2010. Journalism Studies, 13(2), 157-174. 
Bauman, Z. (1991). A Sociological Theory of Postmodernity. Thesis Eleven, 29(1), 33–
46. https://doi.org/10.1177/072551369102900104  
Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Munich: Sage.  
Beck, U. (1996). Risk society and the Provident State. In L. Scott, B. Wynne & B. Szerszynski 
(Eds.), Risk, Environment and Modernity: Towards a New Ecology. London: Sage.  
Bennett, L. (1988). News: The Politics of illusion. New York and London: Longman 
Bennett, W. L. (1990). Toward a theory of press‐state relations in the United States. Journal of 
communication, 40(2), 103-127. 
Berman, B. J. (1984). The concept of “articulation” and the political economy of colonialism. 
Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue canadienne des études africaines, 18(2), 
407-414. 
Billett, S. (2010). Dividing climate change: global warming in the Indian mass media. Climatic 
change, 99(1-2), 1-16. 
Böhm, S., Misoczky, M. C., & Moog, S. (2012). Greening capitalism? A Marxist critique of carbon 
markets. Organization Studies, 33(11), 1617-1638. 
Bond, P. (2012). Politics of climate justice: Paralysis above, movement below. Durban: University 
of Kwa Zulu Natal Press. 
Bosch, T. (2012). Blogging and tweeting climate change in South Africa. Ecquid Novi: African 




Boumashoul, R. (2009). Re-articulating Information Society Discourse (s): A Cultural Studies 
Approach to Postcolonial Locale (s). Tampere University Press. 
Boykoff, M. T. (2007). Flogging a dead norm? Newspaper coverage of anthropogenic climate 
change in the United States and United Kingdom from 2003 to 2006. Area, 39(4), 470-481. 
Boykoff, M. T. (2007). From convergence to contention: United States mass media representations 
of anthropogenic climate change science. Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers, 32(4), 477-489. 
Boykoff, M. T. (2008). Lost in translation? United States television news coverage of 
anthropogenic climate change, 1995–2004. Climatic Change, 86(1-2), 1-11. 
Boykoff, M. T. (2008). The cultural politics of climate change discourse in UK tabloids. Political 
geography, 27(5), 549-569. 
Boykoff, M. T. (2009). We speak for the trees: Media reporting on the environment. Annual review 
of Environment and Resources, 34, 431-457. 
Boykoff, M. T. (2011). Who speaks for the climate? Making Sense of Media Reporting on Climate 
Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Boykoff, M. T., & Boykoff, J. M. (2004). Balance as bias: global warming and the US prestige 
press. Global environmental change, 14(2), 125-136. 
Boykoff, M. T., & Boykoff, J. M. (2007). Climate change and journalistic norms: A case-study of 
US mass-media coverage. Geoforum, 38(6), 1190-1204. 
Boykoff, M. T., & Mansfield, M. (2008). 'Ye Olde Hot Aire': reporting on human contributions 
to climate change in the UK tabloid press. Environmental Research Letters, 3(2), 024002 
Boykoff, M. T., & Yulsman, T. (2013). Political economy, media, and climate change: sinews of 
modern life. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 4(5), 359-371. 
Brundtland, G. H. (1987). The Brundtland Report, World Commission on Environment and 
Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cabello, J. (2009). The politics of the Clean Development Mechanism: Hiding capitalism under 
the green rug. In S. Böhm, & S. Dabhi (Eds.), Upsetting the Offset: The Political Economy 
of Carbon Markets (pp.192-202). London: MayFlyBooks. 
Carvalho, A. (2005). Representing the politics of the greenhouse effect:, Critical Discourse 





Carvalho, A. (2007). Ideological cultures and media discourses on scientific knowledge: re-
reading news on climate change. Public understanding of science, 16(2), 223-243. 
Carvalho, A. (2008). Media (ted) discourse and society: Rethinking the framework of critical 
discourse analysis. Journalism studies, 9(2), 161-177. 
Carvalho, A. (2010). Media (ted) discourses and climate change: a focus on political subjectivity 
and (dis) engagement. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 1(2), 172-179. 
 
Carvalho, A. (2018). Discourses for transformation? Climate change, power and pathways to the 
future.  Retrieved from  
http://repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt/bitstream/1822/55377/1/Carvalho_discourses_for_tra
nsformation.pdf  
Carvalho, A., & Burgess, J. (2005). Cultural circuits of climate change in UK broadsheet 
newspapers, 1985–2003. Risk Analysis: An International Journal, 25(6), 1457-1469. 
Chen, K. H. (1994). Positioning positions: a new internationalist localism of cultural 
studies. positions: East Asia Cultures Critique, 2(3), 680-710. 
Chen, K. H., & Morley, D. (1996). Stuart Hall: Critical dialogues in cultural studies (Eds.). 
Oxford: Routledge. 
Clark, B., & York, R. (2005). Carbon metabolism: Global capitalism, climate change, and the 
biospheric rift. Theory and society, 34(4), 391-428. 
 
Clark, B., & York, R. (2005). Dialectical materialism and nature: An alternative to economism 
and deep ecology. Organization & Environment, 18(3), 318-337. 
 
Clarke, J. (2008). Living with/in and without neo-liberalism. Focaal, 2008(51), 135-147. 
Clarke, J. (2015). Stuart Hall and the theory and practice of articulation, Discourse: Studies in 
the Cultural Politics of Education, 36:2, 275-286, DOI: 10.1080/01596306.2015.1013247 
Cohen, B. C. (1963). The Press and Foreign Policy. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 
Cottle, S. (1998). Ulrich Beck, Risk Society and the Media: A Catastrophic View? European 
Journal of Communication, 13(1), 5-32. 
Cramer, C. M. (2008). The framing of climate change in three daily newspapers in the Western 





Deacon, D., Pickering, M., Golding, P., & Murdock, G. (2007). Researching Communications: a 
practical guide to methods in media and cultural analysis (2nd ed.). London: Hodder 
Arnold.  
 
Department of Environmental Affairs [DEA]. (2017). South Africa’s Third National 
Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
Government of South Africa. Pretoria 
https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/reports/draftsouthafricas3rdnationalco
mmunication_unfccc2017.pdf 
Depledge, J. (2006). Closing the implementation gap. Environmental Policy and Law, 36(5), 199. 
Depledge, J. (2006). The opposite of learning: ossification in the climate change regime. Global 
environmental politics, 6(1), 1-22. 
Dispensa, M.J., & Brulle, R. J. (2003). Media’s social construction of environmental issues: focus 
on global warming–a comparative study. International Journal of sociology and social 
policy, 23(10), 74-105. 
Doulton, H., & Brown, K. (2009). Ten years to prevent catastrophe? Discourses of climate change 
and international development in the UK press. Global Environmental Change, 19(2), 191-
202. 
Dryzek, J. S. (1995). Democracy and environmental policy instruments. In R. Eckersley 
(Eds.), Markets, the State and the Environment (pp. 294-308). London: MacMillan Press. 
Dryzek, J. S. (1995). Political and ecological communication. Environmental Politics, 4(4), 13-
30. 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin (2010) Summary of the Cancun climate change conference: 29 
November - 11 December 2010: International Institute for Sustainable Development. 
 
Evans, H., & Musvipwa, R. (2017). The Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement and 
the Addis Agenda: Neo-liberalism, unequal development and the rise of a new 
imperialism. In T. Halvorsen, H. Ibsen, H. Evans & S. Penderis (Eds.), Knowledge for 
justice: Critical Perspectives from Southern African-Nordic Research Partnerships 
(pp.37-56). Cape Town: African Minds 
Fairclough, N. (1989). Language and power. London and New York: Longman. 
 
Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and social change. Cambridge: Polity press. 





Fairclough, N. (2003). Analysing discourse: Textual analysis for social research. New York: 
Psychology Press. 
Fine, B., & Rustomjee, Z. Z. R. (1996). The political economy of South Africa. Johannesburg: 
Witwatersrand University Press. 
Finlay, A. (2012). Systemic challenges to reporting complexity in journalism: HIV/Aids and 
climate change in Africa. Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies, 33(1), 15-25. 
Fischer, F., & Hajer, M. A. (1999). Living with nature: Environmental politics as cultural 
discourse (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Foster, J. B. (2000). Marx’s ecology: Materialism and nature. New York: NYU Press. 
 
Foster, J. B. (2010). The age of monopoly-finance capital. Monthly Review, 61(9), 1. 
 
Foster, J. B., York, R. and Clark B. (2010). The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on Earth. 
New York: Monthly Review Press. 
 
Foucault, M. (1971). Orders of discourse. Social Science Information, 10(2), 7–30.  
https://doi.org/10.1177/053901847101000201 
Fowler, R., Hodge, B., Kress, G., & Trew, T. (1979). Language and control. Routledge. 
Fowler, R. (1991). Language in The News: Discourse and Ideology in The Press. New York: 
Routledge. 
Friedrich, J., Ge, M., and Pickens, A. [World Resources Institute] (2017). This Interactive Chart 
Explains World’s Top 10 Emitters, and How They’ve Changed. 
https://www.wri.org/blog/2017/04/interactive-chart-explains-worlds-top-10-emitters-and-
how-theyve-changed [Accessed 20 June 2017] 
Gess, H. (2012). Climate change and the possibility of ‘slow journalism’. Ecquid novi: African 
journalism studies, 33(1), 54-65. 
Gilman, S. L. (1985). Black bodies, white bodies: Toward an iconography of female sexuality in 
late nineteenth-century art, medicine, and literature. Critical Inquiry, 12(1), 204-242. 
Goodman, L.B. (2014). Print Media: Influencing behavioural responses towards climate 
change? (Master’s dissertation, Johannesburg, University of the Witwatersrand). 
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the prison notebooks, Edited by: Hoare, Q. and Nowell‐




Grimes, P., & Kentor, J. (2003). Exporting the greenhouse: Foreign capital penetration and CO2 
Emissions: 1980 1996. Journal of World-Systems Research, 9(2), 261-275. 
 
Grossberg, L. (1992). We gotta get out of this place: Popular conservatism and postmodern 
culture. Routledge. 
Grossberg, L. (1996). On postmodernism and articulation: An interview with Stuart Hall. In D. 
Morley & K. Chen (Eds.), Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies (pp.131–
150). London: Routledge. 
Guattari, F. (2000). The Three Ecologies (P. Sutton, Trans.). London: Athlone. 
Habermas, J. (1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (T. Burger, Trans.). 
Cambridge: MIT Press 
Hajer, M. A. (1995). The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and 
the Policy Process. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Hall, S. (1980). Cultural studies: Two Paradigms. Media, Culture & Society, 2(1), 57–72. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/016344378000200106    
 
Hall, S. (1983). Thatcherism — Rolling Back the Welfare State. Thesis Eleven, 7(1), 6–19. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/072551368300700102  
Hall, S. (1985). Signification, representation, ideology: Althusser and the post-structuralist 
debates, Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 2 (2) 91-114 
DOI: 10.1080/15295038509360070    
Hall, S. (1986). Gramsci’s Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity. Journal of 
Communication Inquiry, 10(2), 5–27. https://doi.org/10.1177/019685998601000202   
Hall, S. (1986). The Problem of Ideology-Marxism without Guarantees. Journal of 
Communication Inquiry, 10(2), 28–44. https://doi.org/10.1177/019685998601000203 
Hall, S. (1992) ‘The West and the Rest’. In S. Hall & B. Gieben (Eds.), Formations of 
Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press/The Open University. 
Hall, S. (2006). The Rediscovery of ‘Ideology’: Return of the Repressed in Media Studies. In J. 
Storey (Eds.), Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader (3rd edition). Dorchester: 
Pearson Education Limited.  
 
Hall, S., & O'shea, A. (2013). Common-sense neoliberalism. Soundings, 55(55), 9-25. 
Hall, S., Clarke, J., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Roberts, B. (1978). Policing the Crisis: Mugging, 




Hallding, K., Jürisoo, M., Carson, M., & Atteridge, A. (2013). Rising powers: the evolving role of 
BASIC countries. Climate policy, 13(5), 608-631. 
Hallding, K., Olsson, M., Atteridge, A., Carson, M., Vihma, A., & Roman, M. (2011). Together 
alone: Brazil, South Africa, India, China (BASIC) and the climate change 
conundrum. Policy Brief (Stockholm Environment Institute, 2010).  
Halvorsen, T. (2017). The Sustainable Development Goals, knowledge production and the global 
struggle over values. In T. Halvorsen, H. Ibsen, H. Evans & S. Penderis 
(Eds.), Knowledge for Justice: Critical Perspectives from Southern African-Nordic 
Research Partnerships (pp.13-36). Cape Town: African Minds 
 
Heck, M. C. (1994). The ideological dimension of media messages: Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies. University of Birmingham 
 
Higgins, P. (2012). Eradicating ecocide. London: Shepheard Walwyn. 
 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] (Ed.). (2013). Climate Change 2013: The 
Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, 
M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 
pp. 
 
IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] (2014). 5th Assessment Report. Climate 
change 2014: Impacts, Adaption, and Vulnerability. 
 
IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change]  (2019). Climate Change and Land. [Accessed 
13 October 2019] https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2019/08/4.-
SPM_Approved_Microsite_FINAL.pdf 
 
Janks, H. (1997). Critical discourse analysis as a research tool. Discourse: studies in the cultural 
politics of education, 18(3), 329-342. 
Jensen, D. & McBay, A. (2009). What We Leave Behind. Seven Stories Press. New York: New 
York Press. 
 
Johannessen, J. (2013). Climate Change, Poverty and Climate Justice in South African Media: The 
Case of COP17. South African Journal on Human Rights, 29(1), 32-60. 
Jones, N. (2012). ‘Sexing up’ environmental issues: Exploring media eco-ethics, advocacy and 





Koteyko, N., & Atanasova, D. (2016). Discourse analysis in climate change communication. 
In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Climate Science. 
 
Kumi, E., Arhin, A. A., & Yeboah, T. (2014). Can post-2015 sustainable development goals 
survive neoliberalism? A critical examination of the sustainable development–
neoliberalism nexus in developing countries. Environment, development and 
sustainability, 16(3), 539-554. 
Laclau, E. (1977). Politics and ideology in Marxist theory. London: New Left. 
Louw, E. (2010). The Media and Political Process. London: Sage 
Mare, A. (2011). Climate change, Mediation and Mediatisation in Southern Africa: Towards 
climate and environmental journalism. AfrikaAdapt Symposium, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
9-11 March 2011 
 
Marx, K. (1963). Early writings. (T.B Bottomore, Eds). London: C. A. Watts. 
McChesney, R.W. (1999). Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious 
Times. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
McComas, K., & Shanahan, J. (1999). Telling stories about global climate change: Measuring the 
impact of narratives on issue cycles. Communication Research, 26(1), 30-57. 
McCright, A. M. (2007). Dealing with climate change contrarians. Creating a climate for 
change: Communicating climate change and facilitating social change, 200-212 
 
McDonald, D. A. (2012). Electric capitalism: Recolonising Africa on the power grid. Routledge. 
 
McManus, P. A. (2000). Beyond Kyoto? Media representation of an environmental 
issue. Australian Geographical Studies, 38(3), 306-319. 
Meiring, R. (2013). Framed: COP17 on South African television (Master’s dissertation, 
University of Cape Town). 
Min, S. J. (1997). Constructing Ideology. A Critical Linguistic Analysis. Studies in the 
Linguistic Science. 27(2), 147-165. 
Moore, J. W. (2011). Transcending the metabolic rift: a theory of crises in the capitalist world-
ecology. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 38(1), 1-46. 
 
Neuzil, M. and Kovarik, W. 1996. Mass Media & Environmental Conflict: America's Green 




Never, B. (2011). Who Drives Change. Comparing the Evolution of Domestic Climate 
Governance in India and South Africa. Hamburg (GIGA Working Papers, 174). 
Never, B. (2012). Who drives change? Comparing the evolution of domestic climate governance 
in India and South Africa. The Journal of Environment & Development, 21(3), 362-387. 
Newell, P., & Taylor, O. (2017). Contested landscapes: the global political economy of climate-
smart agriculture. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 45(1), 108-129. 
Ngwadla, X., & Rjamani, L. (2014). Operationalising an equity reference framework in the 
climate change regime – Legal and technical perspectives. Cape Town: Mitigation Action 
Plans & Scenarios (MAPS) 
Nhamo, G. (2011). South Africa in climate negotiations: Challenges from Copenhagen via Cancún 
to Durban 9/12. International Journal of African Renaissance Studies-Multi-, Inter-and 
Transdisciplinarity, 6(2), 5-35. 
Nosty, B. D. (2009). Moving toward communication solutions for sustainable innovation: 
building climate change in the media. Infoamérica: Iberoamerican Communication 
Review, (1), 91-115.  
Olausson, U. (2009). Global warming—global responsibility? Media frames of collective action 
and scientific certainty. Public understanding of science, 18(4), 421-436. 
Olausson, U. (2013). The Diversified Nature of" Domesticated" News Discourse: The Case of 
Climate Change in National News Media. In NordMedia 2013, 8th-11th August 2013, 
Oslo, Norway. 
Painter, J., & Gavin, N. T. (2016). Climate skepticism in British newspapers, 2007–
2011. Environmental Communication, 10(4), 432-452. 
Pauw, P., Brandi, C., Richerzhagen, C., Bauer, S., & Schmole, H. (2014). Different perspectives 
on differentiated responsibilities: a state-of-the-art review of the notion of common but 
differentiated responsibilities in international negotiations (No. 6/2014). Discussion 
Paper. 
Pepermans, Y., & Maeseele, P. (2018). Manufacturing Consent: Rereading News on Four 
Climate Summits (2000-2012). Science Communication, 40(5), 621-649. 
 
Pew Research Center  (2019). Climate Change Still Seen as the Top Global Threat, but 







Philo, G. (2007). Can discourse analysis successfully explain the content of media and 
journalistic practice?. Journalism studies, 8(2), 175-196. 
Rønning, H. & Kupe, T. (1999). The Dual Legacy of Democracy and Authoritarianism: the 
media and the state in Zimbabwe, In Curran, J. & Park, M. (Eds), De- Westernising 
Media Studies. London and New York: Routledge 
Rosa, E. A., & Dietz, T. (1998). Climate change and society: Speculation, construction and 
scientific investigation. International Sociology, 13(4), 421-455.  
 
Sachsman, D. (2000). The role of mass media in shaping perceptions and awareness of 
environmental issues. In Article présenté au Climate Change Communication 
Conference. 
Shanahan, M. (2009). Time to adapt? Media coverage of climate change in nonindustrialised 
countries. In Boyce, T., & Lewis, J. (Eds.). (2009). Climate Change and the Media. Bern, 
Switzerland: Peter Lang US.  Retrieved Oct 30, 2019, from 
https://www.peterlang.com/view/title/21066   
Shanahan, M. (2011). Why the media matters in a warming world: A guide for policymakers in 
the global South. Climate change media partnership Policy Brief. IIED, Internews & 
Panos. 
Shrestha, S., Burningham, K., & Grant, C. B. (2014). Constructions of climate change on the 
radio and in Nepalese lay focus groups. Environmental Communication, 8(2), 161-178. 
Shrubsole, G. (2015). All that is solid melts into air: climate change and neoliberalism. Soundings: 
A journal of politics and culture 59, 115-128. https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/590758. 
Slack, J. (1996). The theory and method of articulation in cultural studies. In D. Morley & K.-H. 
Chen (Eds.), Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies (pp. 112–127). London: 
Routledge. 
Slack, J. D. (2008). Resisting ecocultural studies. Cultural studies, 22(3-4), 477-497. 
Slack, J. D. (2016). Cultural Studies 1983. A Theoretical History. Duke University Press. 
Stoddart, M. C., & Tindall, D. B. (2015). Canadian news media and the cultural dynamics of 
multilevel climate governance. Environmental Politics, 24(3), 401-422. 
Stoddart, M. C., Ramos, H., & Tindall, D. B. (2015). Environmentalists' mediawork for jumbo 
pass and the Tobeatic wilderness, Canada: Combining text-centred and activist-centred 




Stoddart, M. C., Tindall, D. B., Smith, J., & Haluza-Delay, R. (2017). Media access and political 
efficacy in the eco-politics of climate change: Canadian national news and mediated 
policy networks. Environmental Communication, 11(3), 386-400. 
Summers, L. (1991). Internal memo. World Bank. December 12. 
 
Supran, G., & Oreskes, N. (2017). Assessing ExxonMobil’s climate change communications 
(1977–2014). Environmental Research Letters, 12(8), 084019. 
Sweezy, P. M. (2004). Capitalism and the Environment. Monthly Review, 56(5), 86. 
 
Tagbo, E. (2010). Media coverage of climate change in Africa: a case study of Nigeria and South 
Africa. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism & University of Oxford, London. 
Takahashi, B., & Meisner, M. (2012). Environmental discourses and discourse coalitions in the 
reconfiguration of Peru's environmental governance. Environmental Communication: A 
Journal of Nature and Culture, 6(3), 346-364. 
Thussu, D. K. (Ed.). (2010). International communication: A reader. London: Routledge. 
Tong, J. (2014). Environmental risks in newspaper coverage: A framing analysis of investigative 
reports on environmental problems in 10 Chinese newspapers. Environmental 
Communication, 8(3), 345-367. 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development [UNCED] (1992). Earth Summit. 
Rio de Janeiro: UN 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf  
United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]. (2010). Human Development Report: The 
Real Wealth of Nations, New York: Palgrave Macmillan for the UNDP. 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/270/hdr_2010_en_complete_reprint.pdf  
 






van Dijk, T. A. (1983). Discourse analysis: Its development and application to the structure of 




van Dijk, T.A. (1985). Structures of News in the Press. In T.A. van Dijk (Eds.), Discourse and 
Communication. New Approaches to the Analysis of Mass Media Discourse and 
Communication (pp. 69–93). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter 
van Dijk, T. A. (1988). News analysis. Case Studies of International and National News in the 
Press. New Jersey: Lawrence. 
Van Dijk, Teun A. 1988. News as Discourse. Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum. 
van Dijk, T. (1998). Ideology; A Multidisciplinary Approach. London: Sage Publication 
van Dijk, T. A. (1989a). Mediating racism: The role of the media in the reproduction of racism. 
Language, power and ideology: Studies in political discourse, 199-226 
 
van Dijk, T. A. (1993). Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis. Discourse & Society, 4(2), 
249–283. https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926593004002006 
van Dijk, T. A. (1995). Discourse Semantics and Ideology. Discourse & Society, 6(2), 243–
289. https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926595006002006 
van Dijk, T. A. (2008). Discourse and power. Macmillan International Higher Education. 
van Ginneken, J. (1998). Understanding global news: A critical introduction: Sage. 
Wasserman, H. (2012) The challenge of climate change for journalism in Africa. Ecquid Novi: 
African Journalism Studies, 33(1), 1-2. 
Weston, D. E. (2012). The political economy of global warming (Doctoral dissertation, Curtin 
University). 
Williams, R. (1980). Culture and Materialism: Selected Essays. London: Verso. 
Wodak, R. (2001). Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Sage Publication. 
Wodak, R., & Van Leeuwen, T. (1999). Legitimizing Immigration Control: A discourse-
historical analysis. Discourse Studies, 1(1), 83-119. 
World Economic Forum (2019). The Global Risks Report 2019. [Accessed 19 June 2019]. 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_Report_2019.pdf 
 
Yamin, F., & Depledge, J. (2004). The international climate change regime: a guide to rules, 
institutions and procedures. Cambridge University Press. 
Zhang, Y. X., Chao, Q. C., Zheng, Q. H., & Huang, L. (2017). The withdrawal of the US from the 
Paris Agreement and its impact on global climate change governance. Advances in Climate 
Change Research, 8(4), 213-21 
